ML17191A699
| ML17191A699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17191A696 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-98-16, 50-249-98-16, NUDOCS 9806010173 | |
| Download: ML17191A699 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000237/1998016
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Report Nos:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
9806010173 980526
ADOC~ 05000237
G
REGION Ill
50-237; 50-249
50-237 /98016(DRS); 50-249/98016(DRS)
Commonwealth Edison Company
Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
6500 N. Dresden Road
Morris, IL. 60540
May 5-8, 1998
W. Slawinski, Senior Radiation Specialist
K. Lambert, Radiation Specialist
Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
NRC Inspection Reports 50-237/98016; 50-249/98016
This announced inspection consisted of an evaluation of the effectiveness of aspects of the
radiation protection (RP) program. Specifically, the inspection focussed on: (1) the radiological
planning and work controls during an ongoing, planned Unit 3 maintenance outage, including
as-low-as-is-reasonably-*achievable (ALARA) planning, oversight of work, and radiation worker
practices; (2) the circumstances surrounding planned intakes that occurred during the- latter
stages *of the recently completed Unit 2 refueling outage; and (3) the calibration and test
programs for certain radiation monitoring equipment. In these areas, one violation of NRC
requirements was identified, and the following conclusions were formed:
Plant Support
The ALARA group was actively involved in the work planning process~ and an effective
interface existed between RP and the work control group. Outage dose goals were
being met due to minimal emergent work and rework and successful performance of
work scheduled to date.
Radiological preparations for work activities were good with one exception related to the
- preparation for high risk work in the drywell to repair a leaking control rod drive (CRD) .
. Those preparations failed to include surveys of shoot-out steel prior to the initiation of
work in the area, causing the CRD repairs to be delayed. ALARA plans were well
developed and clearly conveyed the radiological work requirements, and pre-job
briefings attended by the inspectors were thorough. Radiological control of work
activities and radiation worker practices were good. Engineering controls, ALARA
initiatives and job planning were instrumental in controlling dose.
One violation was identified concerning an inadequate evaluation of the airborne
concentrations during the tensioning of the Unit 2 drywell cover on April 11, 1998, *
contributing to an intake of radioactivity greater than that planned. Additionally, the RP
staff identified several problems related. to the work activity that Included job turnover
ahd supervisory oversight weaknesses, RPT job coverage deficiencies arid problems
with the scope of the pre-job briefings and associated documentation.
The calibration and test programs for the whole body contamination monitors and the
whole body counters (WBCs) were technically sound and implemented in accordance
with station procedures. Contamination monitor alarms were set at appropriate levels
and instrument sensitivity and alarm operability were successfully demonstrated.
However, a minor discrepancy was identified with the acceptance criteria specified in
the WBC calibration procedure and its application to the last full calibration.
Radiological postings were well maintained and accurately reflected the area
radiological conditions. Container labeling was acceptable, although some minor
deficiencies were noted, which the licensee planned to evaluate and address .
2
Radworker practices throughout the balance of the plant were appropriate, and
radiological housekeeping and material condition of reactor and turbine buildings was
good, with the exception of water intrusion problems in the Unit 2 condensate pump
booster area.
3
DETAILS
IV. Plant Support
R.1
Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1 .1
Radiological Planning for the Unit 3 Maintenance Outage
a.
Inspection Scope*(IP 83729)
The inspectors reviewed the radiological planning and dose goal development for the
planned 15-day Unit 3 maintenance outage (D3P02). The inspection included a review
of the planned outage work scope and work packages, review of dose projections, and
discussions with the ALARA and radiation protection (RP) staffs and plant workers.
b.
