ML17207A877

Forwards Addl Info Re Selected Items in 790817 Fire Protection Program Safety Evaluation

ML17207A877
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	03/06/1980
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-80-76, NUDOCS 8003110638
Download: ML17207A877 (29)

Text

REGUL'ATORY INNATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTI(RIDE;L ACCESSION NBR ! 8003110638 DOC"B DATE e 80/03/06 NOTARIZED!

NO FACIL:50 335 St ~. L'Uc<e Pta'nti Unit ii Flor ida~ Power; 8 Light Co..

AUTHBNAME'UTHOR AFFILIATION UHRIGr R ~ E",,

Fil or i daj Power 8 Light Co.,

REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT". AFFILIATION REIDr R ~ H, Operating Reactors Branch DOCKET 05000335

SUBJECT:

Forwards addlr info, re selected items in'90817 fire protection pt'ogram safety evaluation.

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Mr. R.

W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 84 Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Reid:

Re:

St. Lucie Unit 1

Docket No. 50-335 Fire Protection Your letter of August 17, 1979 forwarded Amendment 33 to Operating License DPR-67.

Section 3 of the accompanying Safety Evaluation Report discussed several modifications that Florida Power 8 Light Company plans to make to improve the St. Lucie Unit 1 fire protection program.

Those items in Section 3 that are marked with an asterisk require the submittal of additional information prior to implementation.

Please refer to letter L-79-235 dated August 24, 1979 for information pertain-ing to asterisked items 3.6 (Fire Door Evaluation) and 3.7 (Ventilation Duct Penetrations).

Information pertaining to the remaining asterisked items is attached to the present letter.

Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 5 Technology REU/MAS/ms Attachment cc:

J.

P. O'Rei lly, Region II Harold F. Reis, Esquire 8008 110 PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING SELECTED ITEMS IN THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DATED AUGUST 17 1979 3.1.4 U

rade Existin Fire Pum s

There are three modifications required for the upgrading of St. Lucie Unit 1 fire pumps.

I.

The first modification will provide the capability for the two fire pumps to automatically start upon a loss of offsite power and a drop of pressure in the fire water distribution system.

The existing installation with the fire pumps on safety related 480 volt load centers (lA2 and 1B2) has the capability of starti ng automatically upon a drop of pressure in the fire water distribution system, but has only manual start capability upon loss of offsite power.

The design requirements to be met for this modification are:

(1)

Upon loss of offsite power, a specified diesel generator loading sequence is followed.

The modification will be

,designed to accommodate proper diesel generator load sequenci ng-(2)

Whenever possible, additional equipment and/or material will be similar to what was used for the existing installation.

This will simplify construction and maintenance, and will help ensure that functional requirements previously considered (such as design, environmental, and material requirements) will not be affecte'd.

(3)

Equipment and material will be procured to qualification criteria at least as good as the "surroundi ng environment or circuitry".

II.

The second modification provides for installation of a pressure switch for each fire pump such that if there is a drop of pressure in the distribution system in close proximity to the fire pump, the appropriate fire pump start circuitry will be engaged.

The existing installation utilizes two pressure switches (PS 354) to sense pressure for the plant fire header and transformer deluge system.

Either pressure switch has the capability to start both fire pumps simultaneously.

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above, a setpoint will be used for the pressure switch such that a true drop of pressure i.s detected, and not surges which may cause false starts.

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The third modification provides for the removal of the capability to stop the fire pumps from the control room.

This capability presently exists through the use of CS-852-2 and CS-853-2 (control switches on the RTGB).

The design basis for this modification is to ensure that stop capability is removed without affecting other circuitry.

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3.9 Cable S readin Room - Fire Barrier Seismic Fire Wall Design - (1-1/2 hour rated)

Design Basis:

The design of the seismic fire wall separating the cable spreading room adheres to the requirements of the American Institute of Steel Construction, the

FSAR, and Reg.

Guide 1.29, Item C.2.

The wall construction will consist of 5/8" Gypsum Board with 1 layer on 1 side and 2 layers on the other side.

The Gypsum wall will be installed to satisfy the required 1-1/2 hour non-combustible fire rating.

Cable Room Fire Door - (1-1/2 hour rated)

Design Basis:

The design of this,fire door and its related components complies with the latest requirements of the American Institute of Steel Construction, the National Fire Protection Association, and the FSAR.

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Early warning detectors (ionization type) are to be installed in close proximity to the pumps to detect fires in the incipient stage.

The fire detection design was performed in

'ccordance with plant design criteria and utilizes components and materials similar to the original design.

Both A 8 B zones were brought into the subject areas which will ensure redundant detection in safety related areas in accordance with the original system design philosophy and FSAR Section 9.5. l.

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3.13.3 Reactor Coolant Pum Oil Collection S stem Conceptual Design-The Conceptual Design is based on preventing potential oil leakage from getting to the reactor coolant loop piping.

This will be achieved by the following:

(1)

Installation of a collection system capable of removing leakage oil to a safe location.

(2)

Insuring that insulation installed on the RCP pump casing and loop piping does not have a surface temperature in excess of 150'F.

The Allis Chalmers motors have the most potential oil leakage locations (e.g. lift pumps and piping, oil coolers and piping).

The motors are mounted on a motor support plate and are fairly well contained between support webs by design.

