ML16342D689

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Insp Repts 50-275/97-08 & 50-323/97-08 on 970512-16. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Unit 1 RP Outage Activities
ML16342D689
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 06/02/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML16342D687 List:
References
50-275-97-08, 50-275-97-8, 50-323-97-08, 50-323-97-8, NUDOCS 9706040164
Download: ML16342D689 (32)


See also: IR 05000275/1997008

Text

ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.:

License Nos.:

Report No.:

Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved By:

50-275

50-323

DPR-80

DPR-82

50-275/97-08

50-323/97-08

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units

1 and 2

7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach

Avila Beach, California

May 12-16, 1997

Michael P. Shannon,

Radiation Specialist, Plant Support Branch

Gilbert L. Guerre, Radiation Specialist, Plant Support Branch

Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

ATTACHMENT:

Supplemental

Information

9706040lh4

970602

PDR

ADOCK 05000275

8

PDR

-2-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units

1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-275/97-08; 50-323/97-08

Plant Su

ort

The external exposure control program was effectively maintained.

High radiation

areas were properly controlled and posted.

Radiation work permits were clearly

written. Workers knew the proper response

to electronic dosimeter alarms

(Section R1.1).

Housekeeping

was very good (Section R1.1).

In general,

a good internal exposure control program was in place.

The use of

continuous

air monitors and high efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units

were utilized appropriately to monitor and limit airborne exposures.

The respiratory

protection program was effectively implemented

(Section R1.2).

A violation was identified regarding the failure to perform air sample surveys as

required by the radiation work permit (Section R1.2).

An inspection followup item was opened regarding an air sample hose factor

evaluation (Section R1.2).

Radiological outage work planning was good.

Management

provided good support

for the radiation protection program.

ALARApersonnel were appropriately involved

in outage planning activities.

Lessons

learned from past work were captured

and

incorporated into radiological work packages

(Section R1.3).

Effective controls were implemented to prevent the spread of radioactive

contamination.

Station workers used the personnel contamination monitors

properly.

Radiation protection personnel

provided timely response

and appropriate

direction to station workers who alarmed the personnel contamination monitors.

Radioactive material was properly labeled and posted (Section R1.4).

A good ALARAprogram was maintained.

The ALARAreview committee was

appropriately involved in station goal setting and monitoring.

The ALARAhit team

was a program str'ength.

Challenging exposure

goals were set based

on past

performance.

A good temporary shielding program was effectively maintained.

The

ALARAsuggestion

program and hot spot reduction program were properly

implemented

(Section R1.5).

-3-

A good temporary additional radiation protection technician training program was in

place.

Radiation protection management

was appropriately involved in the

development

of the temporary additional radiation protection technician training

program.

The on-the-job training and evaluation programs did not ensure that an

individual being evaluated

had first completed the formal classroom

required training

(Section R5.1).

Overall, an effective nuclear quality services program was maintained.

The nuclear

quality services auditors were well qualified to perform radiation protection

audits/assessments.

The nuclear quality services assessments

and field

observations

were good; however, improvement could be made to the timely

response

of nonquality radiological action requests.

The radiation protection section

self-assessment

program was in the developmental

stage and not yet effectively

implemented

(Section R7.1).

REPORT DETAILS

Summar

of Plant Status

Unit

1 was in a refueling outage.

Unit 2 operated

at full power.

No events occurred that

affected the inspection activities.

Plant Su

ort

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1

External Ex osure Controls

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Selected radiation workers and radiation protection personnel

involved in the

-.

external exposure control program were interviewed.

A number of tours of the

radiological controlled area, including the Unit 1 containment building, were

performed.

The following items were reviewed:

Radiological. controlled area access controls

Control of high radiation areas

Radiation work permits

Job coverage by radiation protection personnel

Dosimetry use

Housekeeping

within the radiological controlled area

Observations

and Findin s

Field radiological work briefings performed by radiation protection technicians

provided workers with current radiological conditions and stressed

ALARAcold

waiting areas.

ALARAcold waiting areas were areas of significantly less dose rates

than the work area.

High radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in the radiological

controlled area and containment building.

All Technical Specification required doors

were locked.

Flashing lights were used where appropriate

and were operational.

Radiation work permits were written in a clear consistent manner and contained

appropriate radiological control information.

