ML17055B792
| ML17055B792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nuclear Energy Institute |
| Issue date: | 02/22/2017 |
| From: | Mccullum R Nuclear Energy Institute |
| To: | Annette Vietti-Cook NRC/SECY |
| SECY/RAS | |
| References | |
| 81FR89011, NRC-2016-0204, PRM-50-114 | |
| Download: ML17055B792 (14) | |
Text
PRM-50-114 1 81FR89011 RODNEY MCCULLUM Sr. Director, Fuel & Decommissioning Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 www.nei.org P: 202-739-8082 M: 202-384-0240 E: rxm@nei.org February 22, 2017 Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff
Subject:
NEI Comments on the PRM for 10 CFR Part 50 (Docket ID NRC-2016-0204)
Project Number: 689
Dear Ms. Vietti-Cook,
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 is pleased to provide the enclosed comments on the Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50-114 or Petition) noticed in the Federal Register on December 9, 2016. 2 The Petition, submitted by Mr. David Lochbaum on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists and 2 co-petitioners, requests several modifications to the Commissions requirements governing the extended shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. NEIs detailed comments on PRM-50-114 are included in the enclosure to this letter. As explained in the enclosure, NEI recommends that the NRC deny the Petition because it does not demonstrate that the NRCs current requirements are incorrect, incomplete, inadequate, or unnecessarily burdensome 3 in a way that requires rulemaking.
More specifically, PRM-50-114 should be denied because: (1) the Petition incorrectly asserts that the Commissions existing regulations are inadequate as applied to operating reactors that have entered an extended shutdown; and (2) the Petition provides no basis for suggesting 1
NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, nuclear material licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
2 81 Fed. Reg. 89, 011 (Dec. 9, 2016).
3 10 CFR § 2.802(c)(1)(iii).
Ms. Annette Viette-Cook February 22, 2017 Page 2 that the NRC should explicitly prohibit withdrawal of the certification of the permanent cessation of operations submitted pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(1)(i). In addition to expanding upon these two points, the enclosure provides brief responses to the questions presented in the Federal Register notice soliciting public comment on the Petition.
If you have any questions concerning these comments, please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
Sincerely, Rodney McCullum Attachment cc: Carol Gallagher, NRC Jennifer Tobin, NRC
NEI Comments on the PRM for 10 CFR Part 50 (Docket ID NRC-2016-0204)
Enclosure The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking comment on a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and two co-petitioners concerning the extended shutdown and decommissioning of power reactors. 1 As explained below, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), on behalf of the commercial nuclear power industry, recommends that the NRC deny the Petition.
The NRC should deny PRM-50-114 because: (1) the Petition incorrectly asserts that the Commissions existing regulations are inadequate as applied to operating reactors that have entered an extended shutdown; and (2) the Petition provides no basis for suggesting that the NRC should explicitly prohibit withdrawal of the certification of the permanent cessation of operations submitted pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(1)(i). In addition to expanding upon these two points, this enclosure provides brief responses to several of the questions presented in the Federal Register notice soliciting public comment on the Petition.
I. The Petition incorrectly asserts that the Commissions existing regulations are inadequate as applied to operating reactors that have entered an extended shutdown.
Describing the need for issuance of a proposed rule, the Petition states:
The problem this rulemaking seeks to solve is that the NRCs regulations were developed for operating reactors and decommissioning reactors and do not adequately cover reactors in between these two states. Not only are the existing regulatory requirements governing operating reactors not sufficiently applicable to reactors in extended shutdowns, but new regulatory requirements for operating reactors could emerge and it is uncertain how these could apply to reactors in extended shutdowns. 2 The basic premise in the above-quoted passages seems to be that a rulemaking is necessary because the NRC has not promulgated regulations that are sufficiently applicable to reactors in an extended shutdown configuration. But this premise is incorrect. As stated in the NRC staffs response to questions posed in a June 16, 2016, letter from Mr. David Kraft - which is extensively referenced in the PRM - the NRCs regulations do not prohibit a licensee from entering an extended shutdown, While continuing to meet all safety and security requirements as outlined in the facilitys operating license... 3 As this answer makes clear, as a general matter, a facility entering an extended shutdown would need to continue complying with the 1
81 Fed. Reg. 89, 011 (Dec. 9, 2016); Petition for Rulemaking - Power Reactors in Extended Shutdowns, Sept. 1, 2016 (PRM-50-114 or Petition).
