ML17053C231
| ML17053C231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point, Grand Gulf, Susquehanna, Columbia, Limerick, LaSalle, Zimmer, Shoreham, Bailly File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1980 |
| From: | Teh-Chiun Su Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kniel K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-39, REF-GTECI-CO, TASK-A-39, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8101140955 | |
| Download: ML17053C231 (82) | |
Text
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/g ai ***4 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 December 30, 1980 Task Action Plan A-39 Docket Nos.:
50-.358, 50-352/353, 50-367, 50-373/374, 50-387/388, 50-410, 50-322, 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Karl Kniel, Chief Generic Issues Branch Division of Safety Technology F ROTI APPLICANT:
SUBJECT:
T. M. Su, A-39 Task Manager Generic Issues
- Branch, DST Members of the Mark II Owners Group MEETING >lITH REPRESENTATIVES OF MARK 'II OWNERS GROUP AND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY TO DISCUSS THE.SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE LIMI'TS
~Back round The BMR containments are equipped with a number of safety/relief valves (SRV) to release mass and energy from the primary system for overpressure protection.
Inadvertant actuation of a SRV will'lso result in primary system blowdown.
Steam released from the primary system is discharged to the suppression pool where it is condensed.
Extended
- blowdown, however, may heat the suppression pool to the point, where the degree of subcooling of suppression pool water is insufficient to condense the steam smoothly.
Severe vibratory loads may result.
The current practice is to limit the maximum suppression pool temperature below this potential threshold temperature.
This limit was established at a local temperature of 200'F.
The applicants, however, believe that tNere is evidence from test data to relax this limit.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss these test data and the justification for the assumptions used to calculate the suppressi'on pool temperature response..
An attendance list and a copy of the meeting handouts are enclosed.
~Summa r 1.
Temperature Limits Mr: J.
Post of General Electric Company presented the data for SRV condensation tests performed at Kraftwerk Union (KllU) facilities in Germany and CNEN Laboratory in Italy.
Although these data had been presented to the NRC staff and their consultants
/
. Karl Kniel December 30, 1980 new approach to analyze the data by using subcooling as the key parameter has been made.
Results of this new analysis show that the quencher device is capable of stable steam condensation up to 212'F.
The degree of subcooling for these tests ranges from 8'F to 20'F with
'ass flux ranging from 2 to 160 Ibm/ft -sec.
The applicants, therefore, concluded that stable condensation can be achieved by maintaining the suppression pool temperature subcooling greater than 8'F at the quencher discharge.
On this basis, the applicants proposed the suppression pool temperature limits as follows:
a.
For mass flux greater than 140 lbm/ft -sec, the local pool 2
temperature should not exceed 200'F; b.
For mass flux below 140 lbm/ft -sec, the local pool temperature 2
limit can be increased to 212'F.
The applicants stated that these limits are justified by the test data and the geometries of Hark EI suppression pools, which provide a minimum of 16'F subcooling.
The staff expressed a concern regarding the applicability of CNEN
- tests, which were performed in'ubscaled facilities.
The adequacy of scaling, instrumentation setup and data interpretation has to be reviewed and evaluated before any conclusion can be made.
The staff also. expressed a concern on the vibra/ory loads exhibited in the KNU tests for mass flux below 140 lbm/ft -sec.
These loads are relatively low in magnitude but exhibit high frequencies in comparison with initial air clearing loads.
GE indicated that they will evaluate the data to determine these loads.
2.
Justification'for Assum tions The key assumptions used in the calculation of suppression pool temperature response include time allowed the operator to scram the reactor, availability of RHR system operating in pool cooling mode, and main condenser as a heat sink for primary system blowdown.
The applicants discussed the basis.for each assumption.
C. Gr'aves of RSB expressed a concern. on the potential of cutting off the RHR pool cooling mode in response to high containment pressure as a
result of suppression pool heat-up.