The radiation work permit numbering

system, which used the same number for similar work with the exception of the

year designator,

made it easy to review job history information.

1

~ ~

~

-5-

Field interviews with outage workers revealed that the workers were knowledgeable

of the general radiological conditions in their work area.

These workers were

questioned

on general dose rates, general contamination levels, and airborne

information.

All radiation workers observed wore their dosimetry properly.

When questioned,

workers knew to leave their work area and contact radiation protection personnel if

their electronic dosimeter alarmed.

Housekeeping

throughout the radiological controlled area was very good.

c.

Conclusions

The external exposure control program was effectively maintained.

High radiation,

areas were properly controlled and posted.

Radiation work permits were clearly

written. Workers knew their work area radiological conditions and proper response

to electronic dosimeter alarms.

Housekeeping

was very good.

R1.2

Internal Ex osure Controls

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Selected radiation protection personnel

involved with the internal exposure control

program were interviewed.

The following items were reviewed:

Air sampling program, including the use of continuous

air monitors and

filtration units

b.

Respiratory protection program

Whole body counting program

The internal dose assessment

program

Observations

and Findin s

Continuous

air monitors were properly used throughout the radiological controlled

area.

High efficiency particulate air filter ventilation units were appropriately used

to limit airborne exposures

to workers.

Five tasks required respiratory protection equipment for radiological work during the

outage.

Total effective dose

quivalent/as low as is reasonably

achievable

(TEDE/ALARA) evaluations for these tasks determined that respiratory protection

was appropriate.

As of May 13, 1997, no positive whole body counts exceeded

the licensee's

action level for recording internal dose.

'l ~

-6-

In general, job coverage

air sampling was appropriate.

However, on May 13, 1997,

during a tour of the Unit

1 containment building, the inspectors noted that air

sampling was not performed in accordance

with the instructions in Radiation Work

Permit 97-01067 for work in the Unit

1 residual heat;

moval recirculation sump.

Radiation Work Permit 97-01067 required a particulate airborne survey when

grinding [needle gun work], welding, cutting, or wire brushing on contaminated

material.

The radiological survey, which was performed on April 20, 1997, for tQe

residual heat removal recirculation sump, showea the area general contamination

levels to be 1,000 - 3,000 dpm, and one smear was as high as 60,000 dpm (inside,

a pipe)

~ After a review of the radiation work permit job history section, the

inspectors determined that the needle gun work began on the evening of May 11,

1997.

The inspectors determined from interviews with radiation protection foremen

that approximately six radiation protection technicians were involved in providing

job coverage for needle gun work in the residual heat removal recirculation sump

during this period.

Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. states,

in part, that written procedures

shall be

established,

implemented,

and maintained, covering the applicable procedures

recommended

in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision, 2, February 1978, Appendix A.

Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Appendix A, Section 7.e.1, requires procedures

for the

radiation work permit program.

Section 4.2.5 of Procedure

RPI.ID9, "Radiation

Work Permit," Revision 1, requires radiation protection personnel to perform

radiological surveys and sampling as required by the radiation work permit.

After the inspectors discussed

the fact that air sampling was not performed in

accordance

with the requirements

listed on the radiation work permit on May 13,

1997, the licensee performed

a contamination

and airborne concentration

survey of

the residual heat removal recirculation sump which showed the area was not an

airborne area and no longer a contaminated

area.

Additionally, the licensee

performed whole body counts of workers who were working in the residual heat

removal recirculation sump.

The results of the whole body counts were negative.

Although the safety consequences

of this incident were minimal, due to the low

levels of contamination, the major concern was that approximately six radiation

protection technicians were involved in providing job coverage,

and none recognized

that air sampling was required by the radiation work permit.

The failure to perform an airborne survey as required by the radiation work permit is

identified as a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 (50-275;-323/9708-01).

During the review of the primary side steam generator work, the inspectors noted

that air sample holders were located near the sample pump and not attached to the

job location side of the sample hose.

The inspectors determined that hose lengths

varied from approximately 15 to 30 feet.

The inspectors noted that this sampling

method is atypical.

From interviews with radiation protection technicians, the

inspectors concluded that no hose factor was applied to the air sample results.

The

inspectors reviewed

a technical evaluation performed by the licensee dated 1993.

