ML17251A390
| ML17251A390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1988 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17251A388 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-88-22, NUDOCS 8812150080 | |
| Download: ML17251A390 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1988022
Text
U.S'.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report
No.
50-244/88-22
Licensee
No.
Priority
Category
C
Licensee:
Rochester
Gas
and Electric Corporation
49 East Avenue
Rochester,
Facility
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear
Power Plant
Location:
Ontario,
Inspection
Conducted:
October
17 through
November 20,
1988
Inspectors:
Approved by:
C.
S. Marschall,
Senior Resident
Inspector,
Ginna
N.
S. Perry,
Resident. Inspector,
Ginna
t
C.
.
ow
Chief, Reactor
Projects
Section
1A
Date
~Summar
A~Id. II
I <<I
A
Id
ties including plant operations,
operational
safety verification, surveillance
testing,
maintenance,
radiological protection,
physical security, written reports,
periodic and.special
reports,
action
on previous inspection findings, loss of
security surveillance capability,
housekeeping,
equality
Assurance
program imple-
mentation,
intra-company
communications,
licensee
control of modifications,
con-
tainment temperature
profiles,
and surveillance activity review.
d
Results:
Two violations were identified;
one concerning failure to perform safety
evaluations
as required
3) and another concerning failure
'o
maintain
a radiation area
locked (section 2.e).
An additional
example of fail-
ure to adhere
to procedures
is discussed
(section 2.c).
Discovery of an inatten-
tive guard by the, Senior Resident
Inspector is discussed
(section 2.f).
Two pre-
viously identified inspector followup items were closed (se'ction 5).
Licensee fai lu're to perform safety evaluations
has
been
an
NRC identified concern
for more than twenty months,
and is indicative of a programmatic
weakness
in the
control of station modifications.
The additional
example of procedural
nonadher-
ence indicates
a licensee inability to take effective immediate corrective'action
for a previously identified deficiency; other examples
were contained
in inspection
reports 50-244/88-05,
88-15,
88-16 (multiple examples)
and 88-19.
'Appropriate
and
timely.action by an operator
prevented
a plant transient,
and is indicative of safe
and effective control of plant operation.
Several
minor weaknesses
related to
personnel
safety were identified during
a maintenance'ctivity
which was, overall,
carefully controlled.
Efforts to improve plant cleanliness
culminated in opening
the Auxilliary Building to access
in street clothing and construction for a con-
taminated
storage building, intended to allow further improvement in plant clean-
liness,
began
on November 7,
1988.
~,-.i2 i 500<0 88i207
ADOCK 05000244
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
During this inspection period,
inspectors
held discussions
with and inter-
viewed operators,
technicians,
engineers
and supervisory
level personnel.
The following people
were
among those contacted:
"S. T. Adams,
Technical
Manager
J. C..Bodine,
Nuclear Assurance
Manager
~R.
A'. Carroll, Training Manager
"E.
C. Edgar,
Manager of Planning
and Scheduling
D.
L. Filkins, Manager of HP
8 Chemistry
- R. A. Marchionda, Director of Outage
Planning
'T. A. Marlow, Superintendent,
Support Services
"J.
T. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator
"R.
C. Mecredy,
General
Manager,
Nuclear Production
- A. G. Morris, Maintenance
Manager
"T. R.. Schuler,
Operations
Manager
L.
F. Smith, Operations
Supervisor
"S.
M. Spector,
Superintendent,
Ginna Station
J.
A. Widay, Superintendent,
Ginna Production
- R.
E.
Wood, Superv'isor,
Nuclear Security
'Denotes
persons
present at exit meeting
on November 28,
1988.
2.
Functional
or Pro
ram Areas Ins ected
Review of Plant
0 erations
(71707)
The plant operated at full power throughout the inspection period.
On
November 4,
1988
a. worker's outer clothing accidentally caught
on the
Cable Tunnel fire system's
manual pull station.
Several
thousand
gal'lons
of firewater was sprayed into the area resulting in a ground
on
a non-
safeguards
480 volt bus.
The control
room received the fire alarm, but
fire brigade
members
were unable to verify no fire existed within ten
minutes,
therefore
an Unusual
Event was declared.
The Unusual
Event was
terminated
twelve minutes later when it was determined
no fire existed.
