ML17157A715

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Radiological Controls & ALARA Initiative Insp Repts 50-387/91-03 & 50-388/91-03 on 910415-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Previously Identified Items,Instrumentation,Housekeeping & Radiological Postings
ML17157A715
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  
Issue date: 06/03/1991
From: Mann D, Markley A, Noggle J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17157A714 List:
References
50-387-91-03, 50-387-91-3, 50-388-91-03, 50-388-91-3, NUDOCS 9106180210
Download: ML17157A715 (43)


See also: IR 05000387/1991003

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.

50-387

50-388

License Nos. NPF-14 NPF-22

Licensee:

Penns Ivania Power and Li ht Com

an

Units 1 and 2

2 North Ninth Street

Allentown Penns lvania

18101

Facility Name:

Inspection At:

Sus

uehanna Steam Electric Station

Berwick Penns lvania

I

9

I

C

d

d:

~AI 19-19

1991

Inspectors:

5gf g(

J. Noggle,

ation Specialist,Team Leader

d te

FacilHies Radiation Protection Section

D. Mann, Radiation Specialist

Facilities Radiation Protection Section

r

A. M

kley,~

adiation Specialist, R III

date

5 go 'l/

date

Accompanied by: B. Dionne, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Approved by:

W, Pasciak, Chief, Facilities

Radiation Protection Section, DRSS

g-Z-0/

date

Ins ection Summa: A routine radiological controls and ALARAinitiative inspection was conducted

on April 15-19, 1991 (Report No. 50-387/91-03 and 50-388/91-03)

x

A~Id:Add Ill p

I

y ldd*':py

ly

identified items, instrumentation, housekeeping

and radiological postings, vendor staff

qualifications, and procedures

associated with these areas.

The ALARAinspection scope

reviewed the following areas:

ALARAbackground, station dose history, management

involvement, training, ALARAgoals, audits, initiatives and practices, planning, and

ALARAprogram implementation.

Results:

Within the scope of the radiological controls inspection, one non-cited violation

was identified.

DETAILS

Personnel Contacted

Licensee Personnel

  • K. Chambliss, Maintenance Production Supervisor

'T. Dalpiaz, Assistant Superintendent

- Outages

  • T. Fedder, Safety and Health Consultant
  • J. Fritzen, Radiological Operations Supervisor
  • M. Golden, Acting Technical Supervisor

'D. Hagan, Radiation Protection Supervisor

'E. Herstman, Corporate - ALARA

  • C. Kalter, Corporate Radiological Group Supervisor
  • R. Kichline, Project Licensing Specialist
  • J. Lex, Nuclear HP/Chemistry Training Supervisor
  • D. McGarry, Radiological Safety Consultant
  • L. O'eil, Supervisor Engineering - Nuclear
  • R. Prego, Supervising Engineer - Audit and Assessment
  • H. Riley, Health Physics - Supervisor
  • M. Rochester,

Senior Health Physicist

  • D. Roth, Senior Compliance Engineer
  • K. Roush, Supervisor - Nuclear Maintenance Services

"T. Ryder, Power Production Engineer

  • R. Saccone, Reactor Engineering Group Supervisor
  • M. Schelbner, Engineer
  • G. Stanley, Superintendent of Plant
  • T. Steingass,

ISI Supervisor

'B. Veaju, Site Instrument and Control

  • H. V'ebb. Supervisor Nuclear Maintenance Services

NRC Personnel

  • G. Barber, Senior Resident Inspector
  • W. Pasciak, Chief FRPS, Region I
  • J. Stair, Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on April 19, 1991.

Other licensee employees were contacted and interviewed during this inspection.

2.0

Review of Previousl

Identified Items

During a previous inspection, the inspectors questioned the respiratory protection

fit test operator certification process.

The inspectors observed that technicians

were qualified to operate the Dynatech/Frontier Model 260 Fit Booth using a

proceduralized certiGcation process (NTP-QA-42.4 Rev. 1, Health Physics

Contractor Technician Training and Certification Program).

However, the

technicians were qualified to operate the Dynatech/frontier Model 264 Portable

Fit Test Instrument and Tent by On-Job-Training (OJT). The inspectors also

noted that the Model 260 had an active OJT guide form that was not used in lieu

of the more formal certification process.

The licensee agreed that technicians should be qualified to use the Model 260 by

the formal certification process.

Therefore, the licensee inactivated the OJT guide

form for this instrument.

The licensee also agreed that technicians should be

qualified to use the Model 264 by a formal certification process.

The licensee

developed

and implemented this process.

Upon implementation of the Model 264

formal certification, the licensee inactivated the OJT guide form for this

instrument.

The licensee-has

recently begun using the TSI PortaCount, instead of

the Model 260 or Model 264, to perform quantitative respirator fit tests.

The

licensee stated that they were using a OJT guide form to qualify the technicians to

use this equipment.

However, a procedure revision is underway to include a

formal certification process into NTP-QA-42.4 Rev. 3. The OJT guide form will

be inactivated when the formal certification process

is instituted.

A review of this matter during the current inspection indicated that the licensee

had successfully implemented the formal certification process in NTP-QA-42.4

Rev. 2 and deleted the OJT guide forms for both instruments.

A procedure

revision is underway to also include the TSI PortaCount Instrument.

This item is

closed (387/89-80-01 and 388/89-80-01).

3.0

uglification and Trainin of Technicians

The licensee recently implemented HP-HI-014, "Screening and In-processing of

Contract Health Physics Technicians".

This procedure outlines the minimum

qualifications required for a technician in accordance with ANSI N18.1-1971.

Attachment A of this procedure specifies the methodology for evaluating the

experience level of contractor health physics technicians., Some of the experience

levels are-in part as follows:

1

'C

Navv ELT

Time is counted, one for one up to a maximum of 3 years.

The

technician must also have at least 6 months of commercial

experience to be a senior technician.

