ML16342C324
| ML16342C324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1999 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| AL-98-07, AL-98-7, NUDOCS 9904050076 | |
| Download: ML16342C324 (32) | |
Text
C.A.iECOieY 2
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDE)
ACCESSION NBR:9904050076 DOC.DATE: 99/03/19 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SMITH,L.J.
Region 4 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RUEGER,G.M.
Pacific Gas S Electric Co.
DOCKET I 05000275 05000323
SUBJECT:
Advises of NRC planned insp effort resulting from plant PPR completed on 990211 for period 980510-990125,to develop integrated understanding of safety performance. Historical listing 'of plant issues 5: details of insp pl'an'ncl.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZADRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-8064 NAR I 9 I999 Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B32 77 Beale Street, 32nd Floor P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - DIABLOCANYON UNITS 1 AND 2
Dear Mr. Rueger:
On February 11,.1999, the NRC staff completed a PPR of Diablo Canyon.
The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.
PPRs examine information since the last assessment of licensee performance to evaluate long-term trends, but emphasize the last 6 months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance.
The PPR for Diablo Canyon involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period May 10, 1998, to January 25, 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of June 15, 1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on July 8, 1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim in which 'the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants.
At the end of the review period, the NRC willdecide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
Unit 1 operated at power throughout the current period of detailed focus until operators initiated a forced shutdown on December 17 to repair a cooling water line on a reactor coolant pump bearing coofer. The forced shutdown ended 566 days of continuous power operation.
Ten power decreases in excess of 20 percent occurred during this assessment period, related to repairs to main feedwater pump stop valve control oil valves, repair to a heater drain pump, and condenser cleaning.
In addition, operators reduced power because of high kelp loading of the traveling screens; while at this reduced power condition, operators had to respond to flooding in the intake structure.
Unit 2 began this period at 100 percent power. Two power, decreases were effected to isolate and repair secondary side steam leaks and to clean the main condenser.
On December 1, 9904050076 9903f9 PDR ADQCK 05000275 8
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Unit 2 operators manually tripped the plant because of high kelp loading on the intake structure traveling screens.
Following improved weather conditions and repairs on balance-of-plant equipment, operators restored power to 100 percent on December 9, where it remained until the,end of the assessment.
Overall, performance at Diablo Canyon remained acceptable.
Operators performed well and, performance, in 'general, remained steady.
Maintenance continued at the same level as the last assessment; however, two instances of personnel working on the wrong equipment occurred.
The performance in engineering demonstrated a slight improvement durin'g this period. With the exception of a decline in'mergency response performance during drills, plant support activities were also effectively implemented.
Operators performed well during routine operations, as well as during controlled shutdowns.
However, operators failed to verify the offsite power alignment when a diesel generator was declared inoperable.
Some knowledge and performance weaknesses were revealed in the operator response to high seas and the associated fouling of the circulating water screens.
The management process for evaluating hardware problems was effective; however, the process for determining human performance problems lacked the same rigor and formality. Good licensed operator applicant performance was observed during the initial license examinations.'Only core inspection efforts are scheduled in the operations area over the next 8 months.
In the maintenance area, isolated instances of poor implementation of maintenance occurred because of'inattention to detail. For example, personnel performed maintenance on the wrong train of auxiliary feedwater and on the wrong unit on a component cooling system flow transmitter.
Generally, the licensee had a strong surveillance test program', however, an instance occurred that revealed a lack of knowledge while implementing a test, as evidenced by recording data from an incorrect gauge.
Core inspection efforts have been determined to be adequate in the maintenance area over the next 8 months.
In the engineering area, it was noted that your staff had initiated actions to strengthen the safety evaluation program to provide for more thorough safety evaluations.
However, isolated instances of poor safety evaluations, such as the failure to issue a procedure change to separate the auxiliary saltwater and component cooling water systems after a loss of coolant accident, continued to occur during this assessment period.
On a separate note, your staff had established an effective commercial grade procurement program.
Only core inspection efforts are scheduled in the engineering area over the next 8 months.
In the plant support area, some decline in emergency planning was observed, as revealed by the preparations for and implementation of the most recent graded emergency exercise.
Exercise weaknesses were identified for untimely activation of the technical support center and the emergency operations facilityand for failure to notify offsite agencies of the site area emergency declaration in a timely manner.
Several individual instances of poor fire protection implementation were identified. The security program continued to perform at a high level.
Only core inspection efforts are needed in the plant support area over the next 8 months.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an. integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or
Pacific Gas and Electric Company other docketed correspondence between the NRC and'Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
In addition, the PPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued but had not ye) received full review and consideration.
