ML17059B385
| ML17059B385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1996 |
| From: | Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Sylvia B NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17059B387 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1600 EA-96-494, NUDOCS 9701060254 | |
| Download: ML17059B385 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1996016
Text
December
31,
1996
Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President Generation Business
Group and Chief Nuclear Officer
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nuclear Learning Center
450 Lake Road
Oswego, New York 13126
SUBJECT:
NINE MILE POINT ENGINEERING INSPECTION 96-16
Dear Mr. Sylvia:
This letter refers to the engineering inspection conducted from October 28, 1996, to
November 1, 1996, and November 18- 22, 1996, at Nine Mile Point Units
1 and 2. The
purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license
were conducted
safely, and in accordance with NRC requirements.
At the
November 22, 1996, exit meeting, the findings were discussed with Messrs.
R. Abbott and
C. Terry and other members of your staff. Additional findings were also discussed with
Mr. D. Baker of your staff in two telephone
calls on December 5, 1996, and
December 20, 1996.
The inspection was directed toward areas important to public health and safety.
The areas
examined during this inspection included:
1) your corrective actions in response to the
identification of inoperability of redundant control room chillers on August 14, 1996; 2)
your corrective actions following the failure of RCIC turbine lube oil cooler pressure
control
valve (2ICS" PCV115) in January 1991; 3) a plant design change (SC2-0077-93) to
ascertain whether the design and implementation met the regulatory requirements;
and 4)
to evaluate for closure of two previously identified inspection items.
Based on the results of this inspection, the inspector identified several apparent violations.
The NRC considers these issues to be significant and to reflect numerous examples of
weak technical performance
and failures to assure quality in engineering activities.
These
violations involved:
1) making design change
in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
system without performing a safety evaluation in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59; 2) two
examples of failure to identify and correct deficient conditions promptly
as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action; 3) three examples of failure to meet
the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; 4) two examples
of failure to meet Nine Mile 2 Technical Specifications requirements;
and 5) failure to
update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), following the design change of the RCIC
turbine lube oil cooler pressure
control valve from a self-contained downstream
sensing
pressure control valve to an electro-hydraulic control valve, to assure that the information
included in the FSAR contains the latest material developed,
as required by 10 CFR 50. 71 (e).
9'70iOb0254 96i23i
ADQCK 05000220
8
DECI
Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
2
The violations involving multi-examples are explained as follows:
Two examples of failure to identify and correct deficient conditions promptly:
1) the RCIC
turbine lube oil cooler pressure control valve was inoperable for more than five years; and
2) the incorrect condenser water low flow setpoints for the control room chillers, which
existed from 1988 until August 1996, were not identified and corrected although
a control
room chiller was tripped three times due to low flow in September
1995.
Three examples of failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
Design Control:
1) the June 15, 1992, calculation that was used as the basis for two
operability determinations was incorrect and had not been independently
reviewed, use of
this incorrect calculation resulted in a wrong conclusion being drawn for the operability
determination;
2) the 1988 setpoint calculation for the control room chiller condenser
water low flow trip, and the 1992 review of the adequacy of this setpoint calculation failed
to include the effect of pressure
and flow transients
in the service water system, resulting
in an incorrect setpoint being implemented;
and 3) the calculation in a recent design
change used an incorrect downstream
pressure for the pressure
control valve, resulting in a
wrong size of a restricting orifice in the RCIC system; this wrong orifice size could cause
a) the RCIC turbine lube oil cooler and its associated
piping to operate beyond their design
pressure;
and b) continuous opening of relief valve during RCIC operation.
Two examples of Technical Specifications violations:
1) From June 1989, till
August 14, 1996, both control room chiller subsystems
were inoperable in that the chiller
trip setting for the condenser water low flow trip was too high (250 gpm).
During a
postulated design basis accident when the diesel generators
start, the service water
pressure transient could cause both chillers to trip. This is in violation of Nine Mile Point
Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.3, which requires two independent
control
room chiller subsystems
to be operable when the plant is in operation modes
1, 2, 3 and
when irradiated fuel is being handled in the reactor building and during core alterations and
operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel and uncovering irradiated fuel.
2) Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.4 requires that the RCIC
system shall be operable when the reactor steam dome pressure
is greater than 150 psig;
however, there was no valid operability determination to demonstrate that the RCIC system
was operable between January 26, 1991, and September
1996, when the RCIC turbine
lube oil cooler pressure
control valve 2ICS"PCV115 was in the failed open position.
The above apparent violations are being considered for escalated
enforcement action in
accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600.
A predecisional enforcement conference to
discuss the apparent violation will be scheduled
soon.
The decision to hold a predecisional
enforcement conference
does not mean that the NRC has determined that violations have
occurred or that enforcement action will be taken.
The conference
is being held to obtain
information to enable the NRC to make an enforcement decision, such as a common
understanding
of the facts, root causes,
missed opportunities to identify the apparent
violations sooner, corrective actions, significance of the issues,
and the need for
0
Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
3
lasting and effective corrective action.
ln addition, this is an opportunity for you to point
out any errors in our inspection report and for you to provide any information concerning
your perspectives
on:
(1) the severity of the violations, (2) the application of the factors
that the NRC considers when it determines the amount of a civil penalty that may be
assessed
in accordance
with Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy, and (3) any other
application of the Enforcement Policy to this case, including the exercise of discretion in
accordance
with Section Vll.
You will be advised by separate
correspondence
of the results of our deliberations on these
matters.
No response
regarding the apparent violation is required at this time.
ln accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure,
and your response
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
A. Randolph Blough for
James T. Wiggins, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Attachment:
As stated
Docket Nos.
50-220, 50-410
cc w/encl:
R. Abbott, Vice President & General Manager - Nuclear
C. Terry, Vice President- Safety Assessment
and Support
M. McCormick, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
N. Rademacher,
Unit 1 Plant Manager
J. Conway, Unit 2 Plant Manager
D. Wolniak, Manager, Licensing
J. Warden, New York Consumer Protection Branch
G. Wilson, Senior Attorney
M. Wetterhahn, Winston and Strawn
J. Rettberg, New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
Director, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
C. Donaldson,
Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, New York Department of Law
J. Vinquist, MATS, Inc.
P. Eddy, Power Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
F. Valentino, President,
New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority
J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority
0
Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
~
~
D. Screnci, PAO
Region
I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
PUBLIC
NRC Resident Inspector
J. Wiggins, DRS
L. Cheung,
W. Ruland, DRS
R. Correia, NRR
R. Frahm, Jr., NRR
DRS File
W. Dean, OEDO
B. Norris - Nine Mile Point
S. Bajwa, NRR
D. Hood, NRR
K. Cotton, NRR
M. Campion,
Rl
Inspection Program Branch (IPAS)
DOCUMENT NAME: A:iNM961616.INS
To receive a copy or this document, indicate in the box: "C"
Copy without attachment/enclosure
E" ~ Copy with attachment/enclosure
'N" ~ No copy
OFFICE
RI/DRS
NAME
LCheung
RI/DRS
< RI/
WRuland
RI/
RI/
DATE
12/27/96
12/
/96
12/
/96
12/
/96
12/
/96
OFFICIAL RECORD
COPY