ML16342D680
| ML16342D680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342D679 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-97-01, 50-275-97-1, 50-323-97-01, 50-323-97-1, NUDOCS 9706040094 | |
| Download: ML16342D680 (42) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1997001
Text
ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Accompanying
Personnel:
Approved By:
50-275
50-323
DPR-82
50-275/97-01
50-323/97-01
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units
1 and 2
7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila Beach, California
April 14 through May 2, 1997
T. O. McKernon, Lead Inspector, Operations
Branch
T. R. Meadows, Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch
H. F. Bundy, Reactor Engineer, Operations
Branch
M. E. Murphy, Reactor Engineer, Operations Branch
M. S. Freeman,
Inspector-in-Training
D. B. Allen, Resident Inspector-in-Training
J. L. Pellet, Chief, Operations
Branch
ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1:
Supplemental
Information
Attachment 2:
Simulator Facility Report
97060400'P4
97052'7
ADOCK 05000275
8
-2-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units
1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-275/97-01; 50-323/97-01
This multi-focused inspection included
a review of the licensed operator requalification
program;
a review of a submitted draft initial licensed operator examination,
a followup to
open items, and sustained
observations
of control room activities, and Unit
1 outage
control activities.
The inspection covered the period from April 14 through May 2, 1997.
~Oerations
Inspectors observed
good control room coordination between the shift foreman and
'he other shift crew members.
Good linkage between the shift foreman and the
senior control operator was observed
during abnormal condition response
(Section 01.4).
Inconsistent linkage between the shift foreman and the senior control operator was
observed
during some requalification examinations,
contrary to the performance
observed
in the control room.
This remains an issue warranting licensee
management
attention.
This issue, also identified by licensee evaluators resulted in
crew and individual failures of the requalification examination and remediation
(Section 04.1).
Although not firmly established,
the control room staff practiced three-way
communications
(Section 01.4).
Inspectors observed
some inconsistent oversight of the shift crews by the shift
supervisors
(Section 01.4);
Overall, the licensed operator requalification program was acceptable
(Section 04.1).
I
Licensed operator requalification examinations
were well constructed,
challenging,
and discriminated at the appropriate knowledge levels (Section 05.2).
Inspectors observed
professional
and consistent performance
on the part of licensed
operator requalification evaluators.
Evaluators conducted
good critiques of the
crews and individual strengths
and weaknesses
were effectively identified.
(Section 05.3).
The remedial t.aining program was adequate
',Section 05.4)
An apparent violation of Technical Specification with two examples related to the
respiratory protection program was identified (Section 05.5).
-3-
A submitted draft initial licensed operator examination was considered
inadequate
for administration,
in that, portions of the operating test were narrower in scope
than the guidance provided in NUREG-1021 (Section 05.1).
Re ort Details
Summar
of Plant Status
Unit 1 entered Refueling Outage
1RS.
Major work activities included valve repairs on the
residual heat removal system,
Diesel Generator
1-3 maintenance,
testing, and replacement
of the station batteries, Charging Pump
1-1 maintenance
and replacement,
and others.
Unit 2 remained at 100 percent power during this inspection period.
No major equipment
problems or transients were experienced.
I. 0 erations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.4
Conduct of 0 erations
- Extended Control Room Observations
Ins ection Sco
e 71715
During the period of April 28 to May 1, 1997, independent
observations
of control
room activities were conducted with a focus on the Unit
1 outage activities.
The
objective of the observations
was to evaluate control room performance
by the
operators, crew command and control, communication practices, work control, and
procedure
usage.
The inspectors
observed
a number of outage management
meetings, control room shift briefings, prejob briefings, shift turnover briefings,
annunciator acknowledgments
and responses,
surveillance tests, and conducted
interviews with selected
key personnel.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Overall, communications
were effective, but the application of formal three-way
communications was inconsistent.
Three-way formal communications was a recent
management
expectation
and it was apparent that its use was not yet firmly
established
in the control room staff.
Quite often, the receiver of the instructions
had to be prompted to repeat them back and, in other instances,
the communication
lapsed into informal practices.
For example, during initial fuel assembly removal,
the operator in the control room and the communicator on the refueling floor in the
containment
had difficulty communicating the requirement for the fuel upender
machine to be secured
prior to the fuel handlers on the refuel bridge grappling
another fuel assembly.
