ML17223A819

Amend 104 to License DPR-67,revising Tech Specs Re Pressure/ Temp Limits & Low Temp Overpressure Protection

ML17223A819
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/11/1990
From:	Berkow H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17223A820	List: ML17223A819 ML17223A821
References
NUDOCS 9006210030
Download: ML17223A819 (34)

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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-335 ST.

LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO.

1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 104 License No. DPR-67 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power 5 Light Company, (the licensee) dated December 5, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

( the Act) and the'Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 'I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the CoIImission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not -be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9006210030 900611 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P

PNU

I

2.

Accordingly Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 is amended by changes to ihe Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.(2) to read as follows:

(2)

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A

and B, as revised through Amendment No.i04, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION

'yj Herbert N. Ber kow, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:

Jung 1i, 199Q

I V

I Jt

'cI 4

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 104 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-67 DOCKET NO. 50-335 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document com-pleteness.

Remove Pa es 1-4 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-9a 3/4 1-12 3/4 4-21 3/4 4-23a 3/4 4-23b 3/4 4-23c 3/4 4-59 3/4 4-60 3/4 5-7 B 3/4 4-7 B 3/4 4-15 B 3/4 5-1 Insert Pa es 1-4 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-9a 3/4 1-12 3/4 4-21 3/4 4-23a 3/4 4-23b 3/4 4-23c 3/4 4-59 3/4 4-60 3/4 5-7 B 3/4 4-7 B 3/4 4-15 B 3/4 5-1

DEFINITIONS DOSE E UIVALENT I-131 1.10 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (uCi/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134 and I-135 actually present.

The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

E - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY 1.11 E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gama energies per disintegration (in MEV) for

isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95~ of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

RESPONSE

TIME 1.12 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

RESPONSE

TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.).

Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

IEE<<ll 0"

1.13 The FREgUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM 1.14 A GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system offgases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environ-ment.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

1-3 Amendment No.g7, 69

DEFINITIONS IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1.15 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

a.

Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed

systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured, and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or b.

Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or c.

Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the secondary system.

LOW TEMPERATURE RCS OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION RANGE 1.16 The LOW TEMPERATURE RCS OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION RANGE is that. operating condition when (1) the cold leg temperature is

< 304'F during heatup on l

c 281'F during cooldown and (2) the Reactor CooTant System has pressure boundary Integrity.

The Reactor Coolant System does not have pr ssure boundary intejiity when the Reactor Coolant System is open to containment and the minimum area of the Reactor Coolant System opening is greater than 1.75 square inches.

MEMBER S OF 1 HE PUBLIC 1.17 MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are no'. occupation-ally associated with the plant.

This category does not include employees of the licensee, its contractors, or vendors.

Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries.

This category does include persons who use portions of the site for recrea-tional, occupational or other purposes not associated with the plant.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL ODCM 1.18 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL shall contain the current methodology and parameters used in the calculations of offsite doses due to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring alarm/trip setpoints, and shall include the Radiological Environ-mental Sample point locations.

ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

1-4 Amendment No.$9,5g,gg, M~ 'i04

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.5 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T v

) shall be

> 515'F when the reactor is critical.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2f.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (Ta

)

< 515'F, restore T

to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HIT STANDBY within thPlcxt 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.1.5 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T

) shall be determined to be

> 515'F.

avg a.

b.

Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System temperature (T

) is

< 525'F.

With K ~~

> 1.0, ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

3/4 1-7 Amendment No.

4

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100 vi 40 i0 Hiatus 0I 120 tio Cooldewn 220 To NOCATKO REACTOR COOt.ANT TK%N%AATljRI,t SON% 3.1 11 IMXOAJMAllOWASLKtCA~ Al COOLDOWN RATES, SOKE HFS IRQt N O~ATIN ST.

LUCrE - UNIT 1

3/4 1-9a Amendment No. B7, 104

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LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 1-9b Amendment No. 81

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP -

SHUTDOWN

'IMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump* in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specifi-cation 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump*OPERABLE, suspend f

all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 At least one of the above required pumps shall be denonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the charging pump develops a flow rate of greater than or equal to 40 gpm or the high pressure safety injection pump develops a total head of greater than or equal to 2571 ft. when tested pur uant to Specification 4.0.5.

