ML17222A348
| ML17222A348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1988 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Conway W FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| EA-88-117, NUDOCS 8807190374 | |
| Download: ML17222A348 (35) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-389 License No.
NPF-16 EA 88-117 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr.
W.
F.
Conway Senior Vice President - Nuclear P.
O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
REPORT NO. 50-389/88-06 This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request at the Region II office on May 26, 1988.
This meeting concerned the blocking of the safety injection actuation signal and containment isolation signal to a St.
Lucie Unit 2 letdown isolation valve for the period March 13 April 6, 1988.
Enclosure 1 is your outline of the meeting topics, enclosure 2 is a list of attendees, and enclosure 3 is the meeting summary.
We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of-the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Original Signed by Luis A. Reyes
/for J.
Nelson Grace Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
FPL Handouts 2.
List of Attendees 3.
Meeting Summary cc w/encls:
K.
N. Harris, Vice President St.
Lucie Nuclear Plant G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager J.
B. Harper, Site QA Superintendent bcc w/encl,s:
(See page 2)
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Florida Power and Light Company dUtII g 9 jet bcc w/encls:
NRC Resident Inspector DRS Technical Assistant Document Control Desk State of Florida RI C hristensen:er 06/H,/88 RI RII RC l njak ilson lns M
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AGENDA Introduction Blocking of a Safety Injection Actuation signal and a Containment Isolation signal to a Letdown Isolation valve FPL A.
Opening Remarks B. Description of Event C.
Root Cause of Event D.
Corrective Action (OPS)
E.
Safety Significance F.
10CFR50.59 Reviews ofJumpers R Lifted Leads G.
Summary/Questions Ken Harris Chris Burton Chris Burton Chris Burton Greg Keller Ash Pell Oil Boissy III.
Closing Remarks
ENCLOSURE 2
LIST OF ATTENDEES Enforcement Conference May 26, 1988 Florida Power and Li ht Com an W.
F.
Conway, Senior Vice President K.
N. Harris, Vice President - St.
Lucie G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager - St.
Lucie J.
K. Hays, Director, Nuclear Licensing C.
L. Burton, Operations Supervisor C.
A. Pell, Technical Supervisor C.
F. Leppla, ICC Supervisor G. J. Keller, Power Plant Engineering A.
G. Menocal, Power Plant Engineering NRC M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A.
F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
B. A. Wilson, Chief, Projects Branch 2, DRP G.
R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff R.
V. Crlenjak, Chief, Projects Section 2B (PS2B),
DRP H. Bibb, Resident Inspector - St.
- Lucie, DRP E.
G. Tourigny, Project Manager, NRR H. 0. Christensen, Project Engineer,
- PS2B, DRP B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, RII R. J.
- Goddard, Regional Counsel
ENCLOSURE 3
MEETING
SUMMARY
This was an Enforcement Conference to discuss the issues surrounding the blocking of the safety injection actuation signal and containment isolation signal to a letdown isolation valve for a 24-day period.
Mr. Ken Harris, Site Vice President, began the opening remarks for FPL.
Mr. Ernst provided the opening remarks for the NRC.
The details of the event are described in enclosure 1.
At the end of the
- meeting, the NRC expressed concern with the lack of knowledge of the operators for the functioning of the Normal/Isolate switch and their misuse of plant drawing and wiring diagrams.
Both the NRC and FPL made positive statements concerning the reactor operator trainee, who discovered the isolation event.
gp,a REGAL1p0 A
/g O. p4
~**<<+
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 JUN 2s iSSB Docket No.
50-389 License No.
NPF-16 EA 88-117 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr.
W.
F.
Conway Senior Vice President - Nuclear P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno Beach FL 33408-0420 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
REPORT NO. 50"389/88-06 This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request at the Region II office on May 26, 1988.
This meeting concerned the blocking of the safety injection actuation signal and containment isolation signal to a St.
Lucie Unit 2 letdown isolation valve for the period March 13 - April 6, 1988.
