ML17101A808
| ML17101A808 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/2017 |
| From: | Philip Mckenna Reactor Projects Branch 7 |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| Philip J. McKenna | |
| References | |
| IR 2017009 | |
| Download: ML17101A808 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000280/2017009
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
April 11, 2017
David Stoddard, Senior Vice President
and Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT
05000280/2017009 AND 05000281/2017009
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On March 16, 2017, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at your Surry Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were
discussed with Mr. R. Simmons and other members of your staff on March 16, 2017.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the
implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049
and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose
Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the
conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of
selected procedures and records, observation of Mr. Daniel G. activities, and interviews with
station personnel.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
D. Stoddard 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 7
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281
Enclosure:
IR 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc Distribution via ListServ
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP
NAME GMacDonald CJones AMasters SFreeman PMcKenna
DATE 04/03/2017 03/31/2017 04/10/2017 03/30/2017 04/11/2017
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281
Report No.: 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883
Dates: March 13 - 16, 2017
Inspectors: S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII (Team Leader)
G. MacDonald, Senior Reactor Analyst, RII
C. Jones, Resident Inspector, Surry
Approved by: Philip J. McKenna, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 7
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000280/2017009, 05000281/2017009; 03/13/2017 - 03/16/2017; Surry Power Station
Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation
Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness
Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.
The inspection covered a one-week inspection by two senior reactor analysts and one resident
inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-
1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
4. Other Activities
4OA5 Other Activities (TI 2515/191)
The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation
of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency
Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, is to verify
that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in
the licensees Final Integrated Plan, which was described in letters dated
January 25, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML 16033A353) and July 20, 2015,
(ADAMS Accession No. ML 15205A342) and the NRCs plant safety evaluation
(ADAMS Accession No. ML 16158A432) and to verify that the licensees installed
reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The
purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency
Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and the
NRCs safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and
enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be
maintained during such an event.
The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order
Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-
Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051,
Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by
the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and
communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for
information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-
13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan
Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation,
and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be
implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety
evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible,
procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant
staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the
teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.
1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing
procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed
how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between
existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed
mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and
conducted plant walk downs with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to
assess: the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators
4
with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of
equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures,
consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive
maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping
Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were
in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and
planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff
most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The
team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the
Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in
the attachment.
b. Assessment
Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee
satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in
the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined
that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The
inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
- integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and
departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
- protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
- developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX
equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
- trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-
design- basis events.
- developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment
would be available from off-site locations.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing
requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into
the licensees corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings identified.
2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.
Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the
plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling
for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and
electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of
the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
5
b. Assessment
Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee
satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)
instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety
evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order
EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
- installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide
physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and
safety evaluation.
- installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions
and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
- trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing,
and use of the SFP instrumentation.
- developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable
SFP instrumentation.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements,
and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees
corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information
a. Inspection Scope
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns,
the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing,
communications equipment and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite
power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety
assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose
assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees
site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees
multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the
attachment.
b. Assessment
The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose
submittal and in response to the NRCS March 12, 2012, request for information letter
and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to
Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural
emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power
(ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the
following:
- Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing change(s) to support an
ELAP scenario.
- EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an
ELAP scenario.
6
- Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel
pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
The inspectors verified that noncompliances with the current licensing requirements,
and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's
corrective action program.
c. Findings
No findings identified.