2 PRM-50-114, at p. 5.
3 Letter from J.B. Geissner (NRC Region III) to D.A. Kraft (Nuclear Energy Information Service), Aug. 4, 2016, at p. 3 (Kraft Letter) (emphasis added).
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safety and security requirements outlined in the facilities operating license and in the Commissions regulations applicable to operating plants. Absent specific approval from the NRC in the form of a license amendment or exemption, the facility continues to be subject to the requirements applicable to an operating nuclear power plant. In other words, from a regulatory standpoint, a plant in an extended shutdown condition is not in limbo. 4 The Petition seeks to create and fill a regulatory gap that simply does not exist.
For example, in a section titled Existing Regulatory Requirements During a Reactor Extended Shutdown, the Petition provides an example of a boiling water reactors secondary containment status in an attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of a licensees Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis Report during a period of extended shutdown. Specifically, the PRM states that because the Technical Specifications require the secondary containment to be operable only during Modes 1, 2, and 3, and during movement of irradiated fuel inside secondary containment:
Workers at a reactor in the defueled condition during an extended outage could legally remove the walls and ceiling of the secondary containment; replicating the remodeling that hydrogen detonations achieved at the BWR/4 reactors known at [sic] Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 3, and 4. The existing regulatory requirements are insufficient to ensure protective measures, such as the secondary containments enclosing spent fuel pools, are sustained during extended shutdowns to retain the reasonable assurance of adequate protection standard. 5 But this hyperbole omits several important points. First, secondary containment could be safely taken out of service - e.g., for testing or maintenance - within the constraints of a licensees Technical Specifications even while in Modes 1, 2, or 3. It can also be safely taken out of service when not in Modes 1, 2, or 3. The Petition incorrectly implies that, because a licensees Technical Specifications do not constrain out of service time outside of Modes 1, 2, or 3, a licensee could take secondary containment out of service for an unlimited duration (i.e., could legally remove the walls and ceiling) and, further, that a licensees Safety Analysis Report also does not prevent this condition. This is incorrect.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, includes Criterion 64 - Monitoring Radioactivity Releases, which requires that:
[M]eans shall be provided for monitoring the reactor containment atmosphere, spaces containing components for recirculation of loss-of-coolant accident fluids, effluent discharge paths, and the plant environs for radioactivity that may be 4
PRM-50-114, at p. 1.
5 Id. at p. 6.
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released from normal operations, including anticipated operational occurrences, and from postulated accidents.
Long-term removal of the walls and ceiling from a reactors secondary containment would create a physical condition whereby the radioactive releases to the plant environs could not be monitored (a condition commonly referred to as an unmonitored release pathway). This is contrary to the General Design Criteria. Additionally, the Petition provides no risk insights applicable to the postulated scenario. The risk of radioactive release from a shutdown and defueled reactor with no fuel movement in progress is much lower than that of an operating reactor. It would therefore be acceptable to take secondary containment out of service for a reasonable duration, for example to perform maintenance or modifications. In sum, long-term modification of a reactors secondary containment, as described in the Petition, would not comply with the General Design Criteria - not to mention the requirements contained in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 governing the control of station design (Criterion III) and corrective actions (Criterion XVI). In addition, 10 CFR § 50.59 would require a licensee to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing such a change to the plants design.
The Petition also claims that, contrary to the NRCs statement that the requirements applicable to operating plants would continue to apply to plants voluntarily entering into an extended shutdown configuration, TVA did not continue to meet all safety and security requirements for
[Browns Ferry] Unit 1. 6 As support for this statement, the Petition discusses TVAs response to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and information notices applicable to Unit 1 during the period of extended shutdown. These generic communications may require licensee action (e.g., provision of information to the NRC); however they do not impose new or changed regulatory requirements on licensees. Thus, a licensees decision to defer action on a generic communication at a Unit that has been shut down for an extended period of time does not mean that the licensee is not meeting all applicable safety and security requirements. Again, the regulatory gap postulated in the Petition simply does not exist.
Further, in the section titled Decommissioning Activities During Reactor Extended Shutdown, the Petition states that the proposed rulemaking Must clearly address whether decommissioning funds may be used for activities during a reactor extended shutdown and, if so, the criteria governing use of decommissioning funds. 7 The Petition also suggests that
[t]he final rule must require licensees to submit a preliminary decommissioning cost estimate to the NRC at five-year intervals throughout the period of reactor extended shutdown. 8 But here, as with the examples discussed above, the NRCs current regulations are clear and are not in need of revision.