Shi

ard Article 108

uglified

Time is counted on a one for one basis with no time limit.

o

National Laborato

~

Time is counted on a one for one basis, up to a maximum of one

year, when the description of duties performed are comparable to

the duties encountered

at a commercial power plant.

o

Fuel Re

rocessin

Facility

Time is counted on a one for one basis, since the radiation and

contamination levels encountered

are comparable, ifnot more, than

encountered

at a commercial facility.

o

Non-Power Reactors

Time is counted on a one for one basis up to a maximum of 1 year.

The inspector found this procedure to be excellent. A random sample of

contractor technician resume's

was reviewed to compare the experience levels

indicated on the resume to those outlined above.

Within the scope of this review,

no discrepancies

were identified. The licensee stated that appro>imately 70% of

the contractor technicians had worked at the site during previous outages.

Therefore, the technicians were very familiar with plant specific items and site

personnel.

The inspector found the licensee's practice of supplementing

their'utage

staff with returning contractor technicians to be very good.

The inspector reviewed the lesson plans for the Health Physics Level I and Level

II training and retraining.

The inspector also reviewed the lesson plans for the

respirator training and retraining.

No discrepancies were identified.

The lesson plan HP-076 "SSES Health Physics Practices for Contractor Technicians"

was reviewed.

This course covered specific health physics practices such as responses

to lost/offscale dosimetry and posting practices at SSES.

Also included in this, lesson

plan were lessons learned through-out the industry.

The inspector found the course

outline to be very good.

Procedure NTP-QA-42.4,'ealth Physics Contractor Technician Training and

Certification Program was reviewed.

It was noted that Attachment 3 of this procedure

contains a list of the certification forms required to be completed as a minimum for

outage contractor health physics technicians.

No discrepancies

were noted.

The on-the-job training guide for "BWR Unique Systems for Contract Health Physics

Technicians" was reviewed.

The purpose of this guide is to provide contract health

physic technicians, who are less familiar with the BWR steam cycle, to a brief

introduction to selected BWR systems including the radiological concerns associated

  • with each system.

This guide was found to be very good.

4.0

Internal Ex osure Controls

h

The inspector reviewed the operation and quality control of the Whole Body Counters

(WBC). The licensee maintains a Canberra "FASTSCAN" and a Canberra

"ACCUSCAN". The FASTSCAN consists of 2 4" x 4" x 16" sodium iodide (NaI)

detectors behind a shadow shield and associated

electronics.

The ACCUSCAN

consists of one 4" NaI detector,

a moving bed, and associated

electronics.

A valid

geometry is checked at several energies on a monthly basis to insure that the

calibration efficiencies remain acceptable.

This is required in procedure AD-00-740,

Internal Dosimetry Program.

A daily quality control check is performed to ensure

counter stability over an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> counting period.

Quality Control charts are generated

monthly to establish trends in counter performance.

The inspector reviewed records

of recent monthly and daily QC tests and noted that the WBC obtained acceptable

results.

Procedure AD-00-740, section 6.1.5 states in part that non-routine bioassay's

are to be

performed when it is suspected

that an individual may have received an internal

deposition of radioactive material.

In accordance with this, the licensee reviews,

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) data to select a pool of individuals who may have been

exposed to airborne radioactive material.

From this. pool, individuals are randomly

selected for whole body counts.

The inspector reviewed one such random

investigation and concluded that in this case appropriate measures were taken to

prevent the bodily intake of radioactive material.

The inspector reviewed the MPC-hr evaluation forms for three (3) positive whole

body counts.

No discrepancies

were noted.

The licensee used comparative fit-testing as the basis for accepting the TSI

PortaCount fit-test system.

The study demonstrated

that the PortaCount system

was comparable to the corn-oil systems.

The inspector reviewed the hand

calculation performed using ANSI Z88.2 methodology which verified that the TSI

computer algorithm generated appropriate fit factors.

The calculation

demonstrated

correlation factors of essentially one to one for fit factors less than

1,500.

The inspector also noted that greater than 98% of the individuals tested

achieved an acceptable fit factor.

The respirator maintenance

and inspection program was reviewed.

Within the

scope of the review, no discrepancies were identified. The respirator issue

program was reviewed and a spot check performed.

Procedure HP-TP-761, Rev.

7, Issuance

and Control of Respirators, section 9.1.4 states in part; "Determine if

the individual is qualified using a current 'Qualified Respirator User List'." The

inspector compared the "Respirator Issue Log" with the "Qualified Respirator

,User List". From this comparison, it was determined that at two control points,

respirators were issued during the preceding 1-2 days using an outdated "Qualified

Respirator User List". This was determined to be an isolated incident, was a low

severity level, was not a willfulviolation, and was corrected immediately. It

therefore meets the criteria in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.V.A for issuing a non-cited

violation.

5.0

External Ex osure Controls

A review of portable survey instruments revealed that a source check is performed

on all scales using a '"Cs irradiator. The instruments are logged out on a paper

log sheet.

The information in the log is transferred to 'a card catalogue and also

entered into a computer tracking system,

This system is to track the instrument

calibration due date.

None of the instruments reviewed were found to be in use

and out of calibration.

The instruments may be signed out for the duration of a job. Therefore, the

'0

The licensee maintains a systematic review and concurrence chain from increasing

levels of management

to administratively extend-an individual's quarterly exposure

limit. A review of selected administrative exposure extensions was performed.

The

inspector noted that no administrative exposure extensions had been given for an

.individual to exceed

1500 mrem/quarter.

Those exposure extensions reviewed showed

the complete exposure history was on file and the concurrence signatures from the

appropriate levels of management

were correct.

The inspector reviewed the relocation of the permanent whole body thermoluminescent

dosimetry (TLD). Procedure HP-TP-222 Rev. 5, Special Dosimetry Issuance and

Criteria, section 9.1.5 states in part that placement of the relocated permanent whole

body TLD for individuals shall be documented

on the RWP sign-in-sheet when not

specified by the RWP.

