ML17055D128
| ML17055D128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1987 |
| From: | Bicehouse H, Nimitz R, Shanbaky M, Woodard C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055D127 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-220-87-12, 50-410-87-22, GL-82-05, NUDOCS 8708170178 | |
| Download: ML17055D128 (72) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1987012
Text
0
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-220/87-12
50-410/87"22
Docket Nos.
50-220
50"410
License
Nos.
DRP-63
CPPR"12
Priority-
Category
C
Licensee:
Nia ara
Mohawk Power
Com an
301 Plainfield Road
S racuse
13212
Facility Name:
Nine Mile'oint Units
1 and
2
Inspection At:
Scriba
Inspection
Conducted:
June
22-26
1987 and June
30 - Jul
1
1987
Inspectors:
R. L.
mitz, Senior Radiation Specialist
H. J.
8 cehouse,
Radiation
Speci al ist
C.
H.
oodard,
Reactor Engineer
zl~h 7
date
fib/87
date
date
Approved by:
.
Sh
nba
, Chic
Facil
es Radia
on Protection Section
date
Ins ection
Summar
,Ins ection
on June
22-26
1987
and June
30 thru
Jul
1
1987
Combined Ins ection
Re ort No. 50-220/87-12
50-410/87-22
Unit 1:
Review of licensee
actions
on items identified in Inspection
Report
50-220/84-14.
Also reviewed was
a worker concern regarding
Emergency Kits.
ADQCK 05000220
Q
=,.
.aW
~g
Unit 2:
Special,
announced
safety inspection of the licensee's
implementation
and status of the following task actions identified in NUREG-0737:
Post-acci-
dent sampling of reactor coolant
and containment
atmosphere
increased
range of radiation monitors; post-accident
effluent monitoring; containment
radiation monitoring;
and in-plant radioiodine measurements.
The inspection
involved onsite review by three
NRC Region I based
inspectors.
Results:
No violations were identified.
Several
areas
needing
improvement
were identified in the area of post-accident
sampling
and accident monitoring.
DETAILS
1.0
Individuals Contacted
The individuals contacted
during
She inspection
are identified in
Attachment
1 to the report.
2.0
Pur ose
and
Sco
e of Ins ection
Un1t
1
The inspection activities at Unit
1 focused
on licensee
review, evaluation
and initiation of corrective actions
(as necessary)
for the post accident
sampling,
analysis
and effluent monitoring improvement
items identified
during Inspection
50-220/84-14
(See Section
3 of this report).
Also reviewed
was
a concern brought to the attention of NRC Region I by
a
worker.
The concern involved improper filter papers
in Emergency Kits
(See Section
10 of this report,).
Un1t
2
The purpose of the inspection at Unit 2 was to verify and validate the
adequacy of the licensee's
implementation of the following task actions
identified in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI-Action Plan
Re uirements:
Task No.
Title
~ II.B.3
~ II.F. 1-1
~ II.F. I
~ III.F.1"3
~ III.D.3.3
Post Accident Sampling Capability
Noble Gas Effluent Monitors
Sampling
and Analysis of Plant Effluents
Containment
High-Range Radiation Monitor
Improved Inplant Iodine Instrumentation
under Accident Conditions
As part of the inspection,
a review was performed to verify and validate
the adequacy of the licensee's
design
and quality assurance
(gA) program
for the design
and .installation of the Post-Accident
Sampling
Systems
(PASS).
3.0
TMI Action Plan Generic Criteria and Commitments
The licensee's
implementation of the task actions specified in Section 2.0
was reviewed against criteria contained in the following documents.
NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."
"Generic Letter 82-05," Letter from Darrell
G. Eisenhut, Director,
Division of Licensing
(DOL)., to all Licensees
of Operating
Power
Reactors,
dated
March 14,
1982.
~
"TMI-2 Lessons
Learned
Task Force Status
Report
and
Short-Term Recommendations,"
dated July 1979.
"Letter from Darrel
G. Eisenhut,
Acting Director, Division of
Operating Reactors,
NRC," to all Operating
Power Plants,
dated
October 30,
1979.
Letter from Darrel
G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing,
to Regional Administrators,
"Proposed Guidelines for Calibration
and
Surveillance
Requirements
for Equipment Provided to Meet Item II.F. 1,
Attachments
1,
2 and 3,
NUREG-0737," dated August 16,
1982.
Regulatory Guide 1.2 "Assumptions
Used for Evaluating Radiological
Consequences
of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water
Reactors".
~
Rev. 3, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled
Nuclear
Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During
and Following an Accident."
Rev. 3, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that
Occupational
Radiation
Exposure at Nuclear Power Station will be As
Low As Reasonably
Achievable."
Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report
Unit 2 Technical Specifications
NRC Safety Evaluation Report for the Nine Mile Point 2 Nuclear Power
Station.
4.0
License Action on Previous
Ltems
Unit 1
4.1
(Closed)
Inspector
Fol low Item (50-220/84-14-01)
This item consisted of two subparts
~l:
d
Modify the dissolved
gas collection portion of the
PASS system to
improve its collection ability.
Problems
involved were leakage
and
water introduction into the sample.
The licensee
completed the modifications via Mod. No. 80-40-1.
A
preoperation
test of the system
was completed.
Test results
were
reviewed
and approved
on June
13,
1986.
A review was performed of
the preoperation
PASS dissolved
gas test results
and compared with
normal
sample station results.
Results
were considered
acceptable
for the dissolved
gas concentration
found.
Item 2
(Closed)
Determine the purge time required to obtain
a representative
liquid
sample.
The licensee
measured
line lengths
and estimated line volumes to
determine
needed
sample
purge
t>"me.
Purge time requirements
were
incorporated into appropriate
procedures.
4.2
(Open)
Inspector
Follow Item (50-220/84-14-02)
This item consisted of two subparts:
Item
1 (Closed)
Document the performance characteristic
of the criteria flow orifice
above
and below atmosphere
pressure.
The licensee
determined
the flow at pressure differentials which the
orifice would encounter.
Appropriate flow correction charts
were
incorporated into applicable procedures.
Item 2 (Open)
Increase
the heat trace temperature
on the containment
sample line to
at least
1004C.
This has not yet been
performed,
because
of on"going discussions
between
the corporate
and site staff.
4.3
(Closed) Inspector
Follow Item (50-220/84-14-03)
Licensee to complete
and document all training in core
damage
assessment
and the hands-on
operation of the
PASS.
The inspector
reviewed training documentation for chemistry techni-
cian and reactor analysts.
The training has
been
completed
and
documented.
Personnel
receive periodic requalification training.
4.4
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-220/84-14-04)
Complete preoperational
testing of the
RAGEMS effluent monitoring
system.
The preoperational
testing
was completed.
The Station Operation
Review Committee
and Nuclear Review and Audit Board reviewed
and
approved the test results.
4.5
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-220/84-14-05)
This item included five subparts:
Item
1 (Closed)
An additfonal read-out of the information available
from RAGEMS
should
be established
in the Control
Room.
A modem and computer terminal, which can access
RAGEMS, are in the
Control
Room.
These
can
be used to obtain
RAGEMS information and
status.
Item 2 (Closed)
Provide
a duplicate readout
and recording of RAGEMS monitor functions
in the Control
Room.