This confusion appeared,
in part, due to not completing the
third leg of the three-way communications.
At other times, the control room staff
-5-
did utilize three-way communications effectively when giving task instructions to
plant personnel
and reporting critical information.
The inspectors
also heard plant
operators employ proper three-way communications
on the plant radios.
Despite
the lapses
in communication practices, communications
by the licensed operators
was improved over that observed
during the prior year's requalification program
inspection.
Shift management
oversight of activities in the control room was effective.
There
was good linkage between the shift foreman, other members of the shift crew, and
responsible test engineers.
The senior control operator and shift foreman
demonstrated
good linkage during observed
abnormal situations.
For example, at
one point during fuel movement
a containment e'vacuation
alarm annunciated
at the
same time an area high radiation alarm and a smoke detector alarm annunciated.
The operators
responded
promptly to the alarms under the direction of the shift
foreman.
The reasons for the alarms were promptly identified and plant
announcements
made.
Additionally, during a medical emergency
in containment
and a flooding event in the auxiliary saltwater intake structure caused
by leaking
check valves, the situations were properly evaluated
by control room personnel
and
appropriate instructions were provided to field personnel.
Proper public address
announcements
were made to alert plant personnel to the events
in progress.
Appropriate briefings between control room personnel
and technicians were
conducted
prior to commencing plant work activities, which could impact plant
safety.
The inspectors witnessed
a briefing conducted
by the shift foreman, which
related to manipulating relays in energized
13.8 kV breaker enclosures.
The work
activity and potential effects on plant electrical distribution, as it related to the
outage safety plan, were discussed
in detail.
Briefings on other important work
activities, which were not expected to have a direct effect on plant safety, were
appropriately conducted
by the assistant shift foreman.
Routine work activities for plant operators were effectively controlled.
The
inspectors witnessed assignment
of an activity involving cross-tying emergency
diesel generator
air compressors.
The sequence
of the work activities and the
appropriate procedure steps were properly specified.
The performer demonstrated
his understanding
of the task by repeating the instructions.
For the outage unit, shift turnover began
an hour prior to shift change.
The
inspectors observed that logs and turnover checklists were properly reviewed and a
comprehensive
control board walkdown was performed by the oncoming operator
accompanied
by the offgoing operator.
Prior to assuming the watch, the oncoming
crew conducted
an all hands meeting.
Crew members summarized the status of
equipment under their jurisdiction and expected work activities.
The operations
liaison to the outage control center also provided an overview of outage work status
and expected outage work for the upcoming shift. The overall information
exchange
was effective and all crew me~nbers were cognizant of their
responsibilities.
0-
-6-
The inspectors attended
outage control center critical activities and shift turnover
meetings.
The operations
liaison provided appropriate input on plant operational
considerations
as they affected scheduled
work. All participants demonstrated
appropriate concern for plant operational and safety considerations.
Operations personnel exhibited heightened
sensitivity to previous problems with
ground buggy installation on major electrical equipment.
The inspectors observed
restoration of Engineered
Safety Feature
Bus F.
An operator and th
shift technical
advisor performed
a deliberate walkdown prior to energizing the bus where they
checked for proper fuse alignment, ground buggy installation and door bolting.
The
inspectors discussed
the transformer explosion from the previous outage with
several operators
and the shift foreman.
All were well aware of the causes
and
how improper ground buggy installation contributed to the event.
Peer checking was used on control panel manipulations.
The inspectors observed
the unloading portion of the overspeed
test on Emergency Diesel Generator
1-3.
This'was performed in accordance
with Procedure
STP M-9B, "Overspeed Trip Test
of Diesel Generators,"
Revision 17.
During the evolution, control room operators
self-checked
and peer-checked
each step of the procedure
as it was performed.
The peer-checker
read the procedure
and verified the operator was performing the
steps on the proper equipment.
Prejob briefings were conducted
in a thorough and formal manner.
Prior to restoring
Engineered
Safety Feature
Bus F to service the shift foreman specifically warned
operators how ground buggies should be installed.
Prior to performing the
test on Emergency
Diesel Generator
1-3 the shift foreman emphasized
to
operations
and test personnel
involved the precautions
and limitations in the
procedure,
specifically the maximum speed
on the diesel.
In some instances,
inconsistent shift supervisor to shift crew interaction and
oversight was observed.