This allows the technician covering a job to observe the work

pattern and position of the workers in relation to a non-uniform source and then

'elocate the permanent whole body TLD to monitor the point of highest exposure if

necessary.

The inspector felt this was a good licensee program.

Reviewed the actions taken when an individual egressing from the protected area

'larms

the portal monitor.

Procedure AD-00-720 Rev. 9, section 4.9.1 states in part

that:

The Supervisor of Security is responsible for "assuring in the event of a portal

monitor alarms at the gatehouse,

that personnel re-exit via the portal monitor, and, if

a second alarm is activated, that the Health Physics Section is contacted and the

person activating the alarm is detained until Health Physics arrival". The licensee

stated that in each case where a portal monitor actually alarmed in the gatehouse,

it

was the result of the medical administration of a radioisotope.

6.0

P~tant Tour

Tours of the licensee's facilities were conducted during the inspection.

Areas toured

included the Reactor, Turbine, and Radwaste buildings, the whole body counting,

instrument calibration, and dosimetry calibration facilities.

The tours showed

housekeeping

within these areas to be good.

Postings and access control to the

controlled areas were also found to be good.

~ g

yt

7.0

-

Dose Evaluation

'.1

Collective Dose

The collective dose f'rom 1986 to 1989 for SSES was compared with that

for the average U.S. Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). SSES was consistently

below the average throughout this time period.

Occupational Dose Comparison for

Pennsylvania Power & Light's Susquehanna

Steam Electric Station

versus

Average U.S. Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)

Collective Dose per Reactor (Person-rem/Year)

(NUREG/CR-0713)

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Susquehanna

1, 2

414

313

258

352

Average BWR

652

513

529

439

% of Average

Rank (Lowest)

36%

11 out

ot 30

Q9%

25 out

of 33

-51%

11 out

of 34

-19%

15

out'f

36

  • Data unavailable

7.3

Avera e Individual Dose

A review of the average individual dose was performed for the period 1986 to 1989, to

again'compare

SSES exposure against other U.S. BWRs.

SSES average individual dose

was 34% below the average individual dose for BWR radiation workers (with measurable

exposure) in 1986.

This changed to 39% below the average BWR in 1987, 40% below in

1988, and 5% below in 1989.

10

Annual Individual Dose (mrem/year) (NUREG/CR-0713)

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Susquehanna

1, 2

276

243

270

280

Average BWR

% of Average

420

400

450

-40%

360

-5%

  • Data unavailable

7.4

Daily Collective Dose

A review of the daily collective dose was performed to determine ifthe average daily

dose being expended during non-outage and outage periods was lower than that at other

BWRs.

SSES daily dose per reactor was 139% higher than the average BWR during

non-outage periods and 13% lower during outage periods.

Daily Collective Dose per Reactor (mrem/day) (Hinson, 1990)

Non-Outa

e Dose Rate

Outa

e Dose Rate

Susquehanna

1, 2

(1 986-88)

Average BWR

% of Average

1056

441

139%

3460

4000

-13%

The inspectors did not investigate the reasons for the apparently high non-outage

doses to

licensee staff. It is, however, an area the licensee may wish to review for potential reductions.

11

7.5

Ex osure Rate

nd D

s

E

iv len R

e

In an attempt to determine ifthe decreased

collective dose was due to lower than

average exposure rates, a comparison was performed of SSES radiation levels during

shutdown with those radiation levels in the open literature for.other BWRs. By

comparing SSES with data published in N clear T chn I, the contact and general

area dose rates around major components

and systems appear lower than those at other

BWRs.

76

Re eiiveHi hD seJ

s

To further identify the potential causes for the lower collective doses,

a review of

repetitive high-dose jobs that were conducted during outages and during routine

operations was performed.

The collective doses for SSES repetitive high-dose jobs

conducted during the first through fifth outages of Unit 1, and the first through third

outages of Unit 2, were compared against the data for other GE BWRs report in

NUREG/CR-4254.

All of the collective doses reviewed for SSES high-dose jobs

conducted during refueling outages were below the average values for GE-BWRs. In

addition, the collective dose trend for these repetitive jobs appears to be decreasing

instead of increasing with plant age.

7.7

Non-Re etitive Hi h-Dose Jobs

. A review of the non-repetitive high-dose jobs was performed to determine if a lower

amount of non-routine radiological work resulted in the low annual collective doses.

Because special maintenance

activities typically constitute the largest percentage of the

worl'ategory doses reported to the NRC in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.16, the

impact of the non-repetitive activities on SSES doses was examined.

The collective doses

per reactor were adjusted to exclude the dose reported during that year for special

maintenance.

The resulting collective dose per reactor excluding special maintenance

is

as follows:

12

Year

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

SSES Adjusted

Collective Doses

(person-rem)

405

275

218

318

199

U.S. BWR Adjusted

Collective Doses

(excluding special maintenance)

(person-rem)

378

345

8.0.

ALARAPro ram Or anization

8.1

B~kd

The licensee first formally implemented

a program to maintain occupational exposures

as

low as is reasonably achievable in 1978 during plant consfruction.

The first corporate

radiological engineer was hired in 1978, and shortly thereafter initiated the corporate

ALAI'ommittee. The ALARApolicy statement, NDI-6.4.2, "ALARA-Policy and

Program," was approved by the senior V.P. nuclear on December

17, 1981.

This nuclear

- department instruction established

the responsibilities and the foundation of the SSES

ALARAprogram.

The first station ALARAspecialist was hired in 1981, with the station

ALARACommittee convening its first meeting on October 25, 1985.

The ALARAjob

review procedure HP-AL-400 entitled, "RWP ALARAEvaluations," was first approved

on August 15, 1980.

The first ALARAdesign review was documented

on April 16, 1985.