He also questioned the methodology used to calculate the mass and energy release through the SRY.
0
Karl Kniel Oecember 30, 1980 The applicants also presented the results. of a sensitivity study on each assumption.
A five minute delay in manual scram time could
.increase the peak pool temperature by as much as 12'F.
ttost of the assumptions show insignificant effect on peak pool temperature.
In response to the requirement by R.
Frahm of RSB during the meeting held on April 10, 1980, the applicants have investigated the suppression pool temperature response to FSAR Chapter 15 events.
GE stated that results of this study show that the Chapter 15 events yield lower peak pool temperature than that calculated on the basis of the current design cases.
3.
Conclusion T.
Su of the NRC staff provided the staff's comments on the presentation which are summarized below.
The staff and its consultants believe that it is appropriate to evaluate the quencher performance of steam condensation on the basis of degree of subcooling.
Since the CNEN data are based on subscaled
- tests, the applicability of this data base has to be determined..
In order. to expedite the review of pool temperature limit, we believe that the cut-off point of mass flux should be based on the KklU data, which have 'been reviewed extensively in the past.
t<e require that the applicants provide Justification to demonstrate that the containment structure, piping and equipment can accommodate the oscillatory'loads resulting from steam condensation for the mass flux below the cut-off point.
Hith respect to the calculation of pool temperature
- response, we will require the applicants to provide a detailed description of the assumptions and methods used'to calculate the mass" and energy released to the suppression pool.
This includes an identification of-all computer programs and a description 'of the data transferred to initiate any succeeding-calculations.
The description should also include the availability of each system related to the events of SRV actuations such as RHR in pool cooling mode (e.g., automatic cut-off with high containment pl.essure) and transient feedwater flow following feedwater pump trip.
The applicants were informed that they should contact C. Graves (942-9404) of RSB to obtain the detailed requirements for the resolution of, this issue.
0
.0
Karl Kniel December 30, 1980 The applicants indicated that the additional information required to resolve the issues stated above will be made available for the staff's review by the end of March, 1981.
The staff indicated, however, that an early submittal date of this information is needed to meet the current schedule of completion date, i.e. February, 1981.
The completion schedule for this task has been slipped for several months as a result of requests made by the Hark II owners group to relax the temperature limit.
Further slippage of the schedule may jeopardize the availability of staff resources to review this task.
T. H. Su, A-39 Task Manager Generic Issues Branch Division of Safety Technology
LIST OF ATTENDEES T. M. Su, NRC/DST/GIB
T. Lee,
((RC/RSR J.
E. Metcalf, S&W D. Desmarais, S&W H. R. Johnson, EBASCO W. M. Davis, (lE L. Schell, Penn.
Power
& Light Co.
- 0. A. Nossardi, Bechtel (S.F.)
L. Steinert, GE R.
W. Riley, Cin.
Gas
& Elec.
Co.
P. T. Mairose, WPPSS G.
E. Gottfried, S&L R. Ralph, Commonwealth Edison J. Post, GE C. Graves, NRC/DSI, RSB C. Lin, BNL/NRC R. F. McClelland, GE H. C. Urang, GE P. Norian, NRC/DST/GIB
DECEHBER 1980 APRIL 1980 IIEETING CONCERNS:
1)
SENSITIYITY OF THE ANALYSIS TO
~
YARIATIONS IN THE PARANETER (ASSUhPTION)
YALUES 2)
1S TO LTPT TRAi>SIENTS
.'"-'-')
NON-fkECHANISTIC ASSUi1PTIONS
DECESER 1980 APPENDICIES TO "WHITE PAPER" 1)
SENSITIVITY OF THE ANALYSIS TO VARIATIONS IN THE PARAf"lETER VALUES 2)
COl'1PARISON OF FSAR CH. 15 TO LTPT TRANSIENTS..
