ML17146A637
| ML17146A637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1986 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paolino R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17146A635 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-86-21, 50-388-86-22, NUDOCS 8611070347 | |
| Download: ML17146A637 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1986021
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-387/86-21
50-388/86-22
Docket Nos.
50-387/50-388
License
Nos.
NPF-22
Priority
Category
C
Licensee:
Penns
lvania Power
& Li ht
Com an
2 North Ninth Street
Al 1entown
Penns
1 vania
18101
Facility Name:
Sus
uehanna
Steam Electric Station
Inspection At:
Allentown
Penns
1vania
Inspection
Conducted:
Se tember
15-19
1986
Inspectors:
C
R.
.
P ol
n
,
Le d Reactor
En
Approved by:
gsneer
/o
Za
ate
/o at. Ik
C. J. Anderson,
Chief, Plant Systems
Section-EB/DRS
date
Ins ection Summar:
Inspection
on September
15-19,
1986 (Combined Inspection
Report Nos.
50-387/86-21
and 50-388/86-22).
A~:*,i
i
Lii
NV1
internal wiring to determine if licensees
1) have adequately
established
environmental qualification of wiring in accordance
with the requirements
of
and 2) have adequately
addressed
the concerns of IE Information Notice 86-03, "Potential Deficiencies
In Environmental Qualification of
Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring."
Results:
One
10 CFR 50.49 potential violation involving use of unqualified
terminal blocks in Limitorque Motor Valve Operators
and
one violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Failure to follow procedures
(requirement
for sealing conduit entry into components.)
8611070347
861031
I
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ADOCK',05000387 'i,
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Il
a
DETAILS
1.0
Persons
Contacted
1.1
Penns
lvania
Power
5 Li ht
Com an
J.
A. Blakeslee, Jr., Assistant Plant Superintendent
M.
R. Buring, Radiation Protection Supervisor
C.
E. Burke, Plant Chemistry Supervisor
F.
G. Butler, Technical
Supervisor
T.
R. Clymer,
QA Supervisor,
T.
M. Crimmins, Jr.,
Plant Superintendent
R.
L. Doty, Health Physics/Chemistry
Supervisor
D.
R. Heffelfinger, Coordinator Engineer,
NQA
D.
F.
McGann,
Compliance
Engineer
D.
K. McGarry,
NQA,
S.
M. Montgomery, Maintenance
Engineer
L. O'eil, Supervisor
Maintenance
R.
M. Paley,
Technical
Engineer
J.
T. Todd,
Compliance
Engineer
- G. Wetzel,
EQ Coordinator (Allentown Office)
- William Williams, Licensing Engineer (Allentown Office)
1.2
U.S. Nuclear
Re viator
Commission
L.
R. Plisco,
Senior Resident
Inspector
J.
R. Stair,
Resident
Inspector
P.
Clemons,
Radiation Specialist
- denotes
personnel
not present at exit meeting
2.0
General
Information
Licensees
have discovered
Limitorque Motor Valve Operators with jumper
wires different from those tested
by the manufacturer
in its environmental
qualification program and internal wiring of its Limitorque Operators that
either could not be identified or qualification that could not be esta-
blished.
3.0
A
licabilit of Information Notice
In response
to the
NRC Information Notice No. 86-03, "Potential Defi-
ciencies
In Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator
Wiring", the licensee
issued
a draft report
on April 29,
1986
on Clari-
fication of Information Related to the Environmental Qualification of
Limitorque MOV's.
The report identified Internal wiring and potential
Limitorque Operator deficiencies
such
as terminal blocks
and gear case
relief valves.
A preliminary
memo (PLI-45403) was issued to the plant maintenance
group
on
May. 5,
1986 requesting
that the Limitorque Motor operated
valve
actuator
be field inspected for verification of
EQ requirements
noted in
Information Notice 86.-03
and other per'tinent
EQ requirements'
second
memo (PLI-45891) was issued
on June 9,
1986 to clarify the
scope of the
inspection
and to correct errors in the original draft
memo PLI-45403.
On Monday, June
2,
1986
an
MOV- Task Force
was mobilized to establish
responsibilities
and implement
an action plan for the inspection of all
MOVS's.
On June 3,
1986 the Nuclear Plant Engineering
group provided
an
inspection
scope
which included seventeen
(17) MOV's inside
each unit
containment.
Inspections
were conducted
to verify the
use of qualified
internal wiring on limit switch and torque switch connection points within
the switch compartment
and to verify the
use of gear
box grease relief
valves.