0

-7-

The inspectors determined that the technical evaluation for the use of the air sample

holder location appeared

to be inadequate,

in that, there,was only one set of

samples which was performed in a noncontaminated

area and not in similar

radiological conditions to which this sample method was implemented.

After this

issue was discussed

with radiation protection management,

the inspectors were

informed that additional evaluations would be performed in similar radiological areas

in which the sampling setup was implemented.

This item will be subject to further

NRC review and is identified as an inspection followup item (50-275;-323/9708-

02).

c.

Conclusions

The use of continuous

air monitors and high efficiency particulate air filter

ventilation units were appropriate to monitor and limit airborne exposures.

The

respiratoryprotection program was effectively implemented.

A violation was

identified regarding the failure to perform air sample surveys

as required by a

radiation work permit. An inspection followup item was opened

regarding air

sample hose factor evaluation.

,R1.3

Outa

e Plannin

and Pre aration

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Radiation protection section personnel

involved in outage radiation protection

planning and preparation were interviewed.

The following items were reviewed:

ALARAjob planning

Job scheduling

and sequencing

ALARApackages

Incorporation of lessons-learned

from similar work

Supplies of radiation protection instrumentation,

protective clothing, and

consumable

items

b.

Observations

and Findin

s

Radiological work package tasks were well planned, and.ALARA personnel were

appropriately involved during the outage planning stage.

Lessons-learned

from past

similar work were incorporated

into the radiological work packages.

Post job

briefings captured lessons-learned

from craft level personnel,

engineers,

and ALARA

planners.

However, the inspectors noted that radiation protection foremen and/or

J

-8-

technicians did not normally attend the post job briefings.

The inspectors were

informed by the licensee, that job history comments were written in the radiation

work permit packages

by the radiation protection technicians during the

performance of work. At the completion of the task,,'ob history comments were

provided to the ALARAjob planners for evaluation and incorporation into future

similar radiological work packages.

The inspectors attended radiation protection foreman shift turnover meetings.

Good

communication between shifts was noted, and turnovers were performed in a

professional

manner.

Discussions

on work status and problems encountered

during

the shift were communicated.

Appropriate inventories of clothing, monitoring instrumentation,

protective clothing,

and consumable

items were provided.

c.

Conclusions

Management

provided good support for the radiation protection program.

ALARA

personnel were appropriately involved in outage planning activities.

Lessons-learned

from past work were captured

and incorporated

into radiological work packages.

R1.4

Control of Radioactive Materials and Contamination

Surve

in

and Monitorin

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Areas reviewed included:

Contamination monitor use and response

to alarms

Control of radioactive material

Portable instrumentation calibration and performance checking programs

Adequacy of the surveys necessary

to assess

personnel

exposure

Observations

and Findin s

Observations

at the containment access

revealed that all personnel

exiting the

radiological controlled area used the personnel contamination monitors properly.

Radiation protection personnel

assigned to monitor the control point responded

properly to personnel contamination alarms and provided proper guidance to station

workers who alarmed the monitors.

'I

-9-

The review of personnel contamination logs revealed that all information was

recorded

in accordance

with station procedures.

The inspectors noted that the

amount of personnel contaminations

was greatly reduced when compared to the

previous refueling outage

(61 verses 227).

The inspectors reviewed selected

personnel

contamination investigation reduction action plans developed

from an

evaluation of the previous refueling outage

and determined that a number of ideas

were developed

and implemented,

ranging from modified face shields to improved

decontamination

of an area.

The licensee provided good controls to prevent the spread of radioactive

contamination.

Contaminated

areas were properly posted and marked with tape

and rope.

Trash and laundry barrels were properly maintained.

Step-off pads were

placed at the entrances

and exits to contaminated

areas.

The inspectors observed

radiation worker activities, while exiting contaminated

areas,

and noted use of good

health physics practices.

All containers of radioactive material observed

were properly labeled.

Radioactive

material areas and high efficiency particulate air vacuums were properly posted and

controlled.

The inspectors performed independent

radiological survey measurements

during

tours of the radiological controlled area and containment building.

The inspectors

confirmed that radiological postings were in compliance with regulatory

requirements.

All portable radiation protection survey instrumentation was

calibrated and source response

checked

in accordance

with radiation protection

procedures.

In general, surveys were documented

in a clear and consistent manner and were

easy to read and understand.

c.