5)
ASSUNPTION BASIS "WHITE PAPER" REVISION 1)
NON-NECHANISTIC ASSUNPTI ONS
0
DECEf"IBER 1980 CHANGES TO THE "WHITE PAPER" ASSUf'IPTIONS OLD 1)
NON-flECHAHISTIC TREATHENT OF I'lAKEUP VIA FEEDWATER SYSTEN 2)
OFFSITE POWER UNAVAILABLEEXCEPT CASE lA 5)
NO IICITIATIOfNOF HPCS/HPCI OR RCIC 1)
. HECHANISTIC TREATNENT OF FEEONATER ADDITION=
4)
TURBINE-DRIVE FEEDPUNPS B).
NOTOR-DRIVEN FEEDPUf'lPS
. 2)'FFSITE POWER AVAILABLEALL CASES
.5)
HPCS/HPCI INITIATED, HO RCIC,
DECEf'IBER 1980 NEW ASSUi'1PTIONS TO THE "WHITE PAPER" FEEDWATER ADDITION TO THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV),
A, PLANTS UTILIZIffGTURB INE-DRIVEN FEEDPUNPS, r)
UPOi'4 f'1AIN STEAf'1 ISOLATION VALVE (NSIV)
- CLOSURE, THE TURBINE-DRIVEf< FEEDPUl"1PS SUPPLY FEEDWATER UNTIL THE DISCHARGE HEAD FALLS BELOW THE REACTOR PRESSURE, r i)
FOR CASES WHERE I'1AI.N STEAN ISOLATION HAS OCCURRED, THE CONDENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUi'IP(S)
SUPPLIES FEEDWATER TO THE RPV WHEN THE REACTOR PRESSURE FALLS BELOW THE CONDENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUNP DISCHARGE HEAD.
DECEl"lBER 1980 NEM ASSUf'OPTIONS TO THE "WHITE PAPER" 1,
FEEDMATER ADDITION TO THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV).
B PLANTS UTILIZING NOTOR-DRIVEN FEEDPUNPS i)
FEEDPUflPS SUPPLY FEEDMATER TO THE RPV UNTIL THE FEEDPUNPS TRIP ON AN AUTOflA-TIC SIGNAL (E,G-VESSEL HIGH MATER LEVEL TRIP).
rr)
AFTER THE FEEDPUNPS HAVE TRIPPED, THE CONDEf ENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUNP(S)
SUPPLIES FEEDWATER TO THE RPV WHEN THE REACTOR PRESSURE FALLS BELOW THE CONDENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUNP DISCHARGE HEAD.
pl
PECEI'mER 1980 "t'fHITE PAPER" II
/
/
..1.
FEEDHATER ADDITION TO THE REACTOR PRESSURE YESSEL (RPY).
I
~
c.
FEEDhATER LfILLBE SUPPLIED TO THE RPY, AS DESCRIBED ABOYE, UNTIL THE EffTHAlPY OF THE
.FEEDHATER IS LESS THAi4 OR EQUAL TO THE ENTHALPY'OF THE SUPPRESSION POOL HATER,
DECENBER 1980 NEW ASSUfOPTIONS TO THE "WHITE PAPER" 1,
HPCI/HPCS INJECTION OF SUPPRESSION POOL L'NTER INTO THE RPV IS DETERMINED BY THE AUTOS'1ATIC START AND STOP SIGf<ALS GENERATED (E.G.,
LOW-LOW RPV LEVEL STARTS THE HPCI/HPCS INJECTION, HIGH RPV LEVEL STOPS HPCI/HPCS INJECTION).
