ML17174A988
| ML17174A988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1991 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17174A986 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-249-91-29, NUDOCS 9111260192 | |
| Download: ML17174A988 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000249/1991029
Text
..
U
~ S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-249/91029(DRP)
Docket No. 50-249
License No. DPR-25
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL
60515 *
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Statton, Unit 3
Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, Illihois
Inspection Conducted:
September 23 through October 11, 1991
Inspectors:
Approved
A. Kopriva
M. Bongiovanni
Brown
Hi 11 s
J. Leemon
Peck
Phillips
Prescott
Shine
Inspection Summary
.**i¢J~
Date~* * *
Inspection from September 23 through October 11, 1991 (~epor~
No, 50-249/91029(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Special unannounced safety inspection by the resident
inspectors of Branch 1 of the Division of Reactor Projects(DRP).
The
inspection was a performance based inspection of Unit 3 focusing on
maintenance, with observations of operational safety; radiological protection
controts; and meetings.
Results:
Of the three areas inspected, no violations were identified.
0
Two unresolved items were identified in the area of procedural adherence.
The first item dealt with ongoing work on the Unit 3 emergency diesel
generator, in which work activities may have exceeded the procedure.
The
.,
0
0
0
0
s~cond item identified pertained to the emergency diesel generator
cooling water modification where work may have progressed beyond a
Q~ality Control hold point.
A deviation from corrective acti6ns in response to a previously issued
violation was identified. It appears as though a maintenance procedure
w~s not revie~ed for adequacy in boltihg instructions prior to
incorporating the procedure -in a work r_eques.t for main steam safety valve
repairs.
Housekeeping and plant cle~nliness were found to be acceptable.
There
were several locations where a decline in thi~ area w~s obs~rved;
includihg water on floors and trash in cable trays.
.
.
. .
.
The majority of the meetin~s attended appeared to be tho~oug~ and ~ell
_
conducted.
However, the daily meeting and plan-of-the-day*(POD) meeting,
were noted as being loosely organiz~d and incomplete with- respect to
information exchange.
During the HPCI test return valve replacement, several examples 6f good.
work practices were observed:
pre-job briefing
communicati~ns between departments
job oversight by QC, Ohsite Nuclea'r Safety, and first line.
supervision
Actual maintenance work p~actices, as pbserved during the .emergency
diesel generator and standby liquid control work, were good.
These areas
were clean, orderly, and well controlled .
. 2
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company
- E. Eenigenburg, Station Man~ger
- L. Gerner, Technical Superi~tendent
- J. Kotowski, Production Superintendent
E. Mantel, Services Director
- D. Van Pelt, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance
'J. Achterberg, Assistant Superintendent - Work Plannfng
G. Smith, As~istant Superintendent-Op~rations
- *K. P.eterman, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
M. Korchynsky, Operating Engineer
- T. Mohr, Operating Engineer
.
- M. Strait, Technical Staff Supervisor
L. Johnson, Q.C. Supervisor
J. Mayer; Station Security Administrator
- K. Kociuba, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- D. Wheeler, Construction Superintendent
- R. Meadows, Maintenance Staff SuperVi~or
- E. R. Zebus, Project Manager
- J. Harrington, Maintenance Group Leader
- J. Coonan, Maintenante Staff
- B. Coleban, Maintenanc~ Staff
- D. Booth, Master Electrician
- R. Geier, Master Mechanic *
- D. Gullati, Master IM
Nuclear Regulatory Commi_?_?_~on - NRR
- R. J. Barrett, Project Directorate III-2
- B. L. Siegel, Project Manager
Nuclear_B~ulatory Commission - RIII
- W. L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- W. D. Shafer, Chief, Projects Branch 1
- B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section IA
- R. A. Kopriva, Leader, Resident Inspector, Braidwood
- W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden
- M. S. Peck, Resident Inspector, Dresden*
- D. M. Liao, Inspector
- D. E. Hills, Resident Inspector~ Dresden
- Denot~s those attending the exit ihterview conducted on October 11,
1991, and at other times throughout the inspection period .
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs;
- reactor and auxiliary operators; shift engineers and foremen; electrical,
3
...
2.
mechanical, and instrument mai~tenance.personnel; and contract security
personnel.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities were observed and revi~wed to ascertain
that they were conducted in accordance with approved prbcedures,
regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards and in conformance
with Technical Specifications.