By proper utilization of angle iron (l-l/2"xl-1/2"x3/16") and sheet metal (ll gauge [. 125"j) enclosures can be made that will contain oil leakage and also allow access for routine operation and maintenance checks-Hinged and/or easily removed panels will be provided for routine access.

Oil leakage will be piped to a safe location for each RCP.

Air circulation will be provided for the lift pump motors via strategic location of louvers.

The bearing oil level detectors will also be boxed in, however, some modifications may be required to move the level sensors within the cavities.

Per specifications (Ebasco 8770. 100),

components inside containment have a maximum allowable surface temperature of 150'F, therefore, if the RCP pump bowl assembly is properly insulated, the possibility of a fire is remote.

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3.14.5 Automatic S rinkler S stem System Description-The Diesel Generator fire protection system shall be a completely automatic, supervised, preaction sprinkler system with fixed fusable link sprinkler heads in quantity and type re'quired for adequate water coverage of the equipment to be protected in the diesel generator enclosures.

Pire in the diesel generator rooms shall be detected by thermal detectors located at strategic points in the diesel generator rooms.

These heat detectors shall be so wired that any unit when activated will trip the electrically operated s'pri nkler valve.

This sytem shall be so wired that it will be suitable for manual activation as well as automatic activation.

The manual activation will be by an electrical - manual release in a br'eakfront box.

This station will be mounted on the local monitor panel.

In addition, one manual release station for each diesel generator room shall be provided on the west side of the diesel generator building.

These manual release stations shall be suitable for outdoor installation and shall be appropriately 1 abel ed.

Each fire protection system (lA and 1B) is designed to include the following items:

Strainer with blowdown valve, OS 8

Y gate valve, one preaction sprinkler valve, check valve, water piping, closed sprinkler

heads, thermal detector with the required electrical and instrument connections to the preaction sprinkler valve, automatic. control

device, audible fire alarm (local and remote),

and a normally closed globe valve for drain and testing purposes.

Design Requirements-The fire protection system shall be operable at the location specified and ample consideration shall be given to the effects of possible extreme weather conditions.

All electrical equipment, instruments, and other accessories shall be suitable for the specifi ed conditions.

The systems will be supplied from the supply header of the plant's fire protection system located on the south side of the Diesel Generator Building.

The Diesel Generator Fire Protection System shall be designed such that, with a fire in either room, only the system in that room will be placed in operation, and shall remain in operation until the gate valve for the respective system is shut off.

Provisions'shall be made for draining that portion of the piping system downstream of the initiation valve.

All auxiliary electrical systems shall be monitored fail safe in the event of loss of power or failures of relays.

A set of contacts shall be provided for a remote annunciator to indicate operation of either of the systems and other abnormal conditions, such as loss of instrument air, voltage, and closure of the shut off valve.

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Each protective system shall have a monitor panel located near the valve station and in the control room containing all electrical and other devices which are not mounted at the valve station.

This panel shall provide alarm indications for each D/G room for the following conditions:

- System operating

- Closure of shut-off valve

- Loss of control voltage and/or air pressure Each alarm shall be 'provided with a name plate indicating function and system.

All indicating lights are to be normally.unlighted.

The controls for this system including strainer and valves will be located outdoors.

Sleeves for both control and water piping will be provided through walls.

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FEBRUARY 3 5 1980 FEBRUARY llBlRPIWMCfO'LY[

LOB'I TRIBUTION:

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TERA DEisenhut WGammill LShao

-'ocket No. 50-335 JR/1iller RReid Dr. Robert E. Uhrig BGrimes Vice President Florida Power 8 Light Company Advanced Systems 5 Technology P. 0. Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152 PErickson RIngram File OELD BACRS

(-.16)

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Dear Dr. Uhrig:

On December 28, 1979 the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued Information Notice No. 79-37 that presented information available to the staff related to the discovery of cracks in the keyway and bore sections of Westinghouse

'1800 rpm low pressure turbines.

A copy of this Information Notice with errata sheet is enclosed.

Westinghouse notified utility users of this potential problem on October 30, 1979 and was requested by the staff to present a similar briefing in

Bethesda, Haryland on December 17, 1979.

You were contacted on December 14, 1979 and invited to send representatives to the staff briefing and also were requested to advise the staff of the actions being taken in regard to this potential problem at your operating nuclear power p'lant.

W t' se was later requested to meet again with the staff and licensee-es lnglouse users on January 8, 1980 to supplement the information provided n the earlier meeting and in interim correspondence with the staff.

On the basis of information provided by Westinghouse,and recent indications from turbine disc inspections now underway at Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1, Beaver Valley /nit 1 and Indian Point Unit 2, it is evident that the probability of crack formation in these turbine discs is significantly greater than previously assumed by the vendor.

In light of this information and the actions being taken by the licensee-users, we consider this warrants your-prompt full UT inspection of LP rotor discs, especially the keyways and bore areas, and documentation to the NRC of your justification for continued operation until such inspections are made and all defects thus identified are corrected.

Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f), you are requested to provide within 20 days of the date of this letter, or in any event prior to restart if your unit is not operating, written'tatements, signed under oath or affirmation, which will enable the staff to determine whether or not your license to operate St. Lucie, Unit No.

1 should be modified, suspended, or revoked.

As part of your statement, you should provide and address the safety significance of the information requested in Enclosure 2 to this letter.

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