ML16341E547
| ML16341E547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1988 |
| From: | Hooker C, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E548 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-01, 50-275-88-1, 50-323-88-01, 50-323-88-1, NUDOCS 8802290385 | |
| Download: ML16341E547 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1988001
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
Nos.
50-275/88-01
and 50-323/88-01
Docket Nos.
50-275
and 50-323
License
Nos.
DPR-80 and
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
San Francisco,
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
January
19-22,
1988
Inspector:
Approved by:
~Summar:
C.
A. Hooker, Radiation Specialist
p g)
G.
P.
Yu as, Chief
Faci li '
Radiological Protection Section
Date Signed
a
)
~
Date Signed
Ins ection
on Januar
19-22
1988
Re ort Nos.
50-275/88-01
and 50-323/88-01
findings, solid wastes,
licensee
reports
and licensee identified problems,
surveys
and monitoring,
and facility tours.
Inspection procedures
addressed
included 30703,
84722,
92700,
92701 and 83726.
Results:
Of the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
88P2290385
88oooop75
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'
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
a.
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
Personnel
"J.
D. Townsend,
Plant Manager
"J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager
- D. B.
Miklush, Acting Plant Superintendent,
Assistant Plant Manager
"W.
B.
McLane, Assistant Plant Manager,
Technical
Support
"K. Doss,
Senior Nuclear Generation
Engineer
- J.
V. Boots,
Manager,
Chemistry
and Radiation Protection
(C&RP)
~C.
L. Eldridge,
Manager,
equality Control
- R.
P.
Powers,
Seni,or
C&RP Engineer,
Supervisor
Radiation Protection
(RP)
"J.
E. Gardner,
Senior.C&RP Engineer,
Supervisor
Chemistry
- R.
