ML17194A121

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IE Insp Repts 50-237/81-21,50-249/81-15,50-254/81-16 & 50-265/81-16 on 810706-09.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Revise Procedures Re Operability Criteria for Evaluation of Suspension Sys Components Per IE Bulletin 79-14
ML17194A121
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Quad Cities  
Issue date: 08/20/1981
From: Brickley R, Danielson D, Fair J, Yin I
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17194A119 List:
References
50-237-81-21, 50-249-81-15, 50-254-81-16, 50-265-81-16, 81-237-81-21, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8109040157
Download: ML17194A121 (11)


See also: IR 05000237/1981021

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III*

Reports No. 50-237/81-21; 50-249/81-15;

50-254/81-16; 50-265/81-16

Docket Nos.

50~237; 50-249;

50-254; '50-265.

Licenses No. DPR-19; DPR-25

DPR-29; DPR-30

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company

P . 0. * Box 7 6 7

Chicago, IL

60690

Facility Name:

Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3

Quad-Cities Station, Units l and 2 *

Inspection At:

Nutlear Technology, Inc., San Jose, CA (Nutech)

EDS Nuclear Inc._, San Francisco, CA (EDS)

Inspection Conducted:

July 6~7~ 1981 *at Nutech

July 8-9, 1981 at EDS

Inspectors: L. T.Yin I~

f

~~

~

fvJ. R. Fair

Accompanying Persoruiel:

D. H. Danielson

Approved By:

D. H. Danielson, Chief

Materials & Processes Section

Inspection Summary

t/Jir1

inspection on July 6-.9, 1981 (Reports No. 50-237/81-21; 50-249/81-15;

50-254/81-16; 50~265/81~16

.

Areas Inspected:

Licensee actions relative to IE Bulletin No. 79-14 including

general discussions on NRC requirements, work procedure review and review of

analysis and calculations; review of analysis for Mark I torus LPCI modifica-

tion at Dresden.

The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours at the A-E's

offices by three NRC inspectors.

8109040157 810824

i !

l, ~DR ADOCK 05000~&~

__ !

Results:

Of the areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified

(EDS IEB 79-14 procedures did nbt reflect the latest evaluation criteria

Paragraph 2.b) .

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted

Inspection Conducted_ at Nuclear Technology Inc. (Nutech) on July 6-7,_ 1981

Nu tech

R. K. Keever, President

  • N. W. Edwards, Vice President, Engineering
  • A. B. Higgl.nbotham, General Manager
  • T. N. Vogel, Project Director
  • L. V. Sobon, General Manager, Projects
  • B. J. Whiteway, Project DI.rector
  • W. V. Weber, .Engineering Manager

J. Arterburn, Engineering Manager

  • T. J. Victorine, Project Manag~r

G. Wiederstein, Project Engineer

  • W. S. Gibbons, .QA Administrator
  • J. E. Bonner, QA Specialist
  • D. A. Hignite, QA Engineer

USNRC

U. Potapovs, Chief, Vendor Inspection Branch, RIV

  • D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section, RIII
  • J. R. Fair, Senior Mechanical Engineer, IE:HQ
  • R. H. Brickley, _Contractor Inspector, RIV
  • I. T. Yin, Reactor Inspector, -RIII

-*Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 7, 1981

Inspection Conducted at EDS Nuclear, Inc. (EDS) on July 8-9, 1981

EDS

  • B. F. Phipps,* Corporate QA Manager
  • T. C. Chen, Regional QA.Manager
  • M. J. Scholtens, Manager - Project Managemeht
  • B. M. Torsen, Manager, Administration
  • G. C. Slagis, Manager, Engineering Di~ision
  • R. A. Ayres, Section Manager
  • R. A. Hobgood, Western Region QA Manager
  • R. A. Fortney, Vice President and'Mana~er
  • S. M. Jaffer, Section Manager
  • W. F. Tschudi, Section Manager

K. Wong, Assistant Project Manager

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Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

M. C. Strait, Engineer

USNRC

  • R. H.
  • J. R.
  • L T.
  • D. H.

