ML16342A901
| ML16342A901 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1999 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909240105 | |
| Download: ML16342A901 (40) | |
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0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZADRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011.8064 Sepi:embeI" 16, 1999 Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B32 77 Beale Street, 32nd Floor P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177
SUBJECT:
MIDCYCLEPLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - DIABLOCANYON On August 18, 1999, the NRC staff completed the midcycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Diablo Canyon.
The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities. The focus of this performance review was to identify changes in performance over the past 6 months and to allocate inspection resources for the next 7 months.
We did not identify any areas in which your performance warranted additional inspection effort beyond the core inspection program.
Based on this review, we plan to conduct only core inspections at your facility over the next 7 months.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated review of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Pacific Gas 8 Electric Company from October 1, 1998, to July 16, 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identified in the past 6 months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issues that it believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of our plans for future inspection activities at your facilityso that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections that may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000. This date was chosen to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor. oversight process in April 2000. Also, included in the plan are NRC noninspection activities. Routine resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and contirIuous nature.
9909240i05 9909kb PDR ADOCK 05000275 6
Pacific Gas and Electric Company h If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we willcontact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.
Please contact Linda Smith at (817) 860-8137 with any questions you may have.
Sincerely, Linda J. Smith,hie Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.:
50-275 50-323 License Nos.: DPR-80 DPR-82
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan CC:
Dr. Richard Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 lith Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814 Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Mr. Truman Burns>Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Robert R. Wellington, Esq.
Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234-7320 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 David H. Oatley, Vice President Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 3 Avila Beach, California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406 County Administrative Officer San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Robert A. Laurie, Commissioner California Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street (MS 31)
Sacramento, California 95814 Ed Bailey, Chief Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178)
Sacramento, California 94234-7320
Pacific Gas and Electric Company sEp j 6 i99"=
bcc to DCD (IE40) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp, and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Manag S. Richards, NRR Project Director (MS: 13D1)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13D1)
Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
RITS Coordinator RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS C. Gordon Records Center, INPO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16-E-15) ement Section, OEDO DOCUMENT NAME: S:4PPR 99-0A,Le ters)OC To receive co of document, indicate in box: "C" = Co without enclosures "E" = Co with enciosures "N" = No co RIV:DRP/E AC:DRP/E D:D S
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Pacific Gas and Electric Company SEP I 6 l999 bcc to DCD (IE40)
Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
RITS Coordinator RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
- Chief, OEDO/ROPMS'.
Gordon Records Center, INPO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16-E-15) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator PRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO S. Richards, NRR Project Director (MS: 13D1)
S. Bloom, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13D1)
Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB DOCUMENT NAME: S:gPPR 99-02)Letters(DC To receive co of document, indicate in box: "C" = Co without enclosures "E" = Co with enclosures "N" = No co RIV:DRP/
GAPick;I'b 9/t /99 D:D S
D:DRP AC:DRP/E LJSmith <
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1 of 14 08/23/I 999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON I I14LVJVIXL United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 05/20/1999 1999006.02 P(i: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC NCV Prl: 1A Sec: 1C
-Ter: 3A Two examples of failure to followAdmln procedures Two examples of a noncited violation of TS 6.8.1.a, in accordance viith Appendix C of the enforcement policy. were identiTied for failure to followprocedures.
In the first example, carpenters installed a scaffold that blocked a fire suppression sprinMer in the area of a component cooling water pump, in violation of the scaffolding procedure.
In the second example, operators improperly implemented Equipment Control Guideline 18.4, when declaring the fire suppression system inoperable in the area of component cooling water Pump 1-3. Operators initiated an hourly fire tour instead of a continuous fire watch as required by Equipment Control Guideline 18.4. The fire protection engineer performed a subsequent review that determined that the fire suppression system was degraded, but operable.
Four other recent operator errors viith respect to implementation of the Equipment Control Guidelines indicated that improvement was necessary in this area.
These two examples of the violation were placed in the corrective action program as Action Requests A0485075 and A0484540.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Ter:
04/08/1999 1999002 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3B Sec:
Sec:
Good operator communications during exam scenario.
Operators practiced good three-legged communications, peer checking, and crew briefings during dynamic simulator scenarios. Facility evaluators administered the requalification examination professionally and provided well documented findings to support their evaluations. (Sections 04.1
~ 05.2) 04/08/1999 1999002 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC STR Prl: 3B Sec:
Ter:
Good management support of and Involvement In operator training Operations management involvement in the licensed operator requalification training program, including the role of the operations liaison, was considered a strength (Sections 05.2, 05.3) 04/06/1999 1999004-01 Pri: OPS Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Inadequate procedures to ensure pressurizer mixing
.A noncited violation was identified for failure to adequately maintain procedures, as required by Technical SpeciTication 6.8.1.a.