4OA6 Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On March 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to
Mr. Roy Simmons and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that
proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
F. Mladen, Site Vice President
R. Simmons, Plant Manager
R. Johnson, Operations Manager
T. Shell, Assistant Operations Manager
H. Johnson, Superintendent of Shift Operations
J. Rosenberger, Site Engineering Director
J. Henderson, Manager of Design Engineering
J. Holloway, Engineering Supervisor
E. Turko, Engineering Supervisor
D Lawrence, Director of Nuclear Safety and Licensing
L. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Training
B. Garber, Licensing Manager
L. Helstosky, Licensing Engineer
D. Aitken, Licensing Engineer
A. Elms, FLEX Program Manager
K. Rowland, General Project Manager
NRC personnel:
E. Andrews, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF REPORT ITEMS
Opened and Closed
None
Discussed
None
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
0-AP-10.15, Loss of the 428 / 469 Line (with 11 Attachments), Revision 29
0-OP-ZZ-021, Severe Weather Preparation, Revision 17
0-AP-37.01, Abnormal Environmental Conditions, Revision 69
0-ICP-FC-L-105-1, Spent Fuel Pool Level (1-FC-L-105-1) Calibration, Revision 4
0-ICP-FC-L-105-2, Spent Fuel Pool Level (1-FC-L-105-2) Calibration, Revision 5
0-NSP-ZZ-002, Inspection of FLEX Equipment, Revision 7
0-NSP-ZZ-003, Inventory of BDB FLEX Equipment, Revision 3
0-NSP-ZZ-004, Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite Communications, Revision 1
0-MPM-1960-01, Semi-Annual or Annual Test of BDB Flex Equipment, Revision 6
0-MPM-1960-02, Annual Testing of BDB Support Equipment, Revision 1
0-MPM-1960-02, Annual Testing of BDB Support Equipment, Revision 2
0-FSG-5, Initial Assessment and Flex Equipment Staging, Revision 3
0-FSG-11, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, Revision 2
1-AP-10.27, Loss of All AC Power While on RHR, Revision 2
1-AP-27.00, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability, Revision 27
1-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 41
1-FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, Revision 1
1-FSG-2, Alternate AFW Suction Source, Revision 1
1-FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 1
1-FSG-4, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed/Management, Revision 1
1-FSG-6, Alternate ECST Makeup, Revision 1
1-FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 0
1-FSG-8, Alternate RCS Boration, Revision 1
1-FSG-9, Low Decay Heat Temperature Control, Revision 0
1-FSG-10, SI Accumulator Isolation, Revision 0
1-FSG-12, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 0
1-FSG-13, Transition From FLEX Equipment, Revision 0
1-FSG-14, Shutdown RCS Makeup, Revision 1
1-FSG-15, 4160 VAC Generator Connection and Operation, Revision 0
2-AP-10.27, Loss of All AC Power While on RHR, Revision 0
2-AP-27.00, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability, Revision 27
2-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Revision 40
2-FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, Revision 1
2-FSG-2, Alternate AFW Suction Source, Revision 1
2-FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 1
2-FSG-4, ELAP DC Load Shed/Management, Revision 0
2-FSG-6, Alternate ECST Makeup, Revision 1
2-FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation and Control Power, Revision 0
2-FSG-8, Alternate RCS Boration, Revision 1
2-FSG-9, Low Decay Heat Temperature Control, Revision 2
2-FSG-10, SI Accumulator Isolation, Revision 1
2-FSG-12, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 0
2-FSG-13, Transition From FLEX Equipment, Revision 0
2-FSG-14, Shutdown RCS Makeup, Revision 1
2-FSG-15, 4160 VAC Generator Connection and Operation, Revision 0
CM-AA-400, 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 - Changes, Tests, and Experiments, Revision 7
CM-AA-BDB-10, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Program, Revision 3
CM-AA-BDB-101, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Program Maintenance, Revision 5
CM-AA-BDB-102, Beyond Design Basis FLEX Equipment Unavailability Tracking, Revision 8
3
DNES-AA-GN-1003, Design Effects and Considerations, Revision 18EPIP-4.03, Dose
Assessment Team Controlling Procedure, Revision 18 Drawings
1301042-1-E-001, Master Diagram, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, Surry Power Station -
Unit 1, Revision 1
11448-LP-1S14, Lighting Panelboard Schedule 01-EP-LP-1S14, Surry Power Station -
Unit 1, Revision 9
1301019-2-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station - Unit 2, Revision 3
1301019-1-S-001, Installation/Fabrication Sketch Switchgear Receptacle Enclosure
2-BDB-DB-03, Surry Power Station - Unit 1, Revision 3
1301019-11448-FE-18HT, Wiring Diagram, BDB Receptacle Panel 01-BDB-DB-3, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 3
1301019-11448-FE-13A, Wiring Diagram, Lighting Distribution, Surry Power Station Unit - 1,
Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-18HR, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-1, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 3
1301019-11448-FE-11D, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IA & 1-IIIA, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-11E, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-IIA & 1-IVA, Surry Power
Station - Unit 1, Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-18HS, BDB Distribution Panelboard Schedule 01-BDB-DB-2, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-11B, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-II & 1-IV, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-11A, Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Distribution Panels 1-I & 1-III, Surry Power
Station Unit - 1, Revision 2