Brickley, Conttactor Inspect6r, RIV

Fair, Senior Mechanical Engineer, IE:HQ

Yin, Reactor Inspector, RIII

Danielson, Section Chief, RIII

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview on July 9, 1981

Functional or Program Areas Inspected

1.

Inspection at Nutech on Juiy 6-7, 1981 Involing Mark I Torus LPCI

Modification

The inspector reviewed the supporting analyses for the Mark I torus

LPCI modification at Dresden. * This modification consisted -0f an

extension of the LPCI discharge line piping from the ~riginal posi-

tion. above the pool surface to a new position below the pool sur-

face.

A preliminary design had shown lateral supports added to this

line with a subsequent design showing these suppor.ts deleted.

The following.documents were reviewed:

.a.

Letter dated April 23, 1981 from R. F. Petrokes to E. R. Zebus

summarizing the resul,ts at the LPCI analysis .. *

..

b.

Suppression chamber*internal piping fabrication and irrstallation

details; 64.313.0802, 2 sheets., Revision 2, dated Mai;ch 23., 1981,

"LPCI Full Flow Test 'Lines".*

. c.

Computer analysis model and output for the LPCI system inside

the torus;

Subsequent to the review, *the inspector determined that the analysis

is a preliminary analysis to support the recent modification to the

LPCI line inside the toru*s.

The analysis considered the original

seismic design loading condition as well as the newly developed

loading from the Mark I Long Term Program.

The stresses were within

the allowables defined for the Mark I Long Term Program.

This analysis was adequate to support the recent modification inside

the torus for the LPCI discharge line; however, the develbpiilent of

the Mark l Long Term Program loading conditions as well as the torus

structural modeling techniques are subject to final .review and approval

by the NRC when the Dresden Plant Unique Analysis for the Mark I

program is submitted for review.

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2.

Inspection at EDS onJuly 8-9, 1982

a.

.Blume Curve Implementation

The inspector reviewed the EDS procedures for implementing the Blume

Curve Criteria for the IE Bulletin 79-14 evaluation at Dresden 2 & 3

and Quad-Cities 1 & 2.

In review of Project Instructibns 5.0, "Eng-

ineering Criteria/Procedure for the Application of the Blume Curves

Criteria, Revi~iori. 4 and Revision 5, where Bectibn 4.1.1 states that

all spans bet.ween horizontal restraints should meet the rigid span

criteria.

EDS revised Project Instruction 5.0 at the time of the

inspection to*provide a table identifying the maximum span allowed

for each size pipe to meet the rigid sp.ari. criteria. ,EDS further

verified that only four piping runs thus far had been'considered

rigid in accordance with the Blume Criteria and these four runs

were checked for compliance with table presented in the Revision 5

to Project Instructi6n 5.0

The four piping runs were identified to be D2-HDSP-02B, Ql-MS-02B,

Ql:..RHRS-12B, and Ql-SLC-1.0*P.

Further review of these systems was

planned.

This is an unresolved item (237/81-21-01; 249/81-15-01;

254/81-16-01; 265/81-16-01).

b.

Review of EDS IEB-:79-14 Procedures

The inspector reviewed the subject technical Project Instructions

and had the following findings:

Title 1.0 "Engineering Criteria/Procedure for the Review and Resolu-

tion of As-Built Deviations",.Revision 3, dated August 1, 1980.

"Para. 2.0 Definitions"

"6.

Operability Limit - The .stress limit of 0.5 ultimate tensile

strength is considered the stress level at which operability is

no longer justified for operating basis loading conditions."

The operability limit stated in the procedure was, not in accordance

with the NRC criteria of 2.0 Sy for D~E conditions.

Title 2.0 "Administrative Procedure for Processing Bechtel Piping

Walkdown Packages Through Operability Assessment, 0 Revision 2,

dated March 7, 1980.

No adverse comment.