Specifically, procedures did not direct operators to energize the pressurizer backup heaters to ensur'e mixing when the pressurizer steam space sample valves were opened.
Knowledge of the need to perform this action was not within the skill of the newer operators.
The licensee performed a good investigation, and this noncited violation was documented in the corrective action program as Action Request A0482289.
03/26/1999 1999004 03 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC NCV Prl: 1A Sec: 1C Ter:
Failure to implement the Procedure for establishing a fire watch An NRC-identified noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.h was identified. Operators failed to implement a fire protection procedure for establishing a fire watch, because of weak knowledge of fire protection program requirements.
Although this condition existed for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, the issue was mitigated because the area was patrolled hourly for an unrelated fire impairment. This noncited violation was documented in the corrective action program as Action Request A0481645.
03/20/1999 1999004 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec: 1B Ter:
Operator ramp down In power to 50%.
Operators ramped Unit 1 to 50 percent power on indication of elevated differential pressure across the main condenser because of mussel shells. The root cause analysis was thorough, determined that the influxof mussel shells resulted from incomplete cleaning of the Unit 1 traveling screens during Refueling Outage 1R9, and categorized this as a maintenance preventable functional failure.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 10/01/1 998 To 07/01/1 999
Page:
2 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 03/20/1999 1999004 02 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Licensee NCV Prl: 2A Sec: 2B Ter:
Inadequate procedures for controlling OT and OP delta-T reactor protection channel bypassing A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified because operators had placed two reactor protection system channels for Overtemperature T and Overpower T in bypass simultaneously, which was prohibited by Technical Specification 3.3.1. The shiit foreman and licensing personnel demonstrated excellent attention to detail in identification of this issue.
This noncited violation was documented in the corrective action program as AR A0481553.
03/06/1999 1999003 Pri: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Prl: 1A Sec:
Tef:
Overall efforts during 1R9 refueling improved from 2R8 With the exception of minor procedure and communications problems, which occurred during performance of the initial steps of the refueling, all parties involved in the fuel load performed well. Performance during core alterations Was improved in that procedure and perlormance concerns identified in Refueling Outage 2R8 were corrected for Refueling Outage 1R9.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 03/06/1999 1999003 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Equipment clearance program Improved In 1R9 from previous outages Clearance performance during Refueling Outage 1R9 improved as compared to previous outages.
A sampling of clearances that the inspectors examined revealed only one minor error. In addition, the licensee identified fewer significant clearance errors than during Refueling Outage 2R8, indicating that corrective actions effectively improved clearance performance, but further improvement in this area is still necessary 03/04/1999 1999003 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC POS Pcl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Good performance during RCS drain downs In U1 The planning, preparations, and execution of the two draindowns of the Unit 1 reactor to reduced Inventory conditions were generally conducted in a conservative manner.
Licensee contingencies and compensatory actions were appropriate to the circumstances.
02/25/1999 1999003 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Self NEG Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Operator monitoring of spent fuel pool temperature after core offload not conservative Operating procedures were not conservative viith respect to monitoring spent fuel pool temperature since increased temperature monitoring was not required with a fullcore oNoad in the spent fuel pool. Operators continued to monitor the Unit 1 spent fuel pool temperature every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. As a result, following an inadvertent trip of Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 1-2, the pump trip went undetected for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, until a spent fuel pool high temperature annunciator alarmed.
02/11/1999 1999003 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Self NEG Pri: 1A Sec: 3B Ter:
Nitrogen pressurization effects during mldloop not anticipated In Mode 6, while pressurizing the primary relief tank with nitrogen during the draindown to midloop, operators did not have a fullunderstanding of its effect on reactor vessel level. As a result, reactor vessel level dropped approximately 2 feet in an uncontrolled manner, and water flowed into the steam generator tubes.
No procedural limits were exceeded.
Item Tvpe ICompliance.Followup.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
rn
Page:
3 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 02/03/1999 1999003 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Pri: 1A Sec: 3B Ter:
Operators failed to revise risk assessment during RHR flush after adding systems Operators failed to revise the risk assessment of performing the residual heat removal system flush during power operation when they elected to include removal of the boric acid storage tanks from service as part of the evolution.
