ML17139A563

Requests Addl Info Re Remote Shutdown Design.Response Requested within Two Wks of Receipt of Ltr

ML17139A563
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	02/19/1982
From:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8203050189
Download: ML17139A563 (6)

Text

FE'B 1 g >gy Docket Nos.

50-387/388 tlr. Normal'<. Curtis Vice President Engineering 8 Construction - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company 2 North Ningh Street Allentown, PA

]8101

SUBJECT:

Susquehanna Steam Electric for Additional Information

'NSTRIBUTION:

LBII2 File DEisenhut/RPurple RTedesco ASchwencer RPerch EHylton

Cutchin, OELD OI 8(E Region I

Resident Inspector SHanauer RMattson bcc:

T="RA.

NSIC NRC PDR Local PDR ACRS (16)

HThompson RVollmer RHartfield, tlPA OPg~

Pj +

4 /g JMauck TCollins'Rosa

Station, Units 1 and 2:

R

- Remote Shutdown Design questions regarding the capability of the Susquehanna remote shutdown panel were initially transmitted to you on August 17, 1981, indicating the need for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (GDC -19), Appendix K and Appendix R.

Our review of your response, dated December 8, 1981, has determined that it is still not apparent that the Susquehanna remote shutdown design capabilities meet those requirements.

Accordingly, it is requested that you address the additional questions delineated in Enclosure (A).

It is essential that your response be prompt and preferably within two weeks after receipt of this letter.

It may be advisable to convene a

meeting with the Commission's review staff to resolve the open areas.

Please advise, within seven (7) days of receipt of this letter, when we can expect a response, and/or when you will be prepared to meet with the review staff. If there are any questions, please contact the project manager assigned to your project.

Sincerely,

(

8203050isV 8202i9 PDR ADOCK 05000387 PDR

Enclosure:

As stated A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.

2 Division of Licensing cc:

See next page OFFICEI SURNAMEP DATE Q DL:LBA'

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Mr. Norman W; Curtis Vice President Engineering and Construction Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company Al 1 entovn, Pennsyl vania 18101 ccs:

Jay Silberg, Esquire

Shaw, Pi ttman, Potts

& Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.

W.

Washington, D. C. 20036 Edward M. Nagel, Esquire General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power

& Light Canpany 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsyl vani a 18101 Mr. Willian E. Barberich Nuclear Licensing Group Supervisor Pennsylvania Power

& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Al 1 entown, Pennsylvania 18101 Mr. G.

Rhodes Resident Inspector P.. 0.

Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655 Gerald R. Schultz, Esquire Susquehanna Environmental Advocates P. 0.

Box 1560 Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18703 Mr. E. B. Poser Project Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation P. 0.

Box 3965 San Francisco, California 94119 Ms. Colleen Marsh P. 0.

Box 538A, RD t4 Mountain Top, Pennsylvania 18707 Mr. Thomas J. Halligan Correspondent The Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers P. 0.

Box 5

Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501 Mr. J.

W. Millard Project Manager Mail Code 395 General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Robert W. Adler, Esquire Office of Attorney General 505 Executive House P. 0.

Box 2357

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Co-Director Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Poser 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Resources Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P. 0.

Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

ENCLOSURE A The following questions are based on the. applicant's response.

dated December 8, 1981 to the staff position on remote shutdown that was transmitted to the applicant on August 17, 1981.

(1)

The staff is questioning the use of the ADS valve controls located in the upper and lower relay rooms since. they share a

common HVAC system with the control structure.

Me request additional information concerning procedures for access to these areas during a control room evacuation.,

These pro-cedures should include a method of isolating either of these relay rooms from the control structure HVAC system or of

'I isolating the control room from the HVAC system and a

discussion of the smoke detectors in the relay rooms.

(2)

The applicant's response to our positio'n was incomplete re-garding instrument indicators needed for hot and cold shutdown.

He require. that a single failure analysis be provided for these indicators along with the locations for the alternate indications, (3)

The Redundant Path shown in Attachment A tabulates the systems or functions required to achieve a redundant or diverse method of shutdown where the controls and indicators are not necessarily on the Remote Shutdown Panel.

However, we require that locations be shown for the redundant systems or functions and these locations must be reasonably accessible from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

~0 (4)

Provide an analysis for using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

System to reduce the reactor pressure.

This analysis should be per-formed with the use of the RCIC system as a path for reducing reactor pressure during remote shutdown assuming SRYs and the ADS to be un-available, and should include verification that the RCIC turbine steam flow is sufficient to reduce reactor pressure to achieve cold shutdown.

The time to reach cold shutdown should also be provided.

(5}

In the applicants

response, the "primary pith" tabulates:.

those systems/

functions that are controllable from the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP).

The "primary path" system used to reduce the reactor pressure to go from hot to cold shutdown consists of.three. Safety/Relief Valves (SRV)

. which can he controlled from the RSP.

If a single failure prevents these valves from functioning, then the applicant takes. credit for a "redundant path" consisting of manual control of the Automatic Oepressurization Valves (AOS} to reduce the Reactor Pressure.

Ouring our review of the applicant's response, it became apparent that

, the Safety/Relief Valves on the RSP utilize non-safety grade air without accumulators as a backup and are, therefore, non-safety grade.

The staff has concluded that thi.s design does not meet th'e RSP position that was transmitted to the applicant on August 17, 1981; This position states, in part; that the design should provide redundant safety grade cap-abilities for attaining subsequent cold shutdown through the use of suitable procedures.

The staff requires that the applicant submit V

informat'ion as to how the staff position is met with the use of the SRVs.

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