ML17055C477
| ML17055C477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1986 |
| From: | Haughey M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610090386 | |
| Download: ML17055C477 (6) | |
Text
Ot;T 3 1986 Docket No. 50-410 Mr. C. V. Mangan, Senior Vice President Niagar a Mohawk Power Corpor ati on 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202
Dear Mr. Mangan:
DISTRIBUTION:
'~II, Il.IIII RRC PDR Local PDR BWD-3 r/f EAdensam MHaughey EHylton RBer nero Atty, OGC JPartlow EJor dan BGrimes ACRS (10)
'Stevens MSrinivasan GHulman
Subject:
Nine Mile Point 2 - Control Room Ambient Temperature Effects on Safety Related Electronic Equipment (Request for Additional Information)
In recent discussions with your staff, it was indicated that although equipment in the control room supplied by General Electric was purchased to operate in an environment of 120 F and therefore is expected to be able to handle the operating temperature that it would see if the control room ambient temperature reached the Technical Specification limit of 104'F, the balance of the equipment was purchased to operate in an environment with a much lower temperature.
On the basis of this information, the staff is unable to conclude that the concerns (addressed in the enclosure to this memorandum) associated with control room ambient temperature have been adequately considered in the design of the main control room at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.
General Design Criterion (GDC) 4 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A requires structures,
- systems, and components important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental condi-tions associated with normal operation, maintenance,
- testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents.
Therefore, as the staff can not presently conclude that the design of the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 control room meets the requirements of GDC 4, we request Niagara Mohawk respond to the enclosed request for additional information on a schedule commensurate with your expected fuel load readiness date.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated Mary F. Haughey, Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No.
3 Division of BWR Licensing cc:
See next page h
B MHaughey/vag 10/g/86 LQ 4-3:DBL on 10/
/86 D
-3:DBL EAdensam 10/
/86 f
861009038b 861003 PDR ADDCK 05000410 F
t t
H 'i v"
p
Mr. C.
V. Manqan Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 CC:
Mr. Troy B. Conner, Jr.,
Esq.
Conner 5 Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania
- Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006 Richard Goldsmith Syracuse University College of Law E. I. White Hall Campus
- Syracuse, New York 12223 Ezra I. Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Resident Inspector Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station P. 0.
Box 99
- Lycominn, New York 13093 Mr. John W. Keib, Esq.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Mr. James Linville U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Norman Rademacher, Licensing Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Don Hill Niagara Mohawk Power Coroorati.on Suite 550 4520 East West Highway
- Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. Paul D.
Eddy New York State Public Serice Commission Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station-Unit II P.O.
Box 63
- Lycoming, New York 13093
EICSB RE VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONTROL ROOM AMBIENT TEMPERATURE EFFECTS ON SAFETY RELATED ELECTRONIC E UIPMENT Plant operational history of various nuclear power reactors has shown there is a significant potential problem involving the failure of safety related electronic components housed within cabinets located in the control room environment due to excessive temperature effects.
Such failures could lead. to the malfunctioning of control
- systems, inoperability of instrumentation channels associated with protection
- systems, inadvertent actuations and/or failures of safety systems and erroneous indications and alarms to plant operators.
Even though redundant control room cooling systems typically exis., it is believed that the loss of all control room cooling may be more likeiy to occur than previously thought as indicated by IE Information Notice No. 85-89, "Potential Loss of Solid-State Instrumentation Following Fai're of.
Control Room Cooling." It appears from various events that control room temperatures can rise quickly (in a matter of minutes) upon loss of control room HVAC.
Operational experience has shown that even though desicn specifications show that equipment is qualified to handle temperatures up to 120'F, an ambient control room temperature of 90'F (technical specification allowed h gher temperature) can result in erratic :.ehavior of electronic equipment housed within various enclosures.
Cases have been cited where temperatures at the location of cabinet top racks have reached 125'F even though the control room ambient, was 72'F and the HVAC was functioning.
IE Information Notice No. 85-89 was issued to alert licensees/applicants of potential problems related to excessive temperature effects within cabinets.
Based on the above concerns associated with plant operational history.at.
various operating nuclear olants, the applicant is requested to supply information to the staff which describes what consideration (correlation) was given to the possible temperature effects on safety related electronic equipment housed within the various control room cabinets/enclosures as related to the Technical Specification ambient temperature limit of 104 F and what measures have been taken to preclude similar problems from occurring at the Nine Mile Point 2 facility as have occurred at some operating reactors.
c a
t