• The flow path from the RWT to the RCS via a single HPSI pump shall be established only if:

(a) the RCS pressure boundary does not exist, or (b) no charging pumps are operable.

In this case,-all charging pumps shall be disabled and heatup and cooldown rates shall be limited in accordance with Fig. 3.1-1b.

HCV-36 HCV-3626 HCV-3636 HCV-3646 At RCS temperatures below 115'F, any two of the following valves in the operable HPSI header shall be verified closed and have their power removed:

Hi h Pressure Header Auxiliar Header HCV-36 HCV-3627 HCV-3637 HCV-3647 ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 5 O.A, gg, 104

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3 4.4.9 PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer}

temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2a, 3.4>>2b and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.~f ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an analysis to determine the effects of the=out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the RCS Tav to less than 200'F within the'folldwing 30'hours in accordance with'q Figures 3.4-2b and 3.4-3.

• When the flow path from the-RWT to the RCS via a single HPSI pump is established per 3.1.2.3, the heatup and cooldown rates shall be established in accordance with Fig. 3.l-lb.

40urinq hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure, a

maximum temperature change in any one hour period shall be limited to 5'F.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-21 Amendment No. g, yg, "o4

'l I

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.9.1 a.

b.

co The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup,

cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure conditions shall be determined to be to the right of the criticalitv limit line within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality.

The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, at the intervals shown in Table 4.4-5.

The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figures 3.4-2a, 3.4-2b and 3.4-3".

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-22 Pmen~ment No. 81

PALS% S.e 2e ST. LUCC UHlT 1 tiT LNMTS, 1$ KfiY HEATUP ANO CORK CAITCAL OTilfRNAL TO ~ilN n

1000 LOWEST

%UNCS TKMPRRATlÃtR 1~

C Ci1NTICAL

~ 4 ALLOHfAILRi%A~ IATKS NATK,~tile TU%. LNNT,+l AT Au.

TKMPQIATVRKS 500

'00 TC ~ NOICATKO llCS TKQPKAAYlNK,'0 ST.

LUGIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-23a Amendment No. J7,2S,SJ, qp4

0

't

'I n

,.-:pjggg $,i.g

. NCS QNT.,1 t/T LMTS, is Y

COOLOONN.Al

>K%VCR TEST NSKRVCa HYMOSTATN TEST LORRY svtvca T~NIA7VRK

. 1NPF 1tXPP/Nl TO

OYNKINAL, oooo 0

'FINI

~l~

5VffWI TitanINl 100'fIM

~c ~~~~ma v~~a ST.

LUG IE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-23b Amendment No. 27,gg,gJ,

~04

0 Y

I

vI 1

FIOURS 3A 3 ST. LUCIS UNIT 1. 1d fttY MAXIMUMALLQWASLSCOOLDOWN RATSS 1

80 RATS, 4FfHR I

20 30 40 SO 75 100 TfMl'. I.IMIT,4P 412$

125 144 14$ 1N 184 1N 1ad 100 01N 0

100 120 140 Te INQICATSO RSACTOR COOLANTTfMlfRATURS, 4F NOTS: A MAXIMUMCOOLIXIWNRATS OS 100 F/HR IS ALLOWSD AT ANY TEMPS RATURS ASOVS 196 P

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-23c Amendment No. J7,2',HJ, ~o4

POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.13 Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) shall be OPERABLE, with their setpoints selected to the low temperature mode of operation as follows:

a.

A setpoint of less than ot equal to 350 psia shall be selected:

l.

During cooldown when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 215'F and 2.

During heatup and isothermal conditions when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 193'F.

b.

A setpoint of less than or equal to 530 psia shall be selected:

l.

During cooldown when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is greater than 215'F and less than or equal to 281'F.

2.

Du~ing heatup and isothermal conditions when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is greater than or equal to 193'F and less than or equal to 304'F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 4 and 5*.

ACTION:

a.

With less than two PORVs OPERABLE and while at Hot Shutdown during a

planned cooldown, both PORVs will be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering the applicable MODE unless:

1.

