ML17054A354

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Summary of 831104 Meeting W/Util,S&W & GE in Bethesda,Md Re Power Sys
ML17054A354
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/09/1984
From: Haughey M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8401190293
Download: ML17054A354 (10)


Text

Docket No. 50-410 January 9,

1984 APPLICANT:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)

FACILITY:

Nine Mile Point Unit 2

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION ON POWER SYSTEMS AT NINE MILE POINT 2 On November 4, 1983, the NRC staff met with representatives from Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC), Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC),

and General Electric (GE) in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss power systems at Nine Mile Point Unit 2.

During this meeting, the Request for Additional Information transmitted in a letter to Gerald K. Rhode from A. Schwencer on October 3, 1983 was used as a

basis for the discussion.

Each of the requests for information was discussed and clarification was provided for the request on the Nine Mile Point 2

system as required.

It was noted during the discussion that an omission was made in Item 430.72 of the request.

The last sentence should read "Demonstrate by analysis that the standpipes and expansion tank size are adequate to maintain required pump NPSH and makeup water for. seven days continuous operation of the diesel engine at full rated load without makeup water supply to the diesel generators..."

A list of attendees at this meeting is included as Attachment l.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/attachment:

See next page DL:LB¹2/PM MFHaughey:kw 01/g /84 840i.f90293 840i09 PDR ADOCK 050004i0 A

'DR DL:LB¹2/BC ASchwencer 01/

/84 Original signed by Mary F. Haughey, Project Manager Licensing Branch No.

2 Division of Licensing DISTRIBUTION:

NRC PDR L PDR NSIC PRC LB¹2 Rdg.

EHylton MFHaughey BBordenick, OELD ETomlinson, PSB JLazevnick, PSB

~ I 4 J

~,4 I ~

4

~

~

~ 4

,4 4

I 4

'4 I'

~

h 4

4 4 I'

I Iik 4

4

~ River Bend Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.

Senior Yice President River Bend Nuclear Group Gulf States Utilities Company Post Office Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas 77704 ATTN:

Mr. J.E. Booker CC:

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esquire Conner and Wetterhahn 1747 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.

W.

Washington, D. C.

20006 Mr. William J.

Reed, Jr.

Director - Nuclear Licensing Gulf States Utilities Company

- Post 0ffice Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas 77704 H. Anne Plettinger 712 Carol Marie Drive Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 William J. Guste, Jr., Esquire Louisiana Attorney General 7434 Perkins Road Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 Richard M. Troy, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General in Charge State of Louisiana Department of Justice 234 Loyola Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Doris Falkenheiner, Esq.

Attorney at Law 355 Napoleon Street Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 Ian Douglas Lindsey Staff Attorney Department of Justice 7434 Perkins Road Suite C

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 Mr. Linda B. Watkins Attorney at Law 355 Napoleon Street Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 Dwight D. Chamberlain Resident Inspector Post Office Box 1051 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Gretchen R. Rothschild Louisianians for Safe Energy, Inc.

1659 Glenmore Avenue Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 James W. Pierce, Jr.,

Esq.

P. 0.

Box 23571 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70893

I

KD~MZ.ggh+AIlfMERT CONCERHS o

~ ~

Effects of Local Kncxoachments on Pool Svell Loads 1.2 1.3 N/A for Mark I and Mark II Contafnments 1.4 1.6 1 7

~ 2 Safet Relief Valve Dischat e Line Sleeves 2.1 2.2 N/A for Mark I and Mark II Containments 2 3

E I

P l'.

30 ECCS Relief Valve Discha e,Lines below thc S

ression Pool Levc'.1 3.2 3.3 3,4 The desfgn of the STRIDE plant did not consider vent clearing,'ondensation oscillation and.,Juggin.2.oads vhich might bc pro'ductd by the actuation of these relfdalves.'e The STRIDE design provided only nine inches of submergence above thc.RHR zelfef valve discharge lines at lov suppression pool levels.

Discharge from the RHR relief valves may produce bubble discharge or other submerged structure loads on equipment fn the suppressfon pool.

The RHR heat exchanger relf,ef valve dfschazge lines are provfded vith vacuum breakezs to pzevent negative pressure in the lines vhen discharging steam fs condensed in the pool. If thc valves experience repeated actuation, the vacuum breaker sizing may not be adequate to prevent drawing slugs of vater back through the discharge piping.

These slugs of water may apply impact loads ao.thc relief valve or be discharged back Xnto the pool at the Sext relief valve actuation and apply impact loads to submezged structures.

3.5 The RHR relief valves must be capable of correctly functioning following an upper pool dump vhfch may increase thc suppression pool level as much.

as five feet creating higher back pressures on the relfef valves.

3.6 If the RHR heat exchanger relief valves discharge steam to the upper levels of the suppzession pool following a design basis accident, they villsfgnfffcantly aggravate suppressfon pool'temperature stzatification.

\\

3 7 4 ~

The concerns related to thc RHR heat exchanger relief valve discharge lines should also be addressed for all other relief lines that exhaust into pool.

(p 132 of 5/27/82 transcript)

Su ression Pool Te eraturc Stratffication

~

~

The present containment response analyses foz'zywc11 break accidents assume that. the ECCS systems transfer a sfgnfficant quantity of water from the suppression pool to the lover regions of the dryvell through the break.

This results in a pool in the dryvcll vhich is essentially isolated from thc suppression pool at a temperature of approximately 135'P.

The containment response analysis assumes that the dryvell pool fs thoroughly mixed vith the suppression pool. If thc inventory in thc dryvcll is assumed to be isolated and the remainder of the heat is discharged to the suppression pool, an fncreasc in bulk pool temperature of 10'F may occur.

4.2 The existence of the d~well pool is predicated upon continuous operation of the ECCS.

The current emergency procedure guidelines require thc operators to throttle ECCS operation to maintain vessel level beZbcr level-8.

Consequently, the dzyvcll pool may never be formed.

4' A11 Mark IIIanalyses presently assume a perfectly mixed uniform suppression pool.

These analyses assume that thc temperature of the suction to thc RHR heat exchangcrs is the same as the bulk pool temperature.

In actuality, the temperature in the lover part of the pool

Nine Mile Point 2 Mr. Gerald K. Rhode Senior Yice President Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202 CC:

Mr. Troy B. Conner, Jr.,

Esq.

Conner

& Wetterhahn Suite 1050 1747 Pennsylvania

Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C.

20006 Mr. Richard Goldsmith Syracuse Uni versi ty College of Law E. I. White Hall Campus

Syracuse, New York 13210 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger, Director Technol ogi cal Devel opment Programs New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223 Ezra I. Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Resident Inspector Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station P. 0. Box 99
Lycoming, New York 13093 Mr. John W. Keib, Esq.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coranission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406