ML17146A368
| ML17146A368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1986 |
| From: | Lodewyk A, Mcbrearty R, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17146A366 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-86-05, 50-387-86-5, NUDOCS 8605090178 | |
| Download: ML17146A368 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1986005
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION'
Report
No.
50-387/86-05
Docket No.
50-387
License
No.
Pri ority
Category
C
Licensee:
Penns
lvania Power and Li ht
Com an
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown
Penns
1 vani a
18101
Facility Name:
Sus
uehanna
Steam Electric Station Unit
1
Inspection At:
Salem Townshi
Penns
lvania
Inspection
Conducted:
March 10-14
1986
Inspectors:
R.A. McBrearty,
Re
or Engineer
~
.
Lodew
, Reactor
Engineer
Approved by:
J.
. ltiiggin
hief, Materials
nd Proce
s
Section,
EB,
lv /9'8
date
0 30
date
date
Ins ection Summar:
Ins ection
on March 10-14 -1986
Re ort No. 50-387/86-05
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
inspection
by two regional
based
inspectors
of licensee
action
on previous inspection findings, review of the
inservice inspection (ISI) program,
observations
of work in progress
including
QA/QC coverage,
review of licensee
QA audits,
and review of data (video tapes)
associated
with in-vessel
reactor internals
inspection activities.
,Results:
Two violations were identified:
Failure to include longitudinal
seam
and failure to respond to an audit finding.
8b05090l78
860502'DR
ADOCK 05000387
6
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Penns
lvania Power and Li ht
Com an
- R.A. Breslin, Supervisor-Nuclear
Maintenance
Support
E. Carroll,
NSG (=ISI)
"M.M. Golden,
Plant Engineer,
Supervisor
- R.D. Kichline, Compliance
Engineer
"D.F. McGann,
Compliance
Engineer
D. Mitchell, Power Prod.
Engineer
R. Prego,
gA Surveillance
Supervisor
D. Saduary,
Compliance
Engineer
"T.K. Steingass,
ISI Supervisor
'M. Strenk, Project Engineer
"D.J.
Thompson, Assistant Superintendent
of Plant
Southwest
Research
Institute
Su RI
2.
"H. Diaz,
Level III
R. Shimkus,
Level III
"R.M'. Weber,
Inspection
Engineer
"Denotes
those
present at the exit meeting.
Licensee Action On Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item (387-85-10-01):
NDE procedure
does
not meet
Code.
The inspector
reviewed Field Change
No. 1-85-00779 to procedure
TP-ISI-307, Revision I which precludes
the use of flat calibration blocks
at Susquehanna
Unit 1.
This item is now considered
closed.
(Open) Unresolved
Item (387/85-10-02):
Radiographic film density
exceeds
code
maximum allowable,
incomplete
coverage
of areas
of interest.
The
original radiography of weld
FW-B13 showed
a penetrameter
in the area of
interest.
The weld was re-radiographed
with the penetrameters
in the
correct locations.
The original radiographs
of weld FW-B10 showed
no
station marker "3" in view 3-4,
and maximum density of 4.38 in view 6-0
which exceeded
the code
maximum of 4.0.
The license'e
re-evaluated
the
questionable
films and advised
the inspector that additional density
readings of view 6-0 indicate that the
maximum density is less
than 4.0
and .is within ASME Code limits.
The inspector
was further advised that
although view 3-4 shows
no station marker "3", complete
coverage
can
be
shown
by the
use of view 2-3 and 3-4.
This item will remain
open
pending
NRC review of the questionable
films.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item
(387/85-10-03):
Incomplete
NDE personnel
certification records.
The inspector
reviewed additional
personnel
3
records
which were submitted
by the licensee's
ISI vendor.
The inspector
found that the additional
information confirmed that the questioned
personnel
were properly certified in accordance
with SNT-TC-lA and the
licensee's
ISI Program.
This item is considered
closed.
