Text

Amend 40 to License NPF-16,revising Tech Specs Associated W/ Boric Acid Makeup Sys
	ML17222A722
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	03/13/1989
From:	Berkow H; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
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ML17222A723	List: ML17222A722; ML17222A724;
References
	NUDOCS 8903220464
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UNITED STATES e

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 FLORIDA POMER 5 LIGHT COMPANY ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ORLANDO

FLORIDA, AND FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POMER AGENCY DOCKET NO. 50-389 ST.

LUCIE PLANT UNIT NO.

2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.

40 License No. NPF-16 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power 5 Light Company, et al. (the licensee),

dated September 1, 1988, complies with the standards and. requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the ComIission; I

C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Coomission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the colon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

8903220460 8903l3 PDR ADOCK 05000389 P

2.

Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and by amending paragraph 2.C.2 to read as follows:

2.

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 40, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

March 13, 1989 erber t N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

C ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

4O TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

NPF-16 DOCKET NO. 50-389 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pa es 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-15 3/4 5-1 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 6-3 Insert Pa es 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-Ba 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-15 3/4 5-1 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 6-3

0

<<t

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

4O TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

NPF-16 DOCKET NO. 50-389 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Pa es 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-15 3/4 5-1 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-3 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 6-3 Insert Pa es 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-Ba 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14

=

3/4 1-15 3/4 5-1 B3/4 1-2 B3/4 1-3 83/4 5-3 B3/4 6-3

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4. 1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS -

SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron iniection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

A flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via either a boric acid makeup pump or a gravity feed connection and any charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid makeup tank in Specification

3. 1.2.7a.

is OPERABLE, or b.

The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b.

is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1; 2.

1 At least one of the "above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power'-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,

sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55'F by verifying that the Boric Acid Makeup Tank solution temperature is greater than 55'F (when the flow path from the Boric Acid Makeup Tank is used).

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 I"7 Amendment No.

4O

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank(s) with the tank meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 part a) or b), via a boric acid makeup pump through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b.

c ~

One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank(s) with the tank meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 part a) or b), via a gravity feed valve through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

OR At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

One flow path from each boric acid makeup tank with the combined tank contents meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 c),

via both boric acid makeup pumos through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

b.

One flow path from each boric acid makeup tank with the combined tank contents meeting Specification 3.1.2.8 c),

via both gravity feed valves through a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

c.

The flow path from the refueling water storage tank, via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a

SHUTDOWN NRCIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200'F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 8,2S, 40

0 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is below 55'F, by verifying that the solution temperature of the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks is above 55'F.

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,

sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. 't least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.

d.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a and 3.1.2.2b delivers at least 40 gpm to the Reactor Coolant System.

ST.

LUC IE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-Ba Amendment No.

40

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS -

SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 1.2.5 At least one boric acid makeup pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification

3. 1.2. la. is OPERABLE.

- APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no boric acid makeup pump OPERABLE as required to complete the flow path of Specification

3. 1. 2. la.,

suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1.2.5 The above required boric acid makeup pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a

discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psig when tasted pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS " OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 At least the boric acid makeup pump(s) in the boron injection flow path(s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification

3. 1.2.2 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if the flow path through the boric acid pump(s) in Specification

3. 1.2.2 is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid makeup pump required for the boron injection flow path(s) pursuant to Specification

3. l. 2. 2 inoperable, restore the boric acid makeup pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200 F; restore the above required boric acid makeup pump(s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months s.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1.2.6 The above required boric acid makeup pump(s) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump(s) develop a

discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 Amendment No.

8

~

ZV ~ 40

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES -

SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following boratgd water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

One boric acid makeup tank with a minimum borated water volume of 3550 gallons of 2.5 to 3.5 weight percent boric acid (4371 to 6119 ppm boron).

b, The refueling water tank with:

l.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 125,000 gallons, 2.

A minimum boron concentration of 1720

ppm, and 3.

A solution temperature between 40'F and 120'F'.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the

tank, and b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the RWT temoerature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air.temperature is outside the range of 40'F and 120'F.

c.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55'F, by verifying that the boric acid makeup tank solution temperature is greater than 55'F when that boric acid makeup tank is required to be OPERABLE.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1"13 Amendment No.

40

I REACTIVITY CONTROL STEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATEON 3.1.2.8 At least two of the following four borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Boric Acid Makeup Tank 2A in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

b.

Boric Acid Makeup Tank 2B in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

T c.

Boric Acid Makeup Tanks 2A and 2B with a minimum combined contained borated water volume in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.

d.

The refueling water tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume of 417,100 gallons, 2.

A boron concentration of between 1720 and 2100 ppm of boron, arid 3.

A solution temperature of between 55'F and 100'F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a ~

b.

With the above required boric acid makeup tank(s) inoperable, restore the tank(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3000 pcm at 200'F; restore the above required boric acid makeup tank(s) to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 At least two required borated water sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration in the water and 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months oy verifying the Rh'T temperature when the outside air temperature is outside the range of 55'F and 100"F.

c.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55'F, by verifying that the boric acid makeup tank solution is greater than 55'F.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. g,gg, 40

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(6294 PPM) smamo au@

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( wt r. m au< j ST.LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 40

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORON DILUTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.9 Boron concentration shall be verified consistent with SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specifications 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, and 3.9.1.

