ML17056B489
| ML17056B489 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1991 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17056B487 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-91-19, 50-410-91-19, NUDOCS 9111130127 | |
| Download: ML17056B489 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1991019
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.:
Docket Nos.:
50-220 91-19 and 50-410 91-19
50-220 and 50-410
License Nos.:
Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration
301 Plainfield Road
S racuse
New York 13212
Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Inspection At:
Scriba and Oswe o New York
Inspection Conducted:
Au ust 13- Se tember 16
1991
Inspectors:
Craig
ordon, Senior Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist, Division of
Radiation Safety and Safeguards
date
Approved By:
Ebe McC
e, Chief, Emerg
cy
Preparedness
Section, FRSSB, DRSS
o
9I
date
Ins ection Summary:
Ins ection on Au ust 13- Se tember 16. 1991: Ins ection
Re ort Nos. 50-220 91-19 and 50-410 91-19
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response organization (ERO) personnel in response to the August 13, 1991 event involving
loss of control room annunciators
and partial loss of plant instrumentation.
Results:
The licensee's
response
to the event
tested
the key elements
of the Site
Emergency Plan (SEP), which was effectively implemented to protect public health and
safety. One non-cited violation was identified regarding notifications to emergency response
organization personnel.
Other concerns were also identified with regard to site access of
incoming personnel
and accountability of personnel within the protected area and will be
tracked for followup inspection.
9111130127
911105
ADDCK 050002c~0
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TABLE OF C NTENTS
1.0
PERSONS CONTACTED ..........................,.......
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2.0
EVENT DESCRIPTION ..........................,
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3.0
EVALUATIONOF EMERGENCY RESPONSE
3.1
Event Recognition and Emergency Classification
3.2
Initial Response
Actions and Notifications,....
3o3
Site Access
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3.4
Activation of Emergency Response Facilities...
3.5
Accountability of Onsite Personnel.........
3.6
Offsite Coordination..................
3.7
Environmental Assessment..............
3.8
Event Termination and Recovery..........
3.9
News Releases
and Public Information
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4.0
POST-EVENT CRITIQUE........ ~.....,... ~........... ~...
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5.0
EXIT MEETING
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7
<e
DETAILS
1.0
PERSONS CONTACTED
The following licensee representatives
were contacted during the inspection.
R. Abbott, Manager, Recovery Organization
J. Beratta, Security Manager
A. Salemi, Director, Emergency Preparedness
G. Brower, Director, Oswego County, Office of Emergency Management
M. McCormick, Unit 2 Manager
K. Dahlberg, Unit 1 Manager
A. Zaremba, Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator, FitzPatrick
J. Reid, Operations Training Supervisor
M. Conway, Station Shift Supervisor
M. Eron, Assistant Station Shift Supervisor
R. Cotton, EP Trainer
2.0
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On August 13, 1991, at approximately 5:48 a.m., Nine MilePoint Unit 2 experienced
a loss of
control room annunciators,
loss ofBalance ofPlant (BOP) instrumentation, and plant scram. The
loss of annunciators
and BOP instrumentation resulted from a loss of five (5) non-safety related
uninterruptable power supplies when the phase B main transformer failed. At 6:00 a.m., a Site
Area Emergency
was declared
based
upon the emergency
action level criteria of S-EAP-2,
"Classification of Emergency Conditions", being exceeded. At 6:22 a.m., power was restored
to the annunciators
and instrumentation
and
safe
shutdo'wi> conditions were verified.
At
7:06 a.m., the plant commenced
a normal cooldown using secondary
syste'ms and achieved cold
shutdown at 7:37 p.m. At 7:47 p.m., the Site Area Emergency was terminated and a recovery
plan was implemented.
While the plant was in cooldown, an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) was dispatched
to the
site to verify the circumstances
and evaluate the significance of the event.
Among the charter
of AIT activities was the task of evaluating operator response
and reviewing the adequacy of
both the Niagara Mohawk and New York Power Authority (FitzPatrick) emergency
response.
This report documents the AIT findings in the emergency preparedness
area.
3.0
EVALUATIONOF EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Response
actions taken by Niagara Mohawk's Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) were
generally timely and in accordance with established
Emergency Plan implementing procedures
(designated
by the licensee as EAP, Emergency Action Procedures
and EPP, Emergency Plan
Procedures).
An evaluation of each area of the licensee's
response
actions follows.
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3.1
Event Rec
nition and Emer enc
lassificati
n
About five minutes after the loss ofcontrol room annunciation "and reactor scram, shift personnel
'recognized
the necessity of considering
Site Emergency
Plan implementation.