Preservice/Inservice
Ins ection
PSI/ISI
of Lon itudinal Weld Seams
Forty nine longitudinal
seam welds in three piping systems
in Unit
1 have
not received preservice
inspection,
and are not identified or included in
the facility PSI or the ISI program.
It i s the inspector's
understanding
that the program ommission
was identified by the ANII during the course
of pipe weld ultrasonic examinations
by the licensee's
ISI vendor.
Corrective action taken
by the licensee
was to perform an analysis to show
that the welds were acceptable
for continued service,
but no further weld
examinations
were to be performed.
Additionally, at the time of this
inspection,
the inspector
was advised that at least twenty longitudinal
seam welds in Unit 2 have not received preservice
inspection
and are not
included in the Unit 2 PSI program or in the ISI program.
During construction of Unit 1, the Bechtel
M 201 Purchase
Specification
allowed the
use of either
seamless
or welded piping material.
The piping
fabricator provided the licensee with initial documentation
which in-
dicated that seamless
material
would be deliv'ered to the site.
The infor-
mation was given to the licensee's
PSI vendor
who used it to develop the
PSI program
and to determine
the
number
and type of welds which were
required
by the
ASME Code Section
XI to be included in the program.
Documentation
which accompanied
the piping spools to the site
showed that,
some of the spools were fabricated of welded material
and contained longi-
tudinal
seam welds.
The licensee failed to provide the later information
to the
PSI vendor which resulted
in the omission
from the
PSI program
and
from the ISI program of those welds.
See attachment
1 to this report. for
a listing of the omitted welds.
Omission of the longitudinal
seam welds
from the PSI/ISI program is considered
a violation of the requirements
of
a (g) (387/86-05-01).
Observations
of Work in Pro ress
The inspector
observed ultrasonic examinations
in progress
to ascertain
compliance with the
ASME Code
and .with regulatory requirements,
and in the
case of the recirculation
system riser weld, to assess
the quality of the
examination
and the interpretability of the results.
Examination of the
following welds was observed
by the inspector:
VRR-,B 31-1-FW-A4, recirculation
system
28" diameter
valve to
pipe weld
Weld VRR-B 31-1-FW-A10, recirculation
system
12" diameter
sweepolet
The inspector
found that the examinations
were done using
a master/slave
remote
system
by which scanning
is done
by a Level I individual and
interpretation is done
by a Level II individual stationed
outside of the
radiation area.
The Level II observes
the ultrasonic instrument at his
location,
and is in constant
voice contact with the Level I who has visual
access
to
a monitor which duplicates
the display observed
by the Level II.
Instrument
changes
can
be
made only by the Level II.
The inspector
found that the examinations
were performed in accordance
with approved
procedures
by qualified personnel.
The licensee
plans to use the ultrasonic examination results of the
12"
diameter riser welds to determine
the feasibility of meeting inservice
inspection
requirements
of those welds.
This use of ultrasonic
exam-
ination techniques
is in lieu of radiography
by the
MINAC system
as
was
done during the first refueling outage.
To accomplish this two of the
riser welds are scheduled for ultrasonic examination during the current
outage.
The inspector
reviewed data associated
with the examination of riser weld
F W-A 12.
The data
were compared to data associated
with the manual
ultrasonic examination of the
same weld which was done by the licensee's
PSI vendor prior to plant operation.
The current data
noted
a recordable
indication which was observed intermittently for 360
around the weld.
No
mention
was
made of other indications
having
been
observed
during the
course of the examination.
The earlier data
noted that indications were
observed
which were too numerous to record.
During the examination of
FW-A 10 the inspector
observed
numerous
indications in the examina-
tion .volume which were below the recording level, but which could obscure
low amplitude crack .indications.
The inspector
agreed with the Level II
that, if a crack were large enough, its reflection would be detected.
Discussion with the Level II indicated that the display observed
by the
inspector
was similar to the display which was observed
during the
examination of weld
FW-A 12.
At the exit meeting the inspector stated that the ultrasonic
response
observed during the examination of FW-A 10 appeared
similar to responses
noted during previous attempts
to examine the riser welds,
and which
resulted in interpretation
problems
and subsequent
use of the
MINAC
technique.