First, regarding the timing of the use of decommissioning funds, the Commissions regulations already state that:
6 PRM-50-114, at p. 6.
7 PRM-50-114, at p. 4.
8 Id.
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Initially, 3 percent of the generic amount specified in § 50.75 may be used for decommissioning planning. For licensees that have submitted the certifications required under § 50.82(a)(1) and commencing 90 days after the NRC has received the PSDAR, an additional 20 percent may be used. A site-specific decommissioning cost estimate must be submitted to the NRC prior to the licensee using any funding in excess of these amounts. 9 Further, Regulatory Guide 1.184 states:
The licensee may use up to 23 percent of the amount (specified in 10 CFR 50.75) of the decommissioning trust funds for decommissioning activities before submitting a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate. Included in this 23 percent is an initial 3 percent that the licensee can use, even before permanent cessation of operation, for planning the decommissioning. The licensee may use the remaining 20 percent for actual decommissioning or readying the facility for long-term storage. This 20 percent may be used only after the licensee has submitted the certifications specified by 10 CFR 50.82(a) (1) and after the 90-day period following the submission of the PSDAR. The remaining decommissioning trust funds would be available for decommissioning activities after the licensee submits a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate to the NRC. 10 Thus, the NRCs existing requirements adequately describe when - from a timing standpoint -
funds collected for radiological decommissioning may be used by a licensee. Specifically, under the existing rules, use of funds collected for the purpose of radiological decommissioning are limited to the 3 percent allotted to planning until after the licensee has submitted both of the certifications required under section 50.82(a)(1). Assuming that under the framework proposed in the Petition a plant would exit extended shutdown and enter decommissioning once the certifications required by section 50.82(a)(1) have been docketed, it seems clear that, absent an exemption, use of funds during the extended shutdown period envisioned by the Petition would be limited to the 3 percent permitted for planning expenses. Thus, even if a rulemaking were warranted to address the extended shutdown scenario postulated in the Petition (and we maintain that it is not), no changes to the Commissions regulations regarding when decommissioning funds may be used are necessary.
Second, the Petition offers no support for a rule change requiring submittal of preliminary decommissioning cost estimates at five-year intervals throughout the period of reactor extended shutdown. 11 As the Petition acknowledges, the NRCs current requirements already require Part 50 licensees to file decommissioning funding status reports biennially (i.e., by 9
10 CFR § 50.82(a)(8)(ii).
10 Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors, Regulatory Guide 1.184, Rev. 1 (Oct. 2013), at p. 6.
11 PRM-50-114, at p. 4.
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March 31 of odd numbered years). 12 Even under the scenario postulated in the Petition, [T]he owner of a reactor in an extended shutdown may decide to restart that reactor or to enter decommissioning. 13 Thus, unless a reactor that has entered an extended shutdown configuration is within 5 years of the projected end of operations, the Petition offers no justification for requiring submittal of a preliminary decommissioning cost estimate. If such a licensee were to permanently cease operations, the requirements of section 50.82 requiring submittal of site-specific cost estimates would apply. 14 Finally, the decommissioning rulemaking initiated by the NRC staff in late 2015 also illustrates the lack of any regulatory gap for plants in an extended shutdown condition.15 Specifically, the need for the decommissioning rulemaking flows from the fact that many NRC regulations applicable to operating nuclear power plants continue to apply even after a nuclear power reactor has permanently ceased operation and defueled. This includes several regulations that seem to be of specific concern to the Petitioners (e.g., emergency planning and physical security). 16 Indeed, eliminating the inefficiencies associated with the extensive use of license amendments and exemptions to appropriately modify the operating requirements that continue to apply to permanently defueled facilities is the primary reason the staff has undertaken the decommissioning rulemaking. 17 This is, in fact, the antithesis of a regulatory gap in that operating reactor regulations are being conservatively applied even in situations where there is no longer an operating reactor. The decommissioning rulemaking is merely seeking to remove the excess of conservatism that persists when rules applicable to operating plants continue to apply to facilities that have permanently ceased operations and defueled, despite the fact that
[W]hen compared to an operating reactor, the risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, at a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel. 18 Removing this excess conservatism would create efficiency in the application of existing regulations while continuing to assure adequate protection.
Further, while certainly possible, the extended shutdown condition postulated in the Petition (i.e., a voluntary shutdown spanning over a decade with subsequent restart) is not a configuration that the current fleet of operating reactors is likely to experience in a generic 12 10 CFR § 50.75(f)(1) and (2).