Enclosure 1 is your outline of the meeting topics, enclosure 2 is a list of attendees, and enclosure 3 is the meeting
- summary, We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2,
. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, J.
Nel son'r Regional Ad i 'strator
Enclosures:
1.
FPL Handouts 2.
List of Attendees 3.
Meeting summary cc w/encls:
K.
N. Harris, Vice President St.
Lucie Nuclear Plant G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager J.
B. Harper, Site QA Superintendent
AGENDA I
Introduction Blocking of a Safety Injection Actuation signal and a Containment Isolation signal to a Letdown Isolation valve FPL A.
Opening Remarks B. Description of Event
. C.
Root Cause of Event D.
Corrective Action (OPS)
E.
Safety Significance F.
10CFR50.59 Reviews of Jumpers 8 Lifted Leads G.
Summary/Questions Ken Harris Chris Burton Chris Burton Chris Burton Greg Keller Ash Pell Oil Boissy III.
Closing Remarks
ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 LETDOWN ISOLATION CONFIGURATION HQH TEMP CLOSES I
CLOSES I
SAS A a.ass l
GAS A I
I CLOSES h,P PDS 22$
CONTAI4lENT CONTAINMENT GAS B a.osis I
FROM RCS Y-25%
V-25$
V-2522 CIAS/SIAS LOGIC LINPIKSSNSR PRKSSLSK SAS GAS
EVENTCHRONOLOGY
~
Date of mistake (March 13, 1988)
~
=
Date of discovery (April6, 1988)
THOUGHTPROCESSES OF INVOLVEDPERSONNEL
~
Date of mistake
~
Shift Supervisor
~
Assistant Shift Supervisor
~
~
Date of discovery
~
Reactor Operator Trainee
~
Shift Supervisor
~
Operations Supervisor ROOT CAUSE CWD misread
~
Misuse of P & ID Information COUNTERMEASURES
~
Interim
~
Long Term
ENGINEERING REVIEW
~
SYSTEM DESIGN FSAR CHAPTER 15 ANALYSIS CONTAINMENTISOLATION/ LOCA
~
LETDOWN LINE BREAK
~
FSAR CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK
~
CONCLUSIONS
~
INHERENT PROTECTIVE FEATURES SIGNIFICANTLYMITIGATED CONDITION e
NO SIGNIFICANTIMPACTON PUBLIC HEALTHAND SAFETY
Florida Power & Li ht Com an Summa
~ Bypassing of V-2516 Safeguard Signal
~ Self Identified
~ Reported via LER
~ Erigineering Evaluation
~ Corrective actions currently in place
PDIS 2216 EV
'F CHRONOLOGY March 13 (SUNDAY) 1610 Containment entry (Unit 2) to look for unidentified leakage increase from.2 gpm to.7 gpm.
(Tech. Spec.
1 gpm) 1630 Leak found on PDIS 2216 which sends high d/p signai to close V-2516 to protect against letdown line break downstream of Regenerative Meat Exchanger.
At direction of shift supervision, d/p cell isolated to isolate leak.
1714 Following analysis of Technical Specifications, Control Wiring Diagrams (CWDs), and plant drawings (P&IDs),
shift supervision directs a plant operator to place the Normal/Isolate switch for this valve (V-2516) in the isolate position, believing this action would electrically remove any signal from th'e isolated d/p cell while leaving the Tech: Spec. required signals in service (CIAS, SIAS). A log entry was made to indicate that CIAS and SIAS functions remained operable in this condition.
PDIS 2216 EVENTCHRONOLOGY April6 (WEDNESDAY) 0630 0645 0715 0730 0805 A Reactor Operator trainee (who previously had worked in the Instrument and Control group) while conducting a control board walkdown, inquired about the status of the Letdown valve and was informed of the Normal/Isolate switch being in the Isolate position.
Being inquisitive and experienced in reading wiring
- diagrams, he reviewed the appropriate CWD and became alarmed when he found that the Normal/Isolate switch apparently isolates the CIAS and SIAS signals to the Letdown valve.