4.0
Ph sical
Ins ection
As
a result of the Emergency
pump problems both units
were
shutdown
on Saturday,
May 24,
1986 providing the licensee
the
opportunity to perform the
EQ field inspections.
The inspections
were
conducted
from June
5,
1986 through June
15,
1986.
The inspection of Unit
1 resulted
in replacement
of limit switch jumper
wires installed
by Limitorque which were unidentifiable
on nearly all
valves inspected.
None of the
17 valves inside the containment
required
replacement for the torque switch wiring.
Twelve of the
17 valves outside
the containment
required replacement
of unqualified torque switch wiring.
The Marathon
300 and
6000 Series
Terminal blocks were replaced with the
Marathon
1600 Series
on six of 17 valves in the containment
and
on eleven
of 17 valves outside
the containment.
For Susquehanna
Unit 2 the limit switch wiring was replaced
on nearly
all valves inspected.
None of the valves inside the containment required
replacement
of the torque switch wiring for
EQ reasons.
Eleven of the
17
valves outside the containment
required replacement
of unqualified torque
switch wiring.
For six of the
17 MOV's inside the containment
and eleven
of the
17 MOV's outside
the containment,
the 'terminal block was replaced
with a Marathon
1600 series
block.
In addition, the licensee
performed
an operability analysis to determine
the effects
on operability as
a result of the
EQ issues
noted above.
The
licensee
had determined that failure of any
MOV due to unqualified wiring
would not prevent these
valves
from attaining their post-accident
position
and that the unqualified wiring would not be expected
to fail in a manner
that would cause
any valve to reposition following an accident.
A licen-
see
Reportabi lity Evaluation
Committee that convened
on June
10-11,
1986
to review the
EQ issues
and operability analysis
concluded
(Report
No. PLI-45937) that the
EQ problems identified during the licensee's
J'
inspection of Limitorque's were not reportable.
Unit,l returned to power
on June
19,
1986
and Unit 2, 'after several
returned to power on
July 21,
1986.
Both units were
down for this inspection.
r
Unit 2 shut
down on August 9,
1986 for the refueling outage.
Unit
1 came
down
on September
12,
1986 as
a result of unidentified leakage
from the
reactor
water cleanup valve.
The inspector
looked at six MOV's verifying
licensee
replacement
of the unqualified wiring and terminal block replace-
ment with the Marathon
1600 series.
Craft personnel
following approved
procedures
removed the MOV's switch housing cover for access
to the switch
compartment for NRC inspection.
The inspector
observed that the flex-conduit used for electrical
cable
entry into
MOV No. HV-2F008 was not sealed
as required
by Field Procedure
No.
FP-E-11 revision 2, sheet
4 of 4.
The procedure
states:
"Ensure
conduit entries into motor'perators
are
sealed
per E-49 paragraph
4.2. 15.
Paragraph
4.2. 15 of specification
E-49 revision
19,
sheet
20 states,
in
part, that:
"conduits located
above or belowshall
be effectively sealed
against dust,
moisture
and flax-soap with sealant
material
PR-895
(formerly PR-615)
or PR-855-.-or equal."
Three additional
MOV's were
examined
by the
NRC,
MOV numbers
HV-2F002,
HV-2F003 and HV-21210B.
All
three contained
varying amounts of sealant
material
around the flex-con-
duit entry into the switch compartment
housing,
however, there
were large
voids between
the cable
and the flex-conduit so as to make the seal
ineffective in sealing against
the entry dust, dirt, moisture or flax-
soap
from the flex-conduit into the switch housing
compartment.
The inspector
was unable to determine
whether the deficiency was
a carry-
over from the facilities construction
phase or whether the deficiency
occur red as
a result of normal plant maintenance
of electrical
equpment.
.The licensee
was informed that this was
a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
B, Criterion
V (failure to follow procedures)
and
a repeat of construction
deficiency identified in report
No. 50-387/81-00-24
and 50-388/81-00-24
pertaining to: "Potential shorting of Electrical
Equipment
by Drainage of
Flax-soap
from conduit into Equipment Enclosures"
(387/86-21-01;
388/86-22-01).
5.0
Document
Review
'he
inspector
reviewed pertinent work and quality records for the replace-
ment of unqualified internal wiring for Limitorque Motor Valve Operators
to ascertain
whether the records
meet established
procedures
and whether
the records reflect work accomplishments
consistent with NRC requirements
and licensee
commitments.
~,
4
Documents
reviewed include:
Unit 1-Inside Containment
Valve No.