8.2

ALARAPro ram

As previously mentioned, SSES ALARAprogram was initiated during the construction

phase and was in place for the. first refuel outage on unit 1. As a result of this first

outage being radiologically significant, the program has been continually strengthened

and optimized.

The current ALARAprogram is described in NDI-6.4.2, Rev. 3,

"ALARAPolicy and Program," and NSI-2.1.5, Rev. 1, "Implementation and Operation

V

13

of the PPScL ALARAProgram." Allthe major elements of an ALAI'rogram

described in NUREG/CR 4254 were utilized at SSES.

The implementation of these

elements and their relative effectiveness willbe described in the following sections.,

9.0.

~Trainin

The various job-specific ALARAtraining programs were reviewed.

This included a review of

the lesson plans, discussion with the respective training instructor, tour of the training facilities,

and selected review of the various attendance

sheets.

The types of job-specific ALARAtraining

given at SSES included general employee (GET-01), radiation worker (HP001), radiation

protection technician (HP010), administrator and supervisor (HP003), and design engineers

(EG011).

9.1

General Em

l vee ALARATrainin

The current lesson plan for training new employees, which conforms with 10 CFR 19.12

.requirements,

is GET-01, General Employee Training, dated 2/11/91. A review of this

lesson plan and discussion with the instructor indicated that the needed ALARA

objectives were covered.

For general employees, the ALARAconcept is defined, the

management polic'or ALARAis stated, the function of the ALARAprogram is

described, the workers'esponsibilities

towards ALARAare described, and they are

informed not to enter areas bearing radiation symbols unless they have been trained and

have radiation dosimetry.

The ALARAaspects of this training program were considered

adequate.

9.2

Radiation W rker ALARATrainin

The current lesson plan for training radiation workers, which conforms with 10 CFR 19.12 requirements

is HP002 Health Physics Level II dated 3/13/91. A review of this

lesson plan and discussion with the instructor indicated that the needed ALARA

objectives were covered.

In addition to the information described above, radiation

workers also receive training in methods to reduce dose such as time, distance, shielding,

and contamination control ( i.e., containment, filtration, ventilation, and

decontamination).

The ALAI'spects of this training program were considered

adequate.

14

It should also be noted that the licensee has developed impressive mockup facilities for

training workers in radiological areas and on specific components ( e.g. CRD exchange,

LPRM exchange, RWCU pump, undervessel shoot-out steel, SRM/IRM calibration, and

MSIV mockups).

9.3

Radiation Pr

ec i n Technician ALARATrainin

The current training program for radiation safety technicians is documented in NTP-QA-

42.1, Health Physics Section Training and Qualification Program, dated 9/16/88.

This

procedure describes the knowledge, skills, prerequisites,

and qualifications needed to

become

a radiation safety technician. Allhealth physics technicians receive ALARA

training in one or all of the following: (1) HP003 - Health Physics Level III; (2) HP010-

Administrative Procedures for Health Physicists; or (3) HP621 - OTT RMS for ALARA

Programs.

Specialized ALM<Atraining is given to the ALARAspecialists in training

module HP079, Job Spec ALARAspecialist.

These training modules are conducted by

instructors in the Nuclear HP/Chemistry training group.

The content of this ALARA

training was considered

adequate.

A review of attendance

records indicated all level II

HP technicians had received the required ALARAtraining.

94

Adminis rator and Su ervisor ALARATrainin

The job-specific training requirements for administrators and supervisors in ALARAare

specified in NDI-6.4.2, "ALARAPolicy and Program," dated 1/14/91.

This training is

documented in HP003 Health Physics Level III, revised 8/13/90.

This training is

conducted by instructors from the Nuclear HP/Chemistry training group. A review of

the ALARAtraining lesson plan and discussions with the training instructor indicated

that the content and objectives were adequate.

Topics covered included:

(1) ALARA

policy and management

commitment; (2) procedural requirements for ALARA;(3)

Supervisor's ALARAresponsibilities; (4) dose and contamination reduction techniques;

(5) ALARAjob review process; and (6) practical applications.

The ALARAtraining

program developed for supervisors provides the needed motivation and knowledge to

enable them to apply dose and contamination reduction techniques during the planning

and implementation of their work in radiological areas.

A review of the attendance

records for the maintenance

department indicated that all

but one supervisor attended the required HP003 ALARAtraining. This maintenance

services supervisor should attend the required training.

'

9.5

En ineer ALARATrainin

15

The current training requirements for design engineers in the ALARAconcept is

described in the training curriculum for Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE); approved

8/10/90.

This training matrix and NDI 6.4.2, "ALARAPolicy and Program," dated

1/14/91, requires that all design engineers shall receive training that present design

considerations,

cost considerations,

and methods to be used to minimize personnel

exposures.

This training is documented in instruction EGO11, "~6MDesign

Training," revised July 20, 1989.

This training is conducted by the Nuclear Training

Department.

The AL&MDesign training lesson plan was found to be thorough and of good scope.

A review of the attendance

records for EGO11 training indicated that not all the design

engineers

have received this training. The licensee should consider having all design

engineers attend the ALARAdesign training course.

The licensee indicated that the various procedures

and associated

instructions that

describe how ALARAreviews of modifications are performed are currently being

revised.

This revision was initiated as a result of the improvements being made by NPE

in the method of processing plant modifications.

The licensee agreed to consider revision

~of the ALARAdesign training program to reflect the new and improved modification

process.

10.0

Mana ement's Collective Dose Goals

The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedure for establishing annual goals on collective dose,

along with the 1990 performance results.

The procedure which describes how these goals are

formulated and tracked is described in AD-00-745, "ALARAProgram," dated 4/4/91, and NSI-2-

1.5, "Implementation and Operation of the PP8.L ALARAProgram," dated 2/22/88.

Management involvement was evident in that these goals are approved by the plant manager

and senior vice president

- nuclear.

