ML17083B929
| ML17083B929 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1987 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B927 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-87-28, 50-323-87-28, NUDOCS 8709110258 | |
| Download: ML17083B929 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1987028
Text
'
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/87-28,
50-323/87-28
Docket Nos.
50-275,
50-323
License
Nos.
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
San Francisco,
California 94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
2
Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Cond
e
.
July
31,
19
Inspector:
Q
F.
B
doi
, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:
M.
M. Mendonca,
Chief
Reactor Project Section
1
D
e Signed
d Z~zd'7
Date Signed
~Summar:
Ins ection Durin
Period of Jul
27-31
1987
Re ort Nos. 50-275/87-28
and
50-323/87-28
various vital areas
and equipment in the plant,
and followup of temporary
instruction, Part 21(s), Generic Letters
and Nonconformance
Reports.
Inspection
Procedures
Nos.
25573,
30703,
36100,
71707
and 92700 were used
as
guidance for the inspection.
Results:
One violation regarding environmental qualifications of electrical
equipment
was identified (paragraph
5.A).
8709i 10258 870~
ADOCK 05000275
Q
~
'
DETAILS
Individuals Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
PGSE
- J. D. Townsend, Acting Plant Manager
- W. B. McLane,
Computer Engineering
Manager
- R. M. Luckett, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
R.
G.
Oman, Assistant Project Engineer (Bechtel)
F.
W. Chan, Electrical Engineer
- L. F. Womack, Operations
Manager
T. L. Grebel,
Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
M.
W. Stephens,
General
Foreman,
Instrumentation
T. A. Nelson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
S.
D. Wilson, Regulatory
Compliance
Engineer
D. R. Bell, Quality Control
(QC) Supervisor,
General
Construction
Various other engineering
and
QC Personnel.
- Denotes attendees
at exit meeting
on July 31,
1987.
Area Ins ection
An independent
inspection
was conducted
in Units
1 and
2 Turbine and
Auxiliary Buildings.
The equipment
and areas
inspected
included:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.I.
J.
K.
L.
Five Emergency Diesel
Generator
Rooms
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear
Rooms
Combined Two-Unit Control
Room
Four Safety Injection
Pump Areas
Four
Pump Areas
Three
Component
Cooling Pumps,
Unit 2
Pumps
Six 480 Volt Vital Bus
Rooms
Two Hot Shutdown
Panels
Two 480 Volt Load Center Areas
Turbine Building at Elevations
140'/85'ix
Battery. Rooms
Housekeeping
and equipment status
appeared
to be acceptable
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Followu
of Part
21
Re orts
The licensee's
response
to the following Part
21 report was reviewed:
A.
Closed
87-08-P,
HFA
Rela -Armature Bindin
The General Electric Company in a "Relay and Accessory Service
Advice Letter" dated
December
16,
1986 identified faulty operation
of their HFA Auxiliary Relays.
HFA Relays that had
been
continuously energized with AC power have failed to provide correct
~
'
2
'
contact operation
when de-energized.
The cause of incorrect
operation of contacts
was determined to be mechanical
binding of the
Relay Armature.
This binding of the Armature was caused
by
incorrect location of a stop tab which is welded to the armature.
The manufacturing
process
has
been corrected
so that relays
fabricated after October 24,
1986 are not subject to this defect.
General Electric identified relays manufactured
between
January
1983
and October
1986 as suspect.
The licensee
reviewed the
HFA Relays at Diablo Canyon following the
service advice letter and determined that the original
HFA Relay
installed in the plant were replaced in 1982 with HFA Century Series
Relays.
However, it was found that four suspect
relays per unit
were installed recently in a modification to the
RCP circuit breaker
backup protection circuitry. This is not a safety system;
however,
the licensee
has
issued action requests
0061512 (Unit 1) and 0061531
(Unit 2) to change
these
HFA relays to Century Series
Relays.
This item is closed.
4.
Non-Conformance
Re orts
(NCR
ITT General
Controls
Company has.informed
the licensee that material
supplied
by them for safety related
uses
had been certified in error
due to their non-conformance
with guality Assurance
requirements
imposed
by the purchase
order.
The concern
here is environmental qualifications of the starting
capacitor for the motor on the electro-hydraulic actuators
supplied
to Diablo Canyon by ITT General
Controls.
These capacitors
were
originally manufactured
by a subtier supplier, Mallory Capacitors.
The type of dielectric used in the Mallory capacitors
was changed
subsequent
to the original equipment qualification.
In addition,
Mallory subsequently
subcontracted
capacitor
supply to Aerovox.
The only applications of these .actuators
at Diablo Canyon which
require
Eg are
System level control valves
LCVlll, 110,
113,
115,
HD 43, 44'for Unit 1 and LCVlll, 110, ll3,
.
ll5, HD45, 46 for Unit 2.
