ML16342C109
| ML16342C109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1999 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904070415 | |
| Download: ML16342C109 (32) | |
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CATEGORY 2 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9904070415 DOC.DATE: 99/03/30 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-275 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Pacific Ga 05000275 50-323 Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Pacific Ga 05000323 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SMITH,L.J.
Region 4 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATXON RUEGER,G.M.
Pacific Gas
& Electric Co.
SUBJECT:
Forwards plant issues matrix that was inadvertently omitted from PPR for plant facility.Encl 1 to PPR requested to be replaced.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
ZE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response NOTES:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD4-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD LE CENTER R7'DMP PECB NUDOCS -ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 EXTERNAL: LMXTCO MARSHALL NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)
ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 19 ENCL 19
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t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZADRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011-8064 MAR 30 j999 Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B32 77 Beale Street, 32nd Floor P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 941 77
SUBJECT:
ERRATA TO PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - DIABLOCANYON UNITS 1 AND 2
Dear Mr. Rueger:
A On March 19, 1999, NRC issued a completed Plant Performance Review for your Diablo Canyon facility. Subsequent to issuance of the letter it was noted that the Engineering functional area was inadvertently omitted from the Plant Issues Matrix. Please replace Enclosure 1 to the Plant Performance Review with the attached Enclosure 1. We regret any inconvenience that this may have caused.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 817/860-8137.
L Sincerely, w~/-
Linda Joy Smith, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-275, 50-323 License Nos. DPR-80, DPR-82
Enclosure:
Plant Issues Matrix cc w/enclosure:
Dr. Richard Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 lith Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814 99040704i5 990330 PDR ADOCK 05000275 6
.v
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Mr. Truman Burns>Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102 Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 David H. Oatley, Vice President Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 3 Avila Beach, California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406
Pacific Gas and Electric Company David Edge County Administrative Officer San Luis Obispo County Room 370, county Government Center San Luis Obispo, CA 93408 Jack S. McGurk Chief, Environmental Management Branch 601 North 7th Street Sacramento, CA 95814-0208
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company bcc to DCD (tF40) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR
. PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Managem W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13D1)
Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
MIS System RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS C. Gordon Records Center, INPO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16-E-15) ent Section, OEDO DOCUMENT NAME S:'tDRP'tDRPDIRiPPRiDC.REV To receive co of document, Indicate in box: "C" = Co without enclosures Co with enciosures "N" = No co RIV:DRP/E GAPick;df
'/30/99 AC:DRP/E D:DRP KEBrock
- LJSmith, 3/30/9 3/~ - /99 OFFICIALRECORD COP' RECONCUR LJSmith 3/30/99
Pacific Gas and Electric Company bcc to DCD (IE40)
Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
MIS System RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS C. Gordon Records Center, INPO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16-E-15) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO, T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13E16)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13D1)
DOCUMENT NAME: S:>DRP>DRPDIRtPPREDC.REV To receive co of document, Indicate In box:
C" ~ Co without enclosures Co with enclosures "N" = No co RIV:DRP/E GAPick;df
'/30/99 D:DRP AC:DRP/E KEBrock LJSmith 3/~
/99 3/30/9 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY RECONCUR LJSmith 3/30/99
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 12/18/98 NEG IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1C 12/18/98 POS IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1C 12/4/98 POS IR 98-18 NRC OPS 1B 12/3/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-21 LIC OPS 1B 3B 12/3/98 VIO IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1B 3B SL IV 10/24/98 NCV IR 98-16 LIC OPS 1A 1 B LER 1-98-005 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 12/18/98 POS IR 98-21 NRC OPS 1B ITEM DESCRIPTION Overall, the operating crew responded satisfactorily to the degraded conditions in the circulating water system and the manual reactor trip by effectively stabilizing the plant in a safe condition with a loss of the normal heat sink. However, the generally successful response to the event was adversely impacted by several performance issues.
The management process for collecting plant process information and evaluating equipment response to the manual reactor trip was rigorous in identifying and addressing equipment performance problems.
The process for evaluating human performance lacked the same degree of formality and structure as the management process for evaluating equipment response.
The lack of structure, coupled with poor operating logs, made it difficultto reconstruct event details and assess the root cause of specific operator performance issues.
Operators controlled power decreases and increases in a careful manner in response to equipment problems and high kelp loading on the traveling screens.