Operators understood that the boric acid storage tanks were of low risk significance and believed that a revision of the risk assessment was unnecessary because of weak knowledge of the on-line maintenance risk assessment procedure.
Subsequent evaluation of the risk associated with this activity confirmed the risk was low.
02/03/1999 1999004.04 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC NCV Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 4B Failure to followadministrative controls for on-line maintenance The failure to properly followan administrative procedure for controlling maintenance activities was identified as a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
Operators performed the risk assessment, used to determine if on. line maintenance is acceptable, after declaring the auxiliary saltwater supply to Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger 2-1 inoperable for replacement of the inlet expansion joint. The operators also failed to consult with the onsite Probabilistic Risk Assessment group, as required.
In addition, the licensee identified several performance weaknesses, such as failure to properly document actions taken and poor communication among operators and between operators and management related to the risk involved with the emergent maintenance.
This noncited violation was documented in the corrective action program as Action Request A0476004 01/28/1999 1999301 Pri: QPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec: 3A Ter:
Poor quality for licensee Initial exam submittal The licensee's initial examination submittal was considered acceptable for administration requiring only minor enhancement suggestions.
However, subsequent post-written examinations resulted in, the licensee commenting on six written examination questions, which required justification by the licensee and an explanation of how future post-examination comments viiifbe minimized.
01/28/1999 1999301 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS PrL 1C Sec: 3B Ter.
Overall licensed operator applicant performance satisfactory Allsix applicants demonstrated the requisite knowledge and skills to satisfy the requireinents of 10 CFR Part 55 and were issued senior operator licenses (Section 04.1).AII six applicants demonstrated the requisite knowfedge and skills to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 and were issued senior operator licenses.
01/28/1999 1999301 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC STR Prl: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:
Good overall license operator exam performance Overall, licensed operator applicants performed well during the examination.
Operators demonstrated good 3-way communications practices, peer checking, and crew briefs. No generic performance weaknesses were identified.
01/23/1999 1998020 Pri: QPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC PQS Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Power ascension performed In careful manner The inspectors monitored portions of each reactor startup and power ascension and determined that operators
. manipulated both units in a careful manner in accordance with procedures unm rico r umnliance.Followup.Other)
~ From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
4 of 14 08/23/1 999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description
'12/18/1998 1998020 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Good operator response to unidentified leakage on RCP Operator identification of increasing Unit 1 unidentified leakage and shut down of Unit 1, was an example of good attention to detail and conservative decision making. The root cause analysis, repairs, and retesting of a leaking threaded joint on Reactor Coolant Pump 1-3 were performed well.
12/18/1998 1998021 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Process for collecting human performance Information lacked formality and structure.
The process for evaluating human performance lacked the same degree of formalityand structure as the management process for evaluating equipment response.
The lack of structure, coupled viith poor operating logs, made it difficultto reconstruct event details and assess the root cause of specific operator performance issues.
12/18/1998 1998021 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Pri: 1B Sec:
Ter:
Operating crew responded satisfactorily to degraded conditions in circulating water system.
Overall, the operating crew responded satisfactorily to the degraded conditions in the circulating water system and the manual reactor trip by effectively stabilizing the plant in a safe condition. However, the generally successful response to the event was adversely impacted by several performance issues.
12/18/1998 1998021 Pri: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Pri: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Process for collecting plant pr ocess Information was rigorous.
The management process for collecting plant process information and evaluating equipment response to the manual reactor trip was rigorous in identifying and addressing equipment performance problems.
12/18/1998 1998021-01 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC VIOIV Pri: 1B Sec: 3B Ter:
Poor crew understanding resulted in failure to secure CW pump & to properly set ADVcontroller The crev/s misunderstanding of the effects of atmospheric dump valve pressure setpoint adjustments on the reactor coolant system, coupled with a communication error between the control operator and the shift foreman, resulted in a pressure setting of the atmospheric dump valves that exceeded the setpoint specified in the procedure.
The higher pressure setting unnecessarily challenged the main steam safety valves when it contributed to the liftingof Main Steam Safety Valve RV-7. A second example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to implement emergency operating procedure requirements; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
The crew did not understand the response of the intake screen differential pressure indication to a unit trip, which led them to improperly leave Circulating Water Pump 2-2 operating and resulted in the screen differential pressure exceeding the design limits. Weak fidelityamong the annunciator response procedures and an abnormal procedure and the crevfs narrow focus on pump motor amps also contributed to the delay in securing the circulating water pump. One example of a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified for failure to secure the pump in accordance with abnormal operating procedures; however, because the licensee implemented effective corrective actions, no response was required.