While one shift supervisor involved himself in oversight of
unanticipated
annunciator responses
and prebriefings,
as well as, shift turnover
briefings, another shift supervisor limited his involvement to shift turnover and a
few status briefings by the shift foreman.
The inspectors noted that the licensee's
expectations
for shift supervisor shift crew involvement was not specifically
delineated.
Procedure
OP1.DC10, Revision 3, stated that the shift supervisor
responsibility was for direction of the shift foreman and for providing overall
coordination of all plant activities.
The procedure
did not set forth management's
expectation
as to the amount of shift supervisor to crew involvement. The licensee
management
representative
acknowledged
the observation
and stated that more
consistent involvement in interactions was an area for improvement.
The inspectors observed
one instance
in which there appeared
to be a lapse in
communication between the clearance coordinator and the shift foreman, which
related to the status of control board clearance tags.
During the preparation for
re-energization of the 4 kV Bus F, the 'iftforeman noted
a control board
-7-
information tag on the 480 volt Bus F.
Prior to re-energizing the 4 kV bus the shift
foreman had personnel physically verify no grounding straps were installed on the
480'volt bus and verified all work activities on the 480 volt bus had been reported
'omplete
and ready for testing.
The inspectors noted that Procedure'P2.ID1,
Revision 7, required the clearance coordinator to inform the shift foreman when it
was appropriate to have the operators remove control board information tags.
This
example represented
good oversight by the shift foreman and cautious actions
taken prior to re-energizing the 4 kV bus.
No safety concern or personnel
hazard
existed.
The licensee initiated an event trending record to track the administrative
error.
Because of this example, the inspectors reviewed training provided on the
clearance request process prior to entering the 1RB Refueling Outage.
The
inspectors verified that clearance training had been provided to both licensed and
non-licensed
operators between February 10 and March 14, 1997.
The training, a
2-hour class, included familiarization with the clearance
procedure,
how to
manipulate clearances,
and a practical exercise
in making a master clearance
and
subclearances.
The inspectors considered
the training appropriate
and
comprehensive.
Conclusions
Control room communications,
command,
and control were effective.
Although it
was not a uniformly implemented practice, the control room staff normally practiced
formal three-way communications when providing instructions and reporting critical
information.
Prejob briefings and peer-checking
were used properly.
Shift turnover
was effective and crew members demonstrated
a good understanding
of plant
status and work activities.
Communications
and coordination of work between the
control room and the outage control center was effective.
Some variance in shift
supervisor to shift crew interaction was observed.
There was good linkage between the shift foreman and the operating crew members
during responses
to abnormal conditions.
04
Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1
0 erator Performance
on Annual Re uglification Examinations
Ins ection Sco
e
71001
The inspectors observed the performance of two shift crew groups and one staff
crew group during their annual requalification evaluations.
Each shift crew group
was composed
of five active licensed operators
and one shift technical advisor.
The staff crew group was a composite group of licensed shift operators,
inactive
licenses,
a certified trainer, and one shift technical advisor.
The 2-year licensed
operator requalification cycle began with Session
95-1 on June 19, 1995, and
-8-
ended for licensed operators with Session 96-7 on April 18, 1997, for a total of
14 sessions.
The cycle included two annual operating examinations during
Sessions
95-8 (May 21 through June 21, 1996) and 96-7 (March 15 through
April 18, 1997). These operating tests included simulator dynamic performance
evaluations
and five job performance
measures
for each licensed operator.
Also
included was a written examination during Session 96-7 for each operator
consisting of an open reference examination.
Observations
and Findin
s
The inspectors observed
a portion of Session 96-7 biennial examination during the
week of April 14, 1997.
All three crew groups observed
passed
all portions of their
evaluations.
However, one individual on the staff (composite) crew group failed the
dynamic simulator evaluation.
Additionally, a shift crew failed the dynamic
simulator evaluation during the first week of requalification examinations
administered
prior to this inspection period.
The cause for the failures was primarily performance deficiencies
in crew oversight,
communication,
and procedure
usage skills. The licensee's practice was that the
senior control operator serve as a procedure
reader during abnormal and emergency
evolutions, allowing the shift foreman to focus attention on plant conditions and
procedure entry conditions and transitions.
The inspectors observed inconsistent
linkage between the senior control operator,
a licensed reactor operator, the shift
foreman, and a licensed senior reactor operator.