Collective dose goals are established for the station and for

the major departments/sections

on an annual basis.

The annual collective dose goal for the

station in 1990 was 425 person-rem.

The 1990 collective dose for SSES for Units 1 and 2 was

440 person-rem.

Although the 1990 goal was exceeded

by 3.5%, this was the lowest annual

collective dose recorded since the first year of operation (1985).

A listing of the various department section goals and actual collective dose total for 1990 are:

16

1990 Annual Collective Dose Goals (person-rem)

Department

Quality Assurance

Nuclear Services

(ISI)

Instrumentation 8 Control

Health Physics/Chemistry

Tech Group

Maintenance

Decontamination

Operations

Outage Mgmt/IEG

Chemistry

Nuclear Plant Eng (NPE)

Construction

Other

Goal

9

15

11

44

3

43

34

19

1

4

2

239

1

Actual

10

15

16

52

3

55

37

26

13

4

2

205

2

% of Total

2.3

3.4

3.6

11.8

0.7

12.5

8.4

5.9

2.9

0.9

0.5

46.6

0.5

425

440

The method of establishing, monitoring, achieving, and reporting collective dose goals appeared

adequate.

11.0

ALARAPro ram Or anization

The licensee's ALARAprogram is described in Nuclear Department Instruction NDI-6.4.2,

ALARAPolicy and Program and AD-00-745, ALARAProgram.

NDI-6.4.2 is a corporate

procedure that describes ALARAresponsibilities, ALARAinterfaces, the implementation of

collective dose goals, and ALARAjob reviews.

This procedure established

the management

commitment to ALARA. The procedure

is well laid out and appears

to cover most facets of an

operational ALARAprogram.

An attachment to this procedure included a copy of a specific

policy statement that defined an apparent strong management

commitment to ALARA, The

inspector noted that the detail and comprehensiveness

of NDI-6.4.2 was very good.

I

I

v <'

g ~

17

AD-00-745, ALARAProgram, is a plant procedure that describes ALARAresponsibilities for

site organizations; the ALARACommittee Charter; interfaces; and the ALUMreview and

evaluation process, including: pre-job review, during job review and post job review criteria,

dose reduction methods and process and engineering controls for consideration.

The plant ALARAorganization utilizes two structures, one for non-outage and one for outage

conditions.

The non-outage ALARAorganization consists of a health physics foreman-ALAI',

an HP planner/scheduler,

and two HP specialists.

During outages, the ALARAorganization

expands to include three additional specialists and an assistant HP foreman for backshift

ALARAand external dosimetry support,

These positions are staffed generally from within the

licensee's organization.

As noted previously, one to two individuals from the corporate radiation

protection group are utilized as ALARAspecialists.

The other positions are filled by upgraded

Level II HP technicians or by contractors.

During recent outages the licensee has reduced its

reliance on contractors in order to develop and retain experience within its own staff.

'

The licensee indicated that the maintenance

department reorganized into job area functions

approximately two years ago.

In response to the maintenance

reorganization, the ALARA

outage group was reorganized.

This resulted in the assignment of~~ specialists to the

following areas of coordination:

drywell, valves, balance of plant, and inservice

inspection/snubbers.

Since the maintenance,

construction, engineering and other work groups

are focused in this manner, consistent lines of communications and established

interfaces appear

to enhance ALARAperformance.

The ALARAcommittee is composed of plant group supervisors from various plant

departments.

Notably, the chairman of the ALARACommittee is the Maintenance Supervisor.

The ALARAcommittee is responsible for: reviewing planned activities and modification tasks

that are estimated to exceed

10 person-rem; identifying engineering, training, or licensing

support which may be necessary for exposure reduction activities; designating groups responsible

for performing tasks to present plans to the committee; and reviewing and recommending

resolution of employee identified ALARAconcerns.

The inspectors also noted that the licensee benefits from a consistent highly experienced work

force.

Many of the maintenance,

instrumentation and controls, and construction personnel have

worked at Susquehanna

Steam Electric Station (SSES) since plant startup,

The licensee utilizes

its own maintenance

"travel crew". These included machinists, welders and other support

personnel who have had previous experience

at SSES.

Contractor personnel also included high

proportions of returnees with previous SSES experience.

Interviews with licensee personnel

18

also indicated that worker attitudes toward exposure minimization have improved over the last

four to five years.

Licensee personnel did acknowledge that improvements are warranted with

respect to minimizing personnel contaminations and improving contamination control

performance.

Through discussions

and interviews with corporate, HP, maintenance,

construction, chemistry

and engineering management

and technical personnel, the inspectors were able to evaluate the

work environment at SSES.

There appears to be a supportive environment which facilitates

and promotes individual responsibility and individual development of solutions to plant

problems.

This includes numerous inventions, site manufactured equipment, and improvements

in practices.

This was evidenced by the development of reactor vessel nozzle shielding by a

contract decontamination technician, the snubber support tool developed by maintenance,

the

feedwater nozzle hydrolazing tooling and cleanup methods used by the inservice inspection

personnel,

and the scaffolding and insulation coordination methodology developed by

construction.

12.0

M na ement Involvement

The functional ALARAorganization at the corporate office consists of two health physicists and

a health physics (HP) specialist.

This group performs an annual ALARAassessment

of the

plant ALARAprogram, ALARAreviews for designs initiated at the corporate department

level, tracking and data management,

coordination of the person-rem goal setting process and

evaluation of source term reduction programs.

The licensee does utilize long term planning for

dose reduction improvement projects.

Most of this planning is coordinated with other

departments.

Implementation of new technology and robotics is coordinated with corporate

maintenance

engineering.

Improvements to the steam plant and condensate

system water

quality performance

is coordinated with corporate chemistry.

The corporate office also

provides operational support for the plant ALARAprogram.

Corporate personnel indicated

that their activities focused on building trust and communications between the plant and

corporate organizations.