(
Item Tvoe ICompliance,Followup,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
5 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 12/05/1998 1998018 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Prl: 1B Operators controlled power changes in a careful manner.
Sec:
Operators controlled power decreases and increases in a careful manner in response to equipment problems and high kelp loading on the traveling screens.
Ter:
12/02/1998 1998020 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Pri: 1B Sec:
Ter:
Operators responded well to expansion joInt failures Overall, Unit 1 operators responded weil to two failures of expansion joints. However, operators initially cross-connected intake cooling system trains upon rupture of an expansion joint that could have resulted in loss ol both Unit 1 circulating water pumps.
Operators recognized and corrected this error before any adverse impact occurred.
10/24/1998 1998016.01 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 10/22/1998 1998016 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC NCV PrL 1A Failure to verify proper offsite power alignments Sec: 1B A noncited violation was identified for failure to implement Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 on 6/2/98 by not verifying proper offsite power alignments when a diesel generator was rendered inoperable.
(See LER 1-98-005)
Ter:
NRC POS Prl: 1A Revised operations department expectations were properly implemented.
~ Sec:
A thorough turbine building watch tour was an indication that operations department revised expectations were properly implemented.
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 03/06/1999 19990M Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 4B Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
EDG 1-1 troubleshooting efforts followingfailure to achieve rated voltage within required time limit.
Following the failure of Diesel Engine Generator 1-1 to reach rated voltage within its test acceptance criteria time limit,troubleshooting to determine the cause of the problem was generally thorough and identified a malfunctioning voltage regulator. Troubleshooting appropriately considered vendor recommendations; and collected data and the number and frequency of tests exceeded requirements.
03/03/1999 1999003.03 Prl: MAINT Self Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 NCV Pri: 2A Sec: 3B Ter:
Inadequate maintenance procedure -loss of offslte power A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1a. was identified for failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances (AR A047924047924. The procedure used to restore the 500 kV offsite power source provided vague guidance for positioning the main turbine protective trip switches.
In addition, lack of a questioning attitude on the part of operators restoring the 500 kV power contributed to the trip signal ~ partial loss of offsite power, and inadvertent diesel engine generator start. Operator response in restoring shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling following the loss of 500 kV power was good.
T ~n rr'nMnunnro t=nllnwiln.Qtherk From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
6 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region It/
DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 02/26/1999 1999001 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2B Welding Procedure Specifications Sec:
Sec:
The welding procedure specifications had been properly qualified and were in accordance with the applicable nonessential
~ essential, or supplementary essential variables specified in Section IXof the ASME Code.
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 02/26/1999 1999001 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 Effective program for Issuelng weld materials Sec:
Sec:
The licensee had established and implemented a program that was effectively administering and controlling the storage, issuance, and control of welding materials.
Ter:
02/26/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 02/26/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
Prl: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
ISI examination observation The inservice inspection examinations were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Examination surface preparation was thorough and radiation protection personnel were sensitive to obtaining as.low-as-reasonably-achievable conditions for nondestructive examination personnel working in the containment building.
Welding Program and observation of welding.
The welding program was well established, well organized, and had very good instructions and guidance.
The observed welding was performed in accordance with the speciTied welding procedure specifications, and there was no identified instance of failing to comply with ASME Code Section IX requirements.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 02/26/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 28 Proficient ISI examination personnel.
Sec:
Sec: 3A The personnel observed performing examination activities were knowledgeable and proficient. The inservice inspection program supervisor was frequently involved in the observation of field activities.
Ter: 3B 02/26/1999 1999001 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Prl: 2B Sec: 3A Ter: 3B Welder qualification and certification program.
The licensee had established a welder qualification/certification program that was in compliance with Section IXof the ASME Code. The records of all selected welders were reviewed and were found to meet the required welder variables established in the ASME Code. The observed welders performed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable welding procedure specifications.
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7 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes item Title Item Description 02/25/1999 1999003-01 Pri: MAINT Self Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 02/11/1999 1999003-02 Prl: MAINT NRC Sec: PLTSUP Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 NCV Prl: 2A Sec: 3B
, Ter: 1A NCV Pri: 2A Sec: 3B Ter: 1C Failure to followprocedure for a trouble alarm and failure to properly preplan relay replacement The first example of a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. for failure to properly implement a procedure, involved the draindown to midloop (AR A0479457). The 'Mid Loop Trouble'larm was not enabled to alert operators of reactor vessel refueling level high or low, as required.