The inspectors were concerned
because
there were times when the shift foreman was not aware of changing plant
conditions and responses
directed by the senior control operator and was unaware
that errors in procedure
usage occurred, such that the incorrect emergency
operating procedures
were being implemented.
In one instance, the shift foreman failed to conduct tailboards prior to transitioning
between emergency
procedures
and failed to inform the shift supervisor of the
transition.
In another instance, the shift foreman was unaware that the primary
operator had been directed to secure the residual heat removal pumps during cold-
leg recirculation swapover and had performed the actions.
During such instances,
the senior control operator appeared
to direct other reactor operators during
emergency
scenario conditions, while reading the emergency
procedures.
While the
senior control operator's actions were not considered
sufficient to justify a failure,
the importance of the senior control operator informing and getting the concurrence
of the shift foreman of actions was reinforced by the licensee evaluations during the
crew critiques.
-9-
The inspectors were concerned with the shift foreman and senior control operator
linkage issue because
only a senior operator is licensed by.10 CFR 55 to direct
reactor operators.
This issue had been previously identified during NRC inspections
(e.g., 50-275;-323/95-04 performed in June 1995).
The inspectors pointed out to
the licensee staff that the policy to allow the senior control operator to read the
emergency
and abnormal procedures
was vulnerable because
it could, at times,
result in a violation of regulations when a breakdown of the shift foreman to senior
control operator linkage occurred.
The licensee's staff acknowledged
this vulnerability and agreed to reevaluate
the
policy and also strengthen
the linkage between the senior control operator and shift
foreman through their training feedback system.
Except for the examples discussed
above, operator performance
in the simulator
was consistent with that observed
in the control room.
Inspectors
did not observe
a similar shift foreman to senior control operator linkage problem in the control room
during abnormal conditions response.
During stressful simulator scenario
conditions, formal three-leg communications
broke down at times and lapsed into
informal communications.
This weakness
was most obvious in the crew group
discussed
above, but also apparent,
to a lesser degree,
in the other two groups
evaluated during this session.
The inspectors
also observed that the shift technical
advisors demonstrated
more involvement in assisting the crews than in previous
inspections.
This was evidenced
by shift technical advisors making helpful
observations
on required component settings and monitorir" vital components.
The licensee's staff acknowledged that crew communications
weaknesses
had been
identified and improvements incorporated into the training program through the
feedback process.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that, with the exception of the one crew failure and an
individual failure in the dynamic simulator portion of the requalification examination,
which were primarily caused
by performance deficiencies in crew oversight,
communication,
and procedure
usage,
the licensed operators exhibited good
knowledge and ability during the requalification examinations.
The inspectors concluded the licensee requalification program was acceptable.
Shift management
issues related to inconsistent linkage between the shift foreman
and the senior control operator remains an issue warranting licensee management
attention.
-10-
05
Operator Training and Qualification
05.1
Initial Licensin
Examination Develo ment
The facility licensee developed
an initial licensing examination in accordance
with
guidance provided in Generic Letter 95-06, "Changes
in the Operator Licensing
Program."
However, prior to administration the licensee decided to withdraw the
application.
As such, the planned licensed operator examination was cancelled.
The following provides observations
as to the licensee developed draft examination.
05.1.1 Examination Outline
a.
~Sco
e
The licensee submitted the initial examination outlines on February 14, 1997.
The
chief examiner reviewed the submittals against the requirements of NUREG-1021,
"Licensed Operator Examiner Standards,"
Revision 7, Supplement
1, and
NUREG/BR-0122, "Examiner's Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Written
Examinations,"
Revision 5.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The chief examiner determined that the initial examination outlines satisfied the
above requirements.
However, minor changes to the written examination were
made so that a more evenly weighted distribution would be achieved
in Group III of
plant systems.
The chief examiner also noted that the job performance
measures
outline did not meet the requirements of NUREG-1021/ES-201
in that there was
direct overlap between Job Performance
Measure
7 and Event 5 of Scenario 2.
Other observations
by the examiner were minor. The comments on the outline were
discussed
with the licensee author and revisions were made and submitted along
with the draft examination.
C.
Conclusion
With the exception of the inadequate
job performance
measure
outline, the licensee
submitted generally good examination outlines.
05.1.2 Draft Initial Examination Packa
e
a.