On November
11,
1988 Flow Instrument (FI) 465,
sensing
steam flow in the
"A" Steam Generator,
failed high.
A Steam
Flow/Feedwater
Flow mismatch
was created
since
FI 465 was the controlling steam flow channel
at the
time.
The operator
immediately placed
control in manual,
pre-
venting
a plant transient;
he selected
the alternate
channel
of flow
indication for th'e 'A'team Generator,
and restored
feedwater control
to automatic.
Early on November
15,
1988,
an electrical fire in onsite security equip-
ment caused
a. temporary loss of security surveillance capabilities
(see
section 2.i and Inspection
Report 50-244/88-24).
Later on November
15,
1988,
the Senior Resident
Inspector
discovered
a
guard inattentive to duty at an observation
post (see
section 2.f).
0 erational
Safet
Verification (71707)
On
a daily basis,
inspectors
observed shift turnover
and conduct of
operations
in the control
room.
Proper c'ontrol
room staffing was main-
tained
and control
room access
was controlled.
Operators
were attentive,
responsive
to plant parameters
and conditions,
and adhered
to approved
procedures'for
ongoing activities.
Control
room log books were reviewed
to obtain information concerning activities and out-of-service
equipment
and use of overtime
was audited for compliance with licensee
and regula-
tory requirements.
On
a weekly basis,
the inspectors
checked
an Engineered
Safety
Feature
System train for operability.
The following were verified: accessible
valves in the flow path in proper position; proper
power supply and
breaker alignment,
and appropriate
MOVs deenergized.
Additionally,
trains were inspected for leakage,
lubrication, cooling and general
con-
dition.
The inspectors
regularly toured all accessible
areas
of the plant and
observed
general
conditions of,the plant and equipment, potential'fire
hazards,
control of activities in progress,
control of housekeeping
and
the presence
of potential missile hazards.
Biweekly the inspectors
reviewed the sampling program,
the problem iden-
tification systems,
and
one safety-related
tagout for proper implementa-
tion.
In addition, the inspectors verified correct lineup of a portion
of, the containment isolation
system
and proper posting of required
notices.
No conditions adverse
to safety were identified.
Monthl
Surveillance Observation
(61726)
Inspectors
observed portions of surveillance test procedures
to verify
test instrumentation
was properly calibrated,
approved
procedures
were
used,
work was performed
by qualified personnel.,
Limiting Conditions for
Operation
were met,
and the system
was correctly restored
following
testing.
The following surveillance activity was observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-2.7,
Revision 42, "Service Water System", effec-
tive date
September
12,
1988,
observed
November 3,
1988.
During performance of PT-2.7,
the inspectors
observed
Results
and Test
- personnel
had unlocked valves to be manipulated during the surve'illance
at the start of the procedure;
the procedure
does not provide guidance
for locking or unlocking the valves.
In the body of the procedure
the
Results
and Test personnel
are required to sign
a step
as completed which
verifies certain valves are locked.
Since the valves were unlocked near
the beginning of the procedure,
the personnel
incorrectly signed the step
with the valves unlocked.
The inspectors
brought this to the attention
of department
and plant management.
Department
management
has already
addressed
the problem by meeting with Results
and Test personnel
and
discussing
the unacceptable
practice of. unlocking the valves at the be-
ginning of a procedure.
Additionally, procedures will be changed
to
describe specifically when to unlock and lock valves.
Licensee control of this surveillance activity was considered
adequate
to insure operability.
Monthl
Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
The. inspectors
observed
portions of various safety-related
maintenance
activities to determine
redundant
components
were operable, activities
did not violate Limiting Conditions for Operation,
required administra-
tive approvals
and tagouts
were obtained prior to initiating work, ap-
proved procedures
were
used or the activity was within the "skills of
the trade",. appropriate
radiological controls were implemented,
igni-
tion/fire prevention controls were properly implemented,
and equipment
was properly tested prior to 'returning it'o service.
Maintenance
(M)-38. 1 "Repair or Replacement
for W-2 switch
1B, Boric
Acid Transfer
Pump" revision 7, effective date August 12,
1988,
observed
November 9,.1988.
Overall,
removal
and replacement
of the'witch was
a carefully controlled
process.
However,
several
minor weaknesses
were observed during the
process'se
of "N/A" for procedure
signoff was inconsistent
in completing the
procedure.
