ML17055C208
| ML17055C208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1986 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608200059 | |
| Download: ML17055C208 (8) | |
Text
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~r 01144 ATTAGHHENT II
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA19406 File No. RI-86-A-0080 Docket No.
50-410 50-220
~I AUG tgS.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ATTN:
Mr. C.
V. Mangan Senior Vice President 300 Erie Boulevard, West
- Syracuse, New York 13202 Gentlemen:
subject:
Allegations by Nine Mile Point 1 Instrument and Control Technician Enclosed is a
summary of allegations made by a Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Instrument and Control Technician about activities at Unit 1 expressed to our Resident Inspector initially on July 11, 1986 and subsequently amplified in discussions with our regional staff.
We understand from the individual that he has informed your staff of all but the last two concerns, items 13 and 14.
Based on discussions between our staff and you and your staff on August 6 and 7,
1986 at the Nine Mile Point site, we understand that your investigation of these concerns is nearly complete.
Please provide us with a written report of the results of your investigation.
This letter is being placed in the Unit 2 docket as well as the Unit 1 docket because these potentially significant allegations could impact the schedule for Unit 2 )icensing.
Following your submittal of the report, we ask that you arrange to meet with us in our Region I office as soon as possible to discuss the report.
We appreciate your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
As stated W lliam F ane, Director Oivision of Reactor Projects
.I II
'A'1
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 11 AUG 1986 cc w/o encl:
Connor 5 Wetterhahn John W. Keib, Esquire J.
A. Perry, Vice President, Quality Assurance W. Hansen, Manager of Quality Assurance D.
- Quamme, NMP-2 Project Director C.
- Beckham, NMPC QA Manager T. J. Perkins, General Superintendent R. B. Abbott, Station Superintendent T. E.
- Lempges, Vice President, Nuclear Generation T.
Roman, Station Superintendent J. Alrich, Supervisor, Operations W. Drews, Technical Superintendent
- Director, Power Division Begartment of Public Service, State of New York Public Document Room (POR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector State of New York bcc w/o encl.:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, ORNA (w/o encl)
ORP Section Chief Region I SLO Robert J. Bores, ORSS
4
SUMMARY
OF ALLEGATIONS CRD Pum Vibration Testin In March, 1986, after weeks of daily vibration tests of the CRD pump, testing was suspended when it was apparent that the increasing vibration would exceed the action limit of the ASME requirements and a plant shutdown would have been required prior to the scheduled March 8, 1986 shutdown.
Helium Leak Tests In March, 1986, the chemistry supervisor noted that errors existed in the procedure for helium leak testing the stack gas
- system, in that portions of the system would not be tested.
The alleger found the supervisor's conclusion to be correct.
The 14C supervisor assigned the alleger to review the leak testing procedure and propose changes to it.
After completing this work, the IEC supervisor sat on the proposed changes and later told the alleger to do the testing with the old procedure.
The leak testing was done in April.
Feedwater Check Valve The alleger was instructed to apply 100 psi air to seat the feedwater check valve after it had failed its initial test.
It failed the second test also.
Then themechanic installing'the r'eplacement valve told the alleger that the valve seat was hammered in place.
The valve passed the leak test, but stuck shut during startup.
The shift supervisor diverted flow in the feedwater lines to free the stuck feedwater check valve.
There appeared to be no procedure for this and no management review.
Eventually, the valve opened.
LPRNs During the outage non-qualified technicians installed LPRM connectors in that A techs were installing them without direct supervisi'on from C techs.
During the. outage and years prior LPRMs connectors were routinely installed without proper cwork Request (lA) paperwork, connectors replacements were represented on VRs as troubleshooting, and the installation and test procedure, LPRM-1, was routinely not used or filled out afterward.
Since the cable replacement six years ago the LPRM cables have not fit properly into the connectors.
The cable+electrics have been melted smaller (per LPRM-1) or the connector bores have been drilled larger to fit them together.-
8.
gC involvement in the LPRN connector work was improper in that IAC techs frequently did not inform gC that connectors were being replaced, and even when aware of the connector replacements, gC inspected only paper and never went under the vessel because they knew the work was unacceptable to specifications.
9.
On July 10 a different design connector was installed on some LPRNs (prior to being discovered by the resident inspector),
and no design change had been submitted for it.
In addition, no work requests or LPRN maintenance procedures were prepared until after the resident inspector came down to witness this activity at which time the workers involved took a break to generate the paperwork and get it approved by the shift supervisor.
2 10.
During the outage the alleger was harassed by fellow workers and discriminated against by his supervision due to his raising concerns
-about the LPRN connector work.
The supervisors did little or nothing to correct his harassment.
IRNs ll.
The connector on IRN 18 was replaced on June 7, 1986, and was not documented on the WR.
12.
lhe plant was started up on the morning of June 17, 198~ased on falsified surveillance test records for the replaced IRN connector.
The IEC tecKs and assistant supervisor falsified the test record without performing any of the required-surveillance testing.
Other 13.
An IEC tecnnician working on LPRN connectors received a dose of 1.25 REM which was in excess of his administrative limit.
14.
A piece of an aluminum tool about 1 inch by 8 inches was lost in the reactor vessel during the outage.
The tool was used for installation and removal of feedwater line plugs.