The following items were tonsidered during this review:
the Limiting*
Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were
removed from seryice, approvals ~ere obtained pri6r to initiating the
- work, activities were accomplished using ~pproved procedures and ~ere
inspected as ap~licable, quality control records were maintained,
- activities were accomplished by qualified personnel, parts and materials
. used were properly certified, radiological controls ware implemented,
and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work.requests we~e
reviewed to determine status 6f outstanding jobs and to assure that
priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may
affect system performance.
The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress to verify
cbmpliance with proper procedures.
The. following activities were inspected:
a.
Unit 3 Emergency Dies~l Generator (EOG) Cooling Wa~~r Modificati6n
The inspectors witnessed portions of the installation of a Unit 3
die~el generator cooling watef flow indicator per modification
Ml2-3-87-54.
The work package (087025-01) was present and followed
- during actual work conducted.
The package appeared adequate and
included prescribed post~~6dification testing;
The concurrent work
load for the responsible supervisor was reviewed and determined to
be reasonable.
The supervisor was observed to have been present
periodically throughout the work activity.*
On September 24, 1991, the inspectors witnessed completion of a
quality control (QC) hold point for minimum fit-up gap, proper
alignment, and cleanliness for the sensing line tube adapter.
The
welder completed the fit-up, tack welded the tubing in place, and.
waited for the QC inspector to arrive at the job site and approve
the QC hold point .. The QC inspector noted that the hold point action
(fit-up and c.leanliness) could not be verified since the tubing had
already been tack welded in place.
The welder was required to break
a~d file down the weld and re-perform* the activity in the presence of
the QC inspector.
Although there was no intent to bypass the hold
point, it was clear that the welder had not understood all the
entire requirements of the QC hold point.
This i~ considered an
Unresolved Item (50-237/91029-0l(DRP)) pending review by the NRC of
welder training and qualification requirements to ensure that.hold
p6ints are met and understoodr
4
The inspectors noted a substantial schedule delay on this job due to
a coordination problem between onsite Engineering and Nuclear
Construction (ENC) and the plant technical staff.
Both groups
planned to perform hydrostatic tests on the ~Yst~m upon completion of
the modification.
The technical staff, however, was unaware of
ENC's requirement for a hydrostatic test.
On the day of the scheduled
ENC hydrostatic test, the technical staff lea.rned of the ENC testing
plaris and questioned the duplication of work.
This resulted in a
delay due to inadequate pre-work review and poor communications.
b.
Unit 3 Emergency Oieiel Generator (EOG) Inspection
The inspector observed the licenseels unscheduled inspection of the
Unit 3 EOG.
The reason for the inspection was the diScovery of
aluminum and magnesiu~ metal-particles in a routine oil sample.
The*
inspector observed the job site for proper work precautions,
procedure adherence, and onsite supervision.
Overall job
performance was good.
The turbocharger was believed to be the
source of aluminum in the oil sample and upon i*nspection of the
turbocharger, no signs of wear or degradations were observed.
The
$OUrce of the metal particle contamination had not been resolve~.
During the review of the work package, th~ irispector ~oted that the
procedure state.d that the main bearings. were to be* 1 owe red far enough
- to visually inspect the condition of the bearing without loweting
them.off the bolts.
Proper inspection could not be performed and
contrary to the procedu~e. the bearings were removed fro~ the
crankcase without a written revision to the procedure.
This issue
regarding procedure adherence for the EOG main bearing inspection is
considered an Unresolved Ite.m (50-249/91029-02(DRP)) pending further*
NRC review of the procedure, the work analyst's requirements, and
specific work activities by the inspector.
c~
Removal and Replacement of Main Steam Line Safety Valves
The inspectors observed portions of ~he removal and installation of
main steam line safety va1ves E, F, and G.
The work was performed under procedure DMP 0200-10 Revision 5, May
1990, "Removal and Installation of Unit 2/3 Main Steam Safety
Valves."
The inspector witnessed the* quality control irispector
verifying the gasket ,compression using a feeler gauge on the E safety
valve and witnessed the maintenance personnel hand tightening the
inlet flange bolts on valve F.
No procedure was preserit at the
valve in the drywell.