Step 3.4 which requires
a Special
Work Permit
be obtained,
if required,
was marked "N/A" without specific guidance to do so.
Step
5.6,. restoration of wires
on the
new switch provides this step
be marked
"N/A" if the previous
step to remove the wires was not performed;
Main-
tenance
management
indicated
use of "N/A" was considered
acceptable
for
any procedure
step containing the words "if" or "or".
Review of main-
tenance
procedures
revealed
several
steps
containing the words "if" or
"or" where the*use of "N/A" was not intended
by the licensee.
Use of
"N/A" without providing the specific circumstances
which allow its use
fosters interpretation of procedures
by the
end users;
as
a result,
con-
trol of the maintenance activity is not assured.
The use of "N/A" with-
out specific guidance is considered
a weakness
in the licensee's
control
of safety-related
maintenance.
Removal of the control switch was accomplished
without checking switch
terminals for'oltage.
Although the .electricians
wore leather gloves
when possible,
removal
and restoration of the wires terminated
on the
switch was accomplished without a glove due to the nature of the work.
The switch was tagged out as required
by procedure;
however
a recent
instance of electricians at Ginna beginning work on the wrong ventilation
motor illustrates
the benefit of insuring
no voltage is present prior
to commencing work on electrical
equipment.
The inspectors
were sur-
prised to learn that senior station
management
and
some electricians
were
unaware of work on the wrong ventilation motor, which involved 480 volt
equipment
and the potential for loss of life.
The inspectors will moni-
tor licensee efforts to improve timeliness of dissemination
of informa-
tion important to safety.
guality Control
(gC) signoffs were not used consistently
in the procedure.
A gC signoff was
used to insure all wires
on the switch were properly
labelled prior to removal.
However,
no gC signoff was evident to verify
wires were placed
on the proper terminals during restoration.
The
gC
inspector
and the electrician performing the'aintenance
noted the
need
for the signoff; the electrician .stated his intent to submit
a procedure
change
to incorporate
gC verification of wire restoration.
Licensee control of these activities was adequate
to ensure
component
operability.
h
Radiolo ical Protection
Review (71707)
During this inspection period,
the resident
inspectors periodically
verified
RWPs were
implemented properly, dosimetry
was correctly worn
in controlled areas
and dosimeter
readings
were accurately
recorded,
access
control, at entrances
.was adequate,
per-
sonnel
used contamination
monitors
as required
when exiting controlled
areas,
and postings
and labeling were in compliance with regulations
and
procedures.
During
a tour of the Auxiliary Building basement
on November 9,
1988,
the inspectors
discovered
the gate barricading the area
behind the Re-
fueling Water Storage
Tank
(RWST) unlocked.
A survey dated October-4,
1988- indicated radiation levels less
than
500 mrem/hr. general
area
and
smearable
contamination
less
than
1400 dpm/100
sq
cm.
Administrative
procedure A-l.1,
Locked Radiation Areas, revision
19, effective March
'5,
1988,
step 3.4.6 requires
each
locked high radiation wi 11
be locked
to prevent unauthorized
entry except while individuals are inside .or
surveillance is maintained at the gate.
At the time of discovery,
the
gate
had been
unlocked for approximately twenty-four hours.
This is apparently
an isolated
instance;
the inspectors routinely verify
barricades
are locked as
a part of plant tours
and
have not previously
"identified an unlocked b'arricade during this
SAL'P period.. Upon noti-
fication, the licensee
immediately surveyed'the
area
found unlocked,
8
confirmed the area*was
not actually
a high radiation
and locked the bar-
ricade.
The licensee
also determined
the door was not intentionally left
unlocked.
Initial corrective actions
planned
included frequent
checks
of high locked radiation area
doors to insure
none are unlocked, adjust-
ment or replacement
of springs
and general
inspection of the door found
unlocked.
Long term corrective actions
planned include
a feasibility
study for installation of local alarming devices
and general
inspection
of all locked high radiation doors.
As described
in
10 CFR 2, Appendix C, section V.A., as
amended
on October
14,
1988,
no Notice Of Violation (NOV) will be issued for this violation
since it is considered
an isolated
instance,
corrective action
has
been
initiated,
and the violation has minor safety or environmental signific-
ance.
Accordingly,
a formal response
to this violation is not required.