Observations and Findings
The station's work control group included an RP staff ALARA representative to ensure
RP involvement in the work planning process. To initiate work at the station, an action
request (AR) was generated and screened by the work control group. A work request
(WR) was generated, if necessary, based on the scope of the work and the radiological
conditions. that may be involved. If the WR involved work in a radiologically protected
area (RPA) or radiological work in other areas, the WR was reviewed by the work
control group's ALARA representative, and radiation dose estimates were generated .
from job history files and plant radiological data base information. Work packages were
then forwarded by the work control group to the ALARA staff for an ALARA action
- review (AAR), if procedure specified dose or work area radiological condition thresholds
were met. The work package and, if applicable, the AAR were used to develop the
RWP. The RWP was subsequently reviewed and approved by work control group's
ALARA representative and, if necessary, the ALARA group.* Inspector review of work
packages, outage work schedules and discussions with the ALARA group disclosed that
the outage planning and scheduling process was adequately developed.
The station's dose goal for D3P02 was eight person-rem, based on the limited scope of
work that was scheduled and the lack of significant emergent and rework that was
anticipated. The most radiologically significant outage activities included control rod
drive maintenance (1.1 person-rem); drywell nuclear instrumentation maintenance (1.5
person-rem); main condenser maintenance (1.1 person-rem); miscellaneous drywell
maintenance (1.0 person-rem); and turbine building X-area maintenance (0.9
person-rem). Although little emergent work was projected for the outage, outage
maintenance activities identified a leak in the "A-6" control rod drive (CRD) mechanism,
necessitating its immediate repair. The emergent CRD repair work was expected to add
about 0.5 person-rem to the outage dose goals. The station had not identified any
additional significant dose producing emergent work or rework during the outage to
date. Consequently, little impact on the dose goal was expected from either emergent
work or rework .
4
The licensee was evaluating a proposed extension to the outage schedule by four days,
to repair a circulation water valve located outside the protected area. If the outage
- extension occurred, additional but yet undefined work within the RPA was expected to
be planned. Despite any extension to the outage, the ALARA group believed that the
originally projected dose goals would be achieved due to the lack of emergent work and
rework and the success experienced in completing scheduled activities. As of May 8,
1998, with the outage about 40 percent complete, the station had accumulated an
outage dose of 1.9 person-rem (25 percent of the outage dose estimate). Based on the
work progress and dose to date, the outage dose goal was being revised to six
person-rem.
c.
Conclusions
The ALARA group was actively involved in the work planning process, and an effective
interface existed between RP and the work control group. Outage dose goals were
being met due to minimal emergentwork and rework and successful performance of
work scheduled to date.
R1 .2
ALARA Controls and Oversight of Radiation Work
a.
Inspection Scope (IP 83729)
The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the station's radiological controls, work
practices, and oversight of radiological work activities. The inspectors interviewed
workers; reviewed AARs and radiation work permits (RWPs), total effective dose
equivalent (TEDE) ALARA evaluations, and applicable procedures; attended pre-job
briefings; and observed ongoing work in various areas of the station~
b.
Observations and Findings
Radiation work permits, AARs, TEDE ALARA evaluations arid associated radiological
controls for the following work activities were reviewed:
A-6 control rod drive leak repair
Reactor water clean-up (RWCU) pipe replacement
Unit 2 dryer/separator pit and "cattle chute" decontamination
Rebuilding of the high pressure core injection check valve # 2301-7
The inspectors noted good engineering controls to reduce general area dose rates and
surface contamination dispersal including hydrolyzing of pipes and valves, judicious use
of water as a wetting agent to reduce the potential for non-fixed contamination from
- becoming airborne, and use of high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) vacuums during
grinding operations. Additional ALARA controls observed in use included wireless
remote monitoring equipment, a variety of protective clothing, and air supplied bubble
hoods. Also, personnel contaminations and intakes were on occasion planned as a
dose savings method, if the ALARA evaluations determined that worker dose would be
5
reduced if work was performed without the use of respiratory protection equipment or
performed with less restrictive protective clothing.