He further stated that it was not clear that the technique
currently proposed is capable of providing meaningful,
repeatable
results.
The inspector
noted that the acceptability
of UT as the Technique for ISI
examination of the riser welds is being reviewed by NRR.
No violations were identified.
ualit
Assurance Activities For ISI
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
Nuclear Quality Assurance
(NQA) and
Nuclear Support
Group audit,
surveillance.,
and witnessing activities for
Inservice Inspection.
5.1
The following NQA reports
were reviewed for scope
and completeness:
~
QASR No.85-025,
Inservice Inspection of Unit
1 Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
Internals
~
1 Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
Steam
Dryer
and
Dryer Support Bracket Repairs
~
QASR No.85-034,
Performance
of MINAC on IHI Welds 69,76,74
~
QASR No.85-040,
~
SSES Audit 85-88, Audit of ISI Activities
The reports
address
both routine
and special
ISI activities
and are
technically comprehensive.
The report findings and observations/
recommendations
revealed that the
NQA, staff had adequate
knowledge
of work details
and program requirements.
5.2
Of the above
reviewed reports
and records,
SSES audit report finding
85-88-01 required action
on the part of the Nuclear Support
Group
(NSG).
NDI-QA-15.3.7 Rev.
Para.
6.4. 1.4 states
that Nuclear Support
will provide
a qualified visual testing inspector
to witness
functional testing.
Contrary to this, the audit found no evidence
that Nuclear
Support
was providing the qualified visual testing
inspector.
The
NRC inspector
surveyed
the extensive
snubber, functional testing
activities being performed during this outage.
This survey
and
subsequent
discussions
with the licensee's
representatives
demon-
strated that finding 85-88-01 is
a valid concern.
,In addition to the above,
Nuclear Department Instruction,
NDI-QA-8.1. 1, states
in part that for follow-up of Audit Findings,
the responsible
organization
shall
respond,
as requested
by the audit
report, stating the results of review and investigation.
The
response
shall clearly state
the corrective action taken or planned.
These
response
requirements
are reiterated
in (a)
The
SSES-FSAR
Table 17.2-1 which commits to full compliance with ANSI N45.2. 12-1977
Edition,
and (b)
PP8 L Operational
Policy Statement,
DPS-7,
Rev..
2.
The cover letter and audit report 85-88 were issued
on December
16,
1985 and requested
a response
within thirty days of receipt of the
audit report.
- A review of the
NQA computer audit tracking log and discussions
with
the responsible
Nuclear Support
Group representative
revealed that
NSG had not yet responded
to the audit finding.
During this
inspection,
a request for an extension of the response
time require-
ments
was submitted
by NSG.
However,
the licensee
had not yet
,
determined
(1)
The resolution of audit finding 85-88-01
(2) If the lack of response
on the part of the Nuclear Support
Group
had been
an isolated
case or indicative of a more widespread
problem, or
(3)
What corrective actions
are to be taken.
The inspector
informed the licensee that not meeting the thirty day
response
date requested
in the Audit Report constituted
a violation
of procedure
NDI-QA-8.1. 1 and
10 CFR 50 Appendix
B requirements
(387186-05-02).
The inspector
had
no further quest
6.
Reactor
Pressure
Vessel
Internals
5.3
NDI-QA-15.3.7 and PE-ISI-002 require the Nuclear Support
Group to
survey
and witness activities performed
by ISI contractor
SwRI.
Evidence of these
requirements
was observed
by the
NRC Inspector
in the field.
UT and
NT checklists
were reviewed
and found to be
complete
and comprehensive
for the activities being performed.
lons.
Remote,
underwater visual inspections
of RPV intervals were performed
during the current refueling outage.
The inspections
were performed
by
CTS Power Service, Inc., who performed the
same function for the licensee
during the
1985 refueling outage.
The inspection results
were recorded
on video tape which serves
as
a permanent,
record of the inspections.