NO VIOLATION (50-244/88"22-01).
Ph sical Securit
Review (71707)
During this inspection period,
the resident
inspectors verified x-ray
machines
and metal
and explosive detectors
were 'operational,
Protected
Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) barriers
were well maintained,
access
con-
trol during security turnover was adequate,
personnel
were properly
badged for unescorted
or escorted
access
and compensatory
measures
were
implemented
when necessary.
During an inspection of the inside p'erimeter
fence
on November
15,
1988,
a guard in an observation
post
was observed
leaning against
the wall
while seated.
He remained motionless
as the inspectors
walked across
the guard's field of vision and tried to attract the guard's attention
by waving at him.
As the inspectors
approached
the post,
the guard was
coincidently interrogated
by radio,
and began.to
move about
as
he re-
sponded
to the radio.
When licensee
management
was notified of the in-
cident,
the guard
was immediately relieved of his post
and
an investiga-
tion was initiated.
The inspector determined that the post was
a security program
enhancement
and not a compensatory
measure for inoperable
equipment.
Corrective action,
including disciplinary measures
and retraining of the
guard,
were timely and appropriate.
Review of Written
Re orts of Nonroutine Events
(90712)
Written reports
submitted to the
NRC were reviewed to determine
whether
details
were clearly reported,
causes
properly identified and corrective
actions appropriate.
The inspectors
also determined
whether
assessment
of potential
safety consequences
had been properly evaluated,
g'eneric
implications were indicated,
events
warranted onsite follow-up, reporting
requirements
of 10 CFR 50.72 were applicable,
and requirements
of 10 CFR 50.73
had been properly met.
The. following L'ER was reviewed
and found to be satisfactory
(Note: date
indicated is event date):
88-009,
September
30,
1988,
"Inadequate
Fire Barrier Inspection
Procedure Identified Only Through Breaches
Causing Partial
Breaches
To Go Undetected".
No unacceptable
conditions were identified.
Review of Periodic
and
S ecial
Re orts (90713)
Upon receipt, periodic
and special
reports
submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed
by
. the inspectors.
This review included the following considerations:
re-
ports contained
information required
by the
NRC; test results
and/or
supporting
information were consistent
with design predictions
and per-
formance specifications
and reported
information was valid.- Within this
scope,
the following report was reviewed
by the inspectors:
Monthly Operating
Report for October
1988.
The report
was considered
adequate
to meet regulatory requirements,
Loss of Onsite Securit
Surveillance
Ca abilit
(71707)
On November
15,
1988 at 3:54 A.M., operators
received
an alarm indicating
loss of security Uninterruptible
Power Supply.
A guard, called to re-
spond to the alarm,
reported
heavy
smoke
from security electrical
equip-
ment.
Station Fire Brigade personnel
responded
at 3:56 A.M. and secured
electrical
power to security switchgear,
extinguishing the fire at 4:04
A.M.
Removing power from security switchgear
also caused
loss of all
onsite security surveillance
functions; the security shift supervisor
immediately stationeg
guards
to provide compensatory
measures
for loss
of surveillance capability and called the day shift in early as
a con-,
tingency measure.
Alternate
power was restored
to security electrical
equipment
and compensatory
security measures
were terminated at 5:31 A.M.
\\
Follow-up by the licensee,
vender representative,
and
NRC revealed
the
fire detection
system for the area
was poorly designed.
Although the
licensee will correct the design deficiency it was pointed out that the
licensee relies
on fire brigade
members to manually actuate
the
system
if required.
Auxiliary operators
and security guards
make
up the fire
brigade;
questioning
by the resident
inspectors
revealed
operators
and
guards
received
adequate
training
on manually actuating fire systems.
Licensee
actions during the event were adequate,
appropriate
and per-
formed within a reasonable
amount of time.
~Hk
(7
7 7)
Major portions of the Auxiliary,and Intermediate
Buildings were opened
to access
in street clothes
on October 31,
1988.
All floor areas,
walls
and equipment
from the floor to 8 feet above the floor are clean unless
otherwise
posted.
Additionally, floors and walls are being painted
and
the licensee
is evaluating lighting in various areas
for potential
im-
,provements.
A new Auxiliary Building addition is currently under construction just
south of the Auxiliary Building.