The computer terminal discussed
in Item
1 provides monitor status.
A
second
back-up High Range Effluent Monitoring System
(OGESMS)
provides for, tracking of effluent releases.
Item 3 (Closed)
Provide pilot lights to verify immediate operation of the
RAGEMS
sample dilution process.
The computer terminal discussed
in Item
1 provides readout in the
Control
Room of both sample count rates
and
RAGEMS flow control
(i.e. dilution).
Item 4 (Closed)
Establish
records for the availability of RAGEMS.
Oevelop backup
procedures
in the event
RAGEMS is not functional.
Licensee
records indicate
RAGEMS was available
100K of the time in
1987 and about
97K of the time in 1986.
The licensee's
old High
Range Effluent Monitor (OGESMS)
can provide back-up
sampling
capability (See Section 4.8 regarding status of procedures).
Item 5 (Closed)
Establish controls to better control modifications to
RAGEMS
software.
The licensee
established
procedure control for modification and
review of RAGEMS software.
1~
4.6
4.7
(Closed) Inspector
Follow Item (50-220/84-14-06)
Provide procedures
and training in the capabilities
and utilization
of RAGEMS.
At the time of Inspection
84-14 only about
2 individuals
had
an indepth understanding
of its capabilities
and utilization.
The licensee
has developed
and completed
procedures
which describe
the capabilities
and utilization of RAGEMS.
Additional chemistry
personnel,
emergency
planning personnel,
and reactor operation
personnel
have received appropriate training on
RAGEMS.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-220/84-14-07)
Provide additional illumination and legible flow diagrams at the base
of the stack.
4.8
The licensee
has provided for controlled flashlights in Emergency
Stack Sampling Kits.
Also controlled flow diagrams
have
been
provided at the base of the stack.
(Open) Inspector
Follow Item (50-220/84-14-08)
This item included two subparts:
Item
1 (Open)
An analysis
should
be provided of the licensee's ability to obtain,
to handle
and to analyze the levels of particulate
and iodine
activity anticipated during accident conditions
and in the event that
RAGEMS were partially or fully disabled
by hardware and/or software
malfunction.
The licensee
provided procedure
guidance for collection of a parti-
culate
and iodine effluent sample if the
RAGEMS was partially or
fully disabled.
Although this method is a back-up to the licensee's
principal
means of monitoring high effluent activities, the procedure
guidance
was considered
in need of improvement in that the procedure
did not specify methods to limit activity collected
on sample
.cartridges
to ensure capability for analysis
arid minimize unnecessary
personnel
exposure.
Licensee
representatives
concurred with the inspector's
observations
~ and indicated procedure quality would be upgraded to address this matter.
Item 2 (Closed)
The licensee
should demonstrate
that
RAGEMS and its associated
sampling lines meets
the stipulation of Footnote
14 of Regulatory
Guide 1.97,
namely that it provides "the best
sample practicable."
4.9
The licensee
should
make
an empirical determination of line losses
or
deposition,
so as to establish
appropriate
correction factors to be
applied.
The licensee
performed
a detailed evaluation of effluent sample line
losses.
Appropriate correction factors for correcting
sample results
wer e
incorporated into station procedures.
(Open) Unresolved
Item (50-220/84-14-09)
The licensee
was not able to provide sufficient information to
demonstrate
that the High Range
Containment Monitor and associated
equipment were qualified for the harsh accident environment they
might be subjected to.
The detectors
and associated
equipment
are not subjected
to drywell
atmosphere.
The detectors
do protrude into the drywell via penetra-
tion but are located in the Reactor Building.
The licensee
considers
the monitor to be subject to
a mild environment
as discussed
in
The licensee
demonstrated
that the detectors
are qualified for anticipated radiation dose. rates
and integrated
doses
to be encountered.
The licensee
provided memoranda
which
provided
a general
discussion
of temperature
and humidity accepta-
bility of the detectors
and equipment.
However, specific maximum
values of temperature
and humidity to be encountered
were not readily
available.
The acceptability of the detectors qualifications relative to
temperature
and humidity remains unresolved.
The licensee will supply the data to support qualifications for
these
items.
4.10 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-22/84-14-10)
Remove or reduce the length of the tygon sample tubing for the
Technical
Support Center Particulate,
Iodine and Noble Gas (PING)
monitor.
The licensee
removed the tygon tubing.
UNIT 2
4.11 (Closed) Inspector Foll ow Item (50-410/86-09-34)
. Complete
NRC review of licensee
action
on NURfG-0737 Item 11.8.3.
This matter is discussed
in section
5 of this report.
4.12 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-410/86-09-35)
Complete
NRC Review of licensee
action
on NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1-1.
This matter is discussed
in section
6 of this report.
4.13 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-410/86-09-30)
Complete
NRC Review of licensee
action
on NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1-2.
This matter is discussed
in section
7 of this report.
4.14 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-410/86-04-37)
Complete
NRC review of licensee
action
on NUREG-0737 Item II.F.l"3.
This matter is discussed
in section
8 of this report.
4.15 (Closed) Inspector
Fol low Item (50/410/86-09-42)
Complete
NRC review of licensee
action
on NUREG-0737 Item III.D.3.3.
This matter is discussed
in section
9 of this report.
5.0
Post-Accident
Sam lin
S stem
Item 11.8.3.
5.1
Position
Item II.B.3., specifies that licensees
shall
have the
capability to promptly collect, handle
and analyze post-accident
samples
which are representative
of conditions existing in the
and containment
atmosphere.
Specific criteria are
denoted
in commitments to the
NRC relative to the specifications
contained
in NUREG-0737.
5;2
<<
~, k
5.3
The implementation,
adequacy
and status of the licensee's
post-
accident
sampling, monitoring and analysis
systems
were reviewed
relative to the criteria identified in Section
3 and in regard to
licensee letters,
memoranda,
drawings
and station
procedures
as
listed in Attachment
2 of this inspection report.
The licensee's
performance relative to these criteria was determined
by interviews
and discussions
with cognizant licensee
personnel,
review of procedures
and documentation
and conduct of performance
tests to verify hardware,
procedures
and personnel
capabilities.
S stem Descri tion and
Ca abflit
The licensee
has installed
a Post-Accident
Sampling
System which is
a
standard
General Electric design.
The system
has the ability to
obtain unpressurized
undiluted and diluted samples of reactor coolant
from the jet pump and the Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR) system.
10
Atmospheric
samples
can also
be obtained
from the drywell,
suppression
pool
and reactor building atmospheres.
Redundant
containment
hydrogen analyzers
provide hydrogen analysis
back-up
capability.
pH and hydrogen
are conducted
in the
laboratory using
an ion specific electrode,
carminic acid (Hach
Method),
pH electrode
and
a gas chromatograph,
respectively.
Radio-
activity analyses
are performed using
a computer-based
gamma
spectrometer
in the licensee's
counting
room.
Chloride analysis
can
also
be performed
by an offsite laboratory.
5.4
PASS Performance
Testin
Grab
samples of reactor coolant
and the drywell (primary containment)
atmosphere
were collected during
an operations test of the
on
June
24-25,
1987.
During this test licensee
personnel
demonstrated
the integrated ability to collect and analyze
samples within the
constraints
of NUREG-0737, II.B.3.