Discussions with the foreman indicated that
due to contamination at the work location, the pa~kage was located
outside of the drywell -and was reviewed and discussed with the
maintenance crew.
When asked by the inspector about the required
torque for the bolts, the foreman stated that no value was specified
in the package and that the use of the slugging wrerich with gasket
compre~sion measurement was acceptable.
The work observed met the
requirements of the work package.
Subseql.ien.t to the observation of the safety va*lve install~tion,
the*inspector reviewed the vendor manual, Dresssr Industries:
Consolidated Safety Valves Type 3700 Instruction Manual, to verify
the proper torq~e requirements.
The ma~ual
1 s installatidn
instructions specified a torque sequence and teferenced Figure 6,
11 Inlet Flange Bolting Torques 11 ; which stated a final torque value of
680 ft-lbs.
The manual
i.~structions also stated that a final
inspection and review should be made to verify that all of the
requirements for bolting the valve inlets were met.
In contrast
to these instructions, step G.2.h of DMP *0200-10 required tightening
the nuts with a slugging wrench while checking cdmpression usin~ a
questioned the licensee on the differences between the vendors
recommended torque requirement and the method the licensee had
implemented.
The licensee 1 s initial response.did not provide any.
justification for their use of the gasket compression method.
They
did; however, commence efforts for a procedure thange to incorporate
the. vendors recommended torque ~alues into the procedure.
.
.
In inspection. report (50-237/91006), a civil penalty and Notice of
Violation was cited for _failure to maintain containment int~grity
due to leakage from a torus purge exhaust 6ontainment isolation
valve i~board flange.
The leakage was due to inadQquate torquing.
The licensee committed in th~ response to the violation, that
corrective actions would include revising the station work .. analysts 1
pre-job checklist to ensure that adequate guidance c6nc~~ning bolting
requirements is provided in.the.work packages, and to review the
existing maintenance procedures for adequacy of bolting instructions
~rior to being incorporated into work packag~s.
The licensee issued Maintenance Memorandum No. 44:.
11Work Analysts
Pre and Post-Job Checklist,
11 on February 15, 1991, which requires
the analyst to verify that adequate guidance in bolting and* torquing
is provided in the work package.
The pre-job checklist used during
thi~ work packige preparation could not be located since the
checklist was used as guidance and was not required to be retained
for each job.
Subsequent to the violation, the licensee was unable.
to provide any evfdence that DMP-0200-10 had been reviewed, for
adequate bolting instructions, as committed to..
Therefore, ii was
not evident that the bolting instructions were evaluated for adequacy
prior to its incorporation and implementation into the work package.
F~ilure to review and evaluate the bolting instructions provided in
DMP 0200- 10 prior to incorporating the procedure into the work
packages as committed to in the response to a previous violation
i.s considered a deviation (50.;.249/91029-03(DRP)).
Although the
- safety significance of this specific example is minimal, the failure
to ensure that corrective actions are implemented from a previous
violation is a concern.
Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee reviewed the existing
mechanical maintenance procedures to identify where additional
torque and bolting information is required.
6
- ..
d.
e.
High Pres~ure Core Injection (HPCI) Full Flow. Test Valve Replacement
The inspector observed portions of the modification to replace the
existing HPCI test return valve with a valve having better flow
characteristics, and to remove the flow restricting orifices.
- Discussions with th~ workers indicated that they were knowledgeable
. of the job task'.
After a section of pipe had been p~epared for welding, it was found
to be too short.
This required fabrication of a new piece of *pipe.
This rework required the workers to spend more time in a radiologically
- co~trolled arei and iri respirators.
The inspectors were concerned
- _that work activities occurring in radiation areas may not be
.
receiving adequate attention.
Increased attentibn to activities
taking place in radiologically controlled areas would possibly reduce
the amount of rewo~k r~quired and reduce personnel radiation
exposure.
During the observation of the removal of the HPCI test return valve~
- which involved lifting the valve out of the HPCI room and .defeating
secondary containment, the inspector noted*the following~
0
0
0
0
The pre-job briefing (heightened level of .awaren~ss) appeared
to b.e of good quality and contributed to successful
coordination of the job.
Adherence to procedures appeared adequate, in that the
~rcicedure was at the job site, frequently referenced, ~nd
- appropriately signed and well understood by the workers.*
Adeq~ate o~~rsight was observed, including QC, Onsite Nuclea~.