APPLICABILITY:

a 0 b.

ACTION:

a.

b.

C.

MODES 3, 4, and 5 with RCS level above the hot leg centerline by use of boronometer or sampling per Table 3. 1-1, and MODE 5 with RCS level below the hot leg centerline; and MODE 6 by sampling per Table 3.1-1.

With the boron concentration not consistent with required SHUTDOWN MARGIN, initiate emergency boration.

If unable to-determine the RCS boron concentration by the means speci-fied above, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one of the means of determining the RCS boron concentration as specified above is restored to OPERABLE status.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1. 2. 9 a 0 b.

When in MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, the boron concentration shall be determined consistent with SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

The boronometer, when used to monitor boron concentration, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

1.

a CHANNEL CHECK once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and 2.

a CHANNEL CALIBRATION once per 18 months, Whenever performing an RCS heatup or cooldown, determine the boron concentration at least once every 50 F change in temperature.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16

3'/4.5

'HERCENCY CORE CQOl ING SYSTEMS ECCS 3/4.5. 1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.

1 Each Reactor Coolant System safety injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

.The isolation valve open, b.

C.

d.

A contained borated water volume of between 1420 and 1556 cubic feet, A boron concentration of between 1720 and 2100 ppm of boron, and I

A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 570 and 650 psig.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES l, 2, 3*, and 4".

ACTION:

a.

With one safety injection tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 5. l. 1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by:

l.

Verifying (by the absence of alarms) the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve is open.

With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia.

When pressur-izer pressure is less than 1750 psia, at least three safety injection tanks shall be

OPERABLE, each with a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 650 psig and a contained water volume of between 1250 and 1556 cubic feet with a boron concentration of between 1720 and 2100 ppm of boron.

With all four safety injection tanks OPERABLE, each tank shall have a minimum pressure of 235 psig and a maximum pressure of 650 psig and a contained water volume of between 833 and 1556 cubic feet with a boron concentration of between 1720 and 2100 ppm of boron.

In MODE 4 with pressurizer pressure less than 276 psia, the safety injection tanks may be isolated.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5"1 Amendment No.40

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS Continued b.

At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to IX of tank volume by verifying the boron concentration of the safety injection tank solution.

C.

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 700 psia, by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by maintaining the breaker open by administrative contr ol s.

d.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each safety injection tank isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1.

When an actual or simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds 515 psia, and 2.

Upon receipt of a safety injection test signal.

4.5. 1.2 Each safety injection tank water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a

~

At least once per 31 days by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

b.

At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2

3/4. 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 1. 1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN.MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcrftical from all operating conditions,

2) the reactfvfty transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reacto~ will be maintained sufficfently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality fn the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T The most restrictive avg'ondition occurs at EOL, with T at no load operating temperature, and is avg associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncon-trolled RCS cooldown.

In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN iQRGIN of 5000 pcm is required to control the reactivity transient.

I Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistOAt with FSAR safety analysis assumptions.

At earlier times fn core life, the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN required for the most restric-tive conditions is less than 5000 pcm.

With T less than or equal to 200 F, avg the reactivity transients resulting from any postulated accident are minimal and a 3000 pcm SHUTDOMN SNGIN provides adequate protection.

3/4. 1. 1. 3 BORON OILUTIOK' mfnimum flow rate of at least 3000 gpm provides adequate

mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron concentration reductions fn the Reactor Coolant System.

A flow rate of at least 3000 gpw wf 11 circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 10,931 cubic feet fn approximately 26 minutes.

The reactfvfty change rate associated with boron concentration reductions will therefore be within the capability of operator recognftfon and control.

3/4. 1. 1. 4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The lfmftatfons on moderator temperature coefficient (KTC) arr provided to ensure that the assumptfons used in the accident and transient analysis remain valid through each fuel cycle.

The survefllance requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction fn RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

The confirmation that the atasured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coef ficfent will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1 1 Amendment No.g, -

GgT-, i i9 o5

REACTIVITY CONTRO STEMS BASES 3/4.1.1. 5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 515'F.

This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range,, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating

range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTNDT temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.

The components required to perform this function include (1) borated water sources, (2) charging

pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid makeup

pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable.

Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a

SHUTDOWN MARGIN from.expected operating conditions of 3000 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F.

The maximum expected boration capability requi.rement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions.

This requirement

'can be met for a range of boric acid concentrations in the Boric Acid Makeup Tank (BAHT) and Refueling Water Tank (RWl).

This range is bounded by 5350 gallons of 3.5 weight percent (6119 ppm boron) from the BAHT and 16,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the RWT to 8650 gallons of 2.5 weight percent (4371 ppm boron) boric acid from BAHT and 12,000 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the RWT.

A minimum of 35,000 gallons of 1720 ppm boron is required from the RWT if it is to be used to borate the RCS alone.

With the RCS temperature below 200"F one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200'F is based upon providing a 3000 pcm SHUTDOWN MARGIN after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140'F.