5.5
Sam lin
The reactor
coolant sampling
subsystem is designed
to obtain
samples
of liquids and dissolved
gases
during all modes of operation.
During
this operational test, diluted and undiluted
samples
were collected
from the jet pump loop during low-power reactor operation.
Although
both liquid and dissolved
gas
samples
could be obtained
from the
sampling points, the following improvement items were discussed
with
the licensee.
The licensee
indicated that these matters will be reviewed
and
clarification or improvements will be considered,
as appropriate
(50"410/87"22-01):
Although licensee
personnel
had received training and procedures
covering hydrogen determination
by Henry's
Law in undiluted
samples.
The licensee
hadn't practiced the procedure
during
Unit-2 drills.
Reactor conditions did not allow the collection
of a sample for this purpose.
No intercomparison of results with normal
and other
PASS samples
had been
made to ensure that hydrogen
gas determinations
could
be
made
by Henry's
Law method.
A ball valve is used to provide
a 0. 1 ml reactor coolant
samples
for dilution with 9.9 ml of demineralized
water (i.e., 100:I
dilution) for the
PASS diluted sampling capability.
No records
11
were available of calibrations of the ball valve to show that it
reproducibly and reliably provided O.l ml samples for subsequent
dilution.
5.6
Containment Air Sam lin
Atmosphere
samples
can
be obtained
from the drywell, reactor building
and suppression
pool.
During the operational test,
samples
were
collected
from the drywell.
The following item needing
improvement
was identified.
The licensee
indicated this item would be reviewed
and clarification or improvements will be considered
as
appropriate.
(50-410/87-22-02):
Procedural
guidance for gathering
containment particulate
and
iodine samples
was not provided to restrict total radioactivity
to ensure that the
samples
could be safely handled
and counted.
5.7
Anal tical
Ca abilit
The licensee's
commitments relative to range,
uncertainty
and
analytical capability were 'provided in the licensee's
Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR).
The Safety Evaluation Report specifies that the accuracy,
range
and
sensitivity of the
PASS analytical
procedures
are consistent with NRC
Revision 3,
and
5.7.1
The licensee's
primary method for chloride analysis is the
use
of a specific ion electrode.
Back-up capability is provided
offsite through the Pooled Inventory Management
System
(PIMS)
which includes resources
for analysis of samples.
NRC's
chloride standards
were submitted to the licensee for analysis
in"house.
The results
are listed in Attachment 3.
The
licensee's
analysis results
were acceptable.
The following improvement item related to.the offsite transport
of samples
was noted.
The licensee
indicated that this item
would be reviewed
and clarification or improvements will be
considered
as appropriate:
(50-410/87"22-03)
The licensee
planned to use
a
NUPAC Model
PAS-1 (Certifi-
cate of Compliance
No. 9184) for offsite shipments of
undiluted reactor coolant.
However, the licensee
was not a
registered
user of the shipping cask
and procedures
for
sample
loading and handling the cask
had not been
established.
12
The licensee
indicated that registration
as
a user of the
NUPAC Nodel
PAS-1 would be completed
and procedures
for its
use would be established
and maintained.
Boron analysis is performed
by the carminic acid method in the
licensee's
laboratory
on
a diluted reactor coolant
sample
(200: 1).
NRC's boron standards
were submitted to the licensee
for analysis.
The results
are listed in Attachment 3.
The
licensee's
analytical results
were acceptable.
However, the
following item needing clarification was noted.
The licensee
indicated that this item would be reviewed
and clarification
.would be made if appropriate
(50-410/87-22-04):
~
The licensee's
FSAR commitments for boron analysis
specified
a range of 50 to 2,000 parts per million (ppm) a 50 ppm.
The
GE standard
methods call for a range of 0 to 1,000
ppm
in order to show boron injection had reached
a total reactor
coolant concentration of 660
ppm or more.
The licensee
stated that
a request to alter the
FSAR range to 0 to 1,000
ppm with an accuracy of + 50
ppm would be made.
Licensee's
laboratory practice would remain
unchanged.
This clarifica-
tion was considered
acceptable.
Analysis for pH is performed using
a
pH meter in the licensee's
laboratory
on an undiluted sample.
Comparison of the
pH
measurements
on the undiluted
sample
and
a routine
sample
from the licensee's
normal reactor
sampling are contained
in
Attachment 3.
The licensee's
analytical results
were
acceptable.
Radioactivit
Anal sis
Gamma isotopic analysis of PASS liquid and gaseous
samples is
performed using the licensee's
normal couqting
room gamma
spectroscopy
system.
The use of dilution and increased
sample
to detector (i.e.,
up to 100 cm) distances
allow the licensee to
analyze
the full range of anticipated concentrations
in liquid
samples.
However,
as noted above, limitations on airborne
particulate
and iodine radioactivities
were needed to ensure
counting capability.
(See section 5.6)
Results of actual reactor water samples
are contained
in
Attachment
3 for a
PASS sample (undiluted)
and normal
operational
sample.
The licensee's
analytical results were
acceptable.
However, the licensee's
library of computer
gamma spectral
peaks did not contain Ruthenium-103
which could
13
be used in assessing
core damage (i.e. melting).
The use of
Ruthenium (and Tellurium) as fuel melting indicators is well
established.
The licensee
indicated that Ruthenium-103
would be included in
the
new gamma
spectroscopy
system
computer library.
5.7.5
H dro en and Dissolved
Gas
Dissolved
gas is determined
by the
method
and
by gas chromatography for hydrogen
and oxygen.
As noted
earlier,
the licensee
had not practiced
the
PASS expansion
method (see
section 5.5).
However, the licensee
demonstrated
operation of the
gas chromatograph for oxygen
and hydrogen
determinations.
The analysis of hydrogen in the containment
atmosphere
is also provided by an in-line hydrogen analyzer
as
required
by NUREG-0737,
Item II.F.1"6.
5.8
Core
Dama
e Assessment
The licensee
uses
a computer-based
ratio method for core
damage
assessment
with a back-up capability for hand calculational
methods.
Results
from the computations
and other plant parameters
(e.g.
core
water level
and hydrogen
measurements)
are assessed
by senior
technical staff for determining core damages.
On June
25,
1987,
the
licensee's
staff successfully
determined
the apparent
core
damage
from a postulated
sample
gamma spectroscopic
analysis.
5.9
Additional Findin s
The licensee indicated'hat
the following additional
items would be
reviewed for clarification or improvement:
(50-410/87-22-05):
~
During the
PASS drill on June
24,
1987,
the
PASS sampling
team
removed supplied air respirators
from the
PASS sampling area to
use other face masks for airline respirators.
In a potentially
contaminated
area
(such
as the sampling room), high unnecessary
airborne exposures
to sampling
team members could result from
the need to change
masks.
A respiratory protection apparatus
allowing both self-contained
and airline use would eliminate
this concern.
The
PASS Sample
Room is also the Radwaste
Sampling
Room.
The
introduction of radwaste liquid samples to the lines supplying
the radwaste
sampling
panel following an accident could result
in unacceptably
high dose rates
in the area of the
PASS panel.
The licensee
indicated Post-accident
controls for the use of the
Radwaste
Sampling
Panel will be provided to minimize this
concern.
Under Technical Specification 6.8.4.c,
the licensee
is required
to provide
a maintenance
program for the
PASS.