Title 4.0 "Review of As..:Built Package for Potential Nonconformances",

Revision 1, dated March 7, 1980.

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"Paragraph 4.2 Blume Piping."

"For piping that was qualified under the Blume Criteria, the initial

review shall consist of checking the seismic spans of piping.

The

tolerance specified in the Deviation Criteria mentioned in 4.1 is

also applicable for the Blume piping.

For example, the as-built

seismic spans can differ from the Blume Curve spans by the toler-

ances specified in the Deviation Criteria. ,'Pip:lng spans. which

exceed the above require!Ilents shall be identified as pbtential

nontohformances.

the inspector stated th~t the Deviation Criteria is not appli~able

to Blume Curv~ rigid sys tern design crite_ria.

Title 5.0 "Engineering Criteria/Procedure for the Application of the

Blume Curves Criteria", Revision 4,* dated June 6, 1981.

"Para. 4.1.1 Horizontal Direction"

"All spans should meet the rigid span criteria.

Do*not support

the piping in the flexible range."

The inspector found that 611 and 8" pipe curves were not generated for

Dresden 2 and 3.

EDS corrected the situation prior to the comple-

tion of the inspection.

Tables with specific.maximum spans based on

.Blume Curve criteria were established for Dresden 2 & 3, and Quad*

Cities 1 and 2.

Title 6. 0, "Proc.edure for the Computer Reanalysis of Piping, Revision

2, dated October 9, 1980.

No adverse comment.

Title 8. 0 "Pipe Support Engineering Criteria/Procedure for the

Review and Resolution of As-Built Deviations", Revision 2, dated

April 10, 1980.

.

"Para. 2.0 Definitions"

"(6) Operability Limit - The stress limit of 0.5 ultimate tensile

strength is considered the stress level at which operability is no

longer justified for operating basis loading conditions."

"Para. 6.2 Operability Assessment by Analytical Evaluation"

"(2) ... "Detailed evaluations will be required for all portions

of the support design uriless that design is for qualified Blume

Curve piping.

Detailed evaluations are not intended to provide

complete calculated qualification of supports."

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The inspector stated that the operability criteria stated in Para-

graph 2.0(6) was not in accordance with the NRC requirement of 2.0

Sy at DBE c.onditions, and that the intent of Paragraph 6. 2. (2) was

unclear.

Title 10.0 "Thermal Criteria for Blume Piping", Revision 2, dated

October 28, 1980.

No adverse comment.

Title 13.0 "Blume Curve Isometric Procedure", Revision O, 6/12/80.

No adverse comment .

. Title 17.0 "Procedure for Requesting Non-Seismic Piping Information",

Revision 1, September 11, 1980.

No adverse comment ..

Title 2 i. 0 "Procedure for Initial Acceptance Criteria of Piping

Systems", Revision O, dated May 7, 1981.

"Para. 2.3 Nonlinear Analysis".

"Refinements to the above analysis methods will be made on a case

by case basis to include nonlinear effects of the piping system due

to strain handling".

"Para. 3.0 Limits of Stress for tnitial Acceptance Criteria.

A less

stringent criteria can be adopted for stainless steel piping on

a case-by-case basis:

<TfsE + ~+uP*~ 2 .. 2oY

~SE +if&~ 2.0.(ff'

.The inspector stated tha.t the nonlinear analysis had not been

concurred with by the NRC, and the stress limit for stainless

steel pipe was not considered to be acceptable.

This was based

on discussions during previous NRC and licensee meetings."

Title 24.0

"Overlap Procedure for Piping Stress Analysis",

Revision O, -October 3, 1980.

No adverse comment.

Title 26.0

"CECO Nonlinear Pipe Analysis", Revision O, dated

October 24, 1980.

No adverse comment.

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Title 27.0

"Procedure for Checking Reanalyzed Problems", Revision

0, dated December 1, 1980.

"Blume Curve Piping Analysis .Check List."

5.

Have the spans been determined to be rigid, .resonant or flexible?