The licensee
designates
the Assistant Station Shift Supervisor (ASSS) and Shift Emergency Plan Coordinator
(SEPC) to review the Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme during emergencies.
The ASSS
and SEPC began the EAL analysis and consulted with the Station Shift Supervisor (SSS).
At
6:00 a.m., the SSS correctly classified the event as a Site Area Emergency (SAE) in accordance
with S-EAP-2, Attachment 2, Figure 2.E.
I
3.2
Initial Res
onse Action
and Notifications
The SSS assumed the role of Emergency Director (ED) and assigned several individuals on shift
to perform response
functions.
The primary means used to notify the State of New York and
Oswego
County
officials of
an
emergency
is
through
the
Radiological
Emergency
Communications
System (RECS).
The notification form was completed and approved by the
ED at 6:05 a.m. and given to the Communications Aide (CA) for transmission via the RECS.
At 6:06 a.m., an information message
describing the event, the SAE classification, and plant
status was simultaneously transmitted to the New York State Warning Point, the Oswego County
Warning Point, the J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, and Nine Mile'Point Unit 1. This
notification was within the 15 minute requirement for notification of offsite authorities following
emergency declaration.
't
EPP-20,
Revision
13 identifies other individuals and organizations
to be notified after an
emergency
is declared.
Upon completing the RECS transmission,
the Communications Aide
continued the notification process and notified the NRC Headquarters
Operations Center on the
Emergency Notification System (ENS). This notification met 10 CFR 50.72.
Plant information
and status updates were provided to the Operations Center Duty Officer. At 6:22 a.m., power
was restored to the control room and reactor shutdown was verified. The Communications Aide
maintained
ENS communication giving NRC plant data and control room information until
approximately 6i45 a.m., then continued with the other assigned
emergency notifications.
The licensee's
notification process
is designed
to facilitate alerting of emergency
response
organization (ERO) personnel so that qualified members can quickly activate and staff response
facilities.
The third call made was to the Community Alert Network (CAN) which is the
licensee's computer-based
system for notifying ERO personnel
~ The CAN, in conjunction with
a paging system, is used to ensure that ERO staff willbe immediately contacted with emergency
information and provided with response
instructions.
Pagers
were activated;
then the CAN
message
was prepared,
reviewed, and the call made for system connection.
The notification to the ERO via the CAN was initiated at 7:00 a.m.; one hour after the
emergency
was classified.
Callouts were completed
at 7:45 a.m.
Figure 6.1 of the Site
Emergency Plan (SEP) specifies prompt notification of on-site response personnel, but the time
period for a prompt report is not specified in the SEP. This ambiguity is in conflict with the 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) requirement for unambiguous definition of emergency responsibilities of on-
shift personnel. In this case, the call to the CAN for notification of the ERO was unnecessarily
delayed until one hour after the Site Area Emergency
was declared.
Although there was no
decision by the SSS to preclude notification of the ERO, a delay was incurred due to the amount
of time spent during the CA's notification of and discussion with the NRC Operations Center.
Since many ERO personnel were enroute to work, there was no specific impact on the response.
Nonetheless,
unnecessarily
delaying notification of responders
in order to make other calls
violates the 10 CFR 50.47(b) requirement for prompt notification. No similar prior violations
were identified. The licensee recognized
the untimely CAN notification and took immediate
corrective action to prevent recurrence.
A revision to the format of S-EPP-20 was implemented
so that notifications must be made in prescribed sequence.
Retraining of Communication Aides
on the revision was completed and the change is currently in effect,
This violation and the
violation of the 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirement to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans
which meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47 are not being cited because of the isolated nature,
the minimal safety impact involved, the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions, and the
criteria specified in 10 CFR 2, Section C,Section V.G.1 of the revised NRC Enforcement
Policy (October,
1988) were satisfied NCV (50-220/91-19-01
and 50-410/91-19-01).
~
'eview
of the CAN Incident Report sho'wed that, out of 193 calls attempted, only 29 resulted
in successful
delivery of the event message
by 7:45 a.m.
The pager
system
immediately
provided an event code to ERO personnel,
but plant status and other event details were not
provided until they arrived at the site.
Despite the delay in ERO notification, the majority of
ERO personnel
were in transit to the site for their normal work day, thereby allowing a
sufficient number of trained ERO staff to support Site Emergency Plan implementation in the
other emergency
response
facilities (ERF).
3.3
~ite Acce s
'hile
ERO personnel were responding from offsite locations, two problems were encountered
in gaining site access.
To assist personnel enroute to the site, the licensee issues each essential
'taff member
an
Oswego
County "green card" which is shown
to local law enforcement
personnel
at roadblocks and traffic control points to allow the member to quickly pass through
and proceed to the site.
During the event, not all essential personnel carried their green card
with them.
Personnel without green cards were not permitted on to owner controlled property
until they received
verbal
authorization
from senior
site staff.
Once
personnel
cleared
roadblocks and arrived at the guard house, green cards were again requested
by Site Security.
Ifa green 'card was not presented,
personnel were prevented from passing through turnstiles i'nto
the protected area.
Since several essential personnel were detained, the licensee issued reminder
1 ~
letters that green
cards
are to be carried at all times by all ERO members.
This item is
unresolved pending review of the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions; UNR (50-
220/91-19-02 and 50-410/91-19-02).
3.4
Activation of Emer enc
Res
nse Facilities
Afterthe emergency was declared, ERO staff were prompt in reporting to designated emergency
response facilities. The TSC was fully staffed and activated when the plant manager assumed
the Site Emergency Director function for directing the response
at 7:37 a.m.
The OSC,
a
designated assembly area, and the offsite EOF were activated shortly thereafter.
A tour ofERFs
and inspection of recordkeeping,
logs, and status boards confirmed that facilities were activated
and that personnel were assigned
emergency duties in accordance with the SEP.
3.5
Accountabilit of Onsite Personnel
S-EPP-5, "Station Evacuation", specifies the process that personnel should follow for reporting
to assembly
areas
and the means by which accountability will be completed.
NRC guidance
specifies that a list of missing individuals should be generated within about 30 minutes of a Site
Area Emergency declaration." According to S-EPP-5,
a printout is to be initiated 30 minutes
after the Station Evacuation Alarm is sounded.
Due to the loss of power to certain areas of Unit 2, an alarm was sounded and an announcement
made from the Unit 1 control room for assembly
and accountability of onsite personnel.
In
general, personnel-.responded
quickly in reporting to their designated
assembly area and keying
into accountability card readers.
Each individual carding into the system was picked up by the
accountability computer.
Terminals located at Site Security and.in the OSC provided printouts
of accountability reports with information on the number of personnel
onsite, divided into
personnel who were accounted for and personnel who were not.
Review of accountability reports indicated that the first report was issued
at 7:04 a.m.
and
identified 255 individuals onsite and 62 individuals not accounted for (missing). The first update
was issued at 7:15 a.m. and identified 48 additional personnel who arrived onsite (303 total
onsite), with 99 personnel
not accounted
for.
Accountability continued, with the number of
individuals in each
category changing
as personnel
entered
the protected
area.
Checks of
accountability reports generated
later in the day and inspection of logs maintained in the TSC
and EOF indicated
that accountability. was completed
around
10:37 a.m.'oncerns
were
identified
with
the
licensee's
accountability
process
during
the
event
because
initial
accountability,
i.e., accountability within the protected
area,
was not completed
within a
reasonable time. In addition, a fixed list of missing individuals was not generated for search and
rescue activities, if needed.
4g
Although there was difficultyin efficiently completing accountability, no adverse affect on the
safety ofeither onsite or incoming personnel was noted. The inspectors met with representatives
of several site organizations to discuss possible improvements in the accountability process.
The
licensee'ommitted
to
address
these
concerns
by making
changes
in responsibility
and
administration of the procedure.
This area is unresolved pending review of the adequacy of the
licensee's corrective actions; UNR (50-220/91-19-03 and 50-410/91-19-03).
3.6
Qff i
C
Ch
Afternotifications were made to offsite authorities, frequent contacts were maintained throughout
the event by ERO staff in coordinating response activities with personnel from New York State,
Oswego County Emergency
Management
(OCEM), and Oswego
County law enforcement.
Representatives
from the J. A. FitzPatrick (JAF) plant provided support and assisted
in the
response.
The inspector reviewed response activities, correspondence,
and records maintained
by JAF personnel. In addition, an interview was conducted with the Director, Oswego County
Emergency Management Office, who was immediately notified after the licensee contacted the
Oswego County warning point via the RECS.
Coordination with FitzPatrick personnel was good with,one exception.
The FitzPatrick EALs
require an Alert when a SAE or higher is classified at Nine Mile Point. Shortly after the SAE,
FitzPatrick declared
an Alert and activated ERFs (TSC, OSC, and EOF) in the event support
of the Niagara Mohawk response
was needed.
RECS notifications were made, the ERFs were
staffed, and news releases were issued in accordance with the FitzPatrick Emergency Plan. The
result was an appropriate level of support to Niagara Mohawk.
From the standpoint of the
public and offsite authorities, however, it appeared
that FitzPatrick also had an emergency.
An
extensive revision to the FitzPatrick EALs, previously submitted for NRC approval, deleted such
emergency classifications based on Nine Mile Point events.
This change will take effect when
NRC review and approval of the entire FitzPatrick EAL set is completed.
According to the Director, OCEM, the county emergency
operations
center
was quickly
activated and a fullemergency staff was established to carry out local response activities. Also,
communications with ERO staff in providing updates on plant status and inforniation affecting
the county's response
were timely.
No concerns were identified with the licensee's
interface
with Oswego County or New York State.
3.7
Environmental Assessment
Although there was no radioactive release
associated
with the event,
dose calculations were
performed based upon the potential for release using the computer-based
dose system (MDAC)
Dose projections from core inventories using real-time meteorological
data for a LOCA condition (release rate
1 Ci/sec) were modeled at different times and calculated
for elevated
releases
and reactor building vent releases.
After EOF activation, three survey
teams were dispatched
at various downwind locations to determine area radiation readings and
s~
continued plume tracking throughout the duration of the event.
Team direction, control, and
positioning were properly performed to define expected plume locations. Review of survey team
reports confirmed no release of radioactive material to the environment
since beta/gamma
measurements
were not above background levels,
Further, as part of the NRC's independent
monitoring program; thermoluminescent
dosimeters
(TLD) are in place around
each power
reactor site.
TLDs are replaced
each quarter and ambient radiation levels measured.
Third
quarter
results
are
expected
in early
October
so
that
a comparison
with the licensee's
measurements
can be made.
3 ~ 8
Event Termination and Recover
Power was restored
to annunciators
at approximately 6:22 a.m., at which time the licensee
discussed
reducing
the emergency
response
effort and
considered
entering
into recovery
operations.
Procedure S-EPP-25, "Emergency Reclassification and Recovery", contains specific
criteria which must be met prior to terminating from a Site Area Emergency
classification
including the Section 8.3.2 statement that the reactor must be in a safe, stable, long-term, cold,
shutdown.
Although control room indications returned, shutdown was confirmed, and there were no safety-
related concerns, S-EPP-25 precluded the licensee from terminating the emergency and entering
recovery. The Site Area Emergency was maintained throughout the controlled reactor cooldown
and formally terminated at about 7:45 p.m.
Following the event, the licensee reevaluated
S-
EPP-25 and revised the termination criteria to allow faster entry into the recovery mode when
the reactor is in a safe condition and cold shutdown can be achieved with available systems and
equipment.
This change
is acceptable
in that it provides the licensee
greater flexibility in
satisfying the termination criteria.
An appropriate recovery organization was developed which included assignment of management
staff with different backgrounds
and experience
to evaluate near-term and long-term recovery
actions.
3.9
News Releases
and Public Informati n
One of the initial response
actions taken by the licensee was to activate the Joint News Center
(JNC) in Oswego.
Public information staff were available at the JNC to issue press releases
and
respond to media inquiries throughout the event.
Periodic briefings were held to give site and
ERO activity updates.
A rumor control system was established
to field and assist with caller
concerns
from the public and outside organizations.
Licensee technical staff also held press
conferences
at the site to des'cribe events and provide news personnel with current information.
Licensee response in this area was sufficient to keep the media and public informed.
a
~ A
4.0
POST-EVENT CRITIQUE
After the event,
the EP staff coordinated
comments
from members of the ERO and other
organizations who participated in the response.
A list,of items was prepared which identified
highlights of response activities.
Included in the list were both positive actions demonstrated
by
response
personnel
and areas for improvement that could-enhance
any future response.
On
Friday, August 16, 1991, the licensee presented
a post-event critique to senior management
which identified all items compiled until that time.
The critique addressed
the major problem
areas and a commitment to correct deficient areas was made.
In that the NRC also identified
similar problems, the critique was determihed to be adequate.
Subsequently,
an Action Plan was
developed to prioritize and schedule corrective actions for identified concerns.
Niagara Mohawk
staff were then formally solicited for comments and criticisms which they had for the purpose
of strengthening the emergency preparedness
area.
Action Plan adequacy is unresolved until the
effectiveness of its implementation can be reviewed; UNR (50-220/91-19-04 and 50-410/91-91-
04).
5.0
EXIT MEETING
At the end of the inspection, the inspector summarized the content and scope of this inspection
and provided preliminary findings to EP staff. On September
16, 1991, a presentation was made
by the NRC Restart Inspection Team to senior licensee personnel,
reemphasizing
the identified
findings.