Approximately
quarterly,
the licensee tests
technician proficiency in using
the
PASS.
Problems with the
may be uncovered during those
tests.
If problems are noted,
a work request is generated
to
correct the problem.
However,
a program for routine inspection
and surveillance testing of the
PASS was not provided.
The test
program conducted
by the licensee
is considered
a repair program
in p'ractice.
This program would not generally provide complete
assurance
that the
PASS could perform its intended function
since routine testing
and surveillance
as
recommended
by GE are
not performed.
6.0
Noble Gas Effluent Monitor
Item ll.F. l. 1
6. 1
Position
Item II.F.1-1 requires
the installation of noble gas
monitors with an extended
range designed
to function during normal
and accident conditions.
The criteria, including the design basis
range of monitors for individual release
pathways,
power supply,
calibration
and other design considerations
are set forth in Table
II.F. 1-1 of NUREG-0737.
6.2
Oocuments
Reviewed
The implementation,
adequacy,
and status of the licensees
monitoring
systems
were reviewed against
the criteria identified in Section 3.0
and in regard to licensee
correspondence,
memoranda,
drawings
and
station procedures
as listed in Attachment 4.
The licensee's
performance relative to these criteria was determined
by interviewing the principal persons
associated
with the design,
testing, installation
and surveillance of the high range
gas
monitoring systems,
reviewing associated
procedures
and
documentation,
examining personnel
qualifications
and direct
observation of the systems.
6.3
S stem Oescri tion
The licensee
has installed
a Science Applications International
Corporation
Gaseous
Effluent Monitoring System
(GEMS) to sample the
main stack and combined reactor building vent/radwaste
building
exhaust effluent.
The systems
are designed to provide for the on-line analysis of noble
gases
over the range of concentrations
from normal low-level
emissions
up to the highest levels stipulated in NUREG-0737,
II.F.1-1.
(i.e., the system is used for normal effluent monitoring
purposes
also).
15
(GE) detector
coupled to a Multi-Channel Analyzer (MCA)
is used to acquire data.
A DEC
PDP 11/44 computer is used to analyze
and interpret data.
In order to provide for a wide dynamic range,
the gaseous
detection
channel utilizes the following: automatic control of analysis
times;
routing of the gas
stream alternatively through either
a
6 liter or a
30
cms shielded detection
chamber;
and the dilution of high concen"
trations of radiogases
in the inlet sampling
stream
by successive
factors of approximately 1/200.
Detector
readouts
are available in the Control
Room, Technical
Support Center
and
Emergency Operation Facility.
6.4
~Ffndfn
s
Within the
scope of the review, the following items were reviewed
and
verified to conform with NUREG-0737:
range
calibration
~
sample points
The establishment
and implementation of Technical Specification
required surveillance
procedure
was also verified.
A procedurally
described
maintenance
program was in place.
(See section 10.3.1)
Within the
scope of this review the following item for clarification
or improvement
was identified:
(50-410/87"22-06)
The licensee
has
made back-up provisions to collect
a grab noble
gas
sample
using
a marinelli and
sample
pump.
However:
a large volume marinelli is used.
A small
volume
(approximately
25 cc) marinelli is needed for higher
concentrations
of noble gases
to ensure
samples
can
be
analyzed
and personnel
exposure is minimized when handling.
the marinelli is purged to the general
area of the sample
station.
This may cause
a personnel
exposure
problem.
7.0
Sam lin
and Anal sis of Plant Effluents
Item II.F.1-2
7.1
Position
Item II.F.1-2, requires
the provision of a capability
for the collection, transport,
and measurement
of representative
samples of radioactive iodines
and particulates
which may accompany
gaseous
effluents following an accident.
It must be performable
within specified dose limits to the individuals involved.
16
The criteria, including the design basis shielding envelope,
sampling
media,
sampling considerations,
and analysis considerations
are set
forth in Table II.F.1-2.
7.2
Oocuments
Reviewed
The implementation,
adequacy
and status of the licensee's
sampling
and analysis
system
and procedures
were reviewed against
the
criteria identified in Section 3.0 of this report and in regard to
licensee
correspondence,
memoranda,
drawings
and station procedures
as listed in Attachment 4.
v(
II
.i
'1
'lI
~ s
I
s
I
"I
~
II"
7.3
7.4
The licensee's
performance relative to these criteria was determined
by interviewing the principal persons
associated
with the design,
testing, installation,
and surveillance of the
systems for sampling
and analysis of high activity radioiodine
and particulate effluents,
by reviewing associated
procedures
and documentation,
by reviewing
personnel
qualifications,
and by direct observation of the system.
In addition,
performance
evaluation
was
made during
a drill in which
particulate
and iodine sample cartridges
were collected
and analyzed.
Descri tion and
Ca abilities
The licensee
has in place
a Science Applications International
Corporation
Gaseous
Effluent Monitoring System
(GEMS).
As with the noble gas portion of the system (described
in Section
6.0), the particulate
and iodine portion of the system is designed
to
provide for the analyses
of these'effluents
from normal low-level
emissions
up to the highest levels specified in NUREG-0737, II.F.1-2.
This system provides for the automatic insertion of individual
standard
sized particulate
and iodine sampling cartridges
into the
sample line in series
ahead of the gas module.
They are then
allowed to collect activity for a specified but variable
amount of
time (through computer control) depending
on the level of activity
sensed
by the gas
sample ratemeter.
They are
t;hen automatically
removed from the sample line and directed into shielded
counti.ng
chambers for measurement
of the collected particulate
radioactivity by their detectors.
The counting time is also
computer controlled
on the basis of the amount of activity contained
in the immediately preceding
sample.
~Flndkn
s
'Within the
scope of the review, the
GEMS was found to meet the
NUREG-0737 Item II.F. 1-2 specifications.
The following elements
were
reviewed:
s *
17
~
range
~
calibration
~
sample points
~
analysis capability
'I ~
"~
The establishment
and implementation of appropriate
Technical
Specification required surveillance
procedures
was also verified.
A procedurally described
maintenance
problem was also in place.
(See
Section 10.3.1)
Within the scope of this review, the following matters
were
identified which the licensee
indicated would be reviewed for
clarification or improvement (50-410/87-22-07):
~
Guidance is not contained in procedures
to aide in selection of
the optimum nuclide library for use in analysis of particulate
and charcoal
cartridges at the
100
cm shelf-height of the
gamma
spectroscopy
system.
A temporary
sample
arrangement
is used to provide backup
capability for collecting
a particulate
and iodine effluent
sample
from the main stack
and reactor building vent.
The
following deficiencies
associated
with the backup
samples
were
identified:
~
~
v < v
I ~
The sampler collects
a sample
from the normal effluent
sampler return line. It is not apparent that the samples
collected are representative.
The sampler
exhausts its effluent to the general
area of
the sample station creating
a possible
personnel
exposure
concern during
sampling'o
provisions to limit the amount of activity collected
on
the cartridges is in place.
Technicians,
although trained in procedure
requirements,
do not perform walk-throughs of backup sampling.
Procedures
do not describe
use of the backup
pump to
collect
a particulate
and iodine sample in the event
GEMS
is not operable.