Conclusions

Station personnel

used the personnel contamination monitors properly.

Radiation

protection personnel

provided timely response

and appropriate direction to station

workers who alarmed the personnel contamination monitors.

Good controls to

prevent the spread of radioactive contamination were maintained.

Radioactive

material was properly labeled and posted.

Radiological surveys were documented

in

a clear manner.

R1.5

Maintainin

Occu ational Ex osure As Low As is Reasonabl

Achievable

ALARA

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Radiation protection personnel

involved with the ALARAprogram were interviewed.

The following areas were reviewed:

-10-

ALARAcommittee support

Exposure goal establishment

and status

Temporary shielding program

ALARAsuggestion

program

b.

Observations

and Findin

s

The ALARAreview committee was appropriately involved in station goal setting and

monitoring.

Senior management

and all major work groups provided good station

support.

The inspectors noted that in addition to the ALARAreview committee,.

the station had developed

an ALARAhit team program.

This team was made up of

first-line supervision arid craft level personnel representatives

from all major

station work groups.

The member's duties, among other things, were to gather

ALARAmethods of performing work from their peers and aid in incorporating these

methods

in work packages.

The inspectors noted that the ALARAhit teams were

headed

up by the outage control center.

The inspectors concluded that this

program provided proper station ownership of the ALARAprogram and determined

this a program strength.

Station, department,

and individual radiation work permit exposures

were

appropriately tracked and trended by the ALARAgroup.

Station exposure goals

were challenging and set based on past best performance

and industry experience.

The 1996 exposure

goal, which included Unit 2 refueling outage activities, was

175 person-rem.

The licensee's

actual exposure for 1996 was 178 person-rem.

The goal was exceeded

by 3 person-rem

due to unplanned radwaste activities.

The 1997 goal was set at 185 person-rem.

The higher goal for 1997 was due to

the Unit 1 outage activities where the source term is approximately 25 percent

higher than Unit 2's source term.

The inspeqtors noted that site exposures

have

been trending down and were in line with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators

3-year averages.

The inspectors noted that a very good temporary shielding program was in place.

Sixty-one temporary shielding packages

were installed during this outage.

The

licensee projected

a dose savings of approximately 40 person-rem.

Randomly

selected temporary shielding packages

contained engineering

evaluations

and

appropriate

radiological survey information, and they were maintained in a neat

orderly manner.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's ALARAsuggestion

program which was part

of the station's "Campaign for Ideas" program.

Ninety ALARAsuggestion

were

received and evaluated during 1996.

Approximately 20 ALARAsuggestions

had

been received year to date for 1997.

No concerns were identified by the inspectors

during this review.

1

~

~

~

The hot spot reduction program was effectively implemented,

and the operations

section was appropriately involved.

c.

Conclusions

Overall, a good ALARAprogram was in place.

The ALARAreview committee was

appropriately involved in station goal setting and monitoring.

The ALARAhit team

was a program strength.

Challenging exposure

goals were set, based

on past

performance.

A good temporary shielding program was effectively maintained.

The

ALARAsuggestion

program and hot spot reduction program were properly

implemented.

R5

Staff Training and Qualification in Radiological Protection and Chemistry

R5.1

Radiation Protection Staff Trainin

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Personnel

involved with temporary additional radiation protection technician training

and resume evaluation were interviewed.

The following items were reviewed:

Radiation protection instructor qualifications

Radiation protection technician training lesson plans

On-the-job training/evaluation

program

Radiation protection management

involvement

Resumes

of temporary additional radiation protection technicians

b.

Observations

and Findin

s

All training instructors had a strong operational radiation protection background.

Appropriate topics were covered for assigned

outage tasks in the training schedule.

Lesson plans were well developed

and radiation protection management

was

appropriately involved in developing the training topics.

Site and industry lessons

learned were included in the training program.

The licensee did not utilize a contractor organization for temporary radiation

protection help.

The licensee maintained

a pool of temporary additional workers

which were Pacific Gas and Electric Company employees.

Sixty-nine temporary

additional senior radiation protection technicians were hired to support outage

radiological activities.

The inspectors noted during a review of temporary additional

radiation protection resumes, that approximately 95 percent were returnees.

The

inspectors determined that this high percentage

of returnees was a program

strength.