1301019-11448-FE-1L, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 0
1301019-11448-FE-1M, 480V One Line Diagram, Surry Power Station Unit - 1, Revision 0
Modifications
Design Change SU-13-00015, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2
Design Change Update 15-0002, BDB Storage Building, Surry Power Station, Units 1&2
Design Change SU-13-01042, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrument
Installations, Revision 12
Design Change Update SU-13-01042-007, Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Level
Instrument Installation
Calculations
Breaker Coordination Curve for 120/240V BDB panels (Pages from Calculation EE-864)
Power Cable Details for DC-SU-13-01019, Cable Sizing and Voltage Drop, (Pages from
Calculation EE-864 Rev. 3 Attachment 13.2)
Condition Reports Reviewed
1019843 1055894 1054005 1041144 1042352 1029092 1015131
Condition Reports Generated as part of the Inspection
1062547, Unterminated Cable in U1 ECST Valve Vault
1062548, Review Cables in U2 ECST Valve Vault (Extent of Condition for CR1062547)
1062544, Drawing Error on Project Drawing 1301042-1-E-001
4
Work Orders
WO 38103535843, Loop Calibration on Support of DC SU-13-01042
WO 38103535844, Loop Calibration on Support of DC SU-13-01042
WO 38103707237, Perform Level Loop Calibration
WO 38103707242, Perform Level Loop Calibration
WO 38103693824, 00-BDB-P-2C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 6, 2016
WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103693864, 00-BDB-P-3B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103693856, 00-BDB-P-3A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103693904, 00-BDB-GEN-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 4, 2016
WO 38103693912, 00-BDB-GEN-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 4, 2016
WO 38103693960, 00-BDB-GEN-1A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 4, 2016
WO 38103693976, 00-BDB-GEN-1C-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 4, 2016
WO 38103693968, 00-BDB-GEN-1B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 4, 2016
WO 38103694016, 00-BDB-P-2B-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 11, 2016
WO 38103694072, 00-BDB-P-1-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103694080, 01-FP-P-4-Pump FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
March 22, 2016
WO 38103694128, 00-BDB-P-2A-Unit FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
April 11, 2016
WO 38103694184, FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated June 10, 2016
WO 38103694192, 00-BDB-LF-1A-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
June 10, 2016
WO 38103694200, 00-BDB-LF-1B-LIGHT FTPM: Perform Annual Test and Inspections, dated
June 10, 2016
WO 38103732208, 365 Day Freq. PT: Annual Testing of BDB Rapidcase Satellite
Communications, dated February 3, 2017
Other
Safety Evaluation Report - Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding
Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related
to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 CAC nos. MF1002, MF1003, MF1004, and MF1005 dated
August 4, 2016ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document
and Final Integrated Plan, Revision 7
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Beyond Design Basis - FLEX Strategy Basis Document and Final
Integrated Plan, Revision 7, Attachment 1.
ETE-CPR-2014-1010, Surry Power Station BDB Flex Validation for Time Sensitive Actions,
Revision 1
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, SPS Flex Strategy Basis Document 10.7.3 Development
Strategy BDB Fuel, Revision 7
ETE-CPR-2012-0011, Attachment 1, Section 7.2.11, Strategies for Repowering Remote
Monitoring Panel if Flooding of the ESGR Occurs, Revision 7
5
AREVA 51-9199717-015, National SAFER Response Center Equipment Technical
Requirements, Revision 15
Letter of Agreement, Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Emergency Management, dated
August 15, 2016
NE-GL-0035S, PC-MIDAS Guideline, Rev. 9
NEI 12-01, Phase 2 Extended Loss of Alternating Current Power (ELAP) Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) Staffing Analysis Report, Revision 1
NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Rev B1
SU-15-01084, BDB Flood Barriers, Revision 2
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1C-Unit 120-240DG, BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel
Gen. 1C Preventive Work Order 38103693976 performed June 14, 2016
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1B-Unit 120-240DG, BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel
Gen. 1B Preventive Work Order 38103693968 performed June 14, 2016
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-1A-Unit 120-240DG, BDB 40kW 120/240 VAC Diesel
Gen. 1A Preventive Work Order 38103693960 performed June 14, 2016
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2B-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693912 performed June 15, 2016
Annual Test and Inspection 00-BDB-Gen-2A-Unit 480V DG, Preventive Work Order 38103693904 performed June 15, 2016
Simulator Scenario developed for ELAP demonstration dated March 17, 2017
Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry
Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2 BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test,
completed October 13, 2015
Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry
Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U2 DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test,
completed October 28, 2015
Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry
Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1 BDB 120/240V Backfeed Test,
completed May 16, 2015
Engineering Acceptance Test Procedure 0-NAT-E-003, Revision 2, Control Circuitry
Checkout/Initial Energization of Electrical Equipment, U1 DBD 480V BDB Backfeed Test,
completed May 16, 2015