A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. was identified for failure to properly preplan maintenance associated with replacement of a relay providing Phase A containment isolation capability (AR A0478430). The relay was removed without adequate precautions or consideration for the effect on plant equipment.
As a result, the operating spent fuel pool cooling pump tripped from service without operator knowledge.
Reactor level pertubatlon AND introduction of clorldes Into RCS.
A licensee-identified noncited violation of Technical Specilication 6.8.1.a. was identified for failure of operators to properly preplan the clearance for maintenance during the initialdraindown of the Unit 1 reactor to midloop (AR A0476823). Isolation of the nitrogen overpressure for the primary relief tank resulted in reactor vessel level perturbations.
A noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a resulted when personnel failed to sample chemical and volume control system demineralizer prior to placing in service as specified by procedures (NCR N0002084). This error resulted in a significant chloride intrusion into the reactor coolant system that cause the Equipment Control Guideline limitto be exceeded.
In addition, the controls for purchasing and control, and dedication of resins for nonsafety-related applications were deficient. -The licensee performed a detailed root cause analysis and corrective actions addressed the issues appropriately.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 01/23/1999 1998020 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Plant material condition With the exception of expansion joints exceeding their vendor recommended lifetimes, and corroded instrument lines associated with the outside tanks, overall maferiel condition of the plant was good.
12/18/1998 1998021 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Self POS Pri: 2A Sec:
Ter:
Plant response to trip With the exceptions of the early liftof Main Steam Safety Valve RV-7 and the autostart of Diesel Emergency Generator 2-2, plant equipment responded to the plant trip as designed.
The licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions to address the Iow setpoint on the main steam safety valve. The autostart of the diesel emergency generator resulted from a long-standing design deficiency that had been previously identified by the licensee and was not a safety concern.
The licensee had initiated action to correct the deficiency prior to the plant tdp.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 12/11/1998 1998017 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3B Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Welding material control requirements properly Implemented.
Welding material control requirements were being properly implemented by the weld room attendant who had a good understanding of the bases for those requirements.
uom TMrio rrumniianCe.FOIIOWuO.Other). FrOm 10/01/1998 TO 07/01/1999
rage.
a ur iw 08/23/1 999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSuE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 D!ABLO CANYON2 12/I 1/1998 1998017 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 5A Licensee personnel were properly identifying, correcting and documenting discrepant weld conditions.
Sec:
Sec:
Licensee personnel were properly identifying, correcting, and documenting discrepant weld conditions, with subsequent notification being made to appropriate management.
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 12/11/1998 1998017 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri: 2B Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Welding program and inspection procedures appropriately addressed Inspection and monitoring requlremer The licensee's welding program and welding inspection procedures appropriately addressed inspection and monitoring requirements specilied in ASME Code Sections IIIand IX, ANSI/ANS Codes B31.1 and B31.7, and Structural Welding Code AVIS D.1-1. The procedures provided clear guidance with respect to inspections
~
frequencies, and responsibilities.
P p
perly implemenl a procedure for calibration of a component cooling water system flowtransmitter, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Technical maintenance personnel performed work on the wrong unit because of a lack of self-verification.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Ter:
11/25/1998 1998018-01 Pri: MAINT NRC NCV Pri: 3A Calibration of CCW flowtransmitter on wrong unit Sec:
Sec:
A noncited violation of Technical S ecification 6.8.1.a was identified for failure to ro 10/27/1998 1998018 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Pri: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Conservative planning & preparations for equipment outages Licensee planning, preparations, and contingencies, including previous simulator training, for the Unit 1 startup transformer insulator coating and Component Cooling Water Pump 1-1 seal replacement were conservative, thorough, and executed properly Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 10/27/1998 1998018 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Effective operator traIning, planning and execution of Dlesal Engine Generator 1-1 cyclinder head replaceme Sec:
Sec: 3B Overall, the licensee provided effective operator training, planning, and execution of the Diesel Engine Generator 1-1 cylinder head replacement.
Ter:
10/03/1998 1998016 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Pri: 1B Sec:
Ter:
Vendor informatfon not incorporated fnto maintenance instructions.
Information contained in the vendor manual concerning proper maintenance steps for disconnecting the digital feedwater control system power supply was not incorporated into maintenance instructions, which resulted in a feedwater system transient. This deficiency affected nonsafety-related equipment and did not violate any regulatory requirements.