Construction
began
on November 7,
1988
and turnover to the licensee
is targeted for March 1,
1989.
The addition
will be
used
as
a contaminated
storage building where contaminated
tools,
equipment
and
shutdown
staging will be stored.
The residents will monitor construction
progress
and
use .of the
new
storage building in addition to the effect of opening
the Auxiliary and
Intermediate
Buildings on activities and
management
tours in future in-
spection reports.
ualit
Assurance
Pro
ram
Im lementation
(71707)
On November
9,
1988,
a guality Control
(QC) inspector
was monitored while
conducting surveillance of electricians
replacing
a control. switch for
the 'A'oric Acid Transfer
Pump (see
section 2.d).
At the conclusion
of the maintenance activity, the
gC inspector discussed
his observations
with the= electricians
performing the activity.
Significant obs'ervations
included lack of a
gC signoff in the procedure
to insure wires removed
were restored
to the correct terminals
and failure of the electricians
to check the switch for voltage prior to beginning work.
The
gC surveillance
was adequate
to assure quality of the maintenance
activity.
Intra-com
an
Communications
On October
31,
1988,
the licensee
began
use of a unique method to com-
municate important information to all plant employees.
The system uti-
lizes
a combination of 6 closed-circuit monitors located throughout the
plant,
a personal
computer
and high quality computer-generated
graphics.
The
new system will inform employees of cur rent work activities, assign-
ments, training, safety,
regulations
and other miscellaneous
information.
Any employee
can submit material for use
on the system;
however,
the
plant manager or either plant superintendent
must give final approval
before material is used.
The system is updated
several
times during the
day to keep information current.
The inspectors will periodically moni-
tor the system's
effectiveness
to communicate
messages
efficiently and
accurately
to station personnel.
Licensee
Control of Modifications (71707)
A history of licensee
weakness
in the area of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews
has
been
documented
in inspection reports
over
a period of more than
20 months;
a
Notice of Violation (NOV) contained in Inspection
Report 50-244/87-04
docu-
mented failure to perform
a
10 CFR 50.59 review of lead shielding;
inadequate
10 CFR 50.59 reviews were discussed
at the exit meeting for Inspection
Report
50-244/87-23;
an unresolved
item in Inspection
Report 50-244/88-08
documented
lack of reviews to meet the requirements
in 10 CFR 50.59;
Inspection
Report
50-244/88-15
documented
licensee failure to perform reviews of modifications
to the Condensate
Storage
Tanks
(CST) and Spent
Fuel
Pool
(SFP)
as required.
by 10 CFR 50.59;
and
an update of open
item 50-244/88-08-01
in Inspection
Re-
port 50-244/88-19
documented
licensee efforts to meet the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.59 were,
as yet, incomplete.
During 'this inspection period the inspectors
reviewed licensee
documents
in
response
to the
CST safety concerns
raised in Inspection
50-244/88-15,
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, section III requires,
in part,
measures
shall
be estab-
lished to assure
appropriate quality .standards
are specified
and included in
,design
documents,
and deviations
from such standards
are controlled.
The
guality Assurance
Manual
Ginna Station,
section
3. step 3. 1.3 requires
modi-
fications involving a change
to the facility as described
in the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) have
a safety evaluation
in accordance
with
10 CFR 50.59 requires,
in part, the licensee
shall maintain
records of changes
in the facility as described
in the safety analysis report
and of changes
in procedures
as described
in the safety analysis report,
and
these
records
shall include
a written safety evaluation
which provides the
bases for determination that the change
does
not involve an unreviewed safety
question.
Licensee
records for the addition of local level indication to the
'ST
were inadequate
because
they did not provide the bases for concluding:
(i) the probability of occurrence
or the consequences
of an accident or mal-
function of equipment
important to safety previously evaluated
in 'the
will not be increased;
or (ii) the possibility for
an accident or malfunction
of a different type than
any evaluated
previously in the
UFSAR will not be
created;
or (iii') the margin of safety
as defined in the basis for any tech-
nical specification will not be reduced.
Moreover, the technical
evaluation
did not state
these
conclusions
had bqen reached.
Nonetheles's,
on October
4, 1988, modifications were
made to the
CST to provide tank level indication
utilizing-tygon tubing.
This is
a violation (VIO 50-244/88-22-02).