The inspectors attended pre-job briefings for the work activities listed above and noted
that the briefings were thorough and comprehensive. The work scope and workers'
roles were clearly discussed; radiological information was exchanged; and good
communication between work groups and radiation protection staff was evident." The
inspectors observed work activities and radiation worker (radwmker) practices
associated with th*e control rod drive leak repair, RWCU pipe section replacement and
decontamination, and removal of the "cattle chute" from the Unit 2 dryer/separator pit.
During these activities, radiological controls were implemented in accordance with the
RWP and AARs, and workers generally demonstrated appropriate use of ALARA
techniques and were aware of radiological conditions in their work areas. Workers were
also observed appropriately *removing protective clothing and exhibited good radworker
practices.
Although the overall preparations and radiological control of work activities were good,
the inspectors noted an example when the radiological preparation for a high risk job
was not completed prior to commencement of the work. Specifically, while several
workers prepared to remove under-vessel "shoot-out" steel and complete other work in
the drywell in preparation for CRD leak repairs, a radiation protection technician (RPT)
identified significant levels of smearable contamination on the steel. Since significant
levels of contamination were not anticipated, the RPT stopped the work and informed
the workers that protective clothing requirements would have to be reevaluated and that
another pre-job briefing conducted before removing the shoot-out steel. The inspectors
noted that the technician acted appropriately to the unexpected conditions; however, the
inspectors expressed concern that the pre-job surveys failed to include the shoot-out
steel. The licensee acknowledged that pre-job surveys should have been more
extensive and was evaluating the matter.
c.
Conclusions
Radiological preparations for work activities were good with one exception related to the
preparation for high risk work in the drywell to repair a leaking CRD. ALARA plans were
well developed and clearly conveyed the radiological work requirements, and pre-job
briefings attended by the inspectors were thorough. Radiological control of work
activities and radiation worker practices were good. Engineering controls, ALARA
initiatives and job planning were instrumental in controlling dose.
R1 .3
Review of Planned Personnel Contamination and Intake Incident
a.
Inspection Scope (IP 83750)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding planned personnel
contaminations and intakes that took place during the latter stages of the Unit 2
refueling outage on April 11, 1998, while tensioning the Unit 2 drywell cover. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation of the event, the applicable RWP and
6
ALARA evaluations; reviewed procedures and supporting documentation; and discussed
the event with RP staff.
b.
Observations and Findings
The drywell cover installation work involved a two person crew working in the reactor
cavity for about two hours, tensioning the cover bolts and studs. Work area dose rates
were generally low (about 100 millirem/hour). while removable contamination was
significant, ranging from several hundred millirad/hour up to about 3 rad/hr over a 100
square centimeter surface area. Further decontamination of the cavity was not
performed because the ALARA group determined that the overall dose expenditure
would exceed the dose accrued during the war~ evolutions in the area. Engineering
controls included the use of a HEPA filtration unit positioned near the workers to control
airborne radioactivity and surface wetting and misting. Respiratory protection
equipment and face shields were not required to be worn by the workers, and nylon
coveralls were used over protective clothing in lieu of heavy rubber gear to avoid heat
stress problems.
On April 11, 1998, two contract boilermakers completed the work and alarmed the
contamination monitors as they attempted to exit the RPA. Contamination was detected
on isolated areas of the face of both workers up to about 20,000 disintegrations per
minute (dpm), and an additional 250,000 dpm was detected on the forearm of one
worker. Both workers were decontaminated; however, they intermittently alarmed the
portal monitors prompting invivo (whole body count (WBC)) bioassays. Initial WBCs on
April 11 detected small intakes of cobalt-60 and manganese-54 for both workers.
Follow up WBCs taken two and three days post event showed that the intake cleared
one of the workers, and resulted in a committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE)
equating to 2 mrem. However, the other worker's WBC continued to indicate the
presence of radioactive material, suggesting that inhalation may have been a primary
route of intake. Dose calculations performed by the RP staff concluded that the internal
(inhalation pathway) dose to the worker was 68 mrem CEDE, and the TEDE was 212
mrem. Shallow (skin dose equivalent (SOE)) doses incurred by both workers due to
skin contamination were minimal. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's dose
evaluations and supporting data, and concluded that the assessments were technically
sound.