The repairs cannot be accomplished within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the repairs cannot be performed under hot conditions, or 2.

Another action statement requires cooldown, or 3.

Plant and personnel safety requires cooldown to Cold Shutdown with extreme caution.

b.

With less than two PORVs OPERABLE while in COLD SHUTDOWN, both PORVs will be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.13 The PORVs shall be verified OPERABLE by:

a.

Verifying the isolation valves are open when the PORVs are reset to the low temperature mode of operation.

b.

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the Reactor Coolant System overpressurization protection system circuitry up to and including the relief valve solenoids once per refueling outage.

c.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATIONof the pressurizer pressure sensing channels once per 18 months.

eactor Coo ant ystem co d leg temperature below 304'F.

• PORVs are not required below 140'F when RCS does not have pressure boundary integrity.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-59 Amendment 58, N. ~04

/

d~"

I" I'

RE CTOR:iCOOLANT SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT PUMP - STARTING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.14 If the steam generator temperature exceeds the primary temperature by more than 30'F, the first idle reactor coolant pump shall not be started.

APPLICABIliTY:

MODES 4

and 5.

ACTION:

If a reactor coolant pump is started when the steam generator temperature exceeds primary temperature by more than 30'f, evaluate the subsequent transient to determine compliance with Specification 3.4.9.1.

SURYEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.14 Prior to starting a reactor coolant pump, verify that the steam generator temperature does not exceed primary temperature by more than 30'F.

~l<<y CldlgT p

A1 h

3D4'F ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 4-60 Amendment No. NJl. 1O4

.~

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1 II

EHERGENCY CORE COOLI S

'CCS SUBSYSTEMS - T

< 325'F, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a.

In MODES 3* and 4, one ECCS subsystem composed of one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump and one OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.

b.

Prior to decreasing the reactor coolant system temperature below 270'F a maximum of only one high pressure safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE with its asfociated header stop valve open.

c.

Prior to decreasing the reactor coolant system temperature below 236'F.all high pressure safety injection pumps shall'e disabled and their associated header stop valves closed except as allowed by Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 3* and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With no ECCS subsystems OPERABLE in MODES 3* and 4, immediately restore one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or be in COLO SHUTDOWN within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

b.

With RCS temperature below 270'F and with more than the allowed high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE or injection valves and header isolation valves open, imttediately disable the high pressure safety injection pump(s) or close the header isolation valves.

c.

In'the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 The high pressure safety injection pumps shhll be verified inoperable and the associated header stop valves closed prior to decreasing below the above specified Reactor Coolant System temperature and once per month when the Reactor Coolant System is at refueling temperatures.

W t pressurizer pressure

< 1750 psia.

NREACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM cold leg temperature above 250'F.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. gg,59, gg, gpss

'MERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS REFUELING WATER TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The refueling water tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum contained volume 401,800 gallons of borated

water, b.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm, c.

A maximum water temperature of 100'F, d.

A minimum water temperature of 55'F when in MODES 1 and 2, and e.

A minimum water temperature of 40'F when in MODES 3 and 4

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

l.

Verifying the water level in the tank, and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1

3/4 5-8 Amendment No.

28

I

~ I N

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

.BASES'he heatup and cooldown limit curves (Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b) are composite curves which were prepared by determining the most conservative

case, with either the inside or outside wall controlling, for any heatup rate of up to 50 F/hr and for any cooldown rate of up to 100 F per hour.

The heatup and cooldown curves were prepared based upon the most limiting value of the predicted adjusted reference temperature at the end of the applicable service period.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial RTN

, the results of.these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4-1.

Reactor opeGtion and resultant fast neutron (E>1 Hev) irradiation will cause an increase in the RT >

Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature can be calculated based upon the fluence.

The heatup and cooldown limit curves shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b include predicted adjustments for this shift in RT at the end of the applicable service period, as well as adjustments for fissure differences between the reactor vessel beltline and pressurizer instrument taps.

The actual shift in RTN of the vessel material will be established periodically during opeNtion by removing and evaluating, in accordance with ASTH E185-82, reactor vessel material surveillance specimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core a'i ea.

The capsules are scheduled for removal at times that correspond to key accumulated fluence levels within the vessel through the end of life.