The
inspectors
reviewed the tapes
associated
with the following components:
.
~
Steam dryer support bracket
274'zimuth
~
Steam dryer seismic
support lug
274
azimuth
~
Steam dryer seismic
support lug - 184
azimuth
~
Steam dryer support ring 185
23
azimuth
During the
1985 outage
underwater visual inspection
revealed
indications
of cracking in portions of the
steam dryer support ring.
examination of the suspect
area confirmed the presence
of cracking,
and
a
subsequent
metallurgical
sample identified the cracking
as intergranular
stress
corrosion cracking.
Using. ultrasonic
and electrical
resistance
techniques,
General Electric Company personnel
determined
the crack depths
in fourteen specific areas.
1
On February
27,
1986,
General Electric Company personnel
used ultrasonic
techniques
to remeasure
the crack depths
in the
same fourteen areas.
The
results
were compared
to the
1985 measurements,
and it was noted that all
of the cracks
had grown since the
1985 measurements
were made.
The licensee
planned to use the information to calculate
the crack growth
rate
and stated at the exit meeting that the item was still being inves-
tigated.
The underwater
visual examination of the
steam dryer support bracket at
the 274'zimuth location revealed
linear indications which were evaluated
by the
same
Southwest
Research
Institute (SwRI) Level III who evaluated
the
1985 results,
and by the licensee's
.Level III.
The indications were
evaluated
by both individuals and determined to be surface
cracks.
The
examination
equipment
was
shown to be capable of detecting
a
1 mil dia-
meter wire - the indications were estimated
to be less
than that in width.
At the exit meeting
the inspector
was advised that preparations
for
lowering the
RPV water level were nearly completed.
This is planned to
provide access
for the performance of a liquid penetrant
examination of
the bracket surface,
and the results will be used to ascertain
whether
further action is required.
Indi'cations associated
with other components
were not detected
during
re-examination
of the components
subsequent
to surface cleaning.
No violations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on Parch
14,
1986.
The inspector
summarized
the purpose
and the
scope of the inspection
and the findings.
At no time during this inspection
was written material
provided by the
inspector to the licensee.
'I
~
~
The following welds were omitted
Unit l.
Attachment
1
from the PSI/ISI program at Susquehanna,
~Sstem
Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR)
ASME Class
1
ASME Class
2
Reactor Recirculation
ASME Class
1
Weld Identification
DCA-111-1-1-H
OCA-111-1-1-J
DCA-111-1-1-K
DCA-111-1-1-L
OCA-111-1-2-8
DCA-111-1-3-C
DCA-111-1-4- F
DCA-111-1-5-C
OCA-111-1-5-D
DCA-111-2-1-C
DCA-111-1-4-G
DCA-111-2-2-C
OCA-111-2-3-8
DCA-111-2-9-A
DBB-107-2-1-E
DBB-107-2-1-F
HBB-111-1-1-H
HBB-111-1-1-J
DCA-141-1-1-C
DCA-141-1-1-D
OCA-141-1-3-E
DCA-141-1-3-F
DCA-142-1-1-C
DCA-142-1-1-0
DCA-142-1-3-E
DCA-142-1-3- F
VRR-831-1-4-C
VRR-831-1-4-0
VRR-831-1-5-C
VRR-831-1-5-D
VRR-831-1-6-C
VRR-831-1-6-0
VRR-831-1-7-C
VRR-831-1-7-D
VRR-831-1-8-C
VRR-831-1-8-D
VRR-831-2-4-C
VRR-831-2-4-D
VRR-831-2-5-C
VRR-831-2-5-D
VRR-831-2-6-C
Descri tion
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Attachment
1
Core Spray System
ASME Class
1
VRR-B31-2-6-D
VRR-B31-2-7-C
VRR-B31-2-7-D
VRR-B31-2-8-C
VRR-B31-2-8-D
DCA-107-1-1-E
DCA-107-1-1- F
DCA-.107-1-1-G
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Elbow Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
Pipe
Seam
~
~
k
~
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