HV-1F3014
Work
Authorization
S61194/S61100
~Sstem
No.
64
Reel
No.
G14250
G14245
G14249
Frame
No. gCIR
126
1
1946
HV-1F002
HV-1F009
~
S61190/S61101
S61191/S61105
52
G14245
G14248
G14249
G14245
G14250
G14261
395
106
1971
393
383
9
86-2397
86-2404
HV-2F022
HV-21345
V60451
V60445
Unit-2-Inside Containment
G14262
G14307
G14262
G14307
G14264
1919
529
2043
499
253
86-2491
86-2485
HV-2F002
V60444
62
G14307
404
86-2484
HV-1F015B
S61157
Unit 1-Outside
Containment
G14253
G14307
G14250
1700
444.
103
86-2466
HV-1F015A
HV-1F048B
S61158
S61159
49
G14261
G14253
G14307
128
1680
449
86-2467
86-2468
HV-2F003A
V60464
Unit 2-Outside
Containment
G14264
G14307
G14264
59
615
90
86-2539
l
HV-2F006B
HV"2F004A
Y60465
V60468
49
G14307
G14264
G14307
620
174
635
86-2540
86-2543
'
In addition to the above
documents
the
NRC inspector
reviewed the Limi-
EQ file No.
EQPL-E7B which contained
the Equipment Qualification
Report
No. B-0119 for Limitorque Motor Valve Operators
and the Wyle Report
No. 45603-1 for the Marathon
1600 series
terminal blocks.
The Limitorque
file SCEW sheet
indicated that the Limitorque was qualified to 312'F with
notations stating that the application for Limitorque with either
the
Marathon
300,
1600 series,
GE EB-5, Curtis type
L and
Buchanan
0222/0524
terminal blocks are for outside
containment
use only.
The Wyle Report
and
SCEW sheet indicate that the Marathon
1600 series
block is qualified to
365
F.
Section
4.0 of the report indicates
the terminal block assemblies
were powered with applied voltages of 132VAC,
264VAC adnd
528VAC during
the
LOCA/MSLB test.
The report goes
on to say the terminal blocks with
applied voltages of 528
VAC did not meet the requirements
specified for
maximum current
leakage
and minimum insulation resistance.
There
was
no
data to support applied voltages of 480VAC at Susquehanna.
Discussions with the licensee
regarding
the basis for using the Marathon
1600 series
indicates
an oversite
on the part of the Nuclear Plant
Engineering
Group.
It appears
that Engineering
had determined
from the
information on the
SCEW sheet that the Marathon
1600 series
terminal block
was qualifi'ed.
The problem in using the
SCEW sheet is that this data
summary sheet
does not include all critical parameters.
The
SCEW sheet
format basically follows the format in
10 CFR 50.49(e) listing primary
criteria such
as temperature,
pressure,
radiation,
humidity, aging,
sub-
mergence
and operating time.
On September
17,
1986 the licensee
issued
two non-conformance
reports
(NCR) Nos.
86-0635 for Unit 2 and 86-0636 for
Unit 1.
The
NCR states
that "terminal blocks are not qualified for use
in circuits above
264VAC when located in the drywell and subjected
to
post-LOCA environmental
conditions."
The Wyle Report
No. 45603-1 is used
as
a reference.
The Nuclear Plant Engineering
Group will re-evaluate
the
Operability and Reportabi lity requirements.
Raychem
Heat Shrinkable
Sleeving kits are to be used
on splices for 480V terminations
in place of
the unqualified blocks inside the primary containment.
Fifteen Limitorque
MOV's in the containment for Unit
1 and Unit 2 have
been identified for
rework.
The
NCR contains instructions
and descriptions for the applica-
tion of applicable
Raychem Nuclear
Grade
Heat Shrinkable kits.
Work on
replacement
of the terminal blocks with Raychem splice kits started
on
September
18,
1986.
Since the Marathon
1600 series
terminal blocks installed during the
June 5-15,
1986 period were determined
to be unqualified,
then the MOV's
containing these
terminal blocks were unqualified.
The licensee
was informed that this was
a Potential
Enforcement/Unresolved
Item. subject to the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.49 (387/86-21-02;
388/86-22-02).
.0
~Ei
M
The inspector
met with Licensee
personnel
(denoted
in Details,
paragraph
1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection
on September
19,
1986 at the
pl ant fac i 1 ity.
The inspector
summarized
the
scope of the inspection
and the inspection
findings.
At no time during this inspection
was written material
provided to the
licensee.