A licensee
document dated October 25,
1988,
"Design and Modification Guide-
lines for the Condensate
Storage
Tanks (CST)" classifies
the
as "safety-
related
non Seismic Category I" equipment.
The document also states: "It is
apparent that good commercial-grade
engineering
practices
should
be used for
activities which could affect the tanks.'he
attachments
to the tanks,
such
as copper tubing, commercial quality valves,
and tygon hose (to fulfill a
specific Appendix
R function) are considered
acceptable,
as standard
commer-
cial practice."
The document further states:
"Additions of attachments
do
have to be evaluated
to ensure
no adverse effect would occur
on the ability
of the
CSTs to meet regulatory commitments."
10
Although the licensee is apparently
aware of the importance of the
CSTs to
safety,
as the main source of water for the Auxiliary Feedwater
system,
(UFSAR,
section
10.5.2)
~
Service Mater,
a seismically qualified safety-related
source
of water,
can
be used to supply the Auxiliary Feedwater
system only after
a
normally locked closed
manual
valve and
a normally closed motor operated
valve
are
opened.
The
UFSAR states,
in part,
system is an
Engineered
Safety Feature
because it provides
a secondary
heat sink for resi-
dual heat removal; it therefore provides core protection
and prevention of
reactor coolant release
through the pressurizer relief valves.
Licensee re-
view does not address
whether
use of good commercial-grade
engineering
prac-
tices meets
the requirements
of General
Design Criterion
(GOC) 34
Residual
Heat Removal,
which states,
in part, suitable
redundancy
in components
and
features,
and suitable interconnections,
leak detection,'nd
isolation cap-
abilities shall
be provided to assure
the system,,safety
function can
be ac-
complished,
assuming
a single failure.
Technical
evaluation for installation
of tygon tubing,
and installation of copper piping to provide water for the
station
laundry, for which a technical
evaluation
had not been provided at
the end of the inspection period, illustrate the licensee
remains
unable to
adequately
control modifications to the plant as described
in the
UFSAR and
as required
by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the Ginna Quality Assurance
Manual,
and
Containment
Tem erature Profiles (71707)
Containment
temperatures
for the period June
1987 through September
1987 were
reviewed to determine
average daily containment
temperature.
Copies of page
9 of Surveillance
procedure
S-12.4,
RCS Leaka
e Surveillance
Record Instruc-
tions, containing individual and average
containment
temperatures
taken
each
shift, were obtained for all days during the period when average
containment
temperature
exceeded
100 degrees
Fahrenheit.
Peak average
temperature
of
111.23 degrees
Fahrenheit
was reached
on August 18,
1987.
A copy of a con-
trolled drawing showing the location of the containment
Resistance
Temperature
Detectors
used to obtain containment
temperatures
was provided by the licensee.
This information was provided to
NRR for its review.
The inspectors
had
no further questions.
Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s (92701)
'Clcised
Ins ector Follow-u
Item
83-03-01
.
Inspection report 50-244/88-03
documents
licensee
commitment to install Safety Injection (SI)
pump suction
Engineering
Mork Request
4675 controls the installation of the gauges,
and is scheduled for completion during the
1989 refueling outage.
Installa-
tion of the gauges will be monitored
as part of the normal inspection
program.
This item is closed.
+Closed
Unresolved
Item
88-08-01
.
This item documents
licensee failure
to perform adequate
reviews
as required
by 10 CFR 50.59.
Section
4 of this
report'documents
a violation of the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.59;
licensee
actions to meet the requirements
of 10 CFR 50 '9 will be addressed
in response
to the violation, therefore this item is administratively closed.
6.
Exit Interview (30703)
At peribdic intervals during the inspection,
meetings
were held with senior
facility management
to discuss
inspection
scope
and findin'gs.
During this inspection period,
two violations were identified;
one concerning
~failure to perform safety evaluations
as required
by 10 CFR 50.59, for which
a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued,
and another concerning failure to
maintain
a radiation area
locked, for which no
NOV was issued.
Inspectors
also noted
an additional
example of failure to adhere to procedures.
In addition, discovery of an inattentive guard
by the Senior Resident'nspec-
tor is discussed,
and two previously identified inspector followup items were
closed.
Based
on
NRC Region I review of this report and discussion
held with licensee
representatives,
it was determined this report does not contain information
subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.