8.0
Containment
Hi h-Ran
e Monitor
Item II.F. 1-3
8.1
Position
Item II.F.1-3, requires
the installation of two
in-containment radiation monitors with a maximum range of
1 rad/hr
to 10'ad/hr (beta
and
gamma) or alternatively
1 R/hr to 10~ R/hr
18
(gamma only).
The monitors shall
be physically separated
to view a
large portion of containment
and developed
and qualified to function
in an accident environment.
The monitors are also required to have
an energy response
as specified in NUREG-0737, Table II.F.1-3.
8.2
Documents
Reviewed
The implementation,
adequacy,
and status of the installed in-contain-
ment high range monitors were reviewed against
the criteria set forth
in Section 3.0 of this report and in regard to interviews with
cognizant- licensee
personnel,
licensee letters,
station procedures,
as-built prints and drawings
as
1$ sted in Attachment
5 to this
inspection report,
and by direct observation.
8.3
S stem Descri tion
The licensee
has installed four Kaman Model
50314 pressurized
ion
chambers
at the 265'levation of the drywell (90
apart
from each
other).
The detectors,
part of the
Kaman KMA-I1000 Instrument
System,
are
powered
by vital instrument
power supplies.
The
detectors
readout in the Control
Room at Panel
880B and at the five
strategically located Digital Radiation Monitoring System consoles.
The detector readouts
are not used for core
damage
assessments
but
may be used to provide source
term information.
8.4
~F4ndkn
s
'Within the
scope of the review, the following items were reviewed
and verified to conform with NUREG-0737:
0
detector location
.
electrical
separation
range
and energy
response
vendor type calibration
onsite calibration
redundancy
personnel
training
The establishment
and implementation of Technical Specification
required surveillance
procedures
was also verified.
Within the
scope of this review the following items were identified
which the licensee
indicated would be reviewed for possible
clarification or improvement (50-410/87-22-08):
l
~
The in-situ calibration of detectors
A and
B were in error due
to a shield analysis error.
The error,
however,
was minor and
limited to 4X.
19
~
Detector
C and
D are out of service
due to cable problems.
However,
the channels
A and
8 satisfy the Technical
Specification
requirement for two operable
channels.
9.0
Im roved In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation
Under Accident Conditions,
Item III.D.3.3
9.1
Position
Item III.D.3.3, requires that each
licensee
provide
equipment
and associated
training and procedures
for accurately
determining the airborne iodine concentration
in areas within the
facility where plant personnel
may be present during an accident.
9.2
Review Criteria
The implementation,
adequacy
and status of the licensee's
in-plant
iodine monitoring under accident conditions were reviewed against
the criteria listed in Section 3.0 and in regard to the documents
identified in Attachment
6 to this inspection report.
The
licensee's
performance relative to these criteria was determined
by:
Interviews with cognizant licensee
personnel;
Review of applicable operational
and emergency
plan procedures;
Review of applicable
lesson
plans
and training records;
Discussions of methodology
and implementation with radiation
protection technicians;
Verification of equipment availability and storage;
and
Observations
during a sample collection and analysis drill.
9.3
Descri tion of Methodolo
and
Ca abilities
The licensee
has in place three
methods which can
be used to
determine
the airborne concentration of radioiodine within the
facility.
The three
methods are:
collection of an air sample with
a high volume sampler
and subsequent
analysis of the
sample with a
thin window GM tube; collection of an air sample with a high volume
sampler
and subsequent
analysis of the sample with a Ge-Li system;
and lastly real time monitoring of airborne iodine concentrations
with an Eberline
PING.
The method selected
is based
on dose rates
emanating
from the sample
and location being sampled.
The Technical
Support Center
and Emergency Operations Facility each
have
a
PING
monitor.
Samples
can
be collected using charcoal
or silver zeolite
cartridges.
Appropriate
precautions
for purging samples
are in
place.
20
9.4
~Findin
n
Within the
scope of the review, the following items were reviewed
and verified to conform with NUREG-0737:
equipment
associated
training
procedures
sample analysis,
methodology
and accuracy
Within the
scope of the review, the following items for improvement
or clarification were identified (50-410/87-22-09):
The flow rate measuring
devices
on the
PINGs has not been
calibrated for about
4 years.
It was not apparent that the
flow rate measuring
device
was in calibration.
The licensee
indicated that the calibration of the device will be reviewed
and proper calibration frequency will be established.
The background effects
due to noble gases
collected
on
cartridges
and limiting dose rates for acceptable
operation of
the
PINGs has not been fully evaluated.
Procedures
do not
provide minimum dose rates
the system is considered
acceptable
to operate
in and provide valid data.
Practical factors training is not provided for inplant sampling
teams.
Procedure
EPP-6 specifies incorrect location of battery carts
for air samples.
Guidance
as to where to store inplant air samples after
analysis is not provided in appropriate
procedures.
10.0
ualit
Assurance
and Desi
n Review
10.1 Post Accident
Sam lin
S stem
10.1.1 Environmental
uglification of Electrical
Com onents
Inspection
was made to determine licensee
conformance with the
requirements
of Criterion I of NUREG-0737, Appendix B, for the
environmental qualification of the
PASS electrically-operated
com-
ponents
or devices
which are either exposed to containment
harsh
environment or which could be inaccessible
for maintenance
during an
accident condition.
The inspector selected
and examined the licensee
qualification documentation for the Containment Monitoring System
(CMS) Loop A sample line components
which include the solenoid-
operated
sampling valves, electrical
cables,
cable penetrations,
and
heat tracing.
21
The environmental qualification of the components
in the
PASS system
was
made in accordance
with 10
CFR 50.49 Paragraph (f)(2) which
permits qualification by testing
a similar item with supporting
analysis to show that the equipment to be qualified is acceptable.
In order to verify the qualification of the actual
items installed
by the licensee,
the inspector reviewed the analyses
made
by the
vendors
and the licensee
to demonstrate
similarities/differences
between
the test items and the installed items
and the justification
for the qualifications.
The inspector confirmed that incoming electrical conduit and cable
to the electrical
solenoids
are environmentally terminated/installed
in accordance
with licensee
specification
E061A by a review of the
appropriate installation
and inspection reports listed in Attach-
ment 7.
Cable
and solenoid wires are connected
together
by splicing
and insulated
by utilizing a Raychem nuclear-qualified in-line splice
type WCSF-N.
The Target
Rock solenoid-operated
valve quali-
fication in the licensee's
Eg Manual requires
maintenance
to replace
the elastomeric
components
every five years
and to replace
the entire
electrical
assembly
every ten years.
The inspector confirmed that
the licensee's
maintenance
program for these
valves in the Electrical
Maintenance
Procedure
N2-EPM-GEN-SY524,
Rev. 0, 1/87, contains
these
requirements.
Within the
scope of this review no unacceptable
conditions were
identified.
10.1.2 Electrical
Power
Su
lies to The
Criterion 3 of Appendix
B to NUREG-0737 states
that "The instrumen-
tation should
be energi.zed
from station class
lE power sources."
A review by the inspector disclosed that the
PASS instrumentation
and Control Panels
and 2SSP-IPNL102 including their
input and output devices
are
powered
from non Class
1E power sources.
Therefore the inspector
reviewed the pertinent electrical
power
documentation listed in Attachment
7 to ascertain
whether
equipment
and instrumentation
can
be considered
reliably-powered.