13 PRM 50-114, at p. 4.
14 See 10 CFR §§ 50.82(a)(4) and (a)(8)(iii).
15 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulatory Improvements for Decommissioning Power Reactors, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,358 (Nov. 19, 2015).
16 See PRM-50-114, at p. 1.
17 Although the need for a power reactor decommissioning rulemaking is not based on safety concerns, the NRC understands that the decommissioning process can be improved and made more efficient and predictable by reducing its reliance on processing licensing actions to achieve a long-term regulatory framework for decommissioning. Therefore, the primary objective of the decommissioning rulemaking is to implement appropriate regulatory changes that reduce the number of licensing actions needed during decommissioning. 80 Fed. Reg.
72,361.
18 80 Fed. Reg. 72,361 (Nov. 19, 2015).
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fashion, if at all. We are unaware of any examples of the types of extended shutdowns that seem to be of concern to the Petitioners, other than the Browns Ferry example discussed in the Petition. In contrast, the decommissioning rulemaking currently being undertaken by the Commission is necessary because it addresses configurations or conditions that every plant that is currently operating, or that is licensed in the future, will necessarily experience: permanent cessation of operations, defueling, decommissioning, and license termination. The Petition itself acknowledges that decommissioning is an inevitable part of the life cycle of all operating plants. 19 In sum, at this point in time, the rulemaking proposed in the Petition will not result in any significant improvements to reactor safety or security, and will not improve regulatory efficiency. If at some point in the future a licensee decides to pursue the extended shutdown configuration discussed in the Petition, the NRC has all of the regulatory tools necessary ensure that the health, safety, and security of the public continues to be protected.
II. The Petition provides no basis for requesting that the NRC establish new requirements that must be satisfied for a reactor to restart after an extended shutdown.
The Petition states:
The petitioners request that the NRC issue a final rule that defines a reactor extended shutdown condition, establishes the requirements applicable during a reactor extended shutdown, and establishes the requirements that must be satisfied for a reactor to restart from an extended shutdown. 20 The Petition asserts that additional regulatory requirements, developed by this rulemaking, should be imposed on reactors that are shut down for an extended period, but are not actively pursuing restart under a formal process such as Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350. 21 However, existing NRC procedures in IMC 0375 22 already achieve the Petition's objective. IMC 0375 is the NRC process that provides guidance for implementation of the [Reactor Oversight Process] for plants in an extended shutdown condition for reasons not related to performance. 23 The guidance ensures that the [NRC] communicates unified and consistent oversight in a clear and predictable manner to the licensee, the public, and other 19 PRM-50-114, at p. 4.
20 PRM-50-114, at p. 3 (emphasis added).
21 IMC 0350 Oversight of Reactor Facilities in Shutdown Condition Due To Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns.
22 IMC 0375, Implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process at Reactor Facilities in an Extended Shutdown Condition for Reasons Not Related to Performance.
23 IMC 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program at p. 3. In the discussion of the annual assessment letters issued at the end-of-cycle (section 07.0.3.d.9), IMC 0305 directs the letter to describe any impact to the inspection plan for a plant subject to IMC 0375.
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stakeholders. 24 It also ensures the documentation of the required regulatory and licensee actions taken; the resolved technical issues leading to approval for restart (if required); and the eventual return of the plant to the routine [Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)]. 25 Lastly, the IMC 0375 process provides assurance that the plant will be operated in a manner that provides adequate protection of public health and safety following restart. Therefore, the NRC oversight requested in the Petition already exists within the ROP.
In sum, the rulemaking proposed in the Petition will not result in any significant improvements to reactor safety or security, and will not improve regulatory efficiency. If at some point in the future a licensee decides to pursue the extended shutdown configuration discussed in the Petition, the NRC has all of the regulatory tools necessary to effectively ensure that the health, safety, and security of the public continues to be protected.
III. The Petition provides no basis for suggesting that the NRC should explicitly prohibit withdrawal of the certification of the permanent cessation of operations submitted pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(1)(i).
In addition to requesting the creation of a distinct regulatory framework for plants that have entered into an extended shutdown configuration, the Petition also states:
The final rule should explicitly state that a licensee providing the NRC with written certification under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) of permanent cessation of power operations cannot retract that certification and opt to place the reactor into an extended shutdown en route to resumption of reactor operations. 26 The Petition provides no basis for the proposal that NRC impose this limitation on power reactor licenses. To the contrary, imposing such a requirement would unnecessarily limit licensees flexibility in making decisions regarding the continued operation of commercial power reactors -
which are a vital part of the Nations critical energy infrastructure - with no corresponding safety or security benefit.