The intakes were initially thought to be unplanned, and a prompt investigation was
conducted by the licensee. However, the investigation did not identify any unplanned
intakes, although the magnitude of one of the intakes exceeded the. planned dose.
According to the licensee, confusion occurred within the RP organization about what
was planned for the job. The day shift RP staff understood that both worker
contaminations and intakes were planned for the cover tensioning work; however, both
the night shift RP staff.on duty when the contaminations occurred and the involved
workers were unaware that intakes were planned. The licensee's investigation found
that documentation was misplaced, pre-job briefings may not have been attended by all
appropriate staff, RP turnover from day to night shift was poor, RPT coverage for refuel
floor activities may not have been adequate and RP management oversight of the job
7
was insufficient. Specifically, the TEDE ALARA evaluation and supporting
documentation used to justify the planned intakes and establish its parameters was lost
from the licensee's RWP file and never found. Additionally, all necessary night shift RP
staff may not have attended the April 2 and April 6, 1998, pre-job briefings at which the
planned intakes were discussed. While night shift RP staff that were interviewed by the
- 1icensee during their investigation claimed they attended the briefings, attendance could
not be confirmed because records of these briefings were incomplete. Also, no
attendance records were maintained for several, less formal daily shift briefings that
were reported to have been held on the refuel floor between April 7 through April 11,
1998. The lack of briefing checklists documenting the topics discussed during each of
these briefings compounded the staffs confusion. The licensee further indicated that the
briefings on April 2 and 6 may have been overly broad, since several other phases of
reactor reassembly were also discussed at those briefings.
The licensee recognized that the failure to complete pre-job briefing checklists and
maintain complete attendance records for each briefing was contrary to Dresden
Administrative Procedure (OAP) 12-09, (Rev 14) "Dresden Station ALARA Program."
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.A requires, in part, that written procedures be
established and implemented covering the activities recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide (RG)1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A of RG 1.33
recommends that procedures be implemented covering procedural adherence and the
ALARA program. OAP 09-13 (Rev 6) "Procedural Adherence," requires, in part, that
procedures be adhered to during the course of activities and that each step of the
procedure be performed exactly as written. The failure to follow the requirements of the
ALARA program procedure with respect to documentation of pre-job briefings is a
violation of TS 6.8.A. However, this non-repetitive, licensee identified violation is being
treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-2371980016-01; 50-249/98016-01 ).
The licensee's (recreated) TEDE ALARA evaluation indicated that air concentrations of
12 derived air concentrations (DACs) were anticipated during the tensioning work, but
engineering controls were expected to reduce these concentrations to 2 DAC. The
TEDE ALARA evaluation determined that use of respiratory protection equipment would
not result in an overall reduction in worker doses, and concluded that worker
contaminations and intakes were justified. Radiological hold points of 2 rad/hour
smearable contamination over.a 100 square centimeter surface area and 2 DAC
airborne were established to limit worker shallow (skin) dose to less than 50 mrerri'and
the CEDE to 10 mrem. The licensee also assumed that its engineering controls coupled
with the greasy (heavy) form of the work surface contamination was sufficient to
maintain airborne concentrations less than the 2 DAC hold point.
The inspectors identified problems concerning the licensee's air sampling for this
evolution: Two stationary air samples were collected in the cavity during the job
evolution. The air samplers were physically located about 180 degrees apart within the
cavity where the work took place. Post job analysis of these air samples showed air
concentrations to be between 0.3 and 0.6 DAC. However, the air samples were not
always representative of the work environment during the entire job evolution because:
8
(1) air was sampled in stationary locations while the workers moved around the
circumference of the cavity; and (2) the samples were collected for approximately 22
and 7 hour8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> durations, respectively, while the work was complete in about two hours.