Safety, and first line supervtsion at the work site.
Good communications between the. departmen*ts were observed.
The inspector obser~ed, from the ~ontrol room that th~
appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition of
Operation for loss of secondary containment was properly
entered, documented, and complied _with.
Annunciator Modification*
The inspector observed several phases of Modification M12-3-88-22,
the Unit 3 annunciator system upgrade.
The modification basically
separated the multip1e sensor inputs to an alarm, and provided an
individual alarm light and/or computer point for each sensor input .
. The observations included monitoring the installation work in the
control room and auxiliary electrical room.
The i~spector also
observed the successful testing and functional verification of three
alarms that had been modified. *The installation of the new circuits
were noted to be accurately performed.* The quality control
verification was observed for one panel and noted to be thorough.
7
No errors were identified in the w1r1ng terminations and circuit.
identification.
The work practices were generally considered to be
good with one-exception, which was allowing the debris from wire
installation to fall inside the panel.
Most of the debris. was
removed at the end of the day, but ~mall pieces were observed to
remain. , O~e of the better practices noted was ~hat of one w6rker
reading the prints.and providing the identifying number tapes to
another worker who was actually installing the wires.
During the observation of workers in the auxiliary electrical room,
the inspector noted that a worker had. encountered ~ prob 1 em with the *
work contr61 sheet.
The worker i~mediately informed the responsible
supervisor, ~ho then pursued the probl~m. for resolution.
This was .
an example of good work practices and compliance with administrative
procedures.
f .. *Control Room Recorder Modifications
The inspector ~bserved performance of a modification in the control
room, which changed parameter recorders to that of a different
manufacturer.
Upon discussion.with the job site supervisor,* it was
learried that the drawing being used for the job did not *show a lead
that was previously landed on a terminal by a different architectural.
engineering firm's modification .. The ~hspector then diicussed with
the cognizant technical staff ~ngineer for the ~edification, a
concern that the failure to coordinate the plan~ing of these* two
modifications could result in the po_tential failure of .the.
recorder.
The technical staff enginee~ inf6rmed the architectural
engineer of the potential problem requesting a resolution.
This
issue is considered to be closed ~ince the licensee is adequately
addressing the concern.
g .. Standby Lig~id Control Pump and Motor Refurbishme~t*
The inspector observed portions of the job activities at the pump
loc,tion and in the maintenance shop.
These included proper
.
procedure u~age, work package preparation~ job site cleanliness~ and
performance of some jo~ activities.
Job performance in these areas
were considered good.
h.
- unit 3 125V DC Battery Di5charge Test
The inspectors witnessed portions of the 125V DC battery discharge
. test.
Pre-job briefings were thorough and were repeated for newly
assigned individuals not present ~uring the original briefing.
Th~
applicable procedure was in-hand and being followed.
The inspectors
did note that the test was temporarily stopped to obtain an
unanticipated temporary procedure change as required by
administrative procedures.
8
i .
Unit 3 Reactor Recirculation Suction *Valve 2202-58 Repair Activities
The inspector reviewed the work package and witnessed portions of
the valve repair activities.
The foreman was present on the job
site and was knowledgeable about the contingencies to prevent an
inadvertent draining of the reactor coolant system. * The inspector
- verified that the ~aintenance personnel followed the appropriate
radiological work pe~mit and radiatiori protection pri~tices while
performing ~ork in a high radiation areas.
No problems were noted .
. No violations were identified.
Two unresolved items ind a deviation from
a commitment were id~ntified in this section of the report.
-
3. * Operations (71707)
On a ~ampling bisis the. inspectors observed various portions of plant ..
- operations within. the plant ~nd control room.
Emphasis w~s directed
towards operator's adherence to procedurei, Technical Spetifications
requirements, and attentivene~s to plant status and activities.
a.
Con~rol Room Observations
The inspector observed control room operations to determin~ operator
attentiv~ness, control. room demeanrir, distractions as a result of
maintenance in the control room, and operator interactions with
Supervisors.
The o~erator's p~ofessionalism w~s acceptable with
-one exception which was brought to the at.tention of the licensee
management.
The licensee took appropriate, immediate corrective
action.
Control room demeanor appeared business-lik~ and focused,
with good control observed concerning annunciator modification- work.
on Unit 3.
