ML17207A654
| ML17207A654 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1979 |
| From: | Conlon T, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A650 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-79-18, NUDOCS 7912180367 | |
| Download: ML17207A654 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000389/1979018
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA,G EORG IA30303
go/ - 5 1979
Report No. 50-389/79-18
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida
33101
Facility Name:
St. Lucie, Unit 2
. Docket No. 50-389
License
No.
CPPR-144
Inspection at St. Lucie site near Ft. Pierce, Florida
Inspector:
J. J.
L
an
3" IP~S
Date
igned
Accompanying Personnel:
C. E. Murphy (October ll 6 12, only)
Approved by
T. E. Conlon, Section Chief,
RCES Branch
Da
Signed
SUMMARY
Inspection
on October 9-12,
1979
Areas Inspected
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
involved
42 inspector-hours
onsite in the
areas
of soils
and concrete
lab, protective
inside
containment,
and
licensee identified items.
Results
Of the three
areas
inspected,
no apparent
items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified in two areas;
two apparent
items of noncompliance
were found in
one area (Infraction - Failure to procure protective coating materials
as safety-
related items - paragraph
5; and Infraction - Failure to initiate NCR and place
discrepant material in hold area - paragraph 5).
~DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
~"B.
~W.
wE
>K.
C.
MO
~"N.
S.
J. Escue,
Site Manager
M. Hayward,
QA Construction Supervisor
W. Sherman,
QA Engineer
Van Oeveren,
QA Record Custodian
Carlos, Civil QC Supervisor
J. Karch,
QA Engineer
E. Vessely,
Corporate
QA Manager
T.
Weem,
QA Manager,
Construction
Willite, Civil QC Testing Supervisor
Other Organizations
"-R. A. Garramore,
Senior Resident Engineer,
EBASCO
R. Blair,
QC Receiving Supervisor,
U.S. Testing
"V. J. Gerley,
ESSE Civil Design Supervisor,
EBASCO
~L. V. Pelosi,
ESSE Site Supervisor,
EBASCO
"~Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit .Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on October
12,
1979, with
those persons
indicated in Paragraph
1 above.
The licensee
acknowledged the
noncompliances
discussed in paragraph
5.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information is required to
determine
whether
they are
acceptable
or
may involve noncompliance
or
deviations.
New unresolved
items identified during this inspection
are
discussed in Paragraph
5.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort
The inspector examined the following areas:
a ~
b.
c ~
Construction status
Concrete
and soils laboratory and currentness
of calibration of laboratory
equipment
Partial
placement
of pour numbers
NRW-2 and
NRW-4, foundation base
mats in the north retaining wall
d.
e.f.
Unconfined compression testing of 28-day old concrete cylinders from a
base mat in the south retaining wall
Qualification records of Cadwelders
Specifications
and procedures
for Service Level I protective coatings
including:
(1)
Procedure
QI 9.7, "General Inspection of Coating Application and
Surface Preparation"
(2)
Procedure
SQP-43,
"Application of Protective
Coatings - Service
Level I"
(3)
EBASCO Specification
FL0-2998.769D,
"General Protective
for Nuclear Power Plants"
(4)
Drawing No. 2998-G-496
SOI and DCN-550-174
gh.
Receiving inspection and storage of protective coating materials
Application of protective coating materials in the'eactor
containment
neutron tunnel
Review of drawing
number
2998-G-496
SOI
and
DCN-550-174
disclosed
the
following unresolved
item.
The material being
used to fillthe expansion
joint between
the interior base
concrete
and the containment
steel liner
plate
has
not
been qualified to
and
DBA conditions.
This
appears
to be in conflict with NRC requirements.
This
was identified to
the
licensee
as
Unresolved
Item 389/79-18-01,
"Use of expansion joint
filler inside
containment
not qualified to
DBA conditions".
This item is
being evaluated by the NRC.
Examination
of receiving inspection
and
storage
of protective
coating
materials disclosed the following noncompliances:
a
~
Procedure
ASP-8 requires that purchase
requisitions
(RPA's) for safety
related material be prepared in accordance
with the FPSL
QA Manual and
be submitted to FPRL Quality Assurance for review and approval.
