ML17158A061

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Forwards AIT IR 50-387/93-80 on 931029-1109.No Violations Noted.Operator Error Was Immediate Cause of First Three Events & That Fourth Event Was Caused by Structural Weakening of Refueling Bridge Mast
ML17158A061
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1993
From: Cooper R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Byram R
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
Shared Package
ML17158A062 List:
References
NUDOCS 9312300009
Download: ML17158A061 (5)


See also: IR 05000387/1993080

Text

DEC a l ~

Docket No. 50-387

Mr. Robert G. Byram

Senior Vice President - Nuclear

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

2 North Ninth Street

Allentown, Pennsylvania

18101

Dear Mr. Byram:

SUBJECT'RC AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT)REPORT NO. 50-387/93-80

This letter transmits the report for the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) led by Mr. R.R.

Temps between October 29 and November 9, 1993. This inspection assessed

the circumstances,

causes,

corrective actions, safety significance, and generic implications of four fuel handling

incidents which occurred on October 6, 26, 27, and 28, 1993, at the Susquehanna

Steam Electric

Station Unit 1.

In addition, the AIT reviewed other refueling activities to determine if

management

had been

appropriately

involved with previous similar occurrences.

At the

conclusion of this inspection, a public exit meeting was conducted on November 22, 1993, at

the Susquehanna

Energy Information Center.

The AIT concluded that operator error was the immediate cause of the first three events, and

that the fourth event was caused by structural weakening of the refueling bridge mast which

resulted from a previous event.

The AITalso concluded that several of your short-term actions

taken immediately after each event were inadequate.

Further, the AITnoted that the recent four

events were similar to fuel handling events dating back to 1984.

The AIT concluded that the

root-cause evaluations performed for these earlier events lacked thoroughness and independence,

and that the corrective actions taken in those instances were insufficient to prevent recurrence.

Refuelings

are infrequently performed

evolutions which involve unusual

plant conditions,

potentially significant radiation exposures,

and the need for well-defined and well-coordinated

responsibilities among several organizations.

As such, refueling operations constitute a safety-

significant activity with the concomitant responsibility that it be treated

as

such by plant

management

and personnel.

In reviewing your response to these and previous events, the AIT

noted that you had not treated

some

areas of fuel handling activities as safety-significant

activities.

The AIT noted repeated

instances

in which past evaluations

stated

"no safety

significance" or "impact on schedule" as the consequence of the event reviewed.

In reviewing

your response to the repeated maintenance/replacement

of bent mast sections, your resolutions

appeared

to be more concerned with economic factors (i.e., maintaining the timeliness of core

offload/reload) than in treating the problem as one affecting a safety-significant activity. The

most telling evidence of this was the fact that for recent refueling outages,

a spare mast was

280023

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routinely maintained on the refueling floor due to your history of mast problems

and the

expectation that the spare would probably be needed.

The implied emphasis on production over

safety is of particular concern to NRC.

The AIT concluded

that management

visibility and direct involvement with fuel handling

activities was often insufficient and that previous failures in implementing effective corrective

actions from past similar events indicated that you permitted recurrent personnel errors and

equipment failures to continue.

Senior operations management delegated management oversight

of fuel handling activities to the refueling floor senior reactor operator.

This decision was

apparently made under the belief that having a higher management

presence

on the refueling

bridge would distract the operators from their duties.

However, although the desire to reduce

distractions was commendable, senior managers did not hold their people accountable, nor obtain

feedback, so senior managers remained unaware ofconcerns and practices known at the working

level.

Lastly, even though human performance errors have increased

during fuel handling

operations,

management did not increase its oversight.

The intent of this inspection was to determine the causes of these events and to identify any

potential generic safety issues.

Therefore, no attempt has been made at this time to characterize

the findings relative to regulatory requirements.

Any enforcement associated with the inspection

findings willbe sent to you in a separate letter.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and

enclosure willbe placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

lh

We appreciate your cooperation with our inspectors.

Sincerely,

Orig'",~l Sia~< ~y

Richard W. Cooper, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report No. 50-387/93-80

cc w/encl:

H. G. Stanley, Vice President - Nuclear Operations

J. M. Kenny, Nuclear Licensing

G. T. Jones, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

M. M. Urioste, Nuclear Services Manager

D. F. McGann, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance

H. D. Woodeshick, Special Office of the President

J. C. Tilton, HI, Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety, Information Center (NSIC)

K. Abraham, PAO (2)

NRC Resident Inspector

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

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bcc w/encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

The Chairman

Commissioner Rogers

Commissioner Remick

Commissioner de Planque

ACRS

J. Taylor, EDO

T. Murley, NRR

DCD (OWFN Pl-37) (Dist. Code ¹IE10)

A. Chaffee, NRR/DORS/EAB

E. Jordan, AEOD

INPO

Paul Boehnert, Chairman, ACRS

Ken Raglin, Director, Technical Training Center

bcc via E-Mail:

Vf. Dean, OEDO

R. Clark, Project Manager, NRR

L. Nicholson, Acting PDI-2, NRR

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Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

The Chairman

Commissioner Rogers

Commissioner Remick

Commissioner de Planque

ACRS

J. Taylor, EDO

T. Murley, NRR

DCD (OWFN Pl-37) (Dist. Code ¹IE10)

A. Chaffee, NRR/DORS/EAB

E. Jordan, AEOD

INPO

Paul Boehnert, Chairman, ACRS

Ken Raglin, Director, Technical Training Center

bcc via E-Mail:

W. Dean, OEDO

R. Clark, Project Manager, NRR

L. Nicholson, Acting PDI-2, NRR

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  • See Previous Concurrence

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