A nuclear station operators (NSO) turnover was observed.
The turnover appeared to be of a short duration compared to
turnovers at other Commonwealth Edison Stations, but appeared to
provide adequate information.
Overall, the inspector's assessment
of licensee performance in this area was good.
b.
. Radiation Protection Controls
The inspectors observed that work~rs were following health physics
procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, *
etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for
use, operability, and calibration.
.
During observance of the HPCI full flow test valve replacement, the
job site was inspected for adherence to radiological protection
controls.
The Unit 3 HPCI room was considered a high airborne area
while the HPCI piping wa~ being ground riut.
The precautions taken
were adequate.
The HPCI room was considered high airborne for 30
minutes after grinding was finished~ The workers went on break and
left the area with no marking on the door tha~ the room was a
potential high airborne area during the prescribed 30 minutes.
This
issue was discussed with and addressed by the licensee.
9
c. **
Housekeeping and Pl ant Cleanliness
The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant
cleanliness fo~ fire protection, protection of safety-related
equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protection of
equipment from hazards.
At the job sites and general areas in the turbine and reactor
buildings, housekeeping appeared to ~e ad~quate, but weak controls
were observed.
An example ~as the Unit 3 low pressure coolant*
injection (LPCI) room, which was passed through on the way to observe
the work on the HPCI system.
The LPCI room had significant amounts
of standing water which had drained from the LPCI heat e~changer.
.
This water was being tracked through and could easily have increaied
the spread of contamination .frbm the HPCI room to the LPCI room.
This was discussed with the licensee and the standing ~ater was
cleaned up.
Another example was the Unit 2 HPCI room, where trash (ear plugs)
was observed in ~able trays, a lead blahket remained installed past
the estimated removal date without updated evaluations, and general
dim lighting conditions existed.
Some* areas suth .as the ~mer~ency
diesel generator rooms appeared to indic~te a positive trend in
housekeeping practices.
d.
Industrial Safety
On two occasions, the inspector observed contract workers not*
following industrial safety practices pertaining to work on live
electrical breakers and use of proper platforms.
This was brought
.to the attention of the workers ~nd the plant safety personhel.
The
licensee stated that the wo~kers would be counseled in industrial
safety.
e. * Chemical Controls
During a general tour of the turbine building, the inspe~tdr c~me *
. across an unattended bottle of 2-propanol, a cleaning ageht.
Because .~fa large red manufactur~ label, the inspector mistook the
chemical .for one which was prohibited from being .in the plant by the
Dresden chemical ~ontrol procedures.
The procedures state that
prohibited chemical agents are labeled with a red identifying
wa~ning label.
Th~ 1nspector questioned the shift engineer (SE)
about the use of red label.ed chemicals in the plant.
The SE did not
acknowledge any significance of red identifying warning labels
pertaining to chemical control.
The licensee's chemical control
supervisor was contacted and questioned ori the station'~ chemical
control procedures. *The supervisor was knowledgeable and resolved
the in~pector's concerns. *The inspector expressed to the licensee's
10
chemic~l control supervisor that there may be a we~kness in the
licensee's supervisory training of chemical control procedures .. The
chemical control supervisor acknowledged the potential weakness and
indicated that the inspector's concern would be reviewed.
No viol~tions or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Meetings and Other Activities (30702)
a.
ALARA Quarter.ly Meeting
The inspector attended the quarterly ALARA (As Low As Reasonably
.
Achie~able) Meeting.
The meeting was informative and conducted in a
professional manner.
The inspector heard in the discussion the use
of most ALARA principles. * Effectiveness of these meetirigs and ALARA
principles such as, pre~maintenance planning and job site management
overviews had reduced the exposure for workers performing tasks on
the control rod drive system.
Reducing the workers time in the
radiological area as much as possible during reactor vessel stud
removal resulted in reduced personnel.exposure. A dry well model
was used to provide workers with fami 1 iarity of job locations .
reducing stay times during actual job performance;
TV monitors were
used so that supervisory personnel could monitor work activities and
red.uce their exposure. Additional temporary shielding was added to
the general plant over the previous year resulting'in reduced d6se
levels.
The inspector observed good ALARA practices being utilized
at the station.
b. *.Refueling Planning Meeting
During refueli~g planning meetings, the inspector determined that
necessary iriformation was being presented and discussed, good
communications between departments resulted in needed support,
priririties were set, and a person responsible for followup was
assigned if needed.