Immediate operator response to the feedwater system transient was good, and licensee actions to prevent recurrence were effective.
tern Type (Compliance,Foilowup.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
9 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Fun ctlo na I Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description 05/29/1999 1999006 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Prl:4A Sec:
Ter:
Good quality engineering package The design change package associated viith the auxiliary saltwater vault drain system was an example of sound engineering and was designed to improve the reliabilityof the associated check valves. The licensee installed y-strainers and low-point drains to help remove foreign material from the drain system to minimize fouling of the check valve seating surfaces 05/29/1999 1999006.01 Prl: ENG Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Prl: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Failure to properly Implement the Inservce testing Program A noncited violation in accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the enforcement policy was identified for failure to implement Technical Specifications 4.0.5 and 3.7.3.1. Specifically, on July 15, 1997, the licensee used pump curves instead of the required reference values in development of acceptance criteria for inservice testing of the component cooling water pumps. The licensee subsequently submitted a relief request to correct this violation.
04/04/1999 1999004 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec:
Ter:
Appropriateness of TechnIcal Specification Interpretations Because of previous problems with the appropriateness of Technical Specification interpretations, the inspectors assessed a sample of five Technical Specification interpretations.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee properly implemented NRC guidance for license amendment submittals and use of interim administrative controls when performing Technical Specification interpretations.
03/06/1999 1999003.04 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC NCV Pri: 4B Sec:
Ter:
failure to submit license amend changes to 230kV On January, 14, 1998, a violation of 10 CFR 50.59 resulted because the licensee implemented a design change and failed to submit a license amendment for a change to the facilitythat involved an unreviewed safety question.
However, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6of the enforcement policy and is refraining from issuing a Notice of Violation. The licensee changed the configuration of the 230 kV offsite power source from dependence on Morro Bay for operability to dependence on load tap changing transformers and capacitor banks.
Corrective actions for previous 10 CFR 50.59 violations sufficiently addressed this issue.
The design change improved the reliabilityof the 230 kV system.
02/20/1999 1999003 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC NEG Prl: 4B Sec: 5B Ter:
Untimely Prompt Operability Assessment for containment recirculation sumps.
The prompt operability assessment associated with fibrous material in five stops in containment in both units, while technically sound, was not timely given the potential safety significance of inoperable containment recirculation sumps.
The operability question of the containment recirculation sumps was identified in October 1998. However, the prompt operability assessment was not completed until February 1999. The inspectors identified a deficiency in the operability process, specifically, the 'issue needing validation to determine the impact on operability,'ortion.
The licensee had missed two opportunities to perform a prompt operability assessment in December 1998 when forced outages had occurred in each unit.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 01/23/1999 1998020 Prl: ENG NRC POS Prl: 4C Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Comprehensive actions to minimize S/G tube degradation The licensee had implemented comprehensive actions in both units to increase tubing stress corrosion resistance and minimize steam generator tube degradation.
uom Tvno l(wmnliance.Followuo.Other). From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
I
Page:
10 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Typo Codes Item Title Item Description 01/11/1999 1998020 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Ol/1 1/1999 1999004 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Prl: 4B Soc:
Ter:
NRC POS Pri: 4A Sec:
Ter:
Good support when performIng operability assessmont of CST level The prompt operability assessment associated with the Unit 1 condensate storage tank leak was an example of good engineering support for operations.
Questioning attitude found CST design deficiency.
A questioning attitude by a system engineer revealed a design deficiency in the construction of piping leaving the condensate storage tank, in that the carbon steel piping sat on concrete.
Because ground water leakage corroded the piping for Level Transmitter LT-40 and resulted in a failure, the licensee concluded that the structure failed to perform its Maintenance Rule function and classified this as a maintenance preventable functional failure. The inspectors concluded that the licensee effectively implemented the Maintenance Rule and corrective action programs.
1 1/20/1998 1998018 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 10/24/1998 1998016-02 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 NRC NEG NRC NCV Prl: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Pri: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Inadequate relay setpolnt desIgn review and testing during Instaffatlon.
The inspectors concluded that the loss of startup power to the site and subsequent starting of all diesel generators on both units was caused by inadequate relay setpoint design review and inadequate testing during installation of the new startup transformers in 1997. The licensee's immediate corrective actions for this nonsafety-related design deficiency were satisfactory.