WHITE PAPER'UPPL'9";ENTAL INFORt'lATION ASSUNPTION BASIS SENSITIVITY STUDIES FSAR CHAPTER 15 CONPARISON JS POST/12/BQ 1
SSUN T ON AS S
KEY ASSUNPTIONS INCLUDED EQU I PNENT AVAILIB I LITY OPERATOR ACTIONS ASSUNPTION AND BASIS 1)
NSIY CLOSURE 2)
RHR POOL COOLING 3)
NANUAL DEPRESSURIZATION 0)
SUPPRESSION POOL HATER 5)
FEEDHATER 6)
OFFS ITE PONER 7)
NANUAL SCRAN 8)
SCRAN ON HIGH DRYL'JELL PRESSURE 9)
HAIN CONDENSER JS POST/12/80 2.
'1.
NS IV C
OSU ASSUNPTIOK:
3,5 SECONDS AFTER ISOLATION SIGNAL IF ISOLATION EXPECTED, ASSUNE SIGNAL AT TINE = 0.
BASIS'.
MININIZE STEAPI OUT REACTOR IS, CONSERVATIVE..i 0,5 SEC TYPICAL INSTRUMENT DELAY TESTED CLOSURE IS 5 TO 10 SECONDS 3
SECOND LINEAR CLOSURE IS CONSERVATIVE SIGNAL AT TIf'lE = 0 IS CONSERVATIVE JS POSTI12/80 3.
2; ""RHR"POOL"'COOLING ASSUi'IPTION:
POOL COOt I"'.G ON 1O XIVUTES AFTER TS1 BASIS".
POSITIVE ALARN AT TS1 STAnDARO OPERATOR
RESPONSE
IN NORMAL-AND ENERGENCY PROCEDURES JS POST/12/80
SUMP ON:
MANUAL DEPRESSURIZATION OF REACTOR BEGUN AT TSQ
~120oF)
EXCEPTION IF EVENT IS ALREADY DEPRESSURIZATING REACTOR AT A SUFFICIENT RATE TERMINATED WHEN INITIATE SHUTDOWN COOLING 53ASQ:
OPERATOR TRAINED TO RESPOND BY DEPRESSURIZING TO UTILIZE HEAT SINKS NORMAL AND 8'lERGENCY PROCEDURES CALL FOR DEPRESSURIZATION AT TSL4 SIGNIFICANT TIME LAPSE SINCE PREVIOUS ALARMS R"ACTOR SYSTEM UNDER CONTROL FOLLOWING TRANSIENT EVENT RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING IS SUFFICIENT TO REMOVE LONG TERM DECAY HEAT JS POST/12/80 5.
SUPPRESSION POOL MATER ASSUNPTION:
MATER rlASS IN PEDESTAL NOT INCLUDED AS HEAT SINK BASIS:
NIXING BETWEEN PEDESTAL MATER AND HAIN POOL IS NEGLECTED NININIZING POOL YOLUNE IS CONSERVATIVE JS PQST(12(80
SSUMPT ON:
o TURBINE DRIVEN PUNPS CONTII'4UE TO INJECT DURING COASTDOHN e
NOTOR DRIVEN PUNPS CONTINUE TO INJECT 8
AT LOW REACTOR PRESSURE CONDENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUNPS INJECT o
CONTINUED AS LONG AS FEEDHATER ENTHALPY GREATER THAN POOL ENTHALPY CONSERVATIVE TO INCLUDE FEEDNATER ADDITION FOR CONTAINNENT
RESPONSE
NECHAN ISTIC TREATHENT FOLLOWING ISOLATION RECOGNIZE OPERATOR CONFIDENCE IN FEEDHATER SYSTEN CONSERVATIVE AS LONG AS FEEDMATER TBlPERATURE IS GREATER THAN POOL TPlPERATURE JS POST/12/80 7,
0
6 OFFS T
SSU P
OFFSITE POWER AVIALABLEALL CASES B~SS:
CONSISTENT WITH CONTINUED FEEDNATER FLOLI ASSUMPTION REQU I RED TO DRIVE CONDENSATE (BOOSTER)
PUMPS AND MOTOR DR IVFN'FEDNATER PUMPS SINCE CONTINUED Fl'( IS CONSERVATIYF, OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE IS CONSERVATIVE JS POST/12/80 8.
