ML17194A490

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Forwards Final Evaluation of SEP Topic III-4.D,site Proximity Missiles (Including Aircraft).Facility Considered Acceptably Safe.Evaluation Will Be Basic Input to Integrated Safety Assessment Unless as-built Changes Identified
ML17194A490
Person / Time
Site: Dresden 
Issue date: 02/22/1982
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Delgeorge L
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
References
TASK-03-04.D, TASK-3-4.D, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-104, LSO5-82-2-104, NUDOCS 8202260186
Download: ML17194A490 (5)


Text

February 22, 1982 Docket No. 50-237 LS05-82 104 t4r. L. Del-George Director of Nuclear Lic_ensing Corrmonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dear Mr. DelGeorge:

SUBJECT:

SEP WOPIC III-4.D, SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES (INCLUDING AIRCRAFT) ~ DRESDEN 2 Encl o,~ed f s our fina 1 eva 1 uation of SEP Topic II I-4. D for Dresden Unit 2.

This evaluation is b_ased-on the safety analysis provided in your letter dated December 8, 1981. This evaluation compares your facility with-the criteria currently used for licensing new facilities.

We have concluded that Dresden Unit 2 is considered acceptably safe against site proximity missiles.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built cond:ftfons at your fac1l1ty. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Enclosure:

As state~

cc w/enclosure:

See next page

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Sincer~jJjy, Paul O'Connor, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

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Mr. L. DelGeorge.

cc Isham, Lincoln & Beale Counselors at Law One First National Plaza,.42nd Floor Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr; B *. B. Stephenson*

Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Natural Resources Defense Council 917 15th Street, N. W.

Washington, D. C.

20005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden $tation RR #1 Morris, IlliTiois 60450 Mary*Jo Murray Assistant Attorney General Environmental Control Division 188 W. Randolph Street Suite 2315 thicago, 1llinois 60601 Morris Public Library 604 Liberty Street Morr1s, Illinois 60451 Cha frman Board of Supervisors bf Grundy County Grundy County *courthouse Morris, Illinois 60450

~ohn F. Wolf, Esquire 3409 Shepherd Street Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015 Dr. Linda W. Little 500 Hermitage Ori ve Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Judge Forrest J. Remick The Carriage House ~ Apartment 205 2201 L Street, N. W.

Washington, D. :G.

20037 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities ~ranch Region V Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 The Honorable Tom Corcoran United States House of Representatives Washington, o. c.

20515 James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforc~ment

  • 799 Roosevelt Street Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

e**

SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM III-4.D DRESDEN 2 TOPIC:

III-4.D, Site Proximitj Missiles tincluding Aircraft)

I.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of th_is topic. is to ensure that the integrity of the safety-related structures, systems and components would not be jeopardized due to the potential for a site proximity missile.

II.

'REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criterion 4, 11*Environmental and* Missile Design Basis, 11 of Appendix A, 11 General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, 11 to 10 CFR

.Part 50, 11 Licensing of Production and Util*ization Facilities, 11 requires that *nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be appropriately protected against events and conditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant.

. III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic II-1.C, 11 Potential Hazards or Changes in Poten.tial Hazards Due to Transportation, Institutional, Industrial and Military Facilities 11 provides

.*a description of the potential missile hazards.

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.3, 11 Evaluation of Potential.Accidents, 11 3.5.1.5, "Site Proximity Missiles (except Aircraft)," and 3.5.1.6,.. uAircraft Hazards."

V.

EVALUATION The potential for hazardous accidents in the vicinity of* the Dresden 2 station due to industrial, transportation, and militqry facilities is addressed in a report under SEP Topic II-1.C (Ref. 1 ).

In that report, 12 sources of hazard have been identified.

Table 1 lists these sources of hazard.

The possibility of missiles resulting from these sources is as fo 11 ow.s:

a}

It is concluded in Ref, 1 that explosions as a result of the first five cases listed in Table 1 do not constitute design basis events, since the safe distance criterion of R.G. 1.91 with regard to blast overpre-ssure is met.

Therefore, per R.G. 1.91, hazards from missile generation from sources 1 through 5 need not be considered.

For cases 2 through 5, this conclusion is based pn complete information.

Data is still being collected for case 1; the conclusion is based on the foformation available at the present time.

.. b)

The explosions resulting from sources 6 and 7 may give rise to over-pressure levels at the site in excess of 1 psi; however, missile generation from these explosions is not possible, since the hazard is due to travelling clouds and no direct missile.is expected from an explosion in the cloud.

c)

Sources 8 through 10 in Table 1 do not clearly relate to missile generating events; they have been included in the table to provide ease in cross referencing information in this report with that in Ref. 1.

d)

Sources* 11 and 12 in Table 1 relate to aircraft crashes of safety-related structures.

The frequency of such occurrences, based on con-servative assumptions, is calculated to be 1.06 x lQ-7 per year (Ref. 1).

The data from* low-altitude airways is currently being collected.

When this data is evaluated, the total risk from sources 11 and 12 will be obtained and compared to the guidelines given in SR~ 2.2.3.

VI.

CONCLUSION The conclusions of this report are summarized in Table 1.

Based on the available information, the Dresden 2 Nuclear Generatil]g Station is:.considered acceptably safe against site proximity missiles, including aircraft.

Additional data is being collected to rule out two possible sources.of "hazard; these are identified as such in Table l.

VI I.

REFERENCE Commonwealth Edison Company, 11 SEP Topic II-1.C, Potential Hazards Due to Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities, 11 dated :December l 9Sl.

C/\\SE I

1 2

3 I\\

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6*

7 0

I 9

I 10

1. l 12

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TABLE 1

$0URCES OF 11/\\/,/\\RD IDENTIFIED roR SEP TOPIC ~I-1.C,

/\\ND THEIR IMPLIC/\\TIONS FOR SITE PROXIMI'fY MISSILES SOURCE OF POTENTIAL II I\\ '1.i' RO IMPLICATION FOR SITE PROXIMITY MISSILES Explosion (rorn:

i ndu stria l facilities Questionnare has been sent to the local industries.

Based on present informa-t i*on, missile hazard has been ruled out on the basis of acceptable (RG 1.91) stand-o(f distance.*

h t(Jllw.:iy lr i.Jn::;por lot J.on r.J i b.r.J y tr<insportation Ruled out on the basis of the RG 1.91 w.::i l:c rw;:iy transportation stand-off distance *.

milil.:.iry facilities Pi()cline Ruled out because explosion would Vapor cloud e:<plos ion ( rom occur in the air.

w.::1lcrway transoort.Jtion Toxic chcrnci;:ils Collis i.on w.i th intake structures Not related to missile generation.

Liqu_ic.1 spills

/\\i:*cra(t i inpac t (rom:

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J a

  • 1:

a i. r nor ts Ruled out on the basis of low probabi 1 i t,y :,

(I l ( W a Y S Data has been requested* t rom the FAA.

. Will be consideri:?d on probability.basis

  • .:.'*-.t-o alona with case 11.

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