This material willbe placed in the PDR as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence. provides definitions for some of the information listed in the PIM.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Diablo Canyon PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. details our inspection plan for the next 8 months.
Also included in the plan are NRC noninspection activities. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
Because of the anticipated changes to the inspection program and other initiatives, this inspection schedule is subject to revision. Any changes to the schedule listed will be promptly discussed with your staff.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 817/860-8137.
Sincerely, Linda J. Smith, ing Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323 License Nos. DPR-80, DPR-82
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix (PIM)
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enclosures:
Dr. Richard Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 lith Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Mr. Truman Burns>Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission-505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102 Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 David H. Oatley, Vice President Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 3 Avila Beach,.California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo,-California 93406
Pacific Gas and Electric Company David Edge County Administrative Officer San Luis Obispo County Room 370, county Government Center San Luis Obispo, CA 93408 Orrin Orr Chief, Technical Hazards Branch 7100 Bowling Drive, Suite 250D Sacramento, CA 95823 Jack S. McGurk Chief, Environmental Management Branch 601 North 7th Street Sacramento, CA 95814-0208
Pacific Gas and Electric Company bcc to DCD (K46i-'6-NR I 9 l999 Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
MIS System RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS C. Gordon Records Center, INPO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16-E-15) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13D1)
DOCUMENT NAME: S:'tDRP>DRPDIR>PPR>DC To receive co of document, indicate In box: "C" = Co without enclosures "E" ~ Co with enclosures N = No co RIV:DRP/E GAPick;df ~
AC:DRP/E ':DRS LJSmith LhS ATHowell I/
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RECONCUR LJSmith t
3/tio /99 3/tt /99 3/4 99
'Y, 3/ /99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 3/i
/99
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 12/18/98 POS IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1B 12/18/98 NEG IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1C 12/18/98 POS IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION Overall, the operating crew responded satisfactorily to the degraded conditions in the circulating water system and the manual reactor trip by effectively stabilizing the plant in a safe condition with a loss of the normal heat sink. However, the generally successful response to the event was adversely impacted by several performance issues.
The management process for collecting plant process. information and evaluating equipment response to the manual reactor trip was rigorous in identifying and addressing equipment performance problems.
The process for evaluating human performance lacked the same degree of formality and structure as the management process for evaluating equipment response.
The lack of structure, coupled with poor operating logs, made it difficultto reconstruct event details and assess the root cause of specific operator performance issues.
12/4/98 POS IR 98-18 NRC OPS 1B Operators controlled power decreases and increases in a careful manner in response to equipment problems and high kelp loading on the traveling screens.
12/3/98 VIO IR 98-21 LIC OPS 1B 3B SL IV 12/3/98 VIO IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1B 3B SL IV 10/24/98 NCV
. IR 98-16 LIC OPS 1A 1B LER 1-98-005 The crew's misunderstanding of the effects of atmospheric dump valve pressure setpoint adjustments on the reactor coolant system, coupled with a communication error between the control operator and the shift foreman, resulted in a pressure setting of the atmospheric dump valves that exceeded the setpoint specified in the procedure.
The higher pressure setting unnecessarily challenged the main steam safety valves when it contributed to the liftingof Main Steam Safety Valve RV-7. A second example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to implement emergency operating procedure requirements; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
The crew did not understand the response of the intake screen differential pressure indication to a unit trip, which led them to improperly leave Circulating Water Pump 2-2 operating and resulted in the screen differential pressure exceeding the design limits. Weak fidelityamong the annunciator response procedures and an abnormal procedure and the crew's narrow focus on pump motor amps also contributed to the delay in securing the circulating water pump. One example of+
violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to secure the pump in accordance with abnormal operating procedures; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
A noncited violation was identified for failure to implement Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 on 6/2/98 by not verifying proper offsite power alignments when a diesel generator was rendered
- inoperable January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
0
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 10/22/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 9/26/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 09/12/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC OPS 1A 3B 9/12/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC OPS 1A 8/27/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 1B 8/1/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C 8/1/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C 5/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3B ITEM DESCRIPTION A thorough turbine building watch tour was an indication that operations department revised expectations were properly implemented Licensee planning, preparations and contingencies, including simulator training, for the dual unit startup transformer cold wash was conservative, thorough and executed properly A noncited violation was identified for failure to maintain procedures that controlled the positions allowed to maintain an active operator license consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 55.53. Specifically, the licensee allowed credit for the work control shift foreman, as adequate to meet minimum on-shift hours to maintain a license active, although this position required a minimal amount of time directing or supervising licensed reactor operators.