MANUA C
SSU P
FOR INADVERTEI'IT SORY CASES MANUAL SCRAM AT TS3 (110 F)
OPERATOR TRANSFERS REACTOR MODE SNITCH FROM "RUN" TO "SHUTDOWN,"
BUS.:
SORY IS TRANSIENT REACTOR INTEGRITY NOT THREATENED NO AUTOMATIC SCRAM SIGNAL POSITIVE INDICATION OF SORY ALARM AT TS1 AND AT TS3
'PERATOR TRAINFD TO RESPOND TO SORY EVENT SCRAM REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND IN NORMAL AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES OPERATING EXPERIENCE SHOWS SCRAM OCCURS NELL BEFORE TS3 ASSUMING REACTOR AT FULL POWER UNTIL POOL REACHES TS3 IS CONSERVATIVE JS POST/12/80 9.
8.
SCRAM ON HIGH DRYNE L PRESSU M
0:
FOR SBA EVENT SCRAM AND ISOLATION AT TIME = 0 HIGH DRYHELL PRESSURE SIGNAL GENERATED BEFORE VENTS ARE CLEARED AND POOL HEATUP BEGINS SCRAM IS AUTOMATIC ON HIGH DRYHELL PRESSURE SPURIOUS ISOLATION AT TIME = 0 MAXIMIZES ENERGY ADDITION TO THE POOL SBA ANALYSIS'DOES NOT TAKE CREDIT FOR ENERGY HELD UP
,AND HEAT SINKS IN DRYHELL.
ALL BREAK FLOW/ENERGY HEATS UP POOL DIRECTLY JS POST/12/80 10,
9.:--r<AIN-CONDENSER ASSUNPT ION:
FOR SORY NITH SINGLE FAILURE OF LOSS OF ONE RHR NAIV, CONDE,"USER RPlAINS AVAILABLEAS HEAT SINK BASIS'.
SORY IS A TRANSIENT NORNAL PLANT EQUIPNENT HILL'ENAINAVAILABLE HAIN CONDENSER-IS KNOHN PREFERENTIAL HEAT SINK EVENT SEQUENCE HILL NOT GENERATE SIGNAL THAT HOULD f'lAKE NAIN CONDENSER Ul'3AVAILABLE JS POST/12/80 5j
N U
V T
C PT N
REACTOR AT,FULL POWER, POOL JUST BELOH TSl SRV SPURIOUSLY OPENS AND STICKS OPEN PLANT AUTONATIC CONTROLS RESPOND TO STABILIZE REACTOR SYSTEN OPERATOR ATTENPTS TO CLOSE SORY, THEN SCRANS AND PLACES RHR IN POOL COOLING DECAY IN REACTOR STEAN GENERATION FOLLOHING SCRAN TCV CLOSE TURBINE BYPASS DOES NOT OPEN AUTONATICALLY REACTOR HATER LEVEL NAINTAINED BY FEEDHATER OPERATOR OPENS TURBIf'lE BYPASS VALVES TO USE NAII'3 CONDENSER JS POST/12/80 12 '
po SCHEHATIC
SELLS IT'IVITY 'STUD IES KEY'ARANETERS AND ASSUNPTIONS FOR ZINNER PLAHT SPECIFIC CASES BASE CASE If'1 REV 0 i'fHITE PAPER.