~Sco
e
On March 10, 1997, the licensee submitted
a draft initial reactor operator
examination developed
under the guidance of the pilot examination program.
The
chief examiner reviewed the draft examination and provided comments to the
licensee author and supervisor on April 14, 1997.
-11-
b.
Observations
and Findin
s
The chief examiner reviewed the draft initial examination and determined that with
the exception of the operating portion of the test, the examination was adequate.
The written examination and the scenarios
needed only minor enhancements.
However, the administrative and walkthrough portions of the operating test were
not adequate
for examination administration.
Several of the administrative and job
performance
measure followup questions were considered
direct lookups.
Some job
performance
measure followup questions
were constructed
such that multiple
answers were required.
In another instance,
a job performance
measure was
co'nsidered
overly simplistic in that it contained only one active step and was
considered to discriminate poorly.
The walkthrough portion of the operating test
failed to meet the quality assurance
checklist, "Examiner Standard 301-?",
items 3a, b, and d of NUREG 1021, Revision 7, Supplement
1.
Conclusion
The chief examiner concluded that the draft initial examination was not adequate
for
administration in that portions of the operating test were narrower in scope than the
guidance provided in the examination standard,
05.2
Review of Re uglification Examinations
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71001
The inspectors performed
a review of the annual requalification examinations,
including operating tests and biennial written examination, to evaluate general
quality, construction,
and difficulty level.
The inspectors
also reviewed the
methodology for developing the requalification examinations.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The operating examinations consisted of job performance
measures
and dynamic
simulator scenarios.
The scenarios followed the guidelines of NUREG 1021,
"Operator Licensing Examiner Standards,"
Revision 7, Supplement
1, in complexity
and quantitative event requirements.
The scenarios
were written with clear
objectives, expected operator actions, and critical task identification and evaluation
criteria.
The job performance
measures
were adequate
in scope and depth, and
covered
a broad range of topics as required by the training program and the
regulations.
Critical steps in the job tasks were appropriately identified.
The inspectors determined
.hat the written examinations were of the appropriate
breadth of coverage
and depth of knowledge,
and of particularly effective
discriminating value.
-12-
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors
concluded that the requalification examinations were well
constructed,
challenging,
and discriminated at the appropriate knowledge level.
05.3
Re uglification Examination Administration
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71001
The inspectors observed
the administration of all aspects of the requalification
examinations
to determine the evaluators'bilities to administer an examination
and
assess
adequate
performance through measurable
criteria.
The inspectors
also
observed
the plant simulator to support training and examination administration.
Five licensed operator requalification training evaluators
and one operations
management
evaluator were observed participating in one or more aspects of
administering the examinations,
including pre-examination
briefings, observations
of
operator performance,
individual and group evaluations of observations,
techniques
for job performance
measure
cuing, and final evaluation documentation.
Additionally, the feedback system for entering training information and modifying
the requalification training was reviewed.
Observations
and Findin s
The evaluators conducted the examinations
professionally,
and thoroughly
documented
observations
for later evaluation.
Job performance
measure
cues were
provided appropriately as needed,
with no inadve'rtent cuing observed.
A formal evaluation method was used that reviewed crew and individual critical
tasks following the scenario observations,
and then competencies
for the crew and
for individuals when appropriate.
During the simulator evaluations,
the inspectors
noted that the evaluator staff was particularly effective in identifying and properly
categorizing operator performance deficiencies and weaknesses.
The inspectors
also observed strong operations staff participation.
A representative
from the
operations department performed the crew evaluation in the simulator and was
involved with making the pass/fail decision for the crew.
The post-scenario
examination evaluation caucuses
were well organized
and efficient with the
evaluation team reaching
an accurate consensus
on performance results.
This
evaluation method minimized overall crew stress.
The inspectors observed that the
crews held independent
self-critical caucuses,
led by their shift supervisors,
who
were also involved with developing remediation plans, when necessary.
The
inspectors
also observed that shift supervisor ownership for crew and individual
performance was a management
expectation
and was apparent
in most cases.
The inspectors observed that the performance of the simulator in supporting the
examination process was good.
Simulator issues were not observed during the
examination
(see Attachment 2).
-13-
The inspectors
also reviewed operator classroom
and simulator critiques for the
month of January 1997.
Also reviewed were training steering committee meeting
minutes and event trend report information input into operator training.