Also, the licensee inappropriately reactivated the licenses of two individuals using this provision during the past year; however, no operator certifications were currently invalid since personnel had stood the required number of proficiency watches Operator training (class room and simulator) on the effects of a loss of offsite power and unit trip during the startup transformer cold wash was good. Training personnel, Operations management, shift supervision, and operators provided valuable insights into the expected plant response and suggested more effective methods to combat a potential event.
Operators misapplied Equipment Control Guideline 80.1 by using a provision intended for doors with inoperable latching mechanisms and leaking seals to justifypropping open the control room doors, which resulted in a degraded control room envelope.
The licensee did not provide procedures or training nor did they evaluate the pertinent differences prior to substituting this manual for automatic action. The licensee implemented satisfactory corrective actions and an
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evaluation demonstrated the operability of the control room ventilation system The inspectors noted several minor errors in a sampling of two months of control operator and shift foreman's logs. The amount of information entered in the logs have improved compared to previous reviews.
Operator response to a high risk activity (work on 4 Kv panels for Bus G) was cautious and preparations were thorough. The repair activity was well planned to prevent inadvertent loss of power to the vital bus.
Overall good licensed operator applicant performance was observed during the initial license examinations.
Effective communications and good peer checks were observed in the dynamic simulator scenarios.
Allapplicants passed the examination.
January 25, 1999 2
Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 12/11/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC MAINT 5A 12/11/98 STR IR 98-17 NRC.
MAINT 2B 12/11/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC MAINT 3B
~11/25/98 NCV IR 98-18 LIC'AINT 3A 11/20/98 POS IR 98-18 NRC MAINT 3A 3B ITEM DESCRIPTION Licensee personnel were properly identifying, correcting, and documenting discrepant weld
'onditions, with subsequent notification being made to appropriate management.
The licensee's welding program and welding inspection procedures appropriately addressed inspection and monitoring requirements specified in ASME Code Sections III and IX, ANSI/ANS Codes B31.1 and B31.7, and Structural Welding Code AWS D.1-1. The procedures provided clear guidance with respect to inspections, frequencies, and responsibilities.
Welding material control requirements were being properly implemented by the weld room attendant who had a good understanding of the bases for those requirements.
A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified for failure to properly implement a procedure for calibration of a component cooling water system flowtransmitter; consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Technical maintenance personnel
. performed work on the wrong unit because of a lack of self-verification.
Overall, the licensee provided effective operator training, planning, and execution of the Diesel Engine Generator 1-1 cylinder head replacement.
Information contained in the vendor manual concerning proper maintenance steps for disconnecting the digital feedwater control system power supply was not incorporated into maintenance instructions, which resulted in a feedwater system transient.
This deficiency affected nonsafety-related equipment and did not violate any regulatory requirements.
Immediate operator response to the feedwater system transient was good, and licensee actions to prevent recurrence were effective IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 3A
'Based on review of licensee planning documentation; and observation of training, briefings, and the actual work; the inspectors considered that Unit 1 AuxiliarySalt Water (ASW) traveling screen replacement was a well planned and performed maintenance activity on an important safety system.
10/03/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC MAINT 1B 09/12/98 POS 09/j2/g8 NEG IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 2B 4B
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Although the licensee's risk analysis was acceptable to indicated only a slight increase in risk for doing the work on-line, the risk comparison between on-tine and shutdown was not meaningful for the on-line replacement of the Unit 1 traveling screen.
08/27/98 NEG IR 98-16 LIC MAINT 1B 2B Painting on a control room ventilation system fan was conducted without fullconsideration for the effect on operators.
As a consequence, paint fumes entered the control room envelope and caused unacceptable irritation to operations personnel January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 08/01/98 P OS IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1A 3A 3C The licensee provided good oversight and controls for testing of main steam safety valves. The augmented testing ot the MSSVs was scheduled and performed at the frequency specified in surveillance test Procedure STP M-77B, Appendix 7.1. The procedures governing the surveillance tests were technically adequate and personnel performing the surveillance demonstrated an adequate level of knowledge. The inspectors noted that test results indicated that the MSSVs litt points meet the TS 3.7.1.1 requirements.
08/01/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1C 08/01/98 NEG IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 3A 05/28/98 NEG IR 98-11 NRC MAINT 5B 5C The effectiveness ot the reorganization of Maintenance Services into asset teams is Ioo recent to be evaluated.
The inspectors noted the implementation of oversight controls in that coaches and technical specialists have been assigned to assist and monitor the implementation of the new organization. Both positive and negative aspects ot the new methods have been identified by the licensee, including a negative trend in performance.
Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor work practices in inadvertently leaving a check valve in a test gauge line. Although its installation did not impact the operability ot the safety injection pump, it did raise concerns about the validityof the subsequent surveillance tests.
The check valve interfered with the measurement of a significant parameter used to determine pump operability, and could have masked actual degradation ot the pump. The licensee's evaluation of the data logically led to the inspection of the suction pressure connection, which ultimately
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determined the cause, but the delay in review of the surveillance data trom the April27 test was a missed opportunity to correct the problem earlier.
The NRC has determined that a minor violation ot NRC requirements occurred during the steam leak repair on December 15, 1997, in that the modification of the work order was not documented as required by procedure, prior to conducting the repair. This failure constitutes a violation of.
minor significance and is not subject to tormal enforcement action. Further, the NRC concluded that the individuals involved in the activity intended to complete the repair in a manner allowed by procedures but inadvertently did not. Thus, the NRC determined that there was no willfulness associated with this violation. Finally, the NRC has concluded that, given the significance of the actual violation that occurred, your corrective actions were prompt and there were no violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
The corrective actions tor this December 15, 1997, event were not prompt in that: (1) while the need for a Quality Evaluation (QE) was immediately identified, a QE was not formalized until December 30, 1997, and no action was initiated to resolve the QE until February 13, 1998; and (2) written communication to operations personnel of management's expectations with regard to this event was not accomplished until February 17, 1998.
In addition, failure to take corrective action
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~ to add to existing instructions of the man-on-line tag resolution of Action Request A0411400, may have contributed to the event.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 05/25/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A 3B.
05/25/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 2B R 98-08 ITEM DESCRIPTION During surveillance testing of a safety injection pump, an operator error was identified in recording data from the wrong gauge, which was indicative of a lack familiaritywith the procedure and a lack of knowledge of the basis for the measurement being taken. This error was recognized by other licensee personnel independent of the inspectors'bservation.
Otherwise, this and other surveillances observed were performed satisfactorily.
The justification for deferral of inservice testing for several post accident sampling system valves during plant operation from quarterly to cold shutdowns was inappropriate in that the basis for
. deferral failed to recognize that the applicable valves were exercised during sampling during plant operations 05/14/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-10 LIC MAINT 2B 3A Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor self verification which, combined with an inadequate briefing and self imposed time pressure, resulted in a violation of TS 6.8.1.a for failure to implement instructions for performing maintenance, in that two auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were simultaneously rendered inoperable because oil was drained from the wrong pump.
In addition, licensee personnel failed to take adequate immediate corrective actions in that they: (1) failed to notify the control room in a timely manner; (2) continued to work on the wrong component without work authorization or a clearance; (3) failed to make timely log entries in the control operator's log; and (4) could have decided to perform a post-maintenance test in a more timely manner.
The safety significance of this event was mitigated by the relatively short period of time with two AFW pumps inoperable.
05/14/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC MAINT 3B 4B The mechanics demonstrated good maintenance practices in replacing the shuttle valves on the main feedwater Pump 1-1 stop valves. Engineering provided good on site assistance and assisted in determining the proper wiring of the new shuttle valves.
Performance of the functional test confirmed proper operation prior to returning the main feedwater pump to service.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID 'FA TEMPLATE CODE 12/04/98 NEG IR 98-18 NRC PS 1C 11/19/98 STR IR 98-19 NRC PS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION The inspectors identified that portable fire extinguishers located in vital areas were routinely not being inspected annually to the timeliness criteria contained in Procedure M-18.2. However, the fire extinguishers met their performance criteria when tested and the licensee implemented the appropriate corrective actions to correct the deficiency.
The licensee had an effective vehicle access control program. The access authorization program was effectively implemented.
An effective records and reporting system was in place for reporting safeguards events.
Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness-for-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.
11/19/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-19 NRC PS 3A A violation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B-Section E, and the licensee's training and qualification plan was identified involving the failure to perform annual requalifications of warehouse personnel responsible for conducting material and package searches.
The licensee implemented proper corrective actions; therefore, no response to the violation is required.
11/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 5C 1'1/06/98 MISC IR 98-15 NRC PS 1Q 3A 11/06/98 MISC IR 98-15
'LIC PS 1C 3A 11/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C
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3A 11/06/98 STR IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 5A 11/06/98 STR IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A Correction of two emergency action levels was untimely The untimely activation of both the technical support center and emergency operations facilitywas identified as an exercise weakness.
An exercise weakness was identified in the emergency operations facilityfor failure to notify the offsite agencies of the site, area emergency declaration within the required time limit. Since the licensee identified this exercise weakness, no response is required.
