ML17192A584
| ML17192A584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle, 05000273  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1980 |
| From: | Peoples D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Grimes B NRC - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17192A585 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003210534 | |
| Download: ML17192A584 (8) | |
Text
,_
~~< l,,
Commonwea1t9tison *
- One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois*.
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 March 11, 1980
- Mr.. Brian K. Grimes, Director Emergency Preparedness Task Group_
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
N~clear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Evacuation Time Estimates For Areas Near Nuclear Power Plants Dresden Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2, Zion Station Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2, Byron Station Units 1 and 2, Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2, NRC Docket Nos. 50-10/273/249; 50-254/265, 50~295/304, 50-373/374, 50-454/455/456/457 References (a): a Grimes letter to All Power Reactor Licensees; dated November 29~ 1979 (b): B. Gri~es letter to Applicants for Construction Permits And Licensees Of Plants:Under Construction; dated December 26, 1979.
(c): Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, Appendix VI to Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), Section 11.1.1.3, dated October, 1975..
(d): D. L. Peoples,* et. al letter to H. R.
Denton; dated February 25, 1980
Dear Mr. Grimes:
In response to the request for information contained in References (a) and (b), as qualified by your guidance on respons~ submittal dates given to Mr. 0. Knuth (KMC Owners Group on Emergency Preparedness), Commonwealth Edison submits preliminary Evacuation Time Study Reports for Dresden, Quad Cities, Zion and LaSalle CouMty Stations.
Reports for Byron and. Braidwood Stations have not been prepared at this time due.1'
/
I i
to the present lack of detail planning and coordination by
~
state and lo_c~l authorit~es for ~-he locali~i~s s~rrounding
~~~\\\\
Byron and Braidwood Stations.
Given the similarity of these ~ ~\\ 0-\\
two localities to those surrounding the Dresden, Quad Cities v
ti* '
f/Y IY if'~
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~
F soo3210..s ~'"+
Mr Brian K. Grimes March 11, 1980 Page 2 Commonwealth Edison
- and LaSalle County site~, it is not expected that the evacuation time estimates for Byron and Braidwood will be~
significantly different.
A thorough assessment is expected to*
be provided as a part of the operating license review for. these.
- two sites.
The enclo~ed reports ~ere.prepared using data pr6vided by the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and local planners, plus data on special facilities gathered by Commonwealth Edison.
Although developed from the best available data, the findings of these reports must be considered pteliminary because they were prepared prior to the finalization of the Illinois emergency response plan, as ~ell as the plans for the 6ontinguous states of Wisconsin and towa.
These plans are und~rgoing intensive review and modification to accom~odate the 10 mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ)..
Final estimates are expected to be developed as a part of the review of the final state and local plans.
The ~nclosed estimates have been reviewed by the state and lrical emergency planners and where necessary changes were made to incorporate the suggestions of those planners.
In performing the subject studies, two considerations which the NRC requested be addressed; i.e. (1) evacuation' time under adverse weather condition~, and (2) the time requir~d to confirm evacuation, could not be addressed quantitatively at this time.
However, it is judged that the inherent conservatism in the estimation of the total evacuation time as well as the alternative protective actions discussed in Attachment A to the reports minimizes the impact of the lack of an adverse weather estimate.
In addition, the state and local emergency response plans will consider methods of verifying that the entire ~ublic sector has been notified.
Methods to be considered may include the use of readily visible tags which would be previously distributed, as well as confirmatory
- notification.
The report~d estimat~s for general population evacuation times within the 10 mile EPZ are, upon analysis, quite similar for Dresden, Quad Cities, Zion, and LaSalle*
County.
In fact with few exceptions these estimates indicate evacuati6n *times of l~ss than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
This is consistent with the WASH-1400 results (Reference (c)) for which the merjian effective evacuation speed was determined to be 1.2 mph; resulting in an evacuation out to 10 miles in just over 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The only significant deviation reported involves the estimate developed for the evacuation of the zone which 1
includes the City 6f Kenosha, Wisconsin.
The center of Kenosha is 10 miles north of Zion Station, and its southern extre~ity
Mr Brian K. Grimes.
March 11, 1980 Page3*
Commonwealth Edison
- is approximately 8 miles from the plant.
If that city was excluded from the evacuation time estimate for its zone, it is expected that the e~acuation time would be reduced well below 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
In *order to reduce the calculated evacuation times which include Kenosha, Commonwealth Edison has recommended chang~s to the p~oposed evacu~tion routes for that locality which would reduce the Kenosha evacuation time by almost 40%.