Since the neutron spectra at the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are essentially identical, measured nRTR for surveillance samples can be applied with confidence to the correl ending material in the reactor vessel wall.

The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the ART determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calculam GRTNOT for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature require-ments for Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The maximum RTN T for all reactor coolant system pressure-retaining materials, with the exception o% the reactor pressure

vessel, has been estimated to be 90'F.

The Lowest Service Temperature limit line shown on Figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b is based upon this RT

> since Article NB-2332 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Com requires the Lowest Service Temperature to be RT 0

+ 100 F

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-7 Amendment No.

HZ, Pgg, 104

TABLE B 3 4.4-1 REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS COHPONENT Vessel Flange Forging CONP CODE HATERIAL TYPE C-1-1 ASOBC1.2 CU NI P

NDTT

'l

'l F

.008

+20 NP F tlat NIN. UPPER SHELF 50 FT-LB/35 RTNDT FT-LB LONG TRANS '

ONG TRANS

+70 t90

+30 133 86 Inlet Nozzle Inlet Nozzle Inlet Nozzle Inlet Nozzle C-4-3 ASOBC1.2 C-4-2 A508Cl 2 C-l-l ASMC1.2 C-l-l A508C1.2 Inlet Nozzl~ Ext.

C-16-3 h508C1.2 Inlet Nozzle Ext.

C-16-2 ASMC1.2 Inlet Nozzle Ext.

Inlet Nozzle Ext.

C-16-1 A508C1.2 C-16-4 h508C1.2 Bo'

%ad P1ate C-10-1 A533BC1.1 b

..e Head Plate C-9-2 A533BC1.1 h..oa Head Plate C-9-3 A533BCl.l Bottoe Head ?late C-9-1 A533BCl.l

.010

-40 t42

~ 01 t

-40

-18

~013

-70

-20

~ 911

-30 tlO

~005

-0 0

.004 0

+20

~005

+10

-25

.004 0

tl0

.001

+10 t52

~011

+10 t52

.011

+10 t52

.011

+10 t52 t62 t2 0

+30

+20 t40

-5 t30

+72

+72 t72 t72 t2

-40

-60 30 10

+12

+12

+12

+12 120 146 148 146 144 139 139 139 139 139 78 95 96 90 72 95 90 90 90 90 o

REACTOR COOLANT'YSTEH BASES 3/4.4.13 POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES and 3 4.4.14 REACTOR COOLANT PUHP-NG The low temperature overpressure protection system (LTOP) is designed to prevent RCS overpressurization above the 10 CFR Appendix G operating limit curves (Figures 3,4-2a and 3.4-2b) at RCS temperatures at or below 304"F. during heatup and 281'F during Cooldown.

The LTOP system is based on the use of the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and the implementation of administrative and operational controls.

The PORVs aligned to the RCS with the low pressure setpoints of 350 and 530 psia, restrictions on RCP starts, limitations on heatup and cooldown

rates, and disabling of non-essential components provide assurance that Appendix G P/T limits will not be exceeded during normal operation or design basis overpressurization events due to mass or energy addition to the RCS.

3/4.4.15 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.

The OPERABILITY of at least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

The redundancy design of the Reactor Coolant System vent systems serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreverisible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the venC path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vent system are consistent with the requirements of Item II.b.l of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"

November 1980.

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3 4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS BASES 3 4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be inmediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.

This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling echanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection in the accident analysis are met.

The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable safety injection tank minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event ccurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank hich may result, in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

3 4.5.2 and 3 4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems nsures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be avail-ble in the event of a LOCA assuming the, loss of one subsystem through ny single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunc-tion with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient ore cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation ode during the accident recovery period.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of ach component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the ccident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The limitations on HPSI pump operability when the RCS temperature is

< 270'F and

< 236'F, and the associated Surveillance Requirements provide additional administrative assurance that the pressure/temperature limits (figures 3.4-2a and 3.4-2b) will not be exceeded during a mass addition transient mitigated by a single PORV.

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES 3 4.5.4 REFUELING MATER TANK RWT The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a

sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RMT 'minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that l) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RMT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assump-tions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

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