ML17244A934
| ML17244A934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1977 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17054D081 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-77-04, IEB-77-4, NUDOCS 7909050222 | |
| Download: ML17244A934 (9) | |
Text
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.
C.
20555 IE Bulletin 77-04
.Date:
November-4, 1977 Page 1 o'.
2 CALCULATIONAL ERROR AFFECTING THE DESIGN PERFORMANCE OF A SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING pH OF CONTAINMENT SUMP WATER FOLLOWING A LOCA Description of Circumstances:
On September 29, 1977, the Baltimore Gas and, Electric. Company reported that for Calvert'l'iffs. Unit 1 and Unit 2, the amount of trisodNm phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP)'pecified in the technical specifications may not be sufficient under all operating conditions to perform its intended design function.
The TSP is used to control the pH of the containment sump water follow-ing a LOCA in order to reduce the probability of chloride stress corrosion cracking leading to equipment failure or loss of containment integrity and to ensure low volatility of dissolved radioiodines.
At Calvert Cliffs, the TSP is stored in three dissolving baskets located on the lowest level of the containment.
Original design specifications (FSAR) required a sufficient quantity of TSP to raise the pH of the sump water to approximately 7.0.
The more recent guidance provided by the Standard Review Plan (SRP) states that, for Post Accident Chemistry, the optimum pH control consists of stabilizing pH between 7 and 8 within four hours.
For the Calvert Cliffs facilities, the quantity of TSP required to meet the FSAR design specifications was initially calculated to be 75 cubic feet.
However, these'alculations w'ere not based on maximum boron concentrations and water volumes permitted by the technical specifica-tions for the containment sump water sources, e.g.,
Refueling Water Tank (RWT), Safety Injection Tanks (SIT), Boric Acid Tanks (BAT) and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
Revised calculations indicated that the quantity of TSP required to meet design specifications under worst case conditions was approximately 82 cubic feet.
IE Bulletin 77-04 Date:
November 4, 1977 Page 2 of 2 As a result, administrative controls ha9e been implemented at the Calve t Cliffs facilities to limit the maximum boron concentration in the RWT and SITs to 2200 ppm.
The minimum boron concentration specified in the technical specifications will still apply.
Although the problem described above occurred at a facility utilizing TSP for pH control of containment sump water, this problem may be. applicable to facilities utilizing dif-ferent methods of pH control of containment sump water e.g.,
sodium hydroxide (NaOH).
This would be the case if chemical requirements for.
pH control were based on values less than the maximum values for boron concentrations and water volumes permitted by the technical specifica-tions for the containment sump water sources.
Action to be Taken by Licensees and Permit Holders:
For all PWR power reactor facilities with an operating license or a
construction permit:
l.
If your facility utilizes or plans to utilize a system for pH control of containment sump post LOCA solution, describe what action you have taken or plan to take to assure that the system design specifications will be met for all operating conditions permitted by the technical specifications, as applicable to the containment sump water sources.
r 2..
Report in writing within 45 days for facilities with an operating license and within 60 days for facilities with a construction permit, your plan of action and schedule with regard to Item l.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D. C.
20555.
Approved by GAO, B-180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Enclosure:
List of IE Bulletins Issued in 1977
Enclosure IE Bulletin 77-04 November 4, 1977 Page 1 of 1
BULLETIN NO.
~
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~
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SUBJECT
'LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN'977 DATE ISSUED ISSUED TO 77-01 Pneumatic Time Delay Relay Set-point Drift 4/29/77 All holders of Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP).
77-02 Potenti al Failure 9/12/77 Mechanism in Certain W AR Relays with Latch Attachments All holders of OLs or CPs.
77-03 On-Line Testing of the Mestinghouse M
Solid State Protec-tion System (SSPS) 9/12/77 All holders of OLs or CPs for M PMRs.
ROCHE STER GAS AllD ELC CTRIC CORPORATION o
8J iAST >V=/'!UZ,, RQCH=ST=R, Pl.',. lao.lF l EON D. WHITE. JRi VICE PRCSIOCNT September 30, 1977 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
IE Bulletin No. 77-02, Potential Failure Mechanism in Certain Westinghouse (W) AR Relays with=Latch Attachments R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 41 Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
In reply to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 77-02 dated September 12, 1977, concerning Westinghouse AR relays, there are no Westinghouse AR relays installed or planned for use in Reactor Protection or Safeguards Systems at Ginna Station.
Very truly yours, L. D. Whi e, Jr.
e
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~
89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 LEON D. WHITE. JR.
VICE PRCSIDCNT
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Akfa COOE TiC, 545.2700 September 30, 1977 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Subject.
IE Bulletin No. 77-02, Potential Failure Mechanism in Certain Westinghouse (W) AR Relays with Latch Attachments R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 5'1 Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
In reply to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 77-02 dated September 12, 1977, concerning Westinghouse AR relays, there are no Westinghouse AR relays installed or planned for use in Reactor Protection or Safeguards Systems at Ginna Station.,
Very truly yours, L. D. Whi e, Jr.
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRlC CORPORATIOÃ
~
89 EAST AVENJ'", <OC.'i 5T"R, H.Y. 1'6.)9 LL'QN D. WHITC. JR.
VICt >RKSIDCNT
>~ONP A+L> 4v:)c
~ 4 5 ~c'2 i OO September 30, 1977 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
IE Bulletin No. 77-03, On-Line Testing of Westing-house W Solid State Protection System (SSPS)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 41 Docket No. S0-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
In reply to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 77-03 concerning Westinghouse solid state protection systems, the Westinghouse solid state protection system is not installed at Ginna Station.
Very truly yours, L. D. White, Jr.
ROCrl+STER GAS AND ELECTP1C COR'POiWATIOlV S
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VICE PRCSIOKNT Ct AREA cc:$ c Ih 5~0.2700 September 30, 1977 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
19406
Subject:
IE Bulletin No. 77-03, On-Line Testing of Westing-house W Solid State Protection System (SSPS)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 41 Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
In reply to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 77-03 concerning Westinghouse solid state protection systems, the Westinghouse solid state protection system is not installed at Ginna Station.
Very truly yours,
o<