It is expected that final refinemehts in the state (Wisconsin) arid local evacuation.plans will eliminate this disparity.
. Although Commonwealth Edison acknowledges the necessity to make the type of assessment documented in the enclosed reports, it is.essential that the results be reviewed*
objecti~ely, recognizing that the evacuation plans upon which the estimates are based are currently undergoing significant expansion.
Furthermorei your review must recognize the ove~all safety design bases for the plant, because the emergency plan represents only one of the protective measures implemented to protect the health and safety* of the public.
In this regard significant attention has been focused on the public notification guidelines to which reference is made in References (a) and (b).
The basis for these guidelines as related by the NRC are release projections ~ontained in WASH-1400~
Although admittedly certain release categories were reported to have release times as low as 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />; the NRC has thus far failed to acknowledge the minimal contribution to overall risk th~t those categories represent.
Recognizing the psychological impact such information has on the public at risk, it is essential that both the NRC and the utility industry accurately characterize the significance.of all technical data.
This is particularly true in the case of Zion Station which is currently undergoing an intensive review by the NRC.
In this regard, the Indian Point/Zion Near Site Study Report (Reference (d)) clearly demonstrates that neither of these plants represent~ an unusual risk to the public.
This is, in part, the result of the care taken in the initial design of the plant.
It has been demonstrated based on plant specific probabalistic analyses that the co~bined risk for the Zion plant is on~ to two orders of magnitude less than that for the reference plant analyzed in WASH-1400.
An additional reduction in ~isk of approximately two orders'of magnitude, i.e. total reduction by a factor of 10,000, may be postulated based on augmented testing committed by Commonwealth Edison for Zion Station.*
~),.,...)*. ',_.....
Mr. Brian K. Grime.s
- .. March 11, 1980.
. Page 4 e.
Commonwealth Edison
- Information of t~is sort must be considered in the
. review of emergency preparedness.
To ignore s~6h information
- impo~es an unwarranted bu~den of fear and mental anguish on the
.citizens of the communities near the nuclear facility.
It is expected that your review of the enclosed materials will be objective, and will thoroughly integrate all pertinent information before any conclusions are drawn.
If there are ~ny questions on t~e enclosed materials please direct them to this Office.
2181A Very truly yours,
/,.:
"* r
./, *;.
t...\\
~,~.*/./.:..... r;*****<......... ',
D. L. Pe op le s Director of Nuclear Licensing
CommonwealthAison One First National PIWChicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Mar.ch 11, 1980 Mr. Brian K. Grimes, Director Emergency Preparedness Task Group Office 6f Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~ashington, DC 20555
Subject:
Evacuation Time Estimates For Areas Near Nuclear Power Plants Dresden Station Units 1, 2, and 31 Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2, Zion Station Units 1 and 2, LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2, Byron Station Units 1 and 2, Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2, NRC Dotket Nos. 50-10/273/249, 50-254/265, 50-295/304, 50-373/374, 50-454/455/456/457 References (a): a Grimes letter to All Power Reactor Licensees; dated November 29, 1979 (b): B. Grimes letter to Applicants for Construction Permits And Licensees Of Plants Under Construction; dated December 26, 1979.
(c): Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, Appendix VI to Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), Section 11.1.1.3, dated
/
October, 1975.
(d): D. L. Peoples, et.al letter to H. R.
Denton; dated February 25, 1980
Dear Mr. Grimes:
In response to the request for information contained in References (a) and (b), as qualified by your guidance on response submittal dates given to Mr. D. Knuth (KMC Owners Group on Emergency Preparedness), Commonwealth Edison submits preliminary Evacuation Time Study Reports fat Dresden, Quad cities, Zion and LaSalle County Stations.
Reports for Byron and Braidwood Stations have not been prepared at this time due
~
to the present lack of detail planning and coordination by
~.
state and local author! ties for the localities surrounding
~() \\ \\
By ran and Braidwood Stat ions.
Gi v.en the similarity a f these ~
':?~ \\
0-\\
two localities to those surrounding the Dresden, Quad Cities v
~o~
i1l
~~~3/9~013
~
F 8003210 S~"t*
Mr Brian K. Grimes March 11, 1980
- Page 2.*
e Commonwealth Edison and LaSalle County sites, it is not expected that the evacuation time estimates for Byron and Braidwood will be significantly different.
A thorough assessment is expected to be provided as a part of the operating license review for these two sites.
