ML17055C051
| ML17055C051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1986 |
| From: | Mcbrearty R, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055C049 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-86-10, NUDOCS 8607220343 | |
| Download: ML17055C051 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000220/1986010
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report
No.
50-220/86-10
Docket
No.
50-220
License
No.
Category
C
Licensee:
Nia ara
Mohawk Power
Cor oration
300 Erie Boulevard West
S racuse
13202
Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Unit
1
Inspection At:
Scriba
Inspection
Conducted:
June
16-20
1986
Inspectors:
R
A.
cBr
ty,
R
ctor Engineer
date
Approved by:
J.. Wiggi
Chief, Material s and
Processes
Section,
EB,
date
Ins ection Summar:
Ins ection
on June
16-20
1986
Re ort No. 50-220/86-10
~A" I: I,
AI
inspector of Control
Rod Drive Stub Tube examinations,
Data review regarding
Recirculation
System
and
Emergency
Condenser
piping and activities related to
the Hydrogen Water Chemistry Sampling Line hydrostatic
pressure
test.
Results:
One violation was identified:
placing the Hydrogen Water Chemistry
Sampling Line in service prior to performing the hydrostatic
pressure
test.
8b07220343
8b0711
ADOCK 05000220
8
r
0
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Nia ara
Mohawk Power
Cor oration
- J. Boyler, Engineer
"T. Breigle, Quality Assurance
Engineer
- W. Connolly, Quality Assurance
Program Manager
- W. Drews, Technical
Superintendent
~f. Hawksley, ISI
- H. Master III, Quality Assurance
Engineer
- P. Mazzaferro, Assistant Supervisor-Technical
Support
- T. Perkins,
General
Superintendent
~R. Randall,
Supervisor-Technical
Support
- T. Roman, Station Superintendent
- G. Snyder,
Associate
Generation
Engineer
- B. Wolken, Engineer
T. White, Assistant
Generation Specialist
Chica
o Brid e and Iron
C. Kirk, Welding Quality Assurance
Superintendent
United States
Re ulator
Commission
- W. Cook, Senior Resident
Inspector
~Denotes
those present at the exit meeting.
2.
H dro en Water Chemistr
S stem
H drostatic
Pressure
Test
The Hydrogen Water Chemistry
System modification involved the installation
of a sampling line from a perforated
LPRM tube through
an already existing
containment penetration.
The modification was to be done in accordance
with the rules'of the
1980 edition of ASME Section III, Subsection
NC with
the
Summer
1982 Addenda.
Welding was to be controlled by ASME Section
IX,
1980 edition through
Summer
1982 Addenda.
The inspector
reviewed the following to ascertain
compliance with the
applicable
requirements
of ASME Section III, Subsection
NC:
Niagara
Mohawk Design Transmittal
NlY85M9271 LF
Niagara
Mohawk Procedure
No. Nl-ISI-HYD-94
CBEI Procedure
SI-11,
Rev.
1
CB&I Traveler RSL-1, Contract
No. 863060/64
The inspector
found that the controlling documents
did not clearly define
the
sequence
in which work on the
system
was to be accomplished
with re-
spect to the Code-required
hydrostatic pressure
testing.
Construction
and
testing requirements,
in some cases,
were delineated
in narrative
form in
both the licensee's
and contractor's
procedures
and were then incorporated
in the
CBE I Traveler which governed
the field work.
The Traveler
was
found to permit system hydrostatic tests .to occur prior to
a final welding
operation
between
the containment penetration
and the sampling
system
piping.
This resulted
in the
system being placed in operation before the
completed
system
was hydrostatic
pressure
tested
as required
by ASNE
Section III. Also, as
a result of the incorrect
sequence
provided by the
Traveler,
a pin hole leak developed
in the system piping at the reactor
building side of the containment
which was not detected until
the plant was in a startup
mode
and pressurized.
The fact that
an inadequate field installation procedure
was
used for
this modification is
a violation of the applicable
requirements.
(220/86-10-01)
3.
Control
Rod Drive
Stub Tube Examination
The inspector
reviewed documents,
interviewed licensee
personnel,
and
examined nondestructive
examination
records
associated
with CRD Stub Tube
c) acking.