The originally submitted exercise scenario package was of poor quality because objectives were vague and not measurable, offsite radiological plume maps were missing, a scenario event was not properly coordinated with security personnel and had to be rewritten, and a list of simulated events was not developed or provided.
The integrated critique process demonstrated an effective program for identifying areas in need of correction, but exercise participants tended to be passive members in the process.
Overall, performance was good. The control room, technical support center, operational support center, and emergency operations facilitysuccessfully implemented key emergency plan functions including emergency classifications, protective action recommendations, and dose assessment.
A strength was identified in the control room concerning implementation of mitigation strategies for plant equipment fai!ures.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
l'
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID'FA TEMPLATE CODE 11/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A 10/24/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC PS 1B 1C 09/12/98
- NCV, IR 98-14 LIC PS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION Opportunities for improvement in the emergency operations facilityincluded: (1) communication and information flowwere ineffective at times and contributed to the late notification; and (2) the event classification, description, and status were confusing, unclear, and incomplete on notification forms.
The failure to identify that the Unit 2 postaccident sampling system (PASS) off-gas data did not meet procedure requirements or equipment control guidelines during data taking and subsequent supervisory review was an example of weak performance by chemistry personnel.
This item constitutes a minor violation not subject to formal enforcement action An NCV was identified for failure to establish procedures implementing portions of the fire protection program.
09/12/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-14 NRC PS 1C A violation was identified for failure to maintain fire protection procedures, in that the fire impairment procedure defined a continuous fire watch as a 15 minute roving fire patrol.. The licensee intended its use in only limited applications, but did not communicate their expectations properly, therefore, the licensee used this provision on several occasions inappropriately.
05/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC PS 2A Housekeeping and condition of external panels observed coincident with plant walkthroughs was good.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
ENCLOSURE 2 l)ate T)'pe SFA Suurces Issue l)escripliau Codes GENFRAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLELABELS Actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a dear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was issued (such as the I,FR date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period.
'I'he catcgorimtion of the issue - see the Type Item Code table.
SAI.P Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support.
The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report or LER for Licensee Event Report.
Identilication of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
Details of the issue from the LER text or from the IR Fxecutive Summaries.
Template Codes - see table.
TYPF. ITFM CODES TEMP LATF.CODES EA ED Strength Fnforcement Action Letter with CivilPenalty Fnforcement Discretion - No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; 8 - Operations During Transicnls; and C - Programs and Processes 2
Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or 8 - Programs and Processes weakness F.F.I 4 VIO NCV DF.V Overall IVeak Licensee Performance F>calated Enforcement Item - IVaitingFinal NRC Action Violation Level I, II,III,or IV Non-Cited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC 3
Human Performance: A - IVorkPerformance; 8 - Knowledge, Skills, and AbilitiesI Training; C - IVorkEnvironment Engineering/Design: A - Design; 8 - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identilication and Resolution: A - Identification; 8 - Analysis; and C-Resolution Positive Negative LF.R URI **
I.icensing MISC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding I.icensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
NOTES:
EEIsare apparent violations ofNRC requirements that arc being considered for cscaiatcd enforcement action in accordance with th>> "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not rcachcd its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entrics may hc modified when thc final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enl'orcemcnt decision, thc licensee willbe provided with an opportunity to either (I) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcemcnt conference.
URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether thc issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its linal conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entrics may hc modified when the llnal conclusions are made.
ENCLOSURE 3 DIABLOCANYON INSPECTION PLAN IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction Core Inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatoIy all plants)
INSPECTION TITLE/
PROGRAM AREA IP 81700 PHYSICALSECURITY PROGRAM IP 71001 REQUALIFICATIONPROGRAM EVALUATION NUMBER OF INSPECTORS 1
DATES 4/5 - 9/99 4/5 - 9/99 TYPE OF INSPECTION/COMMENTS CORE INSPECTION CORE INSPECTION EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS IN IP 40500 IDENTIFYING,RESOLVING, AND PREVENTING PROBLEMS IP 83750 OCCUPATIONALRADIATIGNEXPOSURE RADIOACTIVEWASTE TREATMENT,AND EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL.MONITORING
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RADIOACTIVEWASTE TREATMENT,AND EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTALMONITORING IP 83750 OCCUPATIONALRADIATIONEXPOSURE IP 86750 TRANSPORTATION 3
5/17 - 21/99 CORE INSPECTION 6/14 - 18/99 CORE INSPECTION 6/14 - 18/99 CORE INSPECTION 8/30 - 9/3/99 CORE INSPECTION 9/20 - 24/99 CORE INSPECTION 11/1 - 5/99 CORE INSPECTION
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