All senior radiation protection technicians met, or exceeded,

the

requirements

of American Nuclear Standard Institute 3.1 (3 years of radiation

protection experience).

Junior technicians were task-qualified and approved

by

radiation protection management.

E

-1 2-

Temporary additional radiation protection technicians were tested on site-specific

material.

The inspectors noted that the Northeast Utilities screening

program was

not used to evaluate the general radiological knowledge of the temporary additional

radiation protection technicians brought onsite to support outage activities.

The

Northeast Utilities program is recognized

ar 6 approved

by a number of utilities as an

acceptable

method to evaluate

a radiation protection technician's general

radiological knowledge.

The licensee stated that the training program was being

evaluated to determine whether the Northeast Utilities screening

program would be

of benefit to the temporary additional radiation protection training program.

On-the-job training and evaluation qualification programs utilized during the

temporary additional radiation protection technician training program were reviewed.

The inspectors determined that the tasks were appropriate,

and the training and

evaluation guidelines were clear.

Station radiation protection management

were

appropriately involved in the development of these programs.

However, the inspectors commented that prior to performing on-the-job training and

evaluations,

the current program did not ensure that the individual being evaluated

had first completed the formal classroom required training.

Radiation protection

management

acknowledged

the inspectors'omment

and stated they would review

their on-the-job training and evaluation programs.

Conclusions

An appropriate

number of trained and qualified temporary additional radiation

protection technicians were onsite to support outage work. A large percentage

of

temporary additional radiation protection technicians were returnees.

Radiation

protection management

was appropriately involved in the development of the

temporary additional radiation protection technician training program.

Radiation

protection instructors were well qualified and had a number of years of applied

radiation protection experience.

All temporary additional senior radiation protection

technicians were ANSI 3.1 level technicians.

The on-the-job training and evaluation

programs did not ensure that the individual being evaluated

had 'first completed the

formal classroom required training.

Radiological Protection and Chemistry Organization and Administration

The inspector reviewed the present organization chart and compared it to an

organization chart obtained during the previous inspection.

No major changes

were

identified.

The licensee maintained

an appropriate organization to effectively

implement the radiation protection program.

-1 3-

R7

Quality Assurance

in Radiological Protection and Chemistry Activities

R7.1

Nuclear Qualit

Service Audits Assessments

and Field Observations

and Radiation

De artment Self-Assessments

and Radiolo ical Occurrence

Re orts

a.

Ins ection Sco

e 83750

Selected personnel involved with the performance of nuclear quality service audits,

assessments,

and radiation department

self-assessments

were interviewed.

The

following items were reviewed;

Qualifications of personnel who performed nuclear quality service audits and

surveillances

Nuclear quality service audits performed since July 1996

Nuclear quality service surveillances performed since July 1996

Radiation protection department self-assessments

performed since July 1996

Radiological action requests written since July 1996

Observations

and Findin s

The two individuals involved with nuclear quality services radiation protection

activities had strong auditor backgrounds

and appropriate technical and operational

radiation protection experience.

However, the inspectors noted that one of these

auditors was recently transferred to the radiation protection section.

The nuclear quality service audit schedule

and plans covered the appropriate

program areas to provide management

with a good overview of the radiation

protection program.

Radiation protection management

and nuclear quality services

management

were appropriately involved in developing the audit plans.

In addition to the monthly quality plan reports compiled by the radiation protection

section, nuclear quality services personnel

independently

tracked and trended

radiological action requests to identify programmatic weaknesses.

Five radiological assessments

were performed by nuclear quality services personnel

since the last NRC inspection of this area in July 1996.

These assessments

covered

a broad range of radiation protection activities and provided management

with a good assessment

of tlute radiation protection program.

Two radiological action requests

were written by nuclear quality services personnel

during the performance of the above assessments.

Both nonquality action requests

remained open as of May 13. 1997.

One was written on October 18, 1996, and

-1 4-

the other was written on January 21, 1997.

The inspectors concluded that

recommended

corrective actions were appropriate to resolve the issues.

The

inspectors

did not identify any time requirement to respond to nonquality action

requests;

however, the inspectors commented that improvement could be made in

timely closure of nonquality action requests.

The licensee acknowledged

the

inspectors'omments.