The corporate radiation protection effort is augmented

by a corporate radiological engineering

function. This effort is supported by a licensee employee who functions as a radiological

engineering consultant,

This function provides quantitative radiological engineering and

,

analytical support to the Nuclear Department and is responsible for the design bases for SSES.

This support includes ALARAprogram direction and support, source term, shielding and

compartment

dose analyses

and provision of the bases for technical training in radiological

19

calculation and evaluation.

An area that is currently receiving attention is a technical

specifications change to allow greater leakage tolerance for main steam isolation valves (MSIV).

This would permit reduced outage time. Another area of support includes the gathering of

data, techniques, and calculational methods for source term reduction.

One to two individuals from the corporate radiation protection staff are given rotational

assignments to the plant to serve as ALARAspecialists during refueling outages.

These

personnel are trained on plant procedures

and processes

in the area of ALARA. Although

additional management

oversight may be required for some of these individuals, depending on

experience,

this is viewed positively. This type of assignment builds relationships and facilitates

communications between these groups.

Rotational assignments

have also been utilized at the,

intermediate to senior management

level. Reportedly, rotations have included the following:

corporate positions, radiation protection groups supervisor, environmental group supervisor, and

maintenance

supervisor.

One area that appears

to merit consideration for improvement is management

support for a

corporate'wide incentive program, into which ALAI'uggestions could be input. The current

incentive program comprise a worker suggestion to-'supervisor program and a bonus system that

rewards plant employees for plant achievement of designated

goals.

The plant achievement

award was made in terms of a percentage of salary for plant wide achievement of management

goals for plant performance.

These goals included regulatory, operational, safety, and

radiological performance.

These were measured

by industry recognized indicators of

performance.

The worker suggestion

system requires the individual to submit his/her

recommendation

to his/her supervisor.

The supervisor would evaluate the recommendation

and

then decide whether to push or reject the idea.

Licensee personnel indicated that upper

management

basically was opposed to incentive systems and that there was no mechanism to

present an idea outside of the normal chain of command.

l

J

20

ALARAInitiatives

ractices

13.1

Source Term Reduction

The licensee is engaged in several significant source term reduction projects.

Although it

was noted that several of these projects appear to be motivated for reasons other than

ALARA,ALARAwould benefit from their implementation.

Water chemistry has a great effect on the production of activation products which

contribute to station source term. Fuel handling and fuel history influences the addition

of fission products to the station systems and thereby contributes to station source term.

At SSES there have been only three fuel rod leakers during ten fuel cycles.

This

indicates excellent fuel integrity and minimal contribution to station source term. In an

effort to minimize shock to the fuel rods, SSES has implemented a fuel ramping

procedure during reactor shutdown and startup.

This involves gradual control rod

movement rather than a scram or sudden rod withdrawal and adds an extra day to the

refueling outage;

a good initiative.

The licensee has changed out 48 control rod drive blades during this outage

approximately one year before end of life. The primary motivation for this change

appears to be minimization of radwaste disposal costs.

The old control blades contained

cobalt bearing stellite rollers that contributed, to the source term in the reactor coolant

system (RCS).

Since the replacement blades do not contain stellite, ALARAwill benefit

from this change out.

The licensee is currently involved in a program to improve feed water chemistry

performance.

This include modifications to the condensate

demineralizers to eliminate

spent resin residues, improved operational utilization of the ultrasonic resin cleaning

system, and installation of erosion resistant replacement piping. Most of this effort in the

steam and condensate

portion of the plant is focused on reducing the amount of iron in

the condensate

water.

The licensee indicated that unlike most boiling water reactors,

which have approximately 90% of its source term due to ~Co, SSES's source term was

composed of appro>imately 75% ~Co and 25% '~Fe and ~Mn. The licensee is also

experimenting with different anion to cation resin ratios as well as different types of resin

for improved performance.

The licensee also indicated that the bid specification was

being developed for the development of a lay up program for temporarily inactive liquid

radwaste systems in order to minimize corrosion.

21

The licensee has performed some initial evaluations of zinc injection and hydrogen water

chemistry methodologies for source term reduction.

These evaluations indicated that

both methodologies result in higher shutdown radiation levels and hydrogen water

chemistry results in higher operating radiation levels.

This appears to be consistent with

the limited,amount of industry experience to date.

The licensee indicated that the source

term was already in the range anticipated with the use of zinc injection and would not

appreciably benefit from this methodology.

The licensee stated that they had adopted

a

wait and see approach until the industry has had more experience with these methods of

source term reduction.

While the licensee's

resources

have been engaged with cobalt reduction efforts in the

reactor core and will be heavily engaged with the snubber reduction program, there has

been little management

support given to cobalt reduction in reactor plant systems and.

components.

No evidence was presented

by the licensee to indicate that the EPRI

method had been utilized to evaluate and systematically reduce the cobalt content of

plant systems and components.

The challenges

associated with the aforementioned

efforts is acknowledged; however, attention is merited for cobalt reduction in reactor

plant systems and components.

~Shieldin

According to SSES data, nearly 60% of all outage radiation exposure occurs inside the

drywell. The station's approach to shielding this area was reviewed.

During the current

unit 2 fourth refueling outage, 73 out of 95 shielding packages were dedicated to the

drywell. Approximatel 32,000 pounds of lead blankets were hung on chains

as shadow

shields or wrapped directly on the drywell radiation sources.

The target for the drywell

shielding was to reduce the whole body dose rate fields below 100 mR/hr for all work

areas.

The licensee has estimated

6 person-rem for'nstallation and removal of drpve]1

shielding for this outage.

Due to the drywell shielding program, there has been a net

reduction of 25% in drywell radiation exposures

since the shielding efforts began.

SSES

is building an experience base of standard drywell shield packages.

Permanent

lugs have

been installed at many locations to simplify shield installation. A conveyor belt was used

this outage to transport lead blankets through and into the drywell. To date, most'of the

shielding efforts are for temporary shielding.