This condition requires either 6750 gallons of 1720 ppm - 2100 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank or 3550 gallons of 2.5 to 3.5 weight percent boric acid solution from the boric acid makeup tanks.

ST.

LUC I E - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. g, gg, 40

REACTIVITY CONTROL S'S BASES The contained water volume limits includes allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RMT also ensure a

pH value of between 7.0'and 8.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a

LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

3/4.1.2. 9 BORON DILUTION The simultaneous use of the boronometer and RCS sampling at intervals

'dependent upon the MODE and the number of OPERABLE charging pumps to ponitor the RCS boron concentration provides diverse and redundant indications of an inadvertent boron dilution.

This wi 11 allow detection with sufficient time for termination of the boron dilution event before a complete loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN occurs.

3/4. 1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-

tained, and (3) the potential effects of CEA misalignments are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to a stuck or untrippable CEA, to two or more inoperable CEAs and to a large misalignment (greater than or equal to 15 inches) of two or more CEAs, require a,prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck or untrippab',e CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments (less than 15 inches) of the CEAs, there is (1) a small effect on the time-dependent long-term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, (2) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and (3) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis.

Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with small misalignments of CEAs permits a 1-hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment requirements.

The 1-hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned

CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the

CEAs, and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

ST.

LUC IE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No.

40

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Continued Overpower margin is provided to protect the core in the event of a large misalignment

(> 15 inches) of a CEA.

However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution.

This distribution may, in turn, have a significant effect on (1) the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, (/) the time-dependent long-term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, and (3) the ejected CEA worth used in the safety

'nalysis.

Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the large misalignment of a CEA requires a prompt realignment of the misaligned CEA.

The ACTION statements applicable to misaligned or inoperable CEAs include requirements to align the OPERABLE CEAs in a given group with the inoperable CEA.

Conformance with these alignment requirements bring the core, within a short period of time, to a configuration consistent with that assumed in generating LCO and LSSS setpoints.

However, extended operation with CEAs significantly inserted in the core may lead to perturbations in (1) local

burnup, (2) peaking factors, and (3) available shutdown margin which are more adverse than the conditions assumed to exist in the safety analyses and LCO and LSSS setpoints determination.

Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

The r~quirement to reduce power in certain time limits depending upon the previous F is to eliminate a potential nonconservatism for situations when a

CEA has been declared inoperable.

A worst-case analysis has shown that a

DNBR SAFDL violation may occur during the second hour after the CEA misalignment if this requirement is not met.

This potential DNBR SAFDL violation is eliminated by limiting the time operation is permitted at full power before power reductions are required.

These reductions will be necessary once the deviated CEA has been declared inoperable.

This time allowed for continued operation at a reduced power level can be permitted for the following reasons:

2.

3.

4 The margin calculations which support the Technical Specifications are based on a steady-state radial peak of F

= 1.7 0.

r When the actual F< 1.70, significant additional margin exists.

T This additional margin can be credited to offset the increase in F with time that can occur following a CEA misalignment.

This incre'ase in F

is caused by xenon redistribution.

The present analysis can support allowing a misalignment to exist for up to 63 minutes without correction, if the initial Fr

< 1.54.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 I-4 Amendment No. 8'i 25

GOAVAINWENTiSYSTEMS ':

BASES CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Continued The Containment Spray System and-the Containment Cooling

$ystem provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere.

However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing. iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for 'restoring an inoperable spray system to'PERABLE status have been maintained'onsistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment;..';

3/4. 6. 2. 2 IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM.

The OPERABILITY of the Iodine Removal System ensures that sufficient N2H4 is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA..

The limits on N2H~

volume and concentration ensure a minimum of 50 ppm of'2H4 concentration available in the spray for a:miaimum of-6. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months per pump.for=a total of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months to provide assumed iodine decontamination factors..on the containment atmosphere during spray function and ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 8.0 for the solution recirculated within contaiament after a

LOCA..This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and compgnents.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance.for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analys'es.

P 3/4. 6: 2. 3 CONTAINMENT COOLI'NG SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Cooling System ensures that (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Cooling System and the Containment Spray System provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere.

As a result of this cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for. the Containment Cooling System have been appr'opriately adjusted..

The allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System and Contain-ment Cooling System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System also provide a mechanism for removing iodine from the.

containment atmosphere.

ST.

LUGI E - UNIT 2 r

'I 8 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 4O

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through GDC 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those-isolation valves designed to close

, automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environ-ment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit dur ing post-LOCA conditions.

Either recombiner unit is capable of con-trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions,

2) radiolytic decomposition of water and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

These hydrogen control systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971.

The containment fan coolers and containment spray ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.

This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceeding the flammable 1 imit.

3/4.6. 5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES The OPERABILITY of the primary containment to atmosphere vacuum relief valves ensures that the containment internal pressure differential does not become more negative than 0.615 psi.

This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal pressure differential of 0.7 psi.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-4

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES REFUELING MATER TANK Continued The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWT also ensure a

pK value of between 7.0 and B.O for the solution recirculated within containment after a

LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems,and components.

ST.

LUCIE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 40

ML17222A722

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