\\
The Shift Supervisor was informed of this concern by the Trainee and reviewed the CWD. He concurred with the analysis of the Trainee and called the OPS Supervisor.
The Shift Supervisor and OPS Supervisor agreed to declare the Letdown valve out-of-service per Tech.
Spec. action statement 3.6.3.a (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LCO) while seeking a more qualified review of the wiring by the appropriate supervisor in the Instrument
& Control gfoup.
The Instrument & Control group supervisor confirmed the suspicion of the operators that the Letdown valve was without a CIAS or SIAS signai with the switch in Isolate;-
After installing a jumper to electrically eliminate the d/p signai from the circuit, the Normal/Isolate switch forthe Letdown valve was returned to Normal and the action statement exited..
A retest of the closure capability of.the Letdown valve on.a CIAS or SIAS signal was subsequently performed.
., THOUGHT PROCESSES QF INVOLVEDPERSONNEL e
Shif't Supervisor (March 13) - Concern with event.was primarily centered around the Tech. Specs. which demand CIAS and SIAS to be operable to the valve.
NIade a mental assessment and verbally discussed with his crew the consequences of operating without-the d/p cell.
He clearly established that there were sufficient alternate-indications available to Control Room personnel to alert them to a Letdown Line break.
He believed the d/p cell would be replaced in the next several days and initiated a Plant Work Order.
He knew that the Letdown valve was a Tech. Spec. valve and confirmed in his mind that the CIAS and SIAS functions were not inhibited. He even made a log entry to this effect.
Assistant Shift Supervisor (Nlarch 13) - After the leak was isolated he looked initiallyat the P & ID and saw that the Isolate switch would not impact the CIAS and SIAS signals.
(Looking at a P & ID and deriving electrical information from it is not standard practice, however the P & ID was already out for review by the crew while they investigated the increase in RCS leakage).
He looked at the CWDs to confirm this but admittedly was already convinced that the switch was the solution to their problem.
When interviewed later, he again looked at the CWD and immediately was able to see that the CIAS and SIAS signals were impacted by the position ofthe Normal/Isolate switch.
Shift Technical Advisor (March 13) - Was aware of the increased RCS leakage which precipitated the containment entry. After isolation of the d/p cell, he participated in the discussion of the Tech. Spec. impact ofthe loss ofthe d/p cell. He was shown the P & 10 by the Assistant Shift Supervisor and concyrred that the Normalflsolate switch did not impact SIAS or CIAS signals.
He did not personally review the CWD but assured himself that two Senior Reactor Operators had performed this review.
THOUGHT PROCESSES OF INVOLVEDPERSONNEL Reactor Operator Trainee (April 6) - Curious about the circuitry which eliminated the d/p signal from the control circuit and interested in keeping his skills in reading CWDs sharp, he chose to review the CWD.
When he uncovered the problem he showed no hesitation in informing the shift supervision.
Shift Supervisor (April 6) - Understanding the implications of the problem, he immediately sought an independent, qualified technical review of the CWD and informed the OPS Supervisor.
There was no hesitation in making his report or recommendations.
Operations Supervisor (April 6) - Made aware of the potential problem, called for an independent qualified technical review of the circuitry and simultaneously informed the Tech. Staff, Quality Control, and Plant Manager of the problem.
He ensured the STA was involved to look at reportability.
An interim assessment of the causes and solutions to prevent recurrence was undertaken with instructions placed in the Night Orders.
ROOT CAUSE FOR THE INCORRECT DECISION
~
The CWD was misread by the operators e
Acontributing factor was the misuse of. P &ID information
COUNTERMEASURES INTERIM
~
Review of event with involved personnel
~
Operations Night Order giving specific guidance regarding the removal of any plant component from service including what type of assessment must be performed.