Overall, the
training department
appeared
responsive
to operator feedback and had recently
started providing a direct response
to comments using the licensee's
e-mail system.
The training department
also presented
the disposition of operator training feedback
comments to the training steering committee.
This appeared
to be a proactive
initiative and provided
a mechanism for establishing direct accountability of the
training department to operations.
Event trend records which are utilized to
document lower threshold problems that do not require specific corrective actions
were also tracked and trended.
The summaries of the records were also presented
to the training steering committee to determine whether specific training was
required for any specific area of operator performance.
Conclusions
The facility evaluators administered
the examinations
professionally and
consistently.
The facility evaluators effectively identified strengths
and
weaknesses
in crew and individual performance
and conducted
good critiques.
Training needs were being fed back into the training program.
05.4
Remedial Trainin
Pro ram Review
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71001
The inspectors
assessed
the adequacy of the effectiveness of the remedial training
conducted
during this requalification cycle and the training planned for the next
cycle to ensure that it addressed
operator or crew performance weaknesses.
The
inspectors
also reviewed simulator documentation
records for requalification
examinations
administered
during 1995 and 1996 to ascertain whether evaluations
were consistent between crews, and individuals.
Records associated
with
remediation were additionally reviewed to determine if the planned remediation was
appropriate
and timely.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors reviewed the observed
failed crew groups'hort-term
remedial
training documentation
process
and the documentation
for other crew and individual
failures that had occurred throughout the requalification cycle.
The inspectors
determined that the short-term remedial training was effective.
The inspectors
determined that of the 12 previous requalification training sessions
and two
evaluation sessions,
each session consisted of approximately
15 crew groups of
5 licensed operators
and
During this requalification cycle
-14-
examination,
1 of the crew groups and 5 individuals failed in the simulator, no
individuals failed the written, and two individuals failed the job performance
measures
portion of the operating test.
The inspectors
assessed
that these failure
rates were not excessive
and were consistent with other industry licensed operator
requalification training programs.
In addition to the above,
a review of past requalification results documentation
indicated that the bases
used by evaluators for determining pass)fail grades were
consistently applied.
For those individuals, which required remediation, the
remediation plans were well documented
and the remediation was timely.
For
example, during the 1996 licensed operator requalification examination simulator
scenarios
utilizing Functional Recovery Procedure
FR-S.1, "Response
to Nuclear
Power Generation/ATWS," was used in scenarios for 5 of 17 total groups.
Of the
5 groups, 3 individuals failed the simulator scenarios.
In all three of these cases,
evaluations were consistently applied as related to six performance competency
areas, individual remediation plans were well documented,
and implementation of
'the remediation was timely.
c.
Conclusions
The remedial training program was adequate.
Short-term remedial training was
effective.
Evaluations by the training department staff and representatives
of the
operations department were consistently applied.
Remediation was well
documented
and quickly implemented.
05.5
Review of Conformance with 0 erator License Conditions:
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71001
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the requalification program's compliance
with Subpart C, Medical Requirements'and
10 CFR 55.53, "License Conditions."
The inspectors interviewed operators
and training management,
and examined the
licensee's records to determine compliance for conditions to maintain an active
operator license, reactivation of licenses, and medical fitness.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Operator license conditions were being accurately identified and tracked.
However,
it was determined that a number of licensed operators (approximately 26) with
corrective lenses
as a condition of license did not have special frames and lens for
their self-contained
breathing apparatuses
used in the control room.
The inspectors
observed that the licensee's
Final Safety Analysis Report, Sections 9.58-24,
9.58-36 and 6.4-3, indicated that self-contained
breathing apparatuses
are provided
for fire brigade and control room personnel
use, which requires that control room
personnel
be self-contained breathing'apparatus
qualified.
As such, the inspectors
considered
the use of self-contained
breathing apparatuses
as design bases
-15-
contingency measure.
It was also noted that Procedure
RP1.ID3, "Respiratory
Protection Program," requires that only special spectacle
kits specified by the
manufacturer of the respirator be used.
Further, Procedure
OM14.ID2, "Medical
Examinations" required individuals with prescription eyeglasses
who are required to
wear a full-face respirator shall use special frames for their glasses that do not
interfere with the face-piece seal.
The inspectors
also noted that operators would
be required to wear self-contained
breathing apparatus
for performance of
procedures
under abnormal environmental conditions, (e.g., Procedure
AP-8B,
"Control Room Inaccessibility - Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown."