Overall the station appears to exhibit a

strong shielding program.

22

13.3

Snubber Reduction

The licensee has appropriated funds and committed to implement a snubber reduction

program.

This willinvolve a reduction of approximately 60% of the station's snubbers.

Over half of the snubber reductions willcome from the drywell which was estimated by

the licensee to reduce personnel exposures by 40 person-rem per outage.

While this will

involve a commitment of exposure and resources to complete, ALARAwillbenefit from

a significant reduction of maintenance

and inservice inspection work in the drywell over

the life of the plants.

13.4

Decontamination Techni

ues

Hydro]azing has been used extensively to perform feedwater nozzle decontamination,

cleaning of cavity drain lines, floor drains and scram discharge lines. The WEPA system

has been used for reactor cavity decontamination.

Steam cleaning has been utilized to

clean concrete after resin spills, reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system heat exchanger

end bell and for reactor cavity decontamination.

The licensee also indicated that

grit/bead blasting was used for turbine rotor and blade decontamination.

Chemical

decontamination

had been evaluated and found not to be cost justified.

The licensee is planning a renovation to the decontamination

shop.

Currently,

decontamination of tools and equipment is performed by hand scrubbing with water,

water spray, vibrator finisher, Maytag dishwasher, freon and electropolishing.

The freon

unit will be decommissioned

to reduce the generation of mixed waste.

13.5

Robotics and automated E ui ment

The licensee began experimenting and evaluating automated equipment in 1987.

The

licensee has utilized the Little Andros robot for unplugging waste sludge from the phase

separator flow eductor, surveying the RWCU phase separator tanks and recovery from

overflow from these tanks.

The super scavenger robot has been used for unit two resin

regenerative

surge tank cleaning and unit one equipment pool decontamination.

A Mini

Rover ROV was used to support the condensate

storage tank cleaning and hydrolazing of

the feedwater nozzles in the reactor vessel.

The licensee also utilizes an eight stud reactor pressure vessel tensioner/detensioner

carousel.

An improved local power range monitor detector removal tool has been

acquired.

Automated valve packing removal tooling has received a mixed review. This

tool is not suitable for all types of valve packings.

An automated vessel seam weld

23

inspection rig was used to perform inservice inspections on reactor vessel beltline seam

welds.

The licensee indicated, that a manipulator arm was being evaluated for

radioactive waste shipping activities. This device would be utilized to install and remove

lines and to attach and detach liftrigs to radioactive waste liners.

Generally, the

licensee was actively pursuing the use of remotely operating equipment for high dose job

applications.

13.6

ra i nal Prac ices

Video equipment has been used to monitor activities on the refueling floor and in the

reactor cavity, main steam isolation valve work, RWCU work, residual heat removal

valve work, on the N8 nozzle work, and for suppression

pool access control. During non-

outage conditions, video equipment is used to monitor the RWCU pump oil level bulb,

the resin regenerative tank and resin surge tank levels to minimize the need for an

operator to enter these high radiation areas.

Communication equipment and headsets with base station setup have been used to

coordinate drywell and refueling floor work. The licensee also indicated that the

maintenance

department

has its own communication gear for refueling and control rod

drive (CRD) maintenance

activities.

Sump cleaning was accomplished

by the use of spargers

and added water to slurry sump

contents.

The contents were pumped to the radioactive waste system.

Temporary filters

were not used to support fuel pool cleaning activities.

Spent fuel pool cleanup was

accomplished

by the use of undenvater vacuums that exhausted

to the fuel pool skimmer

system.

No discrepancies

were noted.

13.7

Reactor Water Cleanu

Pum

s

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's

maintenance history with the RWCU system.

A

history of RWCU pump seal failures that goes back to 1986 is evident.

Since 1986, the

following provides a summary of RWCU pump seal failures:

24

YEAR

Unit 1

P~um

A

Unit 2

~Pum

B

P~um

A

P~um

'B

1990 - 8/31/90

1989

1988

1987

1986

3

2

0

3

1

3

4

4

4

2

TOTAL

17'0

While the licensee did improve procedures,

provided training of maintenance workers,,

required the performance of mockup training the day immediately preceding seal

replacement,

and implemented an improved 0-ring design, RWCU pump seal failures

continued to occur.

The licensee indicated that there were 10-12 modifications made to

the original vendor design to "fix"the pumps.

This culminated in a decision that was

made in 1990 to replace the RWCU pumps with sealess

pumps of greater reliability. It

was noted by the inspectors that there was industry experience regarding reliability

problems with these pumps prior to 1982.

While the decision to replace these pumps

with a sealess

design appears to be a good decision, radiation exposure could have been

reduced had they been replaced earlier.

The timeliness of this action was not evaluated

by the inspectors.

e

14.0

Self Evaluation Assessments

The licensee performs three types of assessments

that originate from the corporate radiation

pr'otection group.

Five programmatic assessments

are scheduled over a three year period.

These generally consist of an evaluation of a particular aspect of the radiation protection

program, such as external exposure control, internal dosimetry, health physics surveillance and

instrumentation.

These usually involve contractor support and include the development of the

objectives, conduct of interviews and participation by a member of the corporate radiation

protection group.

This effort results in a report in which the evaluated site group has input as

to the results of the evaluation.

25

The second type of assessment

involved the evaluation of vendor programs for technical and

regulatory adequacy.

It was unclear whether these assessments

were in addition to, in support

of, or in lieu of quality assurance

vendor audits.

The third type of assessment

was the walk

through assessment.

This involved a member of the corporate radiation protection group

visiting the SSES to observe a particular job or program activity.

In addition to the licensee's program of self assessments,

a Radiation Advisory Group is

utilized. This group is composed of several industry notable personnel that meet four times a

year.

This group willperform independent evaluation of the licensee's programs, licensee

performance,

and significant changes in industry thought, such as latest studies on health effects

of radiation.