The enclosed reports were prepared using data provided by the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and local planners, plus data on special facilities gathered by Commonwealth Edison.
Although developed from the best available data, the findings of these reports must be considered preliminary because they were prepared prior to the finalization of the Illinois emergency response plan, as well as the plans for the continguous states of Wisconsin and Iowa.
These plans are undergoing intensive review and modification to accommodate the 10 mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ).;
Final estimates are expected to be developed as a part of the review of the final state and local plans.
The enclosed estimates have been reviewed by the state and local emergericy planners and where necessary changes were made to incorporate the suggestions of those planners.
In performing the subject studies,. two considerations which the NRC requested be addressed; i.e. (1) evacuation time under adverse weather conditions, and (2) the time required to confirm evacuation, could not be addressed quantitatively at this time.
However, it is judged that the inherent conservatism in the estimation of the total evacuation time as well as the alternative protective actions discussed in Attachment A to the reports minimize~ the impact of the lack of an.adverse weather.estimate.
In addition, the state and local emergency response plans will consider methods of verifying that the entire public sector has been notified.
Methods to be conside~ed may incl~de the ~se of readily visible tags which would be previously distributed, as well as confirmatory notification.
The reported estimates for general population evacuation times within the 10 mile EPZ are, upon analysis, quite similar for dresden, Quad Cities, Zion, and LaSalle County.
In fact with few exceptions these estimates indicate evacuation times of less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
This is consistent with the WASH-1400 results (Reference (c)) for which the median effective evacuation speed was determined to be 1.2 mph; resultin~ in an. evacuation out to 10 miles in just over 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The only significant deviation reported involves the estimate develo~ed for the evacuation of the zon~ which includes the City of Kenosha, Wisconsin.
The center of Kenosha is 10 miles north of Zion Station, and its southern extremity
Mr Brian K. Grimes March 11, 1980 Page 3
. e Commonwealth Edison.
is approximately 8 miles from the plant.
If that city was excluded from the evacuation time estimate for its zone, it is experited that the evacuation time would be ieduced well below 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
In order to reduce the calculated evacuation times which. include Xenosha, Commonwealth Edison has recommended changes to the prciposed evac~ation-routes for that locality which would reduce the Kenosha evacuation time by almost 40%.
It is expected that final refinements in the state (Wisconsin) and local evacuation pl~ns will eliminate this disparity.
I Although Commonwealth Edison acknowledges the necessity to make the type of assessment documented in the enclosed reports, it is essential that the results be reviewed objectiv~ly, recognizing that the evacuation plan~ upon which
- the ~stimates are based are currently undergoing. significant expansion~ Furthermore, your review must recognize the overall safety design bases for the plant, because the emergency plan represents only cine of the protective measures implemented to protect the health and ~afety of the public.
In this regard significant attention has been focused on the public notification guidelines to which ref~rence is made in References (a) and (b).
The basis for these guidelines as related by the NRC are release projections contained in WASH-1400.
Although admittedly certain release categories were reported to have release times as. low as 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />; the NRC has thus far failed to acknowledge the minimal contribution to overall risk that those categories represent.
Recognizing the psychological impact such information has.on the public at risk, it is essential that both the NRC and the utility industry accurately characterize the significance of all
.technical data.
This is partic0larl¥ true in the case of Zion Station which is*currently und~rgoing an intensive review by the NRC.
In this regard, the Indian Point/Zion Near Site Study Report (Reference (d)) clearly d~monstrates that neither of these plants represents an unusual risk to the public.. This is, in part, the result of the care taken in the iMitial design of the plant.
It has been demonstrated based on plant specific probabalistic analyses that the combined ~isk for.the Zion plant is one to two orders of magnitude les~ than that for the reference plant analyzed in WASH-1400.
An additional reduction in risk of approximately two orders of magnitudei i.e. total reduction by a factor of 10,000, may be postulated based on augmented testing tommitted by Commonwealth Edison for Zion Stat.ion.
Commonwealth Edison
~~' '.
- ~
Mr. Brian K. Grimes March 11, 1980 Page.4 Information of this sort must be considered in the review of em~rgency preparedness.
To ignore such information imposes an unwarrant~d. burden 6f fear and mental anguish on the citizens of the communities near the nuclear facility.
It is expected that your review of the enclosed materials will be objective, and will thoroughly integrate all pertihent information before any conclusions are drawn.
If there. are any questions on the enclosed materials please direct them to this office.
2181A Very truly yours, O. L. *Peoples
. Director of Nuclear Licensing *