T. S. 3.5.2 not met during emergency core cooling system on-line malnt.
On 1 1/22/95, engineers identified, during a review of industry information in November 1995, that a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2 had occurred for 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes in November 1989. The violation existed during maintenance of Train A components that rendered both trains of safety injection inoperable by then a then-unrecognized interdependency of the cold leg recirculation paths.
Core cooling could have been provided by Train B Iow pressure and high pressure pumps; therefore, no actual consequences would have resulted.
Based on the age of the issue, the isolated occurrence, the fact that this was unlikely to be identified during routine licensee reviews, and the initiative demonstrated by the engineers, the NRC decided that no enforcement action is necessary on this matter. Consequently, the NRC, in accordance with Section VII.B.6of the Enforcement Policy, exercised enforcement discretion to not propose a civilpenalty and to not cite a violation. (See LER 2-95.003.)
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 05/20/1999 1999009 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 2A Sec:
Sec: 4A Ter:
Vulnerabilities In detoctlon zones During tests, one detection zone was defeated, and vulnerabilities in several other zones were identified.
05/20/1999 1999009 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Pri: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Good security test and maintenance program An good test and maintenance program was implemented that ensured security systems were maintained at maximum effectiveness.
oem Tenn Irmmnllsnro Fnllnwuo.O!herb From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
11 of 14 08/23/1999 1 3:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description 05/20/1999 1999009 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 3B Alarm Station MannIng Sec:
Sec:
The alarm stations were redundant, well protected, and the operators were alert, well trained, and efficient.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 05/20/1999 1999009.01 Prl: PLTSUP Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Ter:
Pri: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Failure to terminate access within 24 Hr.
A violation of Paragraph 5.10 of Security Procedure OM1 1.ID1. Revision 8, DCPP Site Access Process, was identified for failure to terminate protected and vital area access of terminated employees.
This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Specific incidents are in the licensee's corrective action program as Action Requests A0481313, A0481000, A0479894, A0479888, A04479869, and A0476097.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 04/17/1999 1999004 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2A Excellent level of housekeeping during 1R9 Sec:
Sec:
A high level of attention to plant housekeeping in Unit 1. following Refueling Outage 1R9, resulted in an excellent level of housekeeping being maintained throughout safety-related areas in both units.
Ter:
02/27/1999 1999004 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 NRC POS Prl: 5B Sec:
Ter:
Thorough licensee Investigation Into hot particIe exposure Licensee investigation of the circumstances that led to an individual receiving a hot particle exposure was thorough and appropriate to the circumstances.
The licensee determined that personnel had input an incorrect geometry configuration into the multichannel analyzer. This resulted in the estimated dose (160 rem) exceeding regulatory limits. However, the estimated dose significantly improved (14 rem) using the correct geometry. The individual's exposure to the skin did not exceed regulatory limits and no violations of NRC requirements were identified.
12/23/1998 1998020-03 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 12/05/1998 1998018 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 Pri: 3A Sec:
Tef:
Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
failure to properly post a hIgh rad area A noncited violation of 10 CFR 20.1 902(b), consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy, was identiTied for failure to properly post a high radiation area.
Radiation protection personnel failed to post a back entrance to Residual Heat Removal Pump Room 1-2. Although the root cause analysis was inconcfusive, corrective actions were satisfactory Protable fire extlnguishers not routinely Inspected.
The inspectors identified that portable fire extinguishers located in vital areas were routinely not being inspected annually to the timeliness criteria contained in Procedure M-18.2. However, the fire extinguishers met their performance criteria when tested and the licensee implemented the appropriate corrective actions to correct the deficiency.
h k
'I c:.
indi oaaa Tn n7/n1/1aaa
Page:
12 of 14 08/23/1999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Ter:
1 1/19/1998 1998019 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C Sec:
Sec:
Effective vehicle access program, access authorization program, system for reporting safeguards events, ar The licensee had an effective vehicle access control program. The access authorization program was effectively implemented.
An effective records and reporting system was in place for reporting safeguards events.
Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness-for-duty programs were effective, thorough, and intrusive.
1 1/19/1998 1998019.01 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 VIOIV Prl: 3A Failure to provide annual requal. to warehouse personnel performing security duties Sec:
Aviolation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B-Section A, and the licensee's training and qualification plan was identified involving the failure to perform annual requaliflications of warehouse personnel responsible for conducting material and package searches.
The licensee implemented proper corrective actions; therefore, no response to the violation is required.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 11/06/199II 1998015 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter:
Original exercise scenario package was of poor quality.