The crew's misunderstanding of the effects of atmospheric dump valve pressure setpoint adjustments on the reactor coolant system, coupled with a communication error between the control operator and the shift foreman, resulted in a pressure setting of the atmospheric dump valves that exceeded the setpoint specified in the procedure.
The higher pressure setting unnecessarily challenged the main steam safety valves when it contributed to the liftingof Main Steam Safety Valve RV-7, A second example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to implement emergency operating procedure requirements; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
The crew did not understand the response of the intake screen differential pressure indication to~
unit trip, which led them to improperly leave Circulating Water Pump 2-2 operating and resulted in~
the screen differential pressure exceeding the design limits. Weak fidelityamong the annunciator response procedures and an abnormal procedure and the crew's narrow focus on pump motor-amps also contributed to the delay in securing the circulating water pump. One example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to secure the pump in accordance with abnormal operating procedures; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
A noncited violation was identified for failure to implement Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 on 6/2/98 by not verifying proper offsite power alignments when a diesel generator was rendered inoperable January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
III
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 10/22/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 9/26/98 POS IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 09/12/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC OPS 1A 3B 9/12/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC OPS 1A 8/27/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC OPS 1A 1B 8/1/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C 8/1/98 POS IR 98-13 NRC OPS 1A 1C 5/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC OPS 3B ITEM DESCRIPTION A thorough turbine building watch tour was an indication that operations department revised expectations were properly implemented Licensee planning, preparations and contingencies, including simulator training, for the dual unit startup transformer cold wash was conservative, thorough and executed properly A noncited violation was identified for failure to maintain procedures that controlled the positions allowed to maintain an active operator license consistent with the requirements specified in 10 CFR 55.53. Specifically, the licensee allowed credit for the work control shift foreman, as adequate to meet minimum on-shift hours to maintain a license active, although this position required a minimal amount of time directing or supervising licensed reactor operators.
Also, the licensee inappropriately reactivated the licenses of two individuals using this provision during the past year; however, no operator certifications were currently invalid since personnel had stood the required number of proficiency watches Operator training (class room and simulator) on the effects of a loss of offsite power and unit trip during the startup transformer cold wash was good. Training personnel, Operations management, shift supervision, and operators provided valuable insights into the expected plant response and suggested more effective methods to combat a potential event.
Operators misapplied Equipment Control Guideline 80 1 by using a provision intended for doors with inoperable latching mechanisms and leaking seals to justifypropping open the control room doors, which resulted in a degraded control room envelope.
The licensee did not provide procedures or training nor did they evaluate the pertinent differences prior to substituting this manual for automatic action. The licensee implemented satisfactory corrective actions and an evaluation demonstrated the operability of the control room ventilation system The inspectors noted several minor errors in a sampling of two months of control operator and shift foreman's logs. The amount of information entered in the logs have improved compared to previous reviews.
Operator response to a high risk activity (work on 4 Kv panels for Bus G) was cautious and preparations were thorough. The repair activity was well planned to prevent inadvertent loss of power to the vital bus.
Overall good licensed operator applicant performance was observed during the initfal license examinations.
Effective communications and good peer checks were observed in the dynamic simulator scenarios.
Allapplicants passed the examination.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX 12/11/98 STR IR 98-17 NRC MAINT 2B 12/11/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC MAINT 3B
~
11/25/98 NCV IR 98-18 LIC MAINT 3A 11/20/98 POS IR 98-18 NRC MAINT 3A 3B 10/03/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC MAINT 1B 09/12/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 3A 09/12/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 2B 4B 08/27/98 NEG IR 98-16 LIC MAINT 1B 2B DATE TYPE SOURCE ID.
SFA TEMPLATE CODE 12/11/98 POS IR 98-17 NRC MAINT SA ITEM DESCRIPTION Licensee personnel were properly identifying, correcting, and documenting discrepant weld conditions, with subsequent notification being made to appropriate management.
The licensee's welding program and welding inspection procedures appropriately addressed inspection and monitoring requirements specified in ASME Code Sections III and IX, ANSI/ANS Codes B31.1 and B31.7, and Structural Welding Code AWS D.1-1. The procedures provided clear guidance with respect to inspections, frequencies, and responsibilities.
Welding material control requirements were being properly implemented by the weld room attendant who had a good understanding of the bases for those requirements.
A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified for failure to properly implement a procedure for calibration of a component cooling water system flowtransmitter, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Technical maintenance personnel
'erformed work on the wrong unit because of a lack of self-verification.
