ML17054D041
| ML17054D041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| IEC-79-11, NUDOCS 7906200176 | |
| Download: ML17054D041 (10) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION INTERFACE PROBLEM Description of Circumstances:
IE Circular No. 79-11 Date:
June 27, 1979 Page 1 of 2 Apparent inadequate communication between nuclear steam supply system (NSSS),
architect/engineer (A/E) and constructors have resulted in several cases where reactor. vessels or the supports have been misoriented.
The misorienta-tion problems appear to occur at sites where dual reactor units are being constructed and one primary system layout is a mirror image of the other.
In 1975 TVA reported a misorientation problem with the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel.
Westinghouse was the NSSS supplier and TVA provided their own A/E service.
In 1977 the Southern California Edison Company reported a reactor vessel misorientation at San Onofre Unit 2.
Combustion Engineering was the NSSS supplier and Bechtel provided the A/E service.
In 1979 the Texas Utilities Generating Company reported a reactor vessel support system misorientation at Comanche Peak Unit 2.
Westinghouse supplied the
- NSSS, Gibbs and Hill was the plant engineer and Brown and Root was the constructor.
Even though there appears to be minimal safety implications associated with the particular misorientation problems mentioned, repetition of the same type of errors suggests breakdowns in the design/construction interface relation-ships that could in turn lead to more significant safety problems.
Corrective preventive action is recommended for the following reasons:
If the interface control system between the NSSS/AE/Construction is marginal or ineffective as evidenced by the misorientation of reactor vessels and their supports, it is possible that other safety related equipment may also be misoriented and/or mislocated.
In some cases the errors may not be as obvious as a misoriented reactor vessel.
This type of error can and has resulted in hardware modifications and could cause functional and/or structural changes that affect design and operating parameters.
In translating NSSS design information into site construction documents, the A/E may make changes to facilitate construction of the balance of plant.
These translations may also introduce errors which may not be g9062 GO 1 7 6
Enclosure 1
IE Circular No. 79-11 Date:
June 27, 1979 Page 2 of 2 recognized as errors by the A/E's review system.
The organization responsible for function and/or structural design must be made aware of changes affecting design and operating parameters so that proper evalua-tion is, performed.
It is recognized that there are effective field construction inspection
- systems, deficiency reporting systems and as-built check systems to uncover and correct for deviations from design.
- However, these are reactive type systems that address the problems after the errors occur and that rely on detection of errors and design deviations in the construction phase.
The detection of certain other errors and design deviations may only be recogniz-able at the design level.
The NRC's concern is that in some instances sufficient checks at the design level are not being performed to preclude design errors discovered at the con-struction site and that the designer may not be aware of other design related changes that affect design and operating parameters.
requirement that addresses this concern is contained in Criteria III which states in part:
"Measures shall be established for the identification and control of design interfaces and.for coordination among participating design organizations.
These measures shall include the establishment of procedures among participating design organizations for the review,'pproval,
- release, distribution, and revision of documents involving design interfaces."
Preventive action at the design level is necessary to minimize the possibility of the appropriate parties not being aware of A/E and construction related design changes and to prevent errors from occurring.
An appropriate preventive action would be to have the NSSS review A/E drawings that show the location, orientation, clearance, etc., for equipment that the NSSS has functional and/or structural design responsibility.
All holders of construction permits should be aware of the potential problems caused by inadequate communication between the design organization and the construction organization and should take appropriate action to assure them-selves that adequate interface controls are established and implemented.
No written response to this circular is required.
If you require additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
0 ENCLOSURE 2 IE Circular No. 79-11 Date June 27, 1979 Page 1 of 3 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TMELVE MONTHS Circular No.
78-12 78-13 Subject HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Inoperability of Multiple Service Mater Pumps First Date of Issue 6/30/78 7/10/78 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) having a HPCI Terry Turbine All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP, except those located in:
AL, AK, CA, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC "78-14 HPCI Turbine Reversing 7/17/78 Chamber Hold Down Bolting All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP having a
HPCI Terry Turbine excepting Duane Arnold and Monticello 78-15 78-16 78-17 Tilting Disk Check Val ves Fail to Close with Gravity i n Vertical Position Limitorque Valve Actuators Inadequate Guard Training/qualification and Falsified Training Records 7/24/78 7/26/78 10/13/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL; Susquehanna 1
8 2,
- Shoreham, and Salem 2
,a
Enclosure 2
IE Circular No. 79-11 Date:
June 27, 1979 Page 2 of 3 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TMELVE MONTHS Circular No.
78" 18 Subject UL Fire Test First Date of Issue 11/6/78 Issued To All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 78-19 Manual Over ride (Bypass) 12/29/78 of Safety Systems Actuation Signals All Power Reactor Facilities with a CP 79-01 Administration of Unauthorized Byproduct Material to Humans 1/12/79 All Medical Licensees, except 'Teletherapy Medical Licensees, and all Licensed Radio-pharmaceutical Distributors 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt 1/16/79 Vital AC Power Supplies All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
'79-03 Inadequate Guard Training/qualification and Falsified Training Records 2/23/79 All Holders of and Applicants for Special Nuclear Material Licenses in Safeguards Group I 79"04 Loose Locking Nut on 3/16/79 Limitorque Valve Operators All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 79-05 Moisture Leakage in Stranded Mire Conductors 3/20/79 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
Enclosure 2
0 IE Circular No. 79-1l Date:
June 27, 1979 Page 3 of 3 LISTING OF IE CIRCULARS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Circular No.
Subject First Date of Issue Issued To 79-06 Failure to Use Syringe 4/19/79 and Bottle Shields in Nuclear Medicine All Holders of Medical Licenses Except Teletherapy Licenses 79-07 79-08 79-09 79-10 Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power. Increase Attempted Extortion-Low Enriched Uranium Occurrences of Split or Punctured Regulator Diaphragms in Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Pipefittings Manu-factured from Unacceptable Material 5/2/79 5/18/79 6/22/79 6/26/79 All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Fuel Facilities and Licensed Reactors All Materials Priority I, Fuel Cycle and Operating Reactor Licensees All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
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