The originally submitted exercise scenario package was of poor quality because objectives were vague and not measurable, offsite radiological plume maps were missing, a scenario event was not properly coordinated with security personnel and had to be rewritten, and a list of simulated events was not developed or provided.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 11/06/1998 1998015 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl: 1C Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter:
Opportunities for Improvement identified in EOF during implementation.
Opportunities for improvement in the emergency operations facilityincluded: (1) communication and information flowwere ineffective at times and contributed to the late notiTication; and (2) the event dassiflication, description, and status were confusing, undear, and incomplete on notification forms.
1 1/06/1998 1998015 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Prl: 1C Good overall performance In emergemcy exercise.
Sec: 3A, Overall, performance was good. The control room, technical support center, operational support center, and emergency operations facilitysuccessfully implemented key emergency plan functions including emergency classifications, protective action recommendations, and dose assessment.
A strength was identified in the control room concerning implementation of mitigation strategies for plant equipment failures.
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON2 11/06/1998 1998015 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Prl: 1C Effective Integrated critique process.
Sec:
Sec: 5A The integrated critique process demonstrated an effective program for identifying areas in need of correction, but exercise participants tended to be passive members in the process.
Ter:
rr v
~ i-~llwanw Atharva Crnm 1n/n1/199R To 07/01/1999
Page:
13 of 14 08/23/1 999 13:07:40 IR Report 3 Region IV DIABLOCANYON Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Template Item Title ID Type Codes Item Description Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 11/06/1998 1998015 01 Pri: PLTSUP NRC IFI Pri: 1C Failure to activate the TSC and EOF In a timely manner Sec:
Sec: 3A The untimely activation of both the technical support center and emergency operations facilitywas identified as an exercise weakness.
Ter:
11/06/1998 1998015.02 Prl: PLTSUP NRC IFI Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000275 DIABLOCANYON 1 05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Prl: 1C Failure to make a timely offlste agency notification Sec: 3A An exercise weakness was identified in the emergency operations facilityfor failure to notify the offsite agencies of the site area emergency declaration within the required time limit. Since the licensee identified this exercise weakness, no response is required.
10/24/1998 1998016 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000323 DIABLOCANYON 2 Pri: 1B Sec: 1C Ter:
Failure to Identify that Unit 2 PASS off-gas data did not meet procedure requirements.
The failure to identify that the Unit 2 postaccident sampling system (PASS) off-gas data did not meet procedure requirements or equipment control guidelines during data taking and subsequent supervisory review was an example of weak performance by chemistry personnel.
This item constitutes a minor violation not subject to formal enforcement action.
u~m Tier o rt,nmnliwnce.Foliowuo.Other). From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
14 of 14 08/23/1 999 1 3:07:40 IR Report 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Legend Typo Codes:
BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-up item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Licensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV Minor Violation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non.Conformance OTHR Other P21 Part 21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR Strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness Template Codes:
1A Normal Operations 1 B Operations During Transients 1 C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 48 Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes 5A Identification 5B Analysis SC Resolution ID Codes:
NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee Functional Areas:
OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other EEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the 'General Statement of policy and procedure for NRC Enforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1 600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the pIM entries may be modiTied when the final decisions are made.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a dev at on, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the plM entries may be modified when the final condusions are made.
A L 4 r indi sc nnn T~ nvNilfCiAA
)
Page1of1 09/1 6/1999 08:40:44 Er<CLOSuRE 2
DIABLOCANYON Inspection / ActivityPlan 09/01/1 999 - 03/31/2000
~Units Ins eaiion Aativii Title Number of NRC Planned Dates Inspectors / Individuais Start End Inspection Type 1,2 I ~ 2 1,2 1,2 I ~ 2 1,2 IP 83750 IP 83750 IP 40500 IP 82701 IP 81700 IP 84750 X02028 X02029 Occupational Radiation Exposure Occupational Radiation Exposure Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness Program Physical Security Program For Power Reactors Radioactive Waste Treatment, And Effluent And Environmental Monitoring DC1/INITIALEXAMS DC2/INITALEXAMS 09/20/1999 10/18/1999 02/07/2000 02/14/2000 02/21/2000 03/06/2000 03/13/2000 03/13/2000 09/24/1999 10/22/1999 02/11/2000 02/18/2000 02/25/2000 03/10/2000 03/17/2000 03/17/2000 Core Core Core Core Core Core Not Applicable Not Applicable This report does not indude INPO and OUTAGE activities.
TV<<snort ShnwS OnlV On-Site and annOunCed inSpeCtiOn prOCedureS.
ri