Overall, the licensee provided effective operator training, planning, and execution of the Diesel Engine Generator 1-1 cylinder head replacement.
Information contained in the vendor manual concerning proper maintenance steps for disconnecting the digital feedwater control system power supply was not incorporated into maintenance instructions, which resulted in a feedwater system transient.
This deficiency affected nonsafety-related equipment and did not violate any regulatory requirements.
Immediate operator response to the feedwater system transient was good, and licensee actions to prevent recurrence were effective Based on review of licensee planning documentation; and observation of training, briefings, and the actual work; the inspectors considered that Unit 1 AuxiliarySalt Water (ASW) traveling scree replacement was a well planned and performed maintenance activity on an important safety system.
Although the licensee's risk analysis was acceptable to indicated only a slight increase in risk for doing the work on-line, the risk comparison between on-line and shutdown was not meaningful for the on-line replacement of the Unit 1 traveling screen.
Painting on a control room ventilation system fan was conducted without fullconsideration for the effect on operators.
As a consequence, paint fumes entered the control room envelope and caused unacceptable irritation to operations personnel January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 08/01/98 POS 08/01/98 NEG 08/01/98 NE6 IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1A 3A IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 3A IR 98-13 NRC MAINT 1C 3C The licensee'rovided good oversight and controls for testing of main steam safety valves. The augmented testing of the MSSVs was scheduled and performed at the frequency specified in surveillance test Procedure STP M-77B, Appendix 7.1. The procedures governing the surveillance tests were technically adequate and personnel performing the surveillance demonstrated an adequate level of knowledge.
The inspectors noted that test results indicated that the MSSVs litt points meet the TS 3.7.1.1 requirements.
The effectiveness of the reorganization of Maintenance Services into asset teams is too recent to be evaluated.
The inspectors noted the implementation ot oversight controls in that coaches and technical specialists have been assigned to assist and monitor the implementation of the new organization. Both positive and negative aspects of the new methods have been identified by the licensee, including a negative tr'end in performance.
Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor work practices in inadvertently leaving a check valve in a test gauge line. Although its installation did not impact the operability ot the safety injection pump, it did raise concerns about the validity of the subsequent surveillance tests.
The check valve interfered with the measurement of a significant parameter used to determine pump operability, and could have masked actual degradation ot the pump. The licensee's evaluation of the data logically led to the inspection ot the suction pressure connection, which ultimately determined the cause, but the delay in review ot the surveillance data from the April27 test was a missed opportunity to correct the problem earlier.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
0
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 05/28/98 NEG IR 98-11 NRC MAINT 5B 5C 05/25/98 NEG IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A 3B 05/25/98 NEG IR 98-14 NRC MAINT 2B R 98-08 The NRC has determined that a minor violation ot NRC requirements occurred during the steam leak repair on December 15, 1997, in that the modification of the work order was not documented as required by procedure, prior to conducting the repair. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to tormal enforcement action.
Further, the NRC concluded that the individuals involved in the activity intended to complete the repair in a manner allowed by procedures but inadvertently did not. Thus, the NRC determined that there was no willfulness associated with this violation. Finally, the NRC has concluded that, given the significance of the actual violation that occurred, your corrective actions were prompt and there were no violations of~
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
The corrective actions for this December 15, 1997, event were not prompt in that: (1) while the need tor a Quality Evaluation (QE) was immediately identified, a QE was not formalized until December 30, 1997, and no action was initiated to resolve the QE until February 13, 1998; and (2) written communication to operations personnel of management's expectations with regard to this event was not accomplished until February 17, 1998.
In addition, failure to take corrective action to add to existing instructions of the man-on-line tag resolution of Action Request A0411400, may have contributed to the event.
During surveillance testing ot a safety injection pump, an operator error was identified in recording data from the wrong gauge, which was indicative of a lack familiaritywith the procedure and a lack of knowledge of the basis for the measurement being taken. This error was recognized by other licensee personnel independent ot the inspectors'bservation.
Otherwise, this and other surveillances observed were performed satisfactorily.
The justification for deferral of inservice testing for several post accident sampling system valves during plant operation from quarterly to cold shutdowns was inappropriate in that the basis for deferral failed to recognize that the applicable valves were exercised during sampling during plant~
operations.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 05/14/98 VIO SL IV IR 98-10 LIC MAINT 2B 3A Maintenance personnel demonstrated poor self verification which, combined with an inadequate briefing and self imposed time pressure, resulted in a violation of TS 6.8.1.a for failure to implement instructions for performing maintenance, in that two auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps-were simultaneously rendered inoperable because oil was drained from the wrong pump.