Consequently, the air samples were diluted with air obtained during non-work related
time periods. Furthermore, the seven hour duration sample was discontinued about one
hour before the job was complete, and the other sample continued to be collected for
about three hours after the job was completed. A continuous air monitor (CAM) was
operating on the refuel floor during the job; however, it was not used to sample the
cavity work air environment so as to provide a real time indication of the air
concentrations. Although a 2 DAC air concentration hold point was established and was
a key parameter for allowing the work to be completed without respirators, appropriate
measures were riot implemented to ensure the hold point was not exceeded while the
job progressed. Although the event did not result in a significant intake of radioactive
material and the potential for an exposure in excess of regulatory limits was small, the
weaknesses in imp.!ementing the air sampling program, together with the other problems
that occurred during the job, placed the workers at increased radiological risk.
10 CFR 20.1501 requires that each licensee make or cause to be made surveys that
may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20 and that are
reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation levels,
concentrations or quantities of radioactive materials, and to the potential radiological
hazards that could be present. Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, survey means an
evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the production,
use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of
radiation. The failure to adequately evaluate the airborne concentrations in the cavity
during the tensioning of the drywell cover was a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501, 'to
demonstrate compliance with the dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1201 (a)(1 )(i) (Violation No.
50-237/98016-02; 50-~49/98016-02) .
. The licensee formulated several proposed corrective actions to address the self-
identified problems related to the event and those problems identified by the NRC
inspectors. Proposed corrective actions included better controls over original RWP file
documentation, reduced scope of pre-job briefings and conducting them in the ALARA
briefing room to allow enhanced communication and better interaction with work crews,
- improved RP shift turnover briefings and consideration for the use of lapel air sampling
in certain situations.
c.
Conclusions
One violation was identified concerning an inadequate evaluation of the airborne
concentrations during the tensioning of the Unit 2 drywell cover on April 11, 1998,
contributing to an intake of radioactivity greater than that planned. Additionally, the RP
staff identified several problems related to the work activity that included job turnover
and supervisory oversight weaknesses, RPT job coverage deficiencies and problems
with the scope of the pre-job briefings and associated documentation, contrary to station
procedure.
9
R2
Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment
R2.1
Calibration and Test Program for Radiation Monitoring Equipment
a.
Inspection Scope (IP 83750)
The inspectors reviewed the calibration and test program for whole body contamination
monitors and the invivo whole body counters (WBCs ). The inspection included a
walkdown of selected monitors, independent testing of monitor alarms and set points,
- observation of calibration source condition, and review of procedures and calibration*
and test res.ults. The following procedures were reviewed:
DRP 5822-07 (Rev 01 ), "Calibration, Maintenance and Operation of the IPM-9
Whole Body Frisking Monitor;"
DIS 1800-04 (Rev 09), "Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM) Calibration;"
DRP 5822-08 (Rev 0), "Sensitivity Checks of Personnel Contamination
Moriitors;"
DRP 5822-10 (Rev 0), "Operation and Calibration of the Eberline PM-7 Portal
Monitors;"
DRP 5822-41 (Rev 03), "Calibration and Operational Checks of the Eberline
PCM-2 Whole Body Contamination Monitor;" and
DRP 5410.:.08 (Rev 01), "Abacos Plus Whole Body Counter Calibration."
b.
Observations and Findings
Over the last couple years, the licensee purchased and put into service several new
whole body contamination monitors, as part of a* 1ong term program to upgrade radiatio.n
monitoring equipment. Three types of personnel whole body contamination monitors
were used to detect contamination from beta and/or alpha emitting radionuclides.
Whole body portal monitors were used to detect gamma emitting radioactive material.