This was
an'xample
of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1a for a failure to
follow procedures,
(50-275;-323/9701-01).
Further, as a result of the inspector's questions with regard to licensed operator
, usage of self-contained
breathing apparatuses,
the licensee performed data base
searches
of the plant information management
system and licensed operator
qualifications.
The licensee determined that approximately 75 percent of the
licensed watchstanders
had not completed the annual refresher training for
self-contained
breathing apparatus.
Procedure
OD1.DC37, Attachment 6.4,
specifies that, "... operators fulfilling a minimum shift crew position must be a
qualified respirator user."
Since the only available respirators
in the control room for
operator use are self-contained
breathing apparatuses,
licensed operators onshift in
the control room are required to be self-contained
breathing apparatuses
qualified.
The Respirator Training Procedure,
TQ1.DC20, steps 2.1-2.3, describes the
respirator training program as a two-part training program consisting of initial
training and an annual followup refresher training course.
The folfowup annual
refresher training course
is designed to provide training on new equipment or
procedures
and work practices,
as well as, check proficiency in the initial cognitive
objectives which include proper actions for abnormal or emergency situations.
However, it was this annual refresher with which many of the licensed operators
standing watch were not current.
This was a second
example of a failure to follow
procedures
and an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1a
(50-275;-323/9701-01
) .
As corrective actions, the licensee conducted
"Just in Time" training for individuals.
coming onto the watch bill to assure watchstanders
were current in annual
self-contained
breathing apparatuses
training.
The licensee also initiated Action
Request A0429503 to ensure licensed operators
are provided with the required
frames.
-1 6-
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee accurately tracked, maintained,
and
controlled the conditions of operator licenses and reactivation of inactive licenses in
accordance
with Subpart
C, "Medical Requirements,"
and 10 CFR 55.53, "License
Conditions."
However, the issues related to licensed operators with conditioned
licenses not having the special frames for self-contained
breathing apparatus
and
not satisfying the required annual self-contained
breathing apparatus
refresher
training were considered
examples of a procedural violation.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92900)
08.1
Closed
Licensee Event Re ort 50-323/95004:
Technical S ecification 3.0.4 Not
Met Due to Personnel
Error
This licensee event report involved the failure to have hydrogen analyzer cell 82
operable during entry into Mode
1 and 2 while in Action A of Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.
The hydrogen analyzer was determined to be inoperable due
to its isolation valves being closed.
During this inspection, the inspectors verified that long-term corrective actions were
taken by reviewing the event with the appropriate
personnel during technical
maintenance
continuing training.
The training was incorporated
into configuration
control continuing training.
Lessons
plans and attendance
records were reviewed to
verify subject matter coverage
and personnel attendance.
This licensee-identified
and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited
violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(50-275;-323/9701-02).
08.2
Closed
Licensee Event Re ort 50-323 96005:
Manual Reactor Tri
U on
Discover
of Di ital Rod Position Indicator S stem Ino erabilit
Due to Personnel
Error
This licensee event report was submitted to report the inoperability of the digital rod
position indicator system due to a switch being left in the test position after
completion of periodic testing.
During the inspection, the inspectors verified that the applicable
Procedures
MP l-1.6-1, Revision 2, and MP l-1.10-1 were revised to add
verification steps to ensure the S7 test switches on the data input/output
cards are left in the correct position following testing.
This licensee-identified
and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited
violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
(50-275;-323/9701-03).
-1 7-
08.3
Closed
Violation 50-275 9602-03 50-323/9602-03:
Failure to Com lete
Proficienc
Trainin
Re uired b
Procedure TQ1.DC]2 and the U dated Final Safet
Anal sis Re ort for Individuals Assi ned to the Fire Bri ade
This violation involved the failure to adequately
train fire brigade members
in that
onshift watchstanders
did not complete biennial training requirements.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that long-term corrective actions were
implemented to resolve the cited violation.
The licensee had revised controlling
procedures
to provide the additional guidance necessary
for the individual making
up the fire brigade list for the applicable shift have the fire brigade leader and
members status and qualifications listing available to him in the plant information
management
system.
A watch'bill listing along with a fire brigade member report
were verified for April 22, 1997.
No discrepancies
were identified.