The refueling planning meeti~g appeared to be
well executed, informative, ~nd productive.
c.
Daily Planning and Plan of the Day (POD) Meetings
The inspectors attended the daily planning and POD meetings
r~gularly. During these meetings, the inspectors observed persorinel
and departmental interfacing with respect to maintenance activities,
re~olution of problems encountered, and responsibilities assigned
,for completion of certain job tasks .
. These meetings appeared to be somewhat informal and locisely
organized.
The informal method was pcissibly responsible for the
mistommunications related to the technical staff and ENC. scheduling
problems pertaining to the hydrostatic test as noted in Paragraph
2.a of this report.
11
- .
Several issues were discussed at the POD meeting, but.did not appear
tq receive adequate attenti6n.
The~e included only brief or
non-existing discussions of r6ot causes.
the minimal information
exchange observed at the POD ~ppears insufficient for an adequate
understanding of all d~ily activities .. The method of providing
sufficient information exchange to support all daily activities w~s
unknown and npt accessible to.the inspectors.
5.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a
deviation or a violation.
Unresolved items disclosed during this
inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2a and 2b.
6.
Deviations
Deviations are items of failure to. satisfy a commitment where the
commit~~nt in~6lved h~s not been m~de a legally binding r~quirement. A
deviation is discussed in Paragraph 2.c._
- 7.
- Exit Interview
The_ -inspectors met with licensee represe*ntatives (denoted- in parag*raph 1)
during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspectfon
period on October 11, 1991.
The insp~ctots symmarized the scope and
results of the-inspection and discussed the likely content* of this
inspection report.
The licensee acknowl~dged the information arid ~id n6t
indicate that any of the information disclosed during .the inspection
could be considered proprietary in nature .
12
. NOV 1 5 19Q1
Commonwealth Edison Company
2
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning th~s inspection.
- Sincerely,
.~~~~~
W. D. Shafer, Chie~ ,/'v-,
Enclosures:
1.
Inspection Report
N~. 50-249/91029(DRP)
2.
Notice of Deviation
cc w/enclosures:
D. Galle, Vice President - BWR
Operations
T. Kovach, Nuclear*
.
Licensing Manager
.
E. 0; Eenigenbur~, Statibn Manager
. DCD/DCB (RIDS)
OC/LFDCB
Resident Inspectors LaSalle,
Dresden, Quad Cities
Richard Hubbard
- J. W. Mccaffrey, Chief, P~blic
- Utilities Division
Robert Newmann, Offic~ of Public.
Counsel, State 6f Illinois Center
Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Reactor Project~ Branch 1
Docket No. 50-249
Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN:
Mr. Cordell Reed
DEC 2
1991
Senior Vice President
Licensing Department - Suite 300
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL
60515
Dear Mr. Reed:
This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. J. F. Schapker of
this office on September 9-12, 16, 18-19, October 7-8, 29-31, and
November 12, 1991.
The inspection included activities related to
inservice inspection and other outage activities authorized by
NRC Operating License No. DPR-25 for your Dresden Unit 3
facility.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the
report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of
selective examinations of procedures and representative records,
interviews with personnel, and observation of activities.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the
course of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations,
a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be
placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this
inspection.
Enclosure:
Inspection
Sincerely,
~:~i(.ii;;r,*~Ie-ne*d: oy, 1fark K *. P.J!'ll
M. A. Ring, Chief
Engineering Branch
Report No. 50-249/91026(DRS)
See Attached Distribution
9112060042 911202
ADOCK 05000249
Q
~
VMbson
12/?-/91
~:lb_
"'lr~
12/-z_/91
I I
Commonwealth Edison Company
Distribution
cc w/enclosure:
D. Galle; Vice President -
BWR Operations
T. Kovach, Nuclear Licensing
Manager
C. W. Schroeder, Station Manager
DCD/DCB (RIDS)
OC/LFDCB
Resident Inspectors-Dresden,
LaSalle, Quad Cities
Richard Hubbard
J. w. Mccaffrey, Chief
Public Utilities Division
2
Robert Newmann, Office of Public
Counsel, State of Illinois Center
Licensing Project Manager, *NRR
DEC 2
1991