Beta and alpha sensitive contamination monitors were calibrated annually using
radioactive sources traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). Detector efficiencies for cobalt-60 and technetium-99 beta emitter response
ranged from about 8-20%, depending on the monitor and its specific detector, and 10-
25% for response to an americium-241 source (alpha emitting). Contamination monitor
alarms were set at 5000 dpm beta and 1000 dpm alpha. The gamma sensitive portal
monitors detected less than 50 nanocuries cobalt-60 at a 90% confidence level, and
alarms were set at approximately 40 nanocuries. These monitors were calibrated semi-
annually and were used as a passive (screening) monitoring system, in lieu of the whole .
body counters.
Calibration and test methodologies and associated procedures were technically sound,
and calibrations of those monitors selected for review by the inspectors were performed
as required by procedure. Alarm sensitivity functional checks were performed daily on
most monitors and weekly on others, using radioactive sources with activities equivalent
to the alarm set points. The license demonstrated the alarm sensitivity check for
several monitors selected by the inspectors. The checks employed the use of a 40
10
nanocurie cobalt-60 button source for the portal monitor and technetium-99 and
americium-241 sources in varying geometries for the other monitors. Detector alarms
activated as required, although repeated attempts were required for one of the portal
monitors.
Two WBCs were used and calibrated annually by the station. The last calibration was
performed with a mixed gamma emitting NIST traceable (nominal 10 microcurie)
calibration source, housed in a phantom to provide a reference counting geometry for
the lungs, whole body and thyroid. Calibration methodology was also technically sound
and procedures included tolerances that satisfied applicable American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) performance criteria. However, the inspectors identified a
minor problem with the application of the full width half maximum tolerance criteria
specified in the procedure, relative to the last calibration for one of the WBCs. The
health physicist responsible for the calibration acknowledged the discrepancy and
planned to revise the tolerance criteria in the procedure to ensure its consistency with
ANSI recommendations.
c.
Conclusions
The calibration and test programs for the whole body contamination monitors and the
WBCs were technically sound and implemented in accordance with station procedures.
Contamination monitor alarms were set at appropriate levels, and instrument sensitivity
and alarm operability were successfully demonstrated .. A minor discrepancy was
identified with one of the acceptance criteria specified in the WBC calibration procedure
and its application to the last full calibration.
R4
Staff Knowledge and Performance in RP&C
R4.2 . Plant Walkdowns and Other Observations
a.
Inspection Scope (IP 83750)
Several walkdowns of the reactor and turbine buildings were conducted during the
inspection to review radiological posting and labeling, housekeeping and radworker
practices.
b.
Observations and Findings
Radiological postings were well maintained. The inspectors determined, through
independent measurements, that radiation areas and high radiation areas were
appropriately posted, and that high and locked high radiation areas were controlled in
accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. However, the
inconsistency with some of the radiation area postings between Unit 2 and Uni~ 3
reactor buildings described in Inspection Report 50-237/98011 (DRS); 50-249/98011
(DRS) continued, and will be evaluated by the licensee in June of 1998, as previously
committed. Labeling of containers was adequate; however, some minor deficiencies
were noted with the labeling of equipment and tool containers, which the licensee
11
planned to evaluate and address. Appropriate contamination control practices were
observed to be used by workers during balance of plant work activities observed by th.e
inspectors throughout the inspection.
Radiological housekeeping and material condition in the reactor and turbine buildings
was good with the exception of the Unit 2 condensate booster pump area. Several wall
and floor areas of the booster pump room were cracked; paint was chipped and peeled;
and-water was puddled on the floor in several areas. Station personnel indicated that
ground water in-leakage had been a recurrent problem in this area and caused the
problems observed by the inspectors. While most of the room was non-contaminated, a
section was .controlled as a contaminated area, increasing the potential for
contamination control problems should ground water intrusion continue. The licensee
acknowledged the inspectors' concerns and indicated that plans were being considered
to improve the condition of the area.
c.
Conclusions
Radiological postings*were well maintained and accµrately reflected the area
radiological conditions. Container labeling was adequate, although some minor
deficiencies were noted, which the licensee planned to evaluate and address.
