ML17179B081
| ML17179B081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1992 |
| From: | Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17179B079 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309200078 | |
| Download: ML17179B081 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ~OAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 NCV 3 := 1932 Attachment MEMORANDUM FOR:
Patrick L. Hiland, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Section lB FROM:
SUBJECT:
Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III SPECIAL TEAM INSPECTION-DRESDEN CONTROL ROD MISPOSITIONING EVENT An investigation by the Region III Office of Investigations {OI) is being conducted at the Dresden Nuclear Station starting November 30, 1992, concerning the subject event.
In support of that effort, a Special Inspection Team is being dispatched to the Dresden Nuclear Station to provide technical assistance due to the seriousness of the apparent withholding of information involving a control rod mispositioning on September 18, 1992.
Enclosed ~or your implementation is the final Charter to ev*luate the circumstances related to that event in support of Region III OI and to conduct observations in the control room and plant.
The teams objectives are to:
- 1)
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)
Assist the Office of Investigation in co~ducting a timely, thorough, and systematic inspection and investigation related to this event.
Collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence sufficient to determine th~ cause(s), conditions, and circumstances pertaining to the event.
Assess the safety significance of the event and communicate to Regional and Headquarters management the facts and conc~rns related to the event such that appropriate followup can be taken.
Assess whether the licensee has adequately investigated for any other incidents which may have occurred where information was withheld.
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to regarding these objectives or the enclosed Charter, contact either Brent Clayton~~ myself.
')
Enclosure:
Special Team Charter See Attached Distribution
~
ll~
{~~Al*~*
Edward G. Greenman, Direct6r Division.of Reactor Projects
Distribution cc w/encl os*ure:
A. B.
D~vis, RIII
.B. B. Hayes, 01 E. T. *Pawlik, RIII 01
- C. J. Paperiello, RIII F. J. Miraglia, NRR J. G. Partlow, NRR E. G. Greenman; Riil C. E. Norelius, RIII H. J. Mi 11 er, RII I J. W. Roe, NRR B. K. Grimes, NRR T. L. King, NRR W. L. Forney, Riii T. 0. Martin, RIII J. E. Dyer, NRR R. M. Gallo, NRR R. L. Spessard, AEOD D. F. Ross, AEOD G. C. Wright, RIII K. E. Brockman, AEOD*
G. E. Grant, EDO H. B. Clayton, Rill
.R. W. Defayette, RIII
. B. L. Siegel, NRR W. G. Rogers, Dresden SRI H. Peterson, RIII F. L. Brush, Riii NOV 3 0 1992
NOV 3 0 1992 DRESDEN CONTROL ROD MISPOSITIONING ERROR SPECIAL TEAM CHARTER You are to perform a special team inspection commencing on November 30, 1992, to evaluate the circumstances related to the Control Rod Mispositioning Incident of September 18, 1992, and the licensees response upon discovery.
In support of the Office of Investigations (OI):
- 1.
Review the statements of the individuals involved and any other associated records' and develop C\\..._tnrono 1 ogy of even~~-~
- 2.
Determine the technic~l adequacy of the control rod movement procedures and the steps actually performed including recovery of the mispositioned rod.
Determine the safety significance.
- 3.
Determine what, if any, procedures were violated. Determine if it was logable or reportable under the licensees corrective action program.
- 4..
Detenni ne if the event of September 18, 1992, was reportable to the NRC.
- 5.
Determine the highest level of licensee management involved and the
. extent of involvement by management personnel including the Nuclear Engineering staff.
6..
Detenmi ne the adequacy of engineering involvement in the control rod movement activities including qualification of personnel and the admini.strative procedures prescribing their involvement.
7..
Detenmi ne the general attitudes of licensee personnel including other operatfng crews to report deficiencies or errors to management and/or the NRC.
- 8.
Review the licensees evaluation of the event.
- 9.
Determine and evaluate any corrective actions (short and long term) the licensee is implementing.
- 10.
Determine to what extent the other operating crews were briefed or informed of the event.
- 11.
Determine if excessive external pressure influenced operator actions.
- 12.
Determine qualification and staffing levels of on-shift crew during the September 18 control rod mispositioning event.
- 13.
Evaluate licensee's corrective action program with respect to identifying other incidents of not reporting operational problems.
Independently conduct confirmatory interviews.
In augmentation of the Resident Inspector staff and separate from the formal investigation:
- 1.
Conduct shift observations in the control room.and the plant.
- 2.
Monitor activities and situations for attitudes or performance that could indicate the potential for similar instances.
Team and management briefings should be conducted daily between the Team Leader and Brent Clayton, Chief Projects Branch 1.
Prior to concluding team activities, a discussion with your immediate management and me regarding completion of charter activities will be conducted.