ML17055D688

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Summary of 880301 Meeting W/Util to Discuss Potential Failure of Scram Discharge Vol (SDV) Level Instrumentation to Detect High Water Levels in Sdv.List of Attendees & Agenda Encl
ML17055D688
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point 
Issue date: 03/17/1988
From: Haughey M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-66750, NUDOCS 8803220113
Download: ML17055D688 (18)


Text

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RCapra MHaughey CVogan MEETING

SUMMARY

FOR MARCH 1, 1988 MEETING WITH JMcGurren NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION TO DISCUSS THE PBoehnert DISCHARGE VOLUME DESIGN FOR NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 1 AThadani (TAC 66750)

Docket go. 50-220 LICENSEE'ACILITY:

SUBJECT:

On March 1, 1988 the staff met with representatives of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) to discuss concerns relating to a potential failure of the SDV level instrumentation to detect high water levels in the SDV.

Prior to the meeting, NMPC cut the caps off some of the small lines and inserted a

horoscope into the lines to video tape the actual condition of the ines.

The staff viewed the video tape during the March 1 meeting and determined that there was not a significant buildup of crud inside these small line.

On this basis and on the basis that the modifications had been in place for seven years without significant buildup in the lines, the staff determined that there was not an immediate concern relating to the SDV design.

During the meeting NMPC was requested to (1)

Verify that sufficient volume exists in the present design to allow a full scram from the trip setpoint.

(2)'escribe by March ll, 1988, the testing that will be performed on the SDV system before or during startup to confirm the operability of the system after restoring the lines following the video taping.

In November 1987, the staff inspected the scram discharge volume (SDV) design for Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 to determine compliance with a June 24, 1983 Order.

As a result of the inspection, two areas of deviation from the Order were identified.

These deviations had been identified in a January 30, 1981 letter, but the licensee failed to, obtain prior NRC approval for the deviations as required by the Order.

On January 21, 1988 the licensee submitted a request to amend the Order to address the deviations.

During the review of the January 21 submittal, the NRC staff determined that the revised SDV design did not fully resolve the NRC's concern addressed in the generic SER relating to adequate hydraulic coupling of the level instrumentation.

Specifically, the modified design of the SDV included several feet of horizontal, 2 inch piping between the instrument volume and the vertical one inch lines in which the level instrumentation is located.

This design is susceptible to a common mode fai lure from crud blockage in the small carbon steel lines.

EJordan JPartlow DKatze WHodges WSchmidt RBenedict DNeighbors JJohnson ACRS(10) 8803220i 13 '803i 7 PDR ADQCK 05000220'D~R

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(3)

Submit by September I, 1988, a periodic testing program to assure

, continued operability of the system.

J'4)

Inform the NRC'f any knowledge of other plants with a similar design with a,potential for crud buildup.

In addition to the SDV, the staff discussed concerns relating to the qualification of non-lE devices in lE systems at Nine Mile Point, Unit 2.

The staff requested the licensee to submit a status report on the issue as it relates to Nine Mile Point, Unit 2.

A list of meeting attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

A copy of the licensee's handout is included as Enclosure 2.

Sincerely, Mary F. Haughey, Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

Enclosures:

As stated cc:

See next page POI-I PO-

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MHaughey:dig 3/gp/88 POr-i~>

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Mr. C. V. Mangan Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No.

1 CC:

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire Conner 5 Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.

W.

Washington, D. C.

20006 Frank R. Church, Supervisor Town of Scriba R.

D.

82

Oswego, New York 13126 Mr. Thomas Perkins General Supt.-Nuclear Generation Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Post Office Box 32
Lycoming, New York 13093 Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 126
Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. Gary D. Wilson, Esquire Niagara Mohawk Powe~ Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202 Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Ms.

Donna Ross New York State Energy Office 2 Empire State Plaza 16th Floor

Albany, New York 12223 Mr. Thomas W.

Roman Unit 1 Station Superintendent Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Post Office Box 3P

Lycoming, New York 13093

Enclosure 1

March 1, 1988 Meeting on Scram Discharge Volume (NMP-1)

NAME Dan Katze Wayne Hodges Wayne Schmidt Brian Wolken G. Wilson Mark Wetterhahn Stan Wilczek Jr.

R.

A. Benedict Jay McGurren Paul Boehnert Ashok Thadani Donald Hill Jon Johnson Don Neighbors h

ORGANIZATION NRC/DEST/SRXB NRR/DEST/SRXB NRC Region 1

NMP Resident NMPC NMPC Conner Im Wetterhahn NMPC

, NRC -

PM NRC -

OGC NRC - ACRS NRC NMPC - Licensing NRC, RI, DRP NRC, PDI-1

j ly

Enclosure 2

NRC/NMPC HEETIHG 2 P.M.,

MARCH 1, 1988 UNIT 1

SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUIIE AGENDA I

NRC CONCERN REGARDIHG "HYDRAULIC CONNECTION" II REVIEH OF HMPl DESIGN III NMPC INTERPRETATION OF "HYDRAULIC CONNECTION" IV NMPl DESIGN VS.

HRC SER V

ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING DATA VI DISCUSSION

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NRC CONCERN INADEl}UATE "HYDRAULIC CONNECTION" BETWEEN LARGE DIAMTER U-SHAPED PIPING AND THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS HMPI DESIGN FLOW DIAGRAH ISOHETRIC

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HMPC INTERPRETATION OF "HYDRAULIC CONNECTION" SER EHPHASIS ON COUPLIHG BETIIEEH SDV HEADER AND INSTRUIIEHTED VOLUHE (PGS, 5, 6, 22, 25, 42, 43, AND 45),

IHSTRUHENT CONNECTION TO LARGE DIAHETER PIPING HUST BE DESIGNED TO DETECT 14ATER LEVEL CHANGES.

SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR CONNECTION OF INSTRUHENTS IS PROVIDED IH THE SER.

NMPI DESIGN VS, SER SAFETY CRITERION 3 (PG 37-39)

SINGLE FAILURE DESIGN; DIVERSITY OF INSTRUMENTS FOR COMMON CAUSE FAILURE, DESIGN CRITERION I

(PG 45)

DIAMETER OF IV GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO DIAMETER OF SDV HEADER, DESIGN CRITERIOH 4 (PG 47-48)

DESIGN FOR SINGLE FAILURE FOR SPECIFIC PASSIVE FAILURE (I.E.

PLUGGED INSTRUMENT LINE).

DESIGN CRITERION 7

(PG 49)

ASSUI(E A SINGLE FAILURE FOR LINES LESS THAN 2 IN.

CONCLUSION NMPI DESIGN MEETS THE SPECIFIC CRITERIA PROVIDED IN THE SER.

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ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING EVIDENCE BOROSCOPE EXAMINATION VIDEOTAPE OE PIPE INTERNALS

VI l

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