Exami-
nation of requisitions
(RPA's) for purchase
of safety related Service
Ievel I protective
coating materials for use
on concrete
inside
the
containment prepared prior to March of 1979, disclosed that preparation
and review of the
RPA's
were not done in accordance
with the
above
requirements.
As
a result,
the Service
Level I concrete protective
coating materials
were
ordered
as non-safety material
and
were not
inspected
upon
receipt
by quality control
receiving
inspectors.
This
was identified to the licensee
by the inspector on'ctober ll,
1979,
as
Infraction
389/79-18-02,
"Failure to
Procure
Protective
Coating Materials as Safety Related Items".
b.
Procedure
SQP-21
requires
construction quality control to initiate a
nonconformance report when a discrepant condition involving a material,
part or component is identified.
In addition, the procedure
requires
that discrepant
items
be stored in hold areas.
On October
12,
1979,
the inspector
examined the concrete protective coatings
storage
area.
The protective
coating materials
which were purchased
as non-safety
"3"
materials
and on which no receiving inspection
had been performed were
not stored
in hold areas.
Discussions
with responsible
inspectors
disclosed that no inspection of .the materials
had been
made since the
discrepant
material
had
been identified
and that
a
nonconformance
report had not yet been initiated.'iscussions
with the EBASCO painting
supervisor
disclosed
that the materials
which had been identified as
discrepant
on October ll, 1979,
were in the process
of being applied
in the neutron tunnel in the reactor containment building.
The
painting'upervisor
was not aware of any problems with the protective coating
materials.
Failure to initiate a nonconformance
report and place the
discrepant
material in hold areas
was identified to the licensee
as
Infraction 389/79-18-03,
"Failure to Issue
an
NCR and Place Discrepant
Material in Hold Areas".
No deviations were identified.
6.
Iicensee Identified Items (50.55(e))
(Open)
Item 389/79-18-04):
Damage Resulting
from Collapse of Guy Derrick
Crane During Hurricane David.
On September
4,
1979, the licensee
reported
to
NRC Region II,
damage
to the reactor auxiliary building and reactor
building concrete shield wall, resulting from collapse of the
CBGI construc-
tion Guy Derrick crane during Hurricane David as
a potential 50.55(e)
item.
Prior to this inspection,
on October 4,
1979,
the licensee
submitted
an
interim report covering the hurricane
damage
and stated that the item was
reportable
under
the requirements
of 50.55(e).
After initial notification
by the licensee,
a special inspection of the hurricane
damage
was
made by
NRC Region II on September
5-6,
1979
(See Inspection Report Number 50-389/
79-15).
In the
October
4 interim report,
the
licensee
summarized
the
hurricane
damage identified to date
and the proposed corrective action to
repair the
damage.
The investigation of the
damage
to the structures
is
continuing
by non-destructively
testing
the
concrete
using pulse
echo
methods.
The inspector
reviewed nonconformance
reports
(NCR's) issued for
the hurricane
damage.
NCR's
examined
were
number
830 through 842,
845,
846,
848,
850,
851,
and
860.
The inspector discussed
proposed corrective
action with licensee
and
EBASCO engineers
and
examined
the areas
where
corrective action has
been
completed or is in progress.
This item remains
open pending
completion of repairs
to'amaged
areas
and
NRC review of the
licensee's final report.
The licensee
has not yet determined
the type of crane that willbe installed
to replace
the
damaged
crane.
The
FPSL Project
Manager
'agreed
to advise
Region II of their plans prior to startup of installation of the replacement
crane.
7.
Licensee Compliance with NRC Reporting Requirements
The reporting requirements
of
and 50.55(e)
were discussed
with the corporate
QA manager
and site
QA and
QC managers.
These individuals
were advised that Region II was in the process
of inspecting
each licensee
for compliance with reporting requirements.
These inspections
had revealed
many instances
where licensee personnel did not fully understand
the require-
ments
and where procedures
did not provide assurance
that the requirements
would be met.
The licensee personnel
were further advised that NRC Region II
would inspect their compliance with these
regulations in the near future and
that they should review their practices with regard to reporting.