The inspectors

also noted that nuclear quality services personnel

did not followup

on nuclear quality services originated action requests

until the next scheduled

audit

of the program area.

The inspectors commented that timely followup could

enhance

the program.

Nuclear quality services supervision stated that they would

review this comment for program improvement.

Field observations

performed by nuclear quality services personnel were clearly

documented.

No problems were identified during the review of these observations.

The inspectors noted that the self-assessment

program was in the developmental

stage and not yet effectively implemented.

However, a good radiation protection

outage self-assessment

was performed on May 6, 1997, using technical specialists

from another utility. A number of good improvement items were identified, but

have yet to be evaluated

due to outage work.

Conclusions

Overall, an effective nuclear quality services program was maintained.

The nuclear

quality services auditors were well qualified to perform radiation protection

audits/assessments.

The 1996 and 1997 audit schedule

covered the appropriate

program areas to provide management

with a good overview of the radiation

protection program.

The nuclear quality services assessments

and field

observations

were good; however, improvement could be made to timely response

of nonquality radiological action requests.

The radiation protection section self-

assessment

program was in the developmental

stage and not yet effectively

implemented.

V. Mana ement Meetin s

X1

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented

the inspection results to members of licensee management

at an, exit meeting on May 16, 1997.

The licensee acknowledged

the findings

presented.

No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHIVlENT

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

C. Belmont, Director, Nuclear Quality Services

B. Crockett, Manager, Nuclear Quality Services

R. Gray, Director, Radiation Protection

T. Grebel, Director, Regulatory Services

T. Irving, General Foreman,

Radiation Protection

S. Ketelsen, Supervisor,

Regulatory Services

S. LaForce, Engineer, Regulatory Services

G. Lautt, Engineer, Radiation Protection

J. Molden, Manager, Operations Services

M. Mosher, Supervisory Engineer, Nuclear Quality Services

D. Oatley, Manager, Maintenance

Services

R. Rogers, Foreman,

Radiation Protection

R. Snyder, Training Leader, Learning Services

M. Somerville, Senior Engineer, Radiation Protection

D. Taggart, Director, Nuclear Quality Services

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

83750

Occupational

Radiation Exposure

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

~Oened

50-275;50-323/9708-01

VIO

Failure to follow radiation work permit requirements

50-275;50-323/9708-02

IFI

Air sample hose factor evaluation

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Radiation Protection Procedure

RPI.ID1, "Requirements for the Diablo Canyon ALARA

Program," Revision

1

Radiation Protection Procedure

RPI.ID2, "Use and Contro'I of Temporary Shielding,"

Revision 2

Radiation Protection Procedure

RPI.ID3, "Respiratory Protection Program," Revision 2A

Radiation Protection Procedure

RPI.ID9, "Radiation Work Permits," Revision

1

Radiation Protection Procedure

RCP D-205, "Performing ALARAReviews," Revision 8

-2-

Radiation Protection Procedure

RCP D-220, "Control of Access to High, High-High and

Very High Radiation Areas," Revision 11

Radiation Protection Procedure

RCP D-240, "Radiological Posting," Revision 7

Radiation Protection Procedure

RCP D-260, "Radiological Control for Steam Generator

Repair and Maintenance,"

Revision 6

Radiation Protection Pr'ocedure

RCP D-500, "Radiation and Contamination Surveys,"

Revision 11A

Radiation Protection Procedure

RCP D-610, "Control of Radioactive Materials,"

Revision 10A

Nuclear Quality Services Procedure

OM4, "Nuclear Oversight Program," Revision OA,

Nuclear Quality Services Procedure OM4.ID13, "Internal Auditing," Revision 4

Nuclear Quality Services Maintenance Assessment

962350024, dated August 22, 1996

Nuclear Quality Services Radiation Protection Program Asse sment 962920014, dated

October 22, 1996

Nuclear Quality Services Radiation Protection Program Assessment

9<3130006, dated

December 19, 1996

Nuclear Quality Services Radiation Protection Program Assessment

963030010, dated

January

15, 1997

Nuclear Quality Services Radiation Protection Program Assessment

970150015, dated

January 21, 1997

Radiation Protection Section Self-Assessment,

dated May 2, 1997

Radiation Protection Section Monthly Quality Plan Reports for January,

February, and

March 1997

A summary of radiological action requests written since July 1, 1996