Radworker practices throughout the balance of the plant were appropriate and
radiological housekeeping and material condition of reactor and turbine buildings was
good with the exception of the Unit 2 condensate pump booster area.
V. Management Meetings
XI
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the preliminary inspection findings to members of licensee
management on May 8, 1998, and further discussed the findings with the acting radiation
protection manager (RPM) during a telephone conversation on May 21, 1998. The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented and did not identify any of the documents reviewed as
proprietary .
12
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
G. Abrell, Regulatory Assurance
L. Aldrich, Acting Radiation Protection Manager
J. Almon, Training Manager
S. Barrett, Operations Manager
S .. Cieszkiewicz, Health Physicist
R. Freeman, Site Engineering Manager
M. Friedman, Lead Technical Health Physicist
R. Gideon: Unit 2 Outage Manager
C. Howland, Unit 1.Plant Manager
J. Kuczynski, Health Physicist
J. Lewis, Business Manager
W. Lipscomb, Assistant to Site Vice President
D. Miller, Unit 1 Lead Radiation Protection Shift Supervi~or
J. Moser, Lead Operational Health Physicist
P. Quealy, Unit 1 Health Physics Supervisor
F. Spangenberg, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- P. Swafford, Station Manager
D. Winchester, Manager, Quality and Safety Assessment
, IP 83750
Opened
50-237 /98016-01
50-249/98016-01
50-237/98016-02
50-249/98016-02
Closed
None
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Occupational Radiation Exposure
Occupational Radiation Exposure During Extended Outages
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Failure to document pre-job briefings and maintain attendance
records.
Failure to adequately evaluate airborne concentrations during
tensioning of the drywell cover.
13
AAR
A LARA
ANSI
Radworker
RPA
RP&C*
TS
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Action Request
ALARA Action Review
As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable
American National Standards Institute
Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
Control Rod Drive
Derived Air Concentration
Disintegrations Per Minute
High Efficiency Particulate Air
National Institute for Standards and Technology
Radiation Worker
Regulatory Guide
Radiation Protection
_
Radiologically Protected Area
Radiation Protection and Chemistry
Radiation Protection Technician
Radiation Work Permit
Skin Dose Equivalent
Total Effective Dose Equivalent
Technical Specification
Whole Body Counter
PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
D3P02 Schedule, Revision 9
RWP 980019, Rev 0, Units 2 And 3 Refuel Floor Preparation and Maintenance Activities
RWP 988101, Rev 0, D3P02 Drywell Nuclear Instrumentation Maintenance Activities
. RWP 988102, Rev 0, D3P02 Drywell In Service Inspection (ISi) Activities
RWP 988103, Rev 0, D3P02 Drywell Control Rod Drive (CRD) A-6 Leak Repair
RWP 988202, Rev 0, D3P02 Reactor Building Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) System
Maintenance Activities
RWP 988303, Rev 0, D3P02 Turbine Building X-Area Maintenance Activities
RWP 987201, Rev 0, D2R15 Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly and Related Activities
DRP 5822-07 (Rev 01 ), "Calibration, Maintenance and Operation of the IPM-9 Whole Body
Frisking Monitor"
DIS 1800-04 (Rev 09), "Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM) Calibration"
DRP 5822-08 (Rev 0), "Sensitivity Checks of Personnel Contamination Monitors"
DRP 5822-10 (Rev 0), "Operation and Calibration of the Eberline PM-7 Portal Monitors"
DRP 5822-41 (Rev 03), "Calibration and Operational Checks of the Eberline PCM-2 Whole
Body Contamination Monitor".
DRP 5410-08 (Rev 01), "Abacos Plus Whole Body Counter Calibration"
DRP 6020-02 (Rev 04 ), "Radiological Air Sampling"
OAP 12-09 (Rev 14), "Dresden Station ALARA Program"
PIF #01998-02701 and Prompt Investigation, "Possible Intakes While Tensioning the Drywell
Head"
15