10 CFR § 50.82(a) (1) (i) requires submittal of a written certification of permanent cessation of operations, stating the date on which operations have or will cease. 27 This certification must be submitted within 30 days of the time [w]hen a licensee has determined to permanently cease operations. 28 Thus, this certification may be submitted by a licensee well in advance of the 24 IMC 0375, at p. 1.
25 Id.
26 PRM-50-114, at p. 3.
27 See also, 10 CFR § 50.4(b)(8).
28 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(1)(i).
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time when the plant is actually shut down. 29 There is no fundamental change in the status of a plants operating license associated with the filing of the section 50.82(a) (1) (i) certification.
Further, there is no change in the regulatory treatment of a commercial nuclear power reactor that is solely contingent upon submittal of the certification of permanent cessation of operations required by section 50.82(a)(1)(i). Thus, withdrawal of this certification in and of itself -
regardless of whether the licensee intends to enter an extended shutdown or continue operating the plant - does not affect the status of the plant with respect to the NRCs requirements.
Also not discussed in the Petition is a second certification that is required pursuant to section 50.82(a) (1) (ii) once the reactor has been permanently defueled. This certification must state the date on which fuel was removed from the reactor vessel and describe the disposition of the fuel. 30 Once both of the certifications required by section 50.82(a) (1) have been docketed, the facilitys 10 CFR part 50 license No longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. 31 It is at this point that the licensees decision to permanently cease operations fundamentally changes the activities permitted by its Part 50 license (i.e., it is at this point that the facilitys license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor). 32 In sum, the Petition offers no support for prohibiting a licensees ability to withdraw a certification submitted pursuant to section 50.82(a)(1)(i). Promulgating such a regulation would unnecessarily limit a licensees ability to respond to changed circumstances between the time the certification is submitted and the time a reactor is permanently defueled, potentially resulting in the needless loss of critical electricity generating assets with no corresponding safety or security benefit.
IV. Response to questions posed in the NRCs Federal R egister notice (81 Fed. Reg.
89, 011).
29 See, e.g., Letter from J.A. Ventosa (Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. [ENO]) to U.S. NRC, Nov. 18, 2015 (communicating licensees intent to close the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in late 2016 or early 2017 due to deteriorating economics); Letter from B.R. Sullivan (ENO) to U.S. NRC, March 16, 2016 (communicating licensees intent to close the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant on January 27, 2017); Letter from M.P. Gallagher (Exelon Generating Company, LLC [EGC]) to U.S. NRC, June 20, 2016 (communicating licensees intent to close the Clinton Power Station by June 1, 2017 due to deteriorating economics); Letter from M.P. Gallagher (EGC) to U.S.
NRC, June 20, 2016 (communicating licensees intent to close the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station by June 1, 2018 due to deteriorating economics). Both EGC and ENO have subsequently withdrawn these certifications due to promulgation of the Future Energy Jobs Bill (SB-2814) by the Illinois General Assembly (signed by the Illinois Governor on December 7, 2016), and the planned sale and proposed transfer of the operating license for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant from ENO to EGC resulting from the Clean Energy Standard in New York (announced on August 1, 2016), respectively.
30 10 CFR § 50.4(b)(9).
31 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(2).
32 See Kraft Letter, at p. 2 (The docketing of the two certifications [required pursuant to sections 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii)] will result in a permanent cessation of operations but will not result in permanent irreversible termination of the operating license. A facility that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel and is being decommissioned maintains the same license that it had during operations. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.51(b), the license for a facility that has permanently ceased operations will continue to be in effect beyond its expiration date until the Commission notifies the licensee in writing that the license is terminated.).