The only applicable
DBE parameter of concern for'ualification of
these actuators
is post
LOCA recirculation induced irradition.
These actuators
are required to withstand
a total integrated
dose
irradiation level of 7.36 x lOE5 rads.
Based
on data from Mallory,
the only possible capacitor dielectric materials in the Mallory and
Aerovox capacitors
which are in .question
are:
metallized
polypropylene, oil, and paper.
A review of the radiation resistance
of these materials
was undertaken.
Based
upon data from EPRI report
¹JPL D-816 these materials
have radiation resistance
levels of
greater
than
10E6 rads.
The capacitors
are considered qualified for
the postulated
environment
and the presence
of potential material
variances identified above
do not impact the operability of the ITT
actuators
at Diablo Canyon.
An appropriate
revision to the existing
Eg file will be issued to formally document the acceptability of the
material
changes
in the capacitor.
Other steps
taken to resolve this
NCR are described
below:
Vendor was
removed
from the gualified Suppliers list.
All parts supplied to
PGKE under P.O.'s
691617,
715231,
720477,
and 734492 existing in the warehouse
have
been placed
on
HOLD.
Instrument
and Control Engineering - General Office - to supply
guality Assurance
a list of critical components for information
for determining which subtier suppliers
must be audited.
guality Assurance - General Office - to reaudit
ITT to
determine 'the credibility of subtier suppliers of critical
components.
The corrective steps
taken by the licensee
to resolve this
NCR are
adequate.
This item is closed.
B.
DCO-86-TI-N152 Rosemount Transmitter Failure
I8C failure tracking indicates
a generic failure problem with
Rosemount
Model 1153 transmitters.
Eight steam generator
flow
transmitters
(FT-512,
13, 22, 23, 32, 33, 42,
and 43) in Unit 2
appear to share
a generic failure characteristic.
The failure mode
of subject transmitters
is short response
time of transmitter which
results in the noise initiated spurious actuations
of the circuitry,
which is part of reactor trip system for low/low Tave coincident
with high steam flow.
The licensee's
proposed solution to this problem was to replace
the
eight Model
1153 transmitters'with
Rosemount
Model
1152
transmitters.
However, additional evaluation revealed that the
licensee
does not have all of the documentation
to demonstrate
that
the Model
1152. transmitters
are environmentally qualified.
The
alternate
solution was to install
a lead/lag
module manufactured
by
Mestinghouse for installation of the transmitter
loop circuitry in
the Hagan racks.
The installation of these lead/lag
modules
was
completed for Unit 2 during it's first refueling outage which was
completed July 14,
1987.
This problem appears
to be unique to Unit
2.
However, further evaluation is being continued to determine it'
impact on Unit 1.
These modifications, if required
on Unit 1, will
be installed during the second refueling outage
scheduled for March
1988.
The corrective steps
taken
by the licensee to resolve this
NCR are
adequate.
~
'
This item is closed.
5.
Followu
of Previous Identified Ins ection Item
s
tA
Q ~
A.
0 en
Fol 1 owu
Item 50-323 87-25-01
Environmental'al ification
Sea
,
NCR DC2-87-TI-08
-6.
The licensee,
while taking steps
to correct
a cable problem
associated
with hi-range
area radiation monitor 2RM-30, found the'
two cable connectors
at the containment penetration
were not
protected with heat shrink tubing as required
by ISE Maintenance-"
Procedure
2.1-3, "Coaxial
and Triaxial Cable Connector Booting".
The immediate action taken to correct the deficiency was discussed
in Inspection
Report 50-323/87-25.
The Environmental gualification
of the connection
when the heat shrink tubing was not in place,
became
a concern.
During this inspection period, the inspector
examined
the licensee's
Environmental gualification package for the Amphenol
Type
HN
(882-320) connectors
identified as the connector in question.
The
documentation
contained
in the gualification File demonstrated
that
the connector
was Environmentally gualified.
However, it was
recognized that the file had been'ncomplete
at the time
(May 12,
1987) of the discovery of the nonbooted
connectors.
The licensee
had initiated action following the first meeting (July 8,
1987) of
the. Technical
Review Group to acquire the qualification
documentation for the
HN Connector,
Type'82-320-1004.
Also, the
connectors
as electrical
equipment
important to safety were not
identified on the
Eg Ma'ster List.
These
issues
are
an apparent
violation of 10CFR50.49,
paragraph
(d),
(Open Item 50-323/87-25-01).
The inspector
conducted
an exit meeting
on July 31,
1987, with the plant
manager
and other members of the plant staff.
During this meeting,
the
inspector
summarized
the scope of the inspection activities
and reviewed
the inspection findings as described
in this report.
The licensee
acknowledged
the concerns identified in the report.
IIt
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