In addition, licensee personnel failed to take adequate immediate corrective actions in that they:
(1) failed to notifythe control room in a timely manner; (2) continued to work on the wrong component without work authorization or a clearance; (3) failed to make timely log entries in the control operator's log; and (4) could have decided to perform a post-maintenance test in a more timely manner.
The safety significance of this event was mitigated by the relatively short period of time with two AFW pumps inoperable.
05/14/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC MAINT 3B 4B The mechanics demonstrated good maintenance practices in replacing the shuttle valves on the main feedwater Pump 1-1 stop valves. Engineering provided good on site assistance and assisted in determining the proper wiring of the new shuttle valves.
Performance of the functional test confirmed proper operation prior to returning the main feedwater pump to service.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 11/20/98 NEG IR 98-18 LIC ENG 4A 10/24/98 NCV IR 98-16 LIC ENG 2B VII.B.6 LER 2-95-003 08/01/98 NEG IR 98-13 LIC ENG 4B 4C 07/21/98 NCV IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B VII.B.6 EA 98-364 07/21/98 NEG IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B 4C ITEM DESCRIPTION The inspectors concluded that the loss of startup power to the site and subsequent starting of all diesel generators on both units was caused by inadequate relay setpoint design review and inadequate testing during installation of the new startup transformers in 1997. The licensee's immediate corrective actions for this nonsafety-related design deficiency were satisfactory.
On 11/22/95, engineers identified, during a review of industry information in November 1995, that a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2 had occurred for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes in November 1989. The violation existed during maintenance of Train A components that rendered both trains of safety injection inoperable by then a then-unrecognized interdependency of the cold leg recirculation paths.
Core cooling could have been provided by Train B low pressure and high pressure pumps; therefore, no actual consequences would have resulted.
Based on the age of the issue, the isolated occurrence, the fact that this was unlikely to be identified during routine licensee reviews, and the initiative demonstrated by the engineers, the NRC decided that no enforcement action is necessary on this matter. Consequently, the NRC, in accordance with Section VII.B.6of the Enforcement Policy, exercised enforcement discretion to not propose a civil penalty and to not cite a violation The inspectors concluded that the licensee's operability evaluation (OE) for the Unit 1 containment fan cooler units (CFCUs) was adequate, pending a root cause of failure determination for CFCU 1-2.
However, the inspectors considered that there was a potential for the failure of CFCU 1-2 to be due to a common cause not yet recognized; therefore, the inspectors considered that it was prudent to remove CFCU 1-2 at the earliest opportunity, to verifythat the suspected root cause was valid.
The procedural change to not split the auxiliary saltwater and component cooling water systems into their respective trains following a loss-of-coolant accident was determined to be a nonsubstantial unreviewed safety question and willnot be cited as provided by Section VII.B.6of the NRC Enforcement Policy The 10 CFR 50.59 program was not effectively utilized to determine whether proposed design or procedural changes represented potential unreviewed safety questions or affected the technical specifications.
Design and procedural changes utilized the 10 CFR 50.59 process as a means of validating design and procedural changes but did not correctly provide a licensing basis determination.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
A
PLANT ISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 07/21/98 VIO IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B SL IV ITEM DESCRIPTION A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified, with two examples, for changes to the component cooling water system and a procedural revision for the operation of the residual heat removal system during containment recirculation, which involved inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 reviews. The licensee failed to identify that the modification and procedure change involved a change to the technical specifications incorporated in the license 07/21/98 VIO SL IV IR 98.09 NRC
'NG 4B A violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for failing to obtain NRC approval prior to siting a segment of the Unit 1 auxiliary saltwater bypass line on ground not considered bedrock as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update, which was determined by the NRC to involve an unreviewed safety question.
07/21/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC ENG 4B 4C SC The licensee initiated specific steps to strengthen the 10 CFR 50.59 process including the principle focus being through the regulatory services group; established an open dialogue with the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation regarding 10 CFR 50.59 issues; and implemented a management review committee, consisting of management personnel cognizant of the 10 CFR 50.59 process, to review specific safety evaluations.
07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG 5A 07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG 4A 05/25/98 NEG IR 98-08 LIC ENG 4A 5B 5C 07/16/98 POS IR 98-201 NRC ENG 4C The program for dedicating and upgrading commercial-grade, warehouse material not originally purchased with the intent of dedication for safety-related service was generally technically sound and incorporated adequate quality assurance controls.