6.

For flexible spans, ha~ the elevation been consideredT'

The inspettor stated that only Blume Curve rigid span criteria were

considered to be acceptable by the NRC.

Title 28.0, "General Pipe Support Design Engineering Procedures",

Revision O, dated January 21, 1981.

No adverse comment ..

Title 29.0, Procedure for Hand Calculation of Pipe Seismic Stresses

and Support Loads by the Equivalent Static Method", Revision 1, dated

April 6, 1980 ..

No adverse comment.

Subsequent to*the review, the inspector concluded that the proce-

dures contained conflicting requiremen:ts.

The operability criteria

for the evaluation of the installed suspension system component were

not *in accordance with the NRG requirements.

This is an apparent

viOlation identified in Appendix A.

(237/81-21-02; 249/81-15-02;

254/81-16~02; 265/81-16-02).

c.

CRD Design and Analysis

The inspector reviewed the following operability analysis for the

CRD insert and withdrawal lines at Dresden Unit *2 and Quad-Cities

Units 1 and 2:

Calculation Problem 09, "CRDHS Operability Study".

Calculation .Problem Z-001, "Lbad Deflection Data_ for CRDHS

Frames".

Calculation Problem F-103, "Dresden Unit 2 Outside Drywall

Support Qualification".

Drawing No. H-13, Sheet 1 & 2, Revision A, SKB-2-1000-6.

Drawing No. H-14, Sheet 1.£.2, Revision A, SKB-2-1000-7.

Drawing No. DCN #DZ-025, Sheet 3.f.7.

The purpose of the review was to determine whether or not the

licensee had implemented the following NRC meeting conclusions.

Meeting Summary of June 12, 1981 meeting with CECO t-0 discuss

CRD System Reanalysis Criteria, dated June 25, 1981.

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<

'

I

Meeting Summary Of June 30, 1981 meeting with CECO to discuss

results of the operability evaluation for the CRD System.

Subsequent to the review, the inspector concluded.that the CRD

System Operability analysis for Dresde.n 2 a:nd Quali-Cit~es 1 & 2 was

in accordance with the analytical techniques and criteria permitted

in the June 12, and June 30, 1981 meetings between CECO and the NRC.

The acceptability of these supports where the operability criteria

for support stresses (less than yield stress) is exceeded is contin-

_ gent on CECO providing an acceptable schedule for modification of

these supports to within the original operability criteria.

This

schedule for support modifications for Dresden Units 2 & 3 and

Quad .. cities Units 1 & 2 should be provided to Region III by the

middle of August, 1981.

d.

Follow up on Previously Identified Issues

A number of questionable !EB 79-14 evaluation methods were identi-

fied during. a* RIII inspection at EDS in February, 1980 (RIII

Inspection Reports No. 50-237/80-05; 50-249/80-05; 50-254/80-05;

and 50-265/80..,08) and in June, 1980 (RIII Inspection Reports

No.

50-237/~0-10; 50-249/80-14; 50-254/80-14; .arid. 50-265/80-17).

These questionable design issues were discussed and reviewed by

the inspector during this inspection.

The followings is status

of resolution:

(1)

The EDS evaluation was limited to those deficiencies and devia-

tions identified during field veri£ication inspections although

the criteria of evaluation had been upgraded from the original

design considerations.

EDS committed to check restraint lo-

cations to assure pipe spans are within the rigid sides of

the response spectrum curves.

It .is anticipated that EDS will

evaluate the adequacy of the original seismic an;;ilysis and

restraint design for the Dresden.2 & 3 and Quad-Cities 1 ~ 2

systems in light of the apparent lack of instructions avail-

able for the original analyses and designs on how to use the

.Blume Curves.

This item was reviewed.

The findings are documented in Para-

graph 2.a, and 2~b of this report.

(2)

Because of defective restraints identified in the Standby Gas

System 7509-24" line, EDS was requested to re-evaluate all

previous operability evaluations to assure compliance with NRc*

criteria.