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Question 1: The petition outlines a scenario where a reactor is in an extended shutdown condition due to economic or other reasons and would at some unspecified later date return to operation. The petition uses the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant as an example, where the Tennessee Valley Authority voluntarily shut down one unit from 1985 to 2007. Are there any facilities or licensees who may be likely to use the petitioners extended shutdown scenario in the future? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
Answer 1: As recognized in the Kraft Letter, the NRCs regulations do not prohibit a licensee from voluntarily entering the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition. 33 While we believe that the flexibility currently provided in the Commissions regulations should be maintained, at the present time we are not aware of any commercial power reactor licensees with definitive plans to pursue the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
Question 2: The petitioners contend that the NRCs existing regulations were promulgated for operating reactors and that specific regulations are needed to address non-operating reactors in an extended shutdown. Assuming the extended shutdown scenario is credible, in what specific ways are the existing regulations identified in the PRM insufficient to address the scenario described by the petitioners? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
Answer 2: As described above, we do not believe that there is any gap or insufficiency in NRCs regulations, nor are any changes to the NRCs regulations are necessary to ensure the protection of public health and safety or security in the event that a licensee voluntarily enters into the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
Question 3: Assuming that the existing regulations identified in the PRM are insufficient to address the extended shutdown scenario, what specific changes to those regulations are needed to facilitate the requested rulemaking? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
Answer 3: As described above, we do not believe that any changes to the NRCs regulations are necessary to ensure the protection of public health and safety or security in the event that a licensee voluntarily enters into the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
Question 4: The petition describes a plant in an extended shutdown, and proposes two criteria to enter into this nonoperating state (submission of 10 CFR 50.82(a) (1) (i) and 10 CFR 50.4(b) (8) notifications; and a shutdown period of 2 years). Should the term extended shutdown be defined in 10 CFR 50.2, Definitions, and should the regulations specify the timeframe for this scenario? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
33 Kraft Letter, at p. 3.
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Answer 4: As described above, we do not believe that any changes to the NRCs regulations are necessary to ensure the protection of public health and safety or security in the event that a licensee voluntarily enters into the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
At this time, there is no need to define extended shutdown because there is no gap in the regulatory requirements applicable to a plant that has entered a temporary shutdown.
Question 5: Given the NRCs long-standing, well-understood Reactor Oversight Program (ROP), what potential changes would need to be considered to ensure adequate oversight of a reactor during an extended shutdown? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
Answer 5: As described above, we do not believe that any changes to the NRCs regulations are necessary to ensure the protection of public health and safety or security in the event that a licensee voluntarily enters into the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
Question 6: What additional reporting to the NRC should be required for a reactor in an extended shutdown, and with what level of detail and frequency (e.g., the potential changes to the submission of the decommissioning trust fund reports)? Please provide technical, scientific, or other data or information demonstrating the basis for your position.
Answer 6: As described above, we do not believe that any changes to the NRCs regulations are necessary to ensure the protection of public health and safety or security in the event that a licensee voluntarily enters into the extended shutdown configuration described in the Petition.
The Petition has not demonstrated the need for any changes to the reporting requirements applicable to a reactor that has voluntarily entered a temporary shutdown. Since a plant in this condition is still restricted to using only 3% of decommissioning trust funds, just like an operating plant, no additional reporting requirements are required to maintain the safety and security of the plant.
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From: TempNUCGEN To: NRCExecSec Resource Cc: Gallagher, Carol; Tobin, Jennifer
Subject:
[External_Sender] NEI Comments on the PRM for 10 CFR Part 50 (Docket ID NRC-2016-0204)
Date: Wednesday, February 22, 2017 4:46:36 PM Attachments: 02-22-17 NEI Comments on the PRM for 10 CFR Part 50 (Docket ID NRC-2016-0204).pdf 02-22-2017 NEI Comments PRM 2.16.17.pdf
Dear Ms. Vietti-Cook,
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is pleased to provide the enclosed comments on the Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50-114 or Petition) noticed in the Federal Register on December 9, 2016. The Petition, submitted by Mr. David Lochbaum on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists and 2 co-petitioners, requests several modifications to the Commissions requirements governing the extended shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. NEIs detailed comments on PRM-50-114 are included in the enclosure to this letter. As explained in the enclosure, NEI recommends that the NRC deny the Petition because it does not demonstrate that the NRCs current requirements are incorrect, incomplete, inadequate, or unnecessarily burdensome in a way that requires rulemaking.
More specifically, PRM-50-114 should be denied because: (1) the Petition incorrectly asserts that the Commissions existing regulations are inadequate as applied to operating reactors that have entered an extended shutdown; and (2) the Petition provides no basis for suggesting that the NRC should explicitly prohibit withdrawal of the certification of the permanent cessation of operations submitted pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.82(a)(1)(i). In addition to expanding upon these two points, the enclosure provides brief responses to the questions presented in the Federal Register notice soliciting public comment on the Petition.
If you have any questions concerning these comments, please feel free to contact me at your convenience.
The attachments included in this email contain the complete letter and corresponding comments.
Sincerely, Rodney McCullum Sr. Director, Fuel & Decommissioning Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 www.nei.org P: 202-739-8082 M: 202-384-0240 E: rxm@nei.org
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