APPLICABILITY TYPICAL OF ALL NARK II PLANTS
'EV 1 WHITE PAPER ASSUNPTIONS HAVE NIttOR INPACT S I!<G LE PARANETERS VARIED QT FRON BASE CASE GIVEN NEGATIVEAT IS LOHER POOL TENP POSITIVEET rs HIGHER POOL TENP nnr w.nn inn 1 te
TABLE D-l
SUMMARY
OF THE PEAK POOL TEMPERATURE SENSITIVITY STUDIES EVENT 1A 3A 3B 3B 3A PLANT PARAMETER Service Water Temperature Manual Scram Time Time at which Hain Condenser is available Time for Initiation of RHR Pool Cooling Time for Initiation of Manual Depressuri zati on Hanual Depressurization Rate Initial Pool Water Hass VARIATIONS 95 F
85 F
-75 F
65'F
-5 minutes (when
. -Tpool = 110'F) 3 minutes 0
minutes 20 minutes 10 minutes 30 minutes 10 minutes 20 minutes 30 minutes 20 minutes (when Tpool = 120'F) 15 minutes 30 minutes 100 F/hr 200'F/hr 125'F/hr 75 F/hr 5.83 x 10o ibm/(LWL) 5.97 x 10" ibm/ flWL)
POOL PEAK'TEHPERATURE (oF BASE
-l. 3
-2 6
-3. 8 BASE
-5.4
+
7 BASE
-13. 9
+5. 0 BASE
+0. 2
+0. 6 BASE 0.0
+0. 1 BASE
-2. 4
-0. 7
+0.1 BASE
-1,l
S R
C APTER COMPAR SO e
CONPARISON OF LONG TERN POOL TENPERATURE EVENTS AND
';,FSAR:CHAPTER 15 EVENTS o 'XAMINE FRON n>0 PERSPECTIVES MOUL'D FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENT GIVE GREATER POOL HEATUP THAN LONG TERN POOL TEf'1PERATURE'VENT?
DOES LONG TERN POOL TENPERATURE EVENT NAKE ANY ASSUNPTIONS THAT CONPROMISE OR DEGRADE FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVE",ITS?
KFY RESULT LONG TERN POOL TENPERATURE EVENTS HAVE HIGHER PEAK POOL TENPERATURF THAN FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENTS THAT HAVE STEAN DISCHARGE THROUGH SRVS JS POST/12/80 16.
0
PERFORMANCE"OF"COMPARISON:
Etr ENTS CLASSIFIED SIMILAR TO SORY SIMILAR TO ISOLATION/SCRAMi SIMILAR TO SBA NO POOL HEATUP N/A FOR PHR'S ONLY EXAMINED CASE BY CASE ASSUMPTIONS RESULTS lC OACT/'t') /QA 17 p7
FSAR"CHAPT'ER '15"CONPARI'SON CHAPTER '15 EVENTS FSAR EVENTS PREDOi'lINENTLY ISOLATION/SCRAN EVENTS CALCULATE SHORT TERrl REACTOR RESPONSE UNTIL RPV STABILIZED PLECHANISTIC REACTOR SYSTPl TREATNENT DETAILED REACTOR MODEL NO CONTAINPlENT NODEL ANY SINGLE FAILURE CONSIDERED LEAVES T't0 RHR FOR POOL COOLING.