~
A review of current plant fluid drawings (P & lDs) and CWDs for similar inconsistencies which could confuse the operator (None found)
- IF FACE
.- COUNTERIVlKASURES LONG TERM
~
The P & IDfor the Unit 2 CVCS system willbe corrected
~
Engineering willidentify all plant Normal/Isolate switches which remove CIAS and SIAS signals from valves
~
These switches willbe placed under enhanced procedural control
~
Switches willbe labelled locally to indicate the removal of CIAS and SIAS signals when the switch is repositioned
~
Specific training on the impact of repositioning Normal/Isolate switches willbe incorporated into Licensed Operator initialtraining and requalification training
~
Plant Annunciator Summary willbe revised to include the fact that a Normal/Isolate switch in Isolate eliminates CIAS and SIAS signals
- INPLACE
REPEAT SCENARIO RESULTS If an operator desired to place a Normal/Isolate switch in the Isolate position today, the following measures would provide assurance that CIAS or SIAS signals would not be bypassed inadvertently:
1)
This mistake on the P & ID has been identified to the operators and no other instances have been found 2)
Repositioning of Normal/Isolate switches is required to be entered on a status sheet which bears the caution regarding eliminating CIAS/SIAS signals 3)
The Plant Annunciator Summary has been upgraded to include information concerning the bypassing of CIAS/SIAS signals when a Normal/Isolate switch is repositioned (which yields a Control Room annunciator) 4)
The operator turning the switch locally willbe reminded by a placard that states turning the switch eliminates CIAS/SIAS signals 5)
In the long term, licensed operator awareness will be heightened through training (initial and requalification training).. 'In the near term, awareness through the Operations Supervisor's Night Order giving guidance for equipment removal from service willbe maintained.
ENGINEERING REVIEW
~
SYSTEM DESIGN
~
FSAR CHAPTER 15 ANALYSIS
~
CONTAINMENTISOLATION/ LOCA
~
LETDOWN LINE BREAK
~
FSAR CHAPTER 3 ANALYStS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK CONCLUSIONS
~
INHERENT PROTECTIVE FEATURES SIGNIFICANTLYMITIGATED CONDITION NO SIGNIFICANTIMPACTON PUBLIC HEALTHAND SAFETY
NUCLEAR SAFETY ASPECTS PROVIDE ISOLATION RCS Pressure Boundary
~
Containment Isolation
~
Migh Energy Line Break Isolation INHERENT PROTECTION
~
Three Valves in Series
~
ASME Section III, Class I, Pneumatic
~
Diverse Signals (CIAS, SIAS, d/p, Temperature)
~
Fail Close
~
Loss of Air
~
Loss of Electric Power
~
Loss of Channel Power Supply (CIAS/SIAS)
~
Standard Operating Procedures No Maintenance History of Seat Leakage Problems on Valves
~
Closed System Outside Containment
~
FMEAfor Illation of Channel "A"SIAS/CIAS to V-2516 (No single failure will prevent Letdown isolation ifconcurrent SIAS and CIAS signals are generated)
ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 LETDOWN ISOLATION CONFIGURATION HGH tao CLOSES l
CLOSES l
I SAS A-~
CLOSES MS B ~
CL0SES l
lCAS A l
CLOSES AP P08 22$
CONTANMENT OUTSIE CONTAI4KNT.
GAS 8 CLOSES l
V-25$
Y-25%
V-2522 TO CVCS CIASXSIAS LOGIC
BASIS FOR CREDITING V-2515 AS A CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVE
~
All three valves are ASME Section III (Class I) pneumatically operated globe valves specified to the same vendor model and seat leakage requirements.
~
All three valves are utilized in the same service conditions (Flow, temperature, pressure, chemistry)
~
All three valves are "Normally Open" valves and are operated in the same manner (Open/Close - Not Throttled)
~
Allthree valves have been in service the same length of time
~
None of these valves have a history of seat leakage problems
~
Neither Containment Isolation Valve has ever failed a local leak rate test.
In fact, their leakage has always been less than 20/o of the allowable.
~
Allvalves are stroke tested on an 18 month interval.
~
Only one occurrence of a failure of a valve to close was identified in a maintenance record review
FSAR CHAPTER 15 ANALYSIS Evaluate response of NSSS to postulated disturbances in process variables and to postulated malfunctions or failures of equipment.