The review disclosed that panels
and 2SSP-IPNL102 are
supplied
power from distribution panels
2VBS-PNLA102 and
2BVBS-PNLB107, respectively.
These
power distribution panels
are
each separately
powered
from Uninterruptable
Power Supply (UPS)
panels
which are separately
supplied
A-C power through Automatic Bus
Transfer
(ABT) from either offsite power source
and each
UPS panel
is separately
supplied
D-C power from its own 125 volt D-C battery.
It appears
that this independence
and multiplicity of power sources
should provide reliable
power to the
PASS.
22
Further review of the electrical
power distribution within the
disclosed that the solenoid-operated
isolation/sampling
valves in
each of the two
PASS sampling lines from inside containment to the
outside
sampling stations
are
powered
from the two class
IE Division
I and II, 120 volt A-C power sources.
The containment
samples for
each
sampling level must pass
through
a total of five
solenoid-operated
valves.
In each line there
are four valves
powered
from one supply and
one from the other supply.
It is
understood that this design is necessary
to assure
containment
isolation.
However, failure of either power supply disables
the.
sampling
system.
According to the
NUREG-0737 acceptance
criteria, this single failure
which causes
the loss of sampling capability within the
PASS is
satisfactory provided that it can
be restored
to take
samples within
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The licensee will provide instructions for accomplishing
the restoration of power such that sampling
can
be accomplished.
samples
taken at the sampling station normally require the
use
of the store
room elevator to transport
them for analysis
due to the
heavy weight of the
sample containment
and transport cart.
This
elevator is powered
from non-safety related
600 volt load center
2NJS-US2 in the reactor building.
This load center could be fed from
either offsite source
by a manual circuit breaker selection to feed
the load center.
Powering this load center
from either of its
feeders is covered in the normal station operating
procedures.
Therefore the elevator could be powered at all times
when offsite
power is available unless
there is a fault in the power feeders
in or
to the load center.
In this case or if the elevator is otherwise
disabled,
other provisions must be made
by the licensee
to transport
the samples
from the station to the laboratory for analysis.
The containment
sampling lines are electrically heat-traced
to
prevent condensation
in the lines.
Heat tracing of the lines
from within the containment to the last solenoid-operated
valve
ahead of the sampling station is from a Class
lE power supply.
Beyond this valve to the sampling station,
power is Class
non 1E. It appears
that loss of power to either. section of the lines
could cause
problems with water within the lines.
However, it is
reasonable
to assume that power could be restored to these
heaters
within the NUREG-0737 criterion 3-hour time period.
The temperature
of each heat traced line is controlled by an
individual electrical thermostat.
Within the scope of this review, the following items for improvement
or clarification were identified (50-410/87-22-10):
Provide
some guidance for identification of loss of power and
restoration of power to the
PASS isolation valves to ensure
the
capability to collect and analyze
a sample within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
23
l
fl
Jl
~ 5
"5
5
~,<<'
~ 5
'5y
~
Provide guidance for restoration of power to the store
room
elevator to ensure its availability for sample transport.
~
Provide
an appropriate
periodic maintenance
of heat tracing for
the containment
sample line.
10.2 Containment
Hi
h Ran
e Radiation Monitor
CHRRM
NUREG-0737 requires that there
be two radiation monitors within
containment.
By a review of the pertinent electrical
instrumentation
and electrical
power drawings
and documents listed in Attachment
7
and by a physical
walkdown of the system,
the inspector confirmed
that there are two independent
CHRRM systems.
10.2.1
CHRRM Environmental
uglification
The inspector
reviewed the
Eg files for portions of the
system
located within the containment
harsh environment
and also for
portions of the system located outside the containment
as
follows:
~
Kaman Instrumentation
Company gualification Report for
Model KDI-1000 High Range Containment
Area Radiation
Detector
and Mineral-Insulated
Cable
System - Report
4600365-002,
Rev.
A including Addendum No.
1 dated 12/5/85.
Comex Corporation
Design gualification Report for
Instrumentation
Service Classification Electric Penetration
Coaxial
and Triaxial Feedthrough
Module Assemblies - Report
No. IPS-1054,
Rev.
D dated 6/15/84.
5, ~
Niagara
Mohawk and Stone
and Webster Specifications,
Procedures
and Inspection
Reports listed in Attachment
7
which verify the maintenance
of environmental
qualification from the initial procurement
through the
final installation/acceptance
tests.
Within the
scope of this inspection,
the inspector confirmed
that the licensee
has
been able to,.qualify
CHRRM channels
A and
B for operation.
Channels
C and
D will require replacement of
.in-containment mineral-insulated
cables
which do not meet the
Eg qualified insulation resistance
test acceptance
criteria
(see Section 8.4).
10.2.2
CHRRM Electrical
Power
Su
lies
I
q5
The
CHRRM system
has
been classified
by the licensee
as Nuclear
Safety Related
and
as
such it is required to be powered
from
Class lE safety-related
power sources.
24
Pertinent el ectri ca 1 in strumentati on power supp 1 ies
documentation
were reviewed to ascertain
the sources of power
used throughout this system
as follows:
~
NMPC Unit 2 Electrical Plant Master
One Line Diagram
Drawing 12177-EE-MOIE-3.
NMPC Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System Area Monitors and
Detectors Electrical Wiring Diagram Drawing 12177-EE-36G-2.
~
NMPC Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation, Radiation
Monitoring Systems Electrical Miring Diagrams
Drawing
12177-EE-3TN-3.
These
drawings
show that
CHRRM system channels
A and
C are
powered
form Division I Safety Related Uninterruptable
Power
Supply (UPS)
120 volt AC Instrumentation
Power Panel
102A and
channels
B and
D are similarly powered
from Division II UPS
Power Panel
302B.
- ~
The Class
1E
CHRRM system provides output information/signal
data to non Class
1E data acquisition devices.
The inspector
confirmed that these
output circuits include the appropriate
qualified Class
lE/non Class
1E electrical isolation devices
required to protect the
CHRRM system
from non Class
1E circuit
degradation.
Outside containment
system connecting electrical
cables
were
verified as Class
lE qualified by a review of licensee
Cable
Qualification E024PAB,
Rev.
2 dated 2/18/86.
The inspector
found no deficiencies
in the licensee's
design,
environmental qualification, or the electrical
power systems for
the
CHRRM system.
The walkdown inspection of channel
A (outside
containment) did not disclose installation or construction
problems in the areas
of cable installation (pulling, routing,
separation,
identification) nor wiring or identification
problems within both the local
and remote instrumentation
panels.
10.3 Gaseous
Effluent Monitorin
S stem
GEMS
- ".l
- l
"~
r>j
10.3.1
GEMS Environmental
uglification
The inspector
made
a review of the following GEMS equipment
and
system environmental qualification documentation.
Science Applications International Corporation-
Environmental Certificate of Compliance for the items of
equipment which make
up the
GEMS system.
25
~
Science Applications International
Corporation - Gaseous
Effluent Monitoring System -
NM Unit 2 Electrical
Equipment Qualification Report.
Satisfactory operation
and continuing qualification of this
system
and its equipment is contingent
upon
an ongoing
preventive
maintenance
program.