The self-assessment of replacement part evaluation activities was thorough, insightful, and candid.
The planned corrective actions addressed the identified concerns.
Review of the, technical evaluation and quality assurance aspects of a 1994 circuit board replacement (for which Region IV had cited the licensee for failure to perform a prompt operability determination after the licensee's discovery of the problem in 1996) revealed deficiencies in the original safety classification, procurement process, review for suitability of application, and verification that all board components met the design requirement.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had resolved the technical issues satisfactorily and independently verified that the correct configurations of the circuit boards in question were installed in all six emergency diesel generator exciter-regulator cabinets.
The determination that the lack of the proper seismic gap for the turbine pedestal represented a
lack of conformance to the design and licensing basis was not timely. This issue was identified October 1997, but the operability issues were not thoroughly addressed until May 1998. The conclusions of the operability evaluation and prompt operability assessment were reasonable based on the information available.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 12/04/98 NEG IR 98-18 NRC PS 1C 11/19/98 STR IR 98-19 NRC PS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION The inspectors identified that portable fire extinguishers located in vital areas were routinely not being inspected annually to the timeliness criteria contained in Procedure M-18.2. However, the fire extinguishers met their performance criteria when tested and the licensee implemented the appropriate corrective actions to correct the deficiency.
The licensee had an effective vehicle access control program.
The access authorization program was eftectively implemented.
An effective records and reporting system was in place for reportiiig safeguards events.
Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness-tor-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.
11/19/98 VIO SL IV 11/06/98 NEG 11/06/98 MISC IR 98-19 NRC PS 3A IR 98-15 NRC PS 5C IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A A violation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B-Section E, and the licensee's training and qualification plan was identified involving the failure to perform'annual requalifications of warehouse personnel responsible for conducting material and package searches.
The licensee implemented proper corrective actions; therefore, no response to the violation is required.
Correction of two emergency action levels was untimely.
The untimely activation of both the technical support center and emergency operations facilitywas identified as an exercise weakness.
11/06/98 MISC IR 98-15 LIC PS 1C 3A 11/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A 11/06/98 STR IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 5A 11/06/98 STR IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A An exercise weakness,was identified in the emergency operations facilityfor failure to notifythe offsite agencies of the site area emergency declaration within the required time limit. Since the licensee identified this exercise weakness, no response is required.
The originally submitted exercise scenario package was of poor quality because objectives were vague and not measurable, oftsite radiological plume maps were missing, a scenario event was not properly coordinated. with security personnel and had to be rewritten, and a list of simulated events was not developed or provided.
The integrated critique process demonstrated an eftective program for identifying areas in need of correction, but exercise participants tended to be passive members in the process.
Overall, performance was good. The control room, technical support center, operational support center, and emergency operations facilitysuccessfully implemented key emergency plan functions including emergency classifications, protective action recommendations, and dose assessment.
A strength was identified in the control room concerning implementation of mitigation strategies for plant equipment failures.
January 25, 1999 Diablo Canyon
0
PLANTISSUES MATRIX DATE TYPE SOuRCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE 11/06/98 NEG IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C 3A 10/24/98 NEG IR 98-16 NRC PS 1B 1C 09/12/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC PS 1C 09/12/98
~ VIO IR 98-14 NRC PS 1C SL IV 05/15/98 POS IR 98-301 NRC PS 2A ITEM DESCRIPTION Opportunities for improvement in the emergency operations facilityincluded: (1) communication and information flowwere ineffective at times and contributed to the late notification; and (2) the event classification, description, and status were confusing, unclear, and incomplete on notification forms.
The failure to identify that the Unit 2 postaccident sampling system (PASS) off-gas data did not meet procedure requirements or equipment control guidelines during data taking and subsequent ~
supervisory review was an example of weak performance by chemistry personnel.
This item constitutes a minor violation not subject to formal enforcement action An NCV was identified for failure to establish procedures implementing portions of the fire protection program.
A violation was identified for failure to maintain fire protection procedures, in that the fire impairment procedure defined a continuous fire watch as a 15 minute roving fire patrol. The licensee intended its use in only limited applications, but did not communicate their expectations properly, therefore, the licensee used this provision on several occasions inappropriately.
Housekeeping and condition of external panels observed coincident with plant walkthroughs was good.
January 25, 1999 10 Diablo Canyon