TABLE E-1 FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENTS VERSUS LONG TERM POOL TEMPERATURE EVENTS SIMILAR LONG TERM POOL TEMPERATURE EVENTS FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENTS=
SORY AT POWER ISOLATION/
SCRAM SMALL BREAK'CCIDENT NO POOL TEMPERATURE INCREASE 15.l. 1 2
3 5
6 Loss of Feedwater Heating Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand Pressure Regulator Failure - Open Inadvertent Safety Relief Valve Opening PWR Steam Piping Break Inadvertent RHR Shutdown Cooling Operation N/A X
- 15. 2. 1 2
3 5
6 7
8 9
Pressure Regulator Failure - Closed Generator Load Reject Turbine Trip MSIV Closures Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of AC Power Loss of Feedwater Flow Feedwater Line Break Failure of RHR Shutdown Cooling 15.3. 1 2
Recirculation Pump Trip Recirculation Flow Control Failure-Decreasing Flow Recirculation Pump Seizure Recirculation Pump Shaft Break
TABLE E-1 CONTINUED FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENTS VERSUS LONG TERM POOL TEMPERATURE EVENTS SIMILAR LONG TERM POOL TEMPERATURE EVENTS FSAR CHAPTER 15 EVENTS SORY AT POWER ISOLATION/
SCRAM SMALL BREAK ACCIDENT HO POOL
'EMPERATURE INCREASE 15.4. 1 2
3 5
Rod Withdrawal Error - Low Power Rod Withdrawal Error - At Power Control Rod Haloperation Abnormal Startup of Idle Recirculation Pump Recirculation Flow Control Failure with Increasing Flow Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunctions Misplaced Bundle Accident Spectrum of Rod Ejection Assemblies Control Rod Drop Accident N/A X
H/A X
15.5. 1 2
Inadvertent HPCI/HPCS Startup Chemical Volume Control System Malfunction X
H/A 15.6. 1 2
3 4
5 6
Inadvertent Safety Relief Valve Opening Instrument Line Break Steam Generator Tube Failure Steam System Piping Break Outside Containment Loss-of-Coolant Accidents Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment X
N/A
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORNANCE o
OBJECTIVE o
TEST DATA RANGE e
PLANT APPLICATION o
CONCLUSION JSP/1 12/80
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE SHOW BY TEST DATA THAT THE LOCAL TEMPERATURE LIMIT CAN BE RAISED AT LOW MASS FLUX DUE TO THE SUBCCOLING AVAILABLETO THE QUENCHER DEVICE JSP/2 12/80
7
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE PROPOSED RANGE FOR STABLE CONDENSATION Tl OCAL 200 F, G >100 LBM/FT2-SEC TLOCAL 212 F, G+100 LBM/FT2 SEC 200 Tl OCAL
'F
, 140 QUENCHER MASS FLUX LBM/FT2-SEC JSP/5 12/80
~1
C,
~ ~
I QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORNANCE TEST DATA JSP/4 12/80
auENCHER CONDENSATION l ERFORr@NCE TEST DATA RANGE SUBCOOLING COPIPARISONS YHU CONDENSATION TESTS
- 13. TFSTS BELOl,l+T qUq = 20 F
1 TEST DOWN TOIT suB G
UP TO 89 LBN/FT2-SEC
'I CNEN CONDENSATION TESTS TEST TOAT
= 8 F SUB G
UP TO 150 LBN/FT2 SEC JSP/13 12/8P
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE CONCLUSION FROM DATA STABLE CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE WAS OBSERYED AT 5T = 8 F AND G=156 LBM/FT -SEC 5 T ~U~ = 10 F
G=160 LBM/FT -SEC QT qo~ =
7 ro 20 F)G=2 vo 89 LBN/FT -SEC
.THEREFORE FOR G ~ 140 LBN/FT -SEC ANDQT~o~ ~ 8 F
STABLE CONDENSATION PERFORMANC IS EXHIBITED JSP/lQA 12/8a
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE PLANT APPLICATION MARK II QUENCHER SUBMERGENCE IS 13 To 23 FEET CURRENT LIMIT (200 F)
QTBUBW 28 F
-'UBMERGENCE = 13 FT MEAJELL AT 0 PSIG PROPOSED LIMIT (212 F, G+100)
SUB'216 F
JSP/15 12/80
L, Ql!Ch3
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gt COKi; AEVI>Icl47 pf7FSD4kC, - Q lMZCj
'Llg
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@ t8 ria~~
ZE KB."'65
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- ZCQ is'H 1LMiL
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l~'~N SuR~ca4
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Z'f SV ~(~~0~ i~g po Z(Q 2'ep<
r-rzi>rulc ('F'3 36'P/%
P/Ba
4
QUENCHER CONDENSATION PERFORMANCE CONCLUSION AT OR BELOW 140 LBM/FT2 SEC ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING IS ASSURED. AT Tt ocAL F MINIMUMDTsus = 16 F
JSP/17 12/80
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