For example, EDS calculation No. Ql-HPCI-OIC, dated

June 16, 1980, apparently used the wrong earthquake condition

in the evaluatiori.

The matter including EDS Calculation No.

Ql~HPCI-OlC was

ieviewed by the inspector.

The piping stress analysis sho~s

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-..

that the system is within the current operability stress

limit for the SSE of .2. o Sy.

(3)

Regarding EDS Calculation No. DS-LPCI-03C, Revision O, ques-

tionable methods were used in selecting the horizontal stati~

seismic coefficient to be used in the calculation.

It was stated by the licensee that the center of gravity method

was the original.method used by S&L.

This item is not considered

to be within the scope of IEB 79-14.

(4)

Safety relief valve discharge forces do not appear to have

been considered in conjunction with the seismic loads.

The

specifiC case involved line No. Ql-RHRS-4858 B-4 and valve

No. RV-1-1001-165B.

The inspector reviewed EDS package Ql"".RHRS-09B to evaluate

safety or relief valve loading conditions.

EDS is following

the original analysis techniques for safety or relief valve

discharge events.

If these events were not part of the original

analysis,.EDS is not generating new loads.

CECO committed to

look into the necessity of generating safety or relief valve

loads if they were not part of the original analysis.

They

will advise RIII of how these loadings will be handled.

This is an unresolved item (237/81-21-03; 249/81-15-03;

254/81-16-03; 265/81-16-03).

(5)

Stress intensification factors are apparently.not being consi-

dered in the system evaluations based .on the Blume Curve design.

Since the licensee has committed to use only the rigid span

criteria of the Blume Curve, this matter is resolved.

(6)

Using the Blume Curves, Quad-Cities piping above elevation

579 ft. used a factor of three to account for amplification

in determining restraint loads.

The conservation of the

factor *of three is questionable.

The CECO document, "Unresolved Items From Previous NRC Audits

of EDS Nuclear" dated January 26, 1981 was forwarded to RIII

.through a CECO letter, dated March 12, 1981.

Relative to the

subject matter, it was stated that, "the factor of 3 is used

in the cookbook approach to piping design to allow for amplified

responses of flexible piping systems at building elevations Bbove

ground level.

This factor is applied to the hanger design load

and seismic deflection.

The span length is not effected, there-

fore, the first model frequencies should remain in the flexible

range." Further review of this area is planned as a result o.f

-

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.

.. ..

the licensee committing to use the rigid span criteria.

This

is an unresolved .item (237 /81-21-04; 249/81-:-15-04; 254/81-16-04;

265/8i-16-04).

e.

Review of EDS Control of Project Instructions (Pis)

During personnel interview with EDS IEB 79-14 evaluation task

personnel, the inspector found that all the engineers within the

Structural Design Section maintained a copy of controlled Pis,

but this was not required by the engineers within the Piping

Analysis Section, and one out of date PI was identified. It

was stated by the EDS Regional QA Manager that the Pis are

controlled by the Project Engineers (PEs), and the distribution

of Pis are determined by the PEs.

The present EDS QAP 3.9,

"Procedures and Instructions", Revision 3, dated March 7,. 1980,

relative to the Generic Technical _Procedure (GTP), states, "The

respbnsible divisibn shall establish a distribution list for the

procedure manuals issued for use, to ensure that designated

recipients have the current manual issue." Since the Pls are not

considered GTPs, the control was not being applied uniformly.

During the management exit meeting, EDS committed to revise QAP3.9

to include the Pis as a part of the company GTPs and a distribution

list will.be developed for better control.

This .is an unresolved

item (237/81~21~05; 249/81-15-05; 254/81~16~05; 265/81-16-05).

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order

to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or

deviations.

Four unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are dis-

cussed in Paragraphs 2.a, 2.d.(4), 2.d.(6), and 2.e.

Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the

inspection.

The inspector sumniarized the scope and findings-of the inspection~

The licensee acknowledged the*findings*:r;eported herein.

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