The results of these evaluations are then reported to the Senior Vice President-

Yuclear

Plannin

and Schedulin

Major outage work requirements

are determined over one year in advance for two refueling

outages at a time. Draft outage plans are issued consecutively with a minimum lead time of

seven months previous to the, outages.

The outage scheduling group issues the draft plans to all

station departments

including the ALARAgroup for review and comment.

Due to a licensee

initiated Organization Effectiveness Review, the maintenance

department

was reorganized

along plant functional lines in 19S9 (i.e. valves, YSSS, balance of plant, snubbers

and ISI,

maintenance

services, electrical, and I 2 C). Each of these functional maintenance

groups has

its own planner and scheduler.

As the outage work is inherited by each maintenance

group,

each group's planner/scheduler

works to detail the planning within the allotted general outage

scheduling framework.

The ALARAgroup also has a planner/scheduler

who has access to all

of the scheduled work packages

as they are developed.

Lists of work packages

are screened for

radiologically significance afterwhich the ALARAspecialist begins his or her outage planning

activities.

The dedicated position of HP planner/scheduler

is viewed as a good station initiative. This

function allows for early job identification which provides significant lead time for the

application of ALARAtechniques and resources.

There are two computer systems which do

not currently interface with each other; the Plant Maintenance Information System (PMIS) and

the Radiological Management

System (RMS) ~ Allof the maintenance planning/scheduling

is

done from the PMIS whereas all of the ALARAplanning/scheduling functions are performed

using the RMS. Due in part to this limitation, the station schedule does not provide job

progress measurement

data for the ALARAdose tracking system.

The general outage schedule

has basically standardized

an outage approach which includes a four day ALARAwindow

before general work commences

inside of primary containment (drywell). This time period

~

s ~

P'

V

26

allows for the identification of hot spots, flushing of these hot spots, drywell decontamination,

installation of shielding and installation of temporary services (e.g. electricity, lighting,

instrument air, etc.).

This demonstrates

management

resolve to minimize personnel exposures.

16.0

ALARAPr

ram Im lementation

,'I

Formal pre-job reviews were required for any job estimated to cost one person-rem or greater.

The ALQV pre-job review checklist was well developed and of appropriate scope.

The pre-

job review consisted of a four page checklist, meeting attendance

sheet documenting the pre-job

review meeting, and a detailed job person-rem estimate,

From these reviews, and resulting

dose estimates the level of ALARApriority and resources were determined.

According to the ALARAProgram procedure AD-00-745, Rev. 9, for all jobs estimated over

one person-rem

an "in progress" review is required at the half way point. This ALARAreview

is to be completed by the work group supervisor.

Upon review, very few in progress reviews

were completed by the work group supervisor and of those that were, approximately 907o

contained no written comments at all ~ In general, this "in progress" review initiative is not

working. For operational ALARAcontrols, the dose tracking system (RMS) does compare

actual person-rem and actual person-hours to the estimates which would effect an investigation

as soon as an estimate is exceeded.

Currently the operational ALARAreviews do not

incorporate

a measure of job completion to compare the person-rem and person-hours

to.

Apparently, the difficultyin interfacing the PMIS and RMS computer systems prohibits the

current availability of the outage schedule information for ALAI'ontrolpurposes.

'In

general, the operational ALARAcontrol measures

could be enhanced.

A list of current RWP's w'as used to select various ALARAjob review packages from the unit 2

fourth refueling outage.

Six ALARAjob packages

represented

17 different RWP's.

Since the

ALARAjob packages

normally precede the RWP issuance it is the ALARAjob packages which

are reviewed and approved by appropriate levels of management.

The divergence from a single

ALARApackage to several RWPs can cause the need for a post-job review to be missed.

The

station procedure requirement for a post-job review during an outage is any job which

accumulates

five person-rem or greater'. AIARAjob package no.90-095 governing limitorque

testing was broken into four RWPs of which the highest individual RWP resulted in 4.55

person-rem.,This ALARAjob package received no post-job review. The cumulative actual job

exposure for all four RWPs was approximately seven person-rem which should have received a

post-job review. This particular job was well under estimated

exposure. however there is a

27

potential for not reviewing significant exposure expenditures.

When a particular scope of work

is designated

as an ALARApackage and presented to the station ALAI'ommittee as such,

the package should continue to be regarded

as the same unit throughout the post-job review

process.

Dose reports are published twice a day during outages and weekly during routine operations.

The information is obtained from RWP sign-in sheet pocket dosimeter data and is updated with

TLD data when available.

To meet the specific needs of the Electrical and Structural (E 2 S)

Construction group, a dose report program was written for their use by the~~ group.

This custom report was administered and distributed by E 2 S construction as needed.

It was

not clear to the inspectors

whether appropriate training,was provided to the work group

supervisors in order to maximize the use of these dose reports.

An ALARAjob package no.90-113 covering RPV disassembly/reassembly,

recommended

that

RPV stud tensioning be reduced from three passes to two passes

as a dose reduction lessons

learned.

This recommendation

was carried through in the outage health physics report and the

inspector verified its incorporation into current outage practice.

The post-job reviews are captured

as lessons learned in the Outage Health 'Physics Report

which is distributed to all station departments.

This document also provides comprehensive

dose, man-hour, and dose rate data by task and work group cate'gories.

A running historical

basis provides trend comparisons

and evaluations.

There is enough detail in the report to

provide for future dose estimating and planning needs.

In general, the Unit 1 fifth refuel

outage report dated January 2, 1991 was a well developed and useful comprehensive ALARA

outage report.

17.0

Exit Meeting

The inspectors met with licensee representative

at the conclusion of this inspection, on April 19,

199'1.

The inspectors reviewed the purpose and scope of the radiological controls inspection

and discussed

the inspection findings. The inspectors also reviewed the purpose and scope of

the ALARAreview and discussed

the findings.

v

~