IV. Plant Su
ort
F8
Miscellaneous Fire Protection Issues
F8.1
General Comments
The inspectors observed
general plant housekeeping
incident to administration of
the in-plant job performance section of the operating test.
The facility was
reasonably
clean, well lighted, and the floors were clear a"9 free from debris.
The
operators were conscientious
to note discrepancies
and inform the main control
room.
V. Mana ement Meetin
s
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented
the inspection results to members of the licensee
management
at the conclusion of the inspection on May 2, 1997.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings presented.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information or materials examined
during the inspection.
0
ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
D. Adams, Nuclear Quality Services
J. Becker, Operations Director
C. Belmont, Nuclear Quality Services, Director
W. Crockett, Nuclear Quality Services
S. David, Operations
Foreman
S. Fridley Operations Services Manager
S. Ketelsen, Regulatory Services
S. LaForce, Regulatory Services
R. Martin, Regulatory Services
J. Molden, Operations Manager
D. OafIcy, Maintenance
Manager
G. Rueger, Senior Vice President
B. Vatter, Learning Services
71001
71715
92900
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Licensed Operator Requal Evaluation
Extended Control Room Observations
Followup
~oened
50-275;-323/
9701-01
50-275;-323/
9602-03
50-275;-
323/9701-02
50-275;-
323/9701-03
Closed
50-275;-323/
2-95-004
50-275;-323/
2-96-005
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Failure to Follow Procedures
Related to Respiratory
Protection
Failure to Complete Proficiency Training Related to Fire
Brigade Personnel
Technical Specification 3.0.4 Not Met Due to Personnel
Error
Manual Reactor Trip Upon Discovery of Digital rod Position
Indicator System Inoperability Due to Personnel
Error
LER
Technical Specification 3.0.4 Not Met Due to Personnel
Error
LER
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Digital Rod Position Indicator
System Inoperability Due to Personnel
Error
-2-
50-275;-
323/9701-02
50-275;-
323/9701-03
Technical Specification 3.0.4 Not Met Due to'Personnel
Error
Manual Reactor Trip Upon Discovery of Digital rod Position
Indicator System Inoperability Due to Personnel
Error
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures
Reviewed
TQ2.ID4, Training Program Implementation
TQ2.DC3, Licensed Operator, Non-Licensed Operator, and Shift Technical Advisor,
Continuing
Training Program.
OP L-6, "Refueling," Revision 26
STP-V-18A, "Full-Flow Accumulator Discharge Check Valve Test," Revision 7
STP-I-1A, "Routine Shifts Checks Required by Licenses," Revision 60
OP1.DC37, "Plant Logs," Revision 5B
OM14.ID2, "Medical Examinations,"
Revision 1A
Operations Policy Guidelines D-3, "Handling of Control Board Caution Tags and Instrument
Stickers," Revision 2
OP2.ID1, "Clearances
and Administrative Tag Outs," Revision 7,
Record of Reactor Operator Medical 5 License Summary, dated April 15, 1997
Operations Section Performance Trends for January
and March 1997
1R8 Plan of the Day, April 30, 1997
OPE 5:IV, "Auxiliary Saltwater- Changing over Pump R HX Trains," Revision 5
Equipment Control Guidelines,
ECG 7.4, Revision 0, Table 7.4-1
TQ1.DC20, "Respirator Training Program," Revision
1
AP-BB, "Control Room Inaccessibility - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," Revision 8
-3-
Other Documents:
Session 96-7 Group
1 Master Exams (Written, Scenarios,
and JPMs)
Session 96-7 Group 253 Master Exams (Written, Scenarios,
and JPMs)
Sessions
95-8 and 96-7 Biennial examination remedial training records.
Operator Shift Watch List
Active License List
Operator Continuing Training, Session 96-6 Lesson Plans R966C3 5 R966C4, "Clearance
Training"
Simulator Documentation
Records for LR 948SE1, 948SE2, R95-8, and other related
documentation
(e.g., remediation plans, remediation records,
and others) for Licensed
Requalification Examinations during 1995 and 1996.
ATTACHMENT2
SIMULATIONFACILITYREPORT
Facility Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility Docket:
50-275, 50-323
Operating Examinations Administered at: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant,
San Luis Obispo, Ca.
Operating Examinations Administered on:
April 15-17, 1997
These observations
do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without
further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance
with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These
observations
do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility, other
than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is
required in response
to these observations.
None.