NSSS acceptance guidelines for each frequency group.
These guidelines place acceptable bounds on:
~ Offsite dose
~ Reactor Coolant System pressure
~
Fuel performance
~
Loss of Shutdown Margin A review of the limiting analysis for all the Chapter 15 events revealed no adverse consequences with respect to RCS pressure, fuel performance, loss of shutdown margin, or offsite dose.
A more detailed review of the LOCA and letdown line break is presented.
FSAR CHAPTER 15 CONTAINMENTISOLATION LOSS OF COOLANTACCIDENT ASSUMPTIONS
~
LOCA with Regulatory Guide 1.4 Source Term Release (1000/p Noble Gas; 50/0 Iodine)
~
Containment leakage at Technical Specification leak rate for first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 50/0 of Technical Specification rate thereafter
RESPONSE
DURING TEMPORARY CONDITION (Selector Switch in Isolate)
~
Redundant Automatic Isolation of Letdown V2515 Closes on SIAS V2522 Closes on CIAS
~
Prompt Operator Action Closes V2516 RADIOLOGICALEFFECT
~
No Change,
FSAR CHAPTER 15 LETDOWN LINE BREAK LIMITINGFAULT 1 (With Selector Switch in Isolate Position)
~
Opening of Letdown Relief Valve
~
No effect since operator action is credited for isolation at 30 minutes K
LIMITINGFAULT2 (With Selector Switch in Isolate Position)
~
Opening of Letdown Relief Valve with High Pre-Existing Iodine Concentration
~
No effect since operator action is credited for isolation at 30 minutes LIMITINGFAULT3
~
FSAR ANALYSIS
~
Break in letdown line with primary coolant at maximum technical specification allowable activity.
~
Automatic Isolation was delayed 10 minutes for dose calculation Results - See Table
~
TEMPORARY CONDITION
~
Break in letdown line with actual primary coolant activity.
~
Manual Isolation at 32 minutes. No credit for SIAS or high tempeI'ature isolation THYROID(FSAR/ TEMP. COND.)
EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY(2 HOURS) 27 REM/1.4 REM LOW POPULATION ZONE (8 HOURS) 20 REM/1.2 REM WHOLE BODY (FSAR/TEMP. COND.)
200 MREM/1.14 MREM 80 MREM/0.46 MREM
FSAR CHAPTER 3 HELB ANALYSIS PURPOSE'emonstrate that essential structures,
- systems, and components are adequately protected against the dynamic effects of. postulated piping rupture.
This includes:
~ Jet Impingement
~
Pipe Whip Environmental Conditions FOCUS:
Protection of Essential (Safe Shutdown) Equipment By:
~ Separation
~ Barriers,
- Shields, and Enclosures (including environmental effects)
~
Pipe Whip Restraints
~ Termination of Blowdown RESULTS:
Only'nvironmental conditions are affected by the temporary condition. This analysis is presented.
FSAR CHAPTER 3 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK/ E.
NORMALCASE (Selector Switch in Normal Position)
~
Letdown isolation from differential pressure in 6 seconds
~
Equipment qualified for environment from 6 second blowdown TEMPORARY CONDITION (Selector Switch in Isolate Position)
~
Letdown Isolation from Temperature in 40 seconds
~
Equipment qualified for environment from 40 second blowdown
CONCLUSIONS
~
INHERENT PROTECTIVE FEATURES SIGNIFICANTLY MITIGATED CONDITION NO SIGNIFICANTIMPACTON PUBLIC HEALTHAND SAFETY
~ Relationship to Event
~ Switch Reyositionin
~ Jumper Lifted Lead Pro ram
SWITCH REPOSITIONING CH 13 1988
~
NOT COGNIZANTOF DEFEATING SIAS AND CIAS TO V-2516 I
~
RESULTED FROM PERSONNEL ERROR ON MJ&CH 13, 1988
~ Addressed the problem withinthe applicable area ofconcern, but made a mistake in their determination.
. ~ Had their review ofthe effect been correct, the switch repositioning would not have been performed, negating the need for a 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation.
~
NO INTENTIONTO DEFEAT SIAS AND CIAS TO V-2516
~
Sec. 50.59(a)(1)(i)
-. "Maymake changes"
~
Sec. 50.59(a)(l) - "the proposed change"
~
Sec. 50.59(a)(2) - "Aproposed change"
~ Sec. 50.59(b)(3)(c) - "facilitywho desires a change"
~
I@E Enforcement Manual Part 9800 - "identifyproposed changes"
10CFR50.59 JUMPER &LIFTED LEAD PROGRAM IMPORTANT&BE'ERS 8c LIFTEDLAUDS
~ Important Jumper &Lifted Leads have Safety Evaluations.
~ Con6rmed by a Comprehensive Engineering Review.
I DOCUMENTATIONON LESS IMPORTANTAJMPERS 8c LIFTED LEADS
~ Alljumpers &1ifted leads that required Safety Evaluations did have Safety Evalu ations.
~ The potential existed for documentation wealmesses, especially on the less important jumpers &lifted leads Engineering has performed Safety Evaluations on each jumper &lifted lead the NRC recently inquired. about (for those whichdid not already have a Safety Evaluation)
~
JUMPER 8c LIFTEDI%ADPROGRAM EIQQiNCEMENTS
~ 'Ihe Shift Technical Advisor (STA) willprovide recommendations concerning the appli-cability of 10CFR50.59 to jumper &lifted lead requests.
~ The STA willperform written Safety Evaluations as required in 10CFR50.59.
~ Criteria for prior Facility Review Group (FRG-Plant Safety Review Committee) review provided in procedure.
KEYENHANCEMENTS TO OUR JUMPER & LIFTED LEAD PROCEDURE
~
STA reviews proposed JLL and affected component against FUSAR requirements.
~
STA prepares a 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation when component is referenced in FUSAR.
Prior R Post FRG review criteria inade clear.
~
Any "POST'RG reviews performed at next scheduled FRG (these are twice weekly).
~
Any 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation reviewed and approved by FRG wi11 be forwarded to NRC in our annual report.
E2QVIIPLE:
Under the current procedure, the jumper on PDIS-2216 would require a:
~ Safety Evaluation
~ Prior FRG review and approval
ENCLOSURE 2
LIST OF ATTENDEES Enforcement Conference May 26, 1988 Florida Power and Li ht Com an W.
F.
Conway, Senior Vice President K. N. Harris, Vice President - St.
Lucie G. J. Boissy, Plant Manager - St.
Lucie J.
K. Hays, Director, Nuclear Licensing C.
L. Burton, Operations Supervisor C.
A. Pell, Technical Supervisor C.
F. Leppla, IEC Supervisor G. J. Keller, Power Plant Engineering A. G. Menocal, Power Plant Engineering NRC M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
A.
F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
B. A. Wilson, Chief, Projects Branch 2, DRP G.
R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff R.
V. Crlenjak, Chief, Projects Section 2B (PS2B),
DRP H. Bibb, Resident Inspector - St.
- Lucie, DRP E.
G. Tourigny, Project Manager, NRR H. 0. Christensen, Project Engineer,
- PS2B, DRP B. Uryc, Senior Enforcement Coordinator, RII R. J.
- Goddard, Regional Counsel
ENCLOSURE 3
MEETING
SUMMARY
This was an Enforcement Conference to discuss the issues surrounding the blocking of the safety injection actuation signal and containment isolation signal to a letdown isolation valve for a 24-day period.
Mr. Ken Harris, Site Vice President, began the opening remarks for FPL.
Mr.
Ernst provided the opening remarks for the NRC.
The details of the event are described in enclosure 1.
At the end of the
- meeting, the NRC expressed concern with the lack of knowledge of the operators for the functioning of the Normal/Isolate switch and their misuse of plant drawing and wiring diagrams.
Both the NRC and FPL made positive statements concerning the reactor operator trainee, who discovered the isolation event.