The following were included in the inspector '
review:
Stub Tube/Control
Rod Drive Penetration
Repair Program
Inspection
Plans for Spring
1986 Refueling Outage
Procedure
No. 6284-ISI-082,
Revision
1, "Ultrasonic Examination
Procedure
For Reactor
Vessel
Control
Rod Drive Housings
From the
I.D."
Procedure
No. 00000-ISI-029,
Revision 5, "Generic Manual Ultrasonic
Examination Procedure"
Nondestructive
Examination
Data associated
with CRD 30-07,
30-47,
34-07
and 46-27.
The above review was
done to ascertain
compliance with licensee
commit-
ments
and to verify that the examinations
were done
by qualified person-
nel .
The inspector
found that
CRD Housing leaks
were repaired
by a rolling
technique
which had previously been
used to make repairs.
The affected
components
were ultrasonically examined before
and after the rolling
operation
by qualified technicians
using approved
procedures.
The li-
censee
had committed to ultrasonically
examine at least
one previously
rolled housing during each refueling outage.
The examination of CRD 46-27
fulfilled that commitment.
The inspector
found that licensee
commitments
were met and that required
examinations
were completed.
No violatibns were identified.
4.
Preservice
Ins ection
Data
Review
During 1986 refueling outage,
the licensee
replaced
emergency
condenser
piping and performed Induction Heat Stress
Improvement
in the recirculation
system.
The inspector
reviewed the
1986 Outage
PSI Plan
For Replaced
Piping and
Components
at Nine Mile Point Unit
1 - Document
No. 81A1030,
Revision 0.
This Plan delineated
the
PSI requirements
and provided appropriate
diagrams
to identify the areas for examination of those
Class
1,
2 and
3 portions
of piping and components
which were replaced
or given IHSI during the
outage.
The examinations
were intended to meet the
ASME Code Section XI,
1980 Edition through Winter 1981 Addenda.
In addition,
selected
examination
data were reviewed to ascertain
that program requirements,
code requirements
and regulatory requirements
were met.
The following
were included in the inspector's
review:
32-FW-12S-5,
Recirculation
System
28" diameter valve to pipe weld
32-FW-12S-2,
Recirculation
System
28" diameter
elbow to pipe weld
39-FW-4043-09,
Emergency
Condenser
10" diameter
safe-end
to pipe weld
39-SW-4043-019,
Emergency
Condenser
10" x 12" reducer to pipe weld
The recirculation
system ultrasonic examinations
were
done using
UDRPS
automated
techniques,
and the emergency
condenser
welds were
examined
with manual
techniques.
Additionally, the welds were liquid penetrant
examined
per Section
XI requirements.
The inspector
found that applicable
code
and regulatory requirements
were
met,
the examination results
were properly documented,
and the examina-
tions were done
by qualified personnel
using approved
procedures.
5.
Personnel
uglification/Certification Records
Certification records
were reviewed for personnel
who were associated
with
the
NDE performed
on the welds listed in paragraph
4.
This included the
automated
examinations
performed
on the recirculation
system welds.
The
review was
done to ascertain
that the individuals were properly qualified
to perform their assigned
duties.
e
The records
indicated that the examiners
were qualified in accordance
with SNT-TC-1A and the Nuclear
Energy Services qualification program.
I
The individual who analyzed
the
UDRPS automated
data
was certified to UT
Level II limited to automated
techniques
and
had received
EPRI training
in IGSCC planar flaw sizing,
and in the examination of weld overlays.
He
had successfully
passed
the practical
examinations,
given at the
Center,
in flaw sizing and
IGSCC detection
data acquisition
and analysis
using the
UDRPS system.
His activities at Nine Nile Point Unit
1 were
limited to the analysis of data collected
by
UDRPS during the examination
of recirculation
system welds.
No violations were identified.
ualit
Assurance/ ualit
Control Interface
In connection with the review of the procedures
used to control the
installation of the hydrogen
sampling modification discussed
in paragraph
2, above,
the inspector
noted contractor
QC hold points established
in
the Traveler.
The inspector
thus concluded that
CBAI QC had reviewed the
Traveler
so that appropriate
hold points could be established.
The in-
spector also noted that, despite this
QC review, the inadequacy
of the
Traveler with regards
to the sequencing
of hydrostatic testing
and work
activities was not identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
at the conclusion of the inspection
on June
20,
1986.
The inspector
summarized
the purpose
and the
scope of the inspection
and the findings.
At no time during this inspection
was written material
provided by the
inspector to the licensee.
1
4
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