The inspector
reviewed the
recommended
program by Science International
to maintain the
environmental qualification and operability of the system.
It
included inspection,
replacements,
etc.
ranging from monthly to
six year intervals.
Accordingly, the licensee
had prepared
Equipment Qualifications/Maintenance
Program
Oata Sheets
covering these
system.
The licensee
indicated
he would include
these
requirements
in the maintenance
program.
'Within the
scope of this review, the following item for
improvement or clarification was identified (50-410/87-22-11):
~
Include the Maintenance
Program data
sheets for GEMS into
the formally established
maintenance
program.
10.3.2
GEMS Electrical
Power
Su
lies
NUREG-0737, Appendix B, Criterion 3, states
that "The
instrumentation
should
be energized
from station
Class
1E power
sources."
A review was
made by the inspector to determine
the
power sources
to the
GEMS systems
in order to ascertain their
reliability and availability to power this system.
The inspector
found that the
GEMS system mainframe cabinets
2RMS-CAB170 and
2RMS-CAB180 are powered
from non Class
1E power
sources.
However,
each of the cabinets is powered
from a
separate
electrical distribution panel
which derives its power
from an uninterruptable
power supply (fed by both
125 volt D-C
battery
and
120 volt A-C supply).
The A-C power supply to each
of the
UPS systems is derived from A-C load centers
which can
be fed from either of the A-C offsite sources.
Therefore,
the
power supply to these
systems
was considered
to be reliable.
10.4
ualit
Assurance
Review
The inspector reviewed pertinent work and quality assurance
records
for the design,
construction
and installation of both the High Range
Radiation Monitoring and Post Accident Sampling Systems to ascertain
whether the work completed
and the records reflect accomplishments
consistent with NRC requirements,
the
TMI Action Plan Generic
Criteria of NUREG-0737,
and licensee
commitments.
26
Particular
emphasis
of this inspection
in the area of guality
Assurance
was placed
on the High Range
Radiation Monitoring System
mineral-insulated
cabling.
The stringent requirements
placed
upon it
at every step including its procurement,
shipping, receipt,
storage,
handling,
coi ling, uncoiling, recoiling, installation,
checkout,
treating
and acceptance
were critical to the successful
operation of
this system.
Documents
reviewed included those listed in
Attachment 7.
A thorough review of the licensee's
gA program in
regards
to this portion of the system with favorable findings was
believed to be indicative of a good overall program.
During this inspection in this area,
there were not adverse
findings
in the licensee's
gA program
and its implementation.
11.0 Worker Concerns
RI-87-A-0015
General
On March 3,
1987
an individual contacted
the
NRC Region I to express
concern
about the adequacy of particulate air sample filters
provided in Emergency
Survey Kits.
The individual also indicated
that
a deficiency report (i.e.,
Nonconformance
Event Transmittal
)NET]) concerning
the adequacy of the filters had been rewritten to
minimize the significance of the finding.
An onsite review of this matter was performed during this inspection.
The evaluation of the circumstances
surrounding this matter and
licensee
action thereon
was based
on review of the NET, observation
of filters in filter kits and discussion with cognizant personnel.
11.2 ~Ffnd1n
s
On February 4,
1987,
a
NET was issued involving apparent
use of
improper air sample particulate filter papers
in Emergency Kits.
The
NET was reviewed by the Unit 1 Radiation Protection Supervisor
on or about February 4,
1987.
Based
on this review, the
NET was
considered
inappropriate for issuance
because
of a lack of
specificity.
In addition, the supervisor believed the matter should
be addressed
through the
Emergency Kit Inventory Process.
This was
concurred in by the Radiation Protection
Manager.
However,
as
a
result of discussions
between
the Radiation Protection
Manger,
and
the individual,
a second
NET was issued
on February 6, 1987,
by the
Emergency
Response
Coordinator.
The second
NET was issued for the
purpose of placing the observation
in the
NET tacking process.
On February 6, 1987, the Emergency
Response
Coordinator issued
a
memorandum identifying short and long term corrective actions for
the concerns.
The corrective actions were independently verified by
the inspector.
The actions were:
27
~
The ion exchange
papers
and chemistry filter papers
contained
in the kits were replaced.
~
Storeroom stocks
were verified correct.
(Note:
The licensee
believes incorrect stock number filter papers
were
inadvertently used.)
~
Procedures
have
been revised to clearly specify filters to be
placed in kits.
Procedures
were revised to require periodic Emergency
Planning
Management
inspection of kits and initiation of corrective
action for identified deficiencies.
On March 6,
1987,
a memorandum
was issued to the concerned
individual by the Radiation Protection
Manager outlining the reasons
the original
NET was not issued.
11.3 Conclusions
The following conclusions
were obtained:
Incorrect filter papers
were in the kits but subsequently
replaced with the correct papers.
Corrective actions
were taken to identify similar potential
concerns with Emergency
Sample Kit inventories in the future.
Emergency
Procedures
(EPMP-2) provide
a mechanism for
correcting inventory discrepancies.
Discrepancies
are to be
corrected within 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
Consequently, it was not apparent
that
a
NET need
be written to ensure corrective actions
were
taken.
~
The individual was satisfied with the corrective actions taken.
No violations were identified.
The licensee's
Superintendent,
Chemistry. and Radiation Protection
Management
indicated that consideration
would be given to requiring
Radiation Protection
Manager sign-off of NETs that are believed not
needed to be issued.
Currently, first line Radiation Protection
. Supervision
are permitted to solely make the decision
as to the need
for a NET.
IL ~ft
The inspectors
met with licensee
representatives
denoted in Attachment
1
on June
26,
1987 and July 1,
1987.
The inspectors
summarized
the
purpose,
scope
and findings of the inspection.
No written material
was provided to the licensee.
Attachment
1
Individuals Contacted
1.
Nia ara
Mohawk Power
Com an
.'
T.
2)
T.
1)
R.
2)
W.
2)
T.
C.
M.
1)
A.
2)
J.
1)
A.
1)&2)P.
1)
D.
1)&2)L.
1)
A.
1)
M.
1)&2)T.
1)&2)J.
2)
E.
1)&2)T.
D.
A.
1)
C.
1)
W.
1)
T.
2.
NRC
J. Perkins,
General
Superintendent
W.
Roman, Unit 1 Station Superintendent
Abbott, Unit 2 Station Superintendent
Connolly,
gA Program Manager
Newman, Supervisor,
Nuclear guality Assurance
Beckman,
Manager,
Operations guality Assurance
Jones,
Unit 2 Operations
Superintendent
Sassani,
Supervisor,
Instrumentation
and Control
Blasiak, Supervisor,
Unit 1 Chemistry
Ross,
Supervisor,
Unit 2 Chemistry
Volza, Supervisor Radiological
Support
Barcomb,
Supervisor,
Unit 2 Radiation Protection
Wolf, Site Licensing Engineer
Athelli, Senior
Eg Engineer
Grammes,
Eg Engineer
Chwalek,
Emergency Planning Coordinator
Quell, Supervisor,
Chemistry and Radiochemistry
Leach,
Radiation Protection
Manager
Egan,
Compliance
and Verification Engineer
Coleman, Assistant Reactor Analyst
Pinter, Site Licensing Coordinator
Stuart,
Superintendent
Chemistry
and Radiation
Management
Thompson,
Supervisor,
Training
Kurtz, Supervisor,
Radiation Protection Instrumentation
W.
1)
W.
C.
Cook, Senior Resident
Inspector
Schmidt,
Resident Inspector
Marschall, Resident
Inspector
The inspectors
also contacted
other individuals.
-1)
Denotes
those individuals present at the June
26,
1987 Exit Meeting.
- 2)
Denotes
those individuals present at the July 1,
1987 Exit Meeting.
Attachment
2
Documentation for NUREG 0737, II.B.3
Procedures
N2-POT-17-4, "Preoperation
Test-Post Accident Sampling System," Revision
1, (7/3/86);
N2-CSP-13,
"Chemical
Post Accident Assessment
at Unit 2," Revision 1,
(4/24/87);
EPP-9,
"Determination of Core
Damage
Under Accident Conditions," Revision
3, (3/30/87);
.S-CAP-60, "Dilution of Liquid and
Gas
Samples of High Activity," Revision
2, (7/25/84);
S-LIP-22, "Operation
and Calibration of the Carle Instrument Analytical
Gas Chromatograph,"
Revision 1, (6/ll/87)
~Drawfn
s
12177-FSK-21.8.0,
"Flow Diagram Post Accident Sampling"
12177-FSK-22"5L,
"Flow Diagram Radwaste
Building Vent) lation"
GE 796E723,
"Post Accident Sampling System
P&ID"
GE 796E762,
"Post Accident Sampling
System
PAID"
GE 795E822,
"Post Accident Sampling
System
P8 ID"
Attachment
2
General Electric Co.
GEK-83344
~
3
-~
Calculations
Stone L Webster
"Pressure
Drop Calc for Post Accident Sampling
Sys.-RHR
Sample Lines"
(6/20/85);
"Pressure
Drop,
Flow 5 Transport
Time for Post Accident Sampling System-
Jet
Pump Sample," (6/25/87);
"Pressure
Drop Calculation for Post Accident Sampling
Sys-Gas
Sample
Lines " (2/20/86)
Attachment
3
Com arison of Chemical
and Radiochemical
Test Results"
Parameter
Boron (standard)
Concentration
985+10ppm
2980150ppm
4870160 ppm
Measured
Concentration
1000ppm
3080ppm
5100ppm
Licensee
Commitment
Difference
in
+15ppm
i50ppm
+100ppm
over the range
+130ppm
50-2000ppm
chloride (standard)
24.1+3.1
37.4+1.2
80.5+2.2
19.5
40.0
76.5
-4.6ppm
"2.6ppm
"4.5ppm
1"10ppmi1 ppm
>10ppma10%
pH(actual
samples)
6.4
5.9
-0.5
10.2
Isotopic
2.47E-3"
(total activity)
+1.22E-4
(Actual
Samp1 es)
yCi/ml
2.29E-3"*
a1.14E-4
yCi/ml
0 19E 3
- 4'*
yCi/ml
"Standard
sample
taken June
25,
1987 (Normal Station)
""PASS Sample taken June
25,
1987
""" luCi/g to 10 Ci/g a 200K
Attachment
4
Oocumentation for NUREG-0737
Item II F. 1-1 and II F.1-2
Procedures
Procedure
S-GRIP-1, "Operation, Calibration
and Maintenance
of Canberras
Jupiter Spectroscopy
Systems,"
Revision
0
Procedure
N2-CSP-7V,
"Gaseous
Rad Waste Chemistry Surveillance at
Unit 2," Revision
3
Procedure
S-GRIP-7, "Operation
and Calibration of the GELI-1 and GELI-2
Gamma Spectroscopy
System,"
Revision
1
Procedure
NZ-OP-79, "Radiation Monitoring System,"
Revision
2
Procedure
No. N2-CSP-13,
"Chemical
Post Accident Assessment
at Unit 2,"
Revision 2, (Appendix Q)
Attachment
5
Documentation for NUREG-0737 Item II.F. 1-3
Kaman
~
Kaman Report K83-62 u (R),
Kaman Instrument,
KMA-I 1000
II
~
Kaman Instrument Corporation
Report of Calibration - Model
KDA-HR High
Range Area Monitor Ion Chamber Detector
Procedures
~
Procedure
N2-RSP-RMS-R106,
"Channel Calibration Test of the Drywell High
Range Area Monitor," Revision 1, 4/21/87
Attachment
6
To Ins ection
Re ort 50-410/87-22
Oocumentation for NUREG-0737 Item III 0.3.3
"F
Procedure
S-RTP-76,
"Operation
and Calibration of the Eberline Model
Ping-lA, Particulate
Iodine and Noble Gas Monitor," Revision
1
Procedure
S-RTP-75,
"Operation
and Calibration of Radeco
High Volume and
Battery Operate Air Samplers
Model
H809V1 and
H809C, Revision
1
Procedure
EPP-6, "Inplant Emergency Surveys,"
Revision
9
Procedure
S-CRP-l,
Au Sample Analysis, Revision
0
Procedure
EPMP-3,
"Review and Revision of Site Emergency
Plan
and
Procedures,"
Revision 2.
Procedure
EPMP-2,
"Emergency
Equipment Inventories
and Checklist,"
Revision 3.
" .'4
lt ~,
tg
~Ill
h
Attachment
7
Documentation for
A and desi
n review
12177-EE-BTA-4
Wiring Diagram, Control Panel,
and 2SSP-IPNL102
12177-EE-MOlE-3
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Emergency
600v and
120
VAC
12177-EE-M01G-4
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Normal
125
VDC
12177-EE-M01F-4
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Emergency
and Normal
125
VDC
12177-EE-MOlA-3
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Normal
Power Distribution
12177-EE-M01C-3
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Normal 600v and
120
VAC Rev
3
12177-EE-M01D-5
Plant Master
One Line Diagram Normal 600v and
120
VAC Rev 4
12177-EE-M01A-4
Plant Master Diagram Normal
Power Distribution
12177-EE-M01C-4
Plant Master Diagram Normal 600v and
120
VAC
12177-EE-llGM-2
Wiring Diagram Heat Tracing System
12177-EE-11GN-3
Wiring Diagram Heat Tracing System
2 HTS"PNL001
2-87-0210,
-0343, -0344, -0367,
-1126 and -1048 Quality Assurance
Inspection
Reports for Containment
High Range Radiation Monitoring System
Stone
and Webster
ualit
Assurance
Ins ection
Re orts
E6A 44615
-
Witness Cable
Removal
from Packing
Boxes
and Storage
E6A 44626
"
Insulation Resistance
Tests
E5A 83455
-
Unsatisfactory Attributes for Cables
E6A 44669
-
Coiling and Uncoiling Cables
E6A 44682
-
Cable Installation
.E6A .44790
-
Cable Termination, Continuity Testing,
Torquing of Connectors
E6A 44632
-
Handling of Cable
E6A 44725
-
Cleaning of Cable
E6A 44743
-
Termination
and Torquing of Connectors
b
Nia ara
Mohawk
ualit
Assurance
Ins ection
Re orts
2-87-0367
CHRRM System
2-87-0344
CHRRM System
2-87-0210
CHRRM System
2-87-0343
CHRRM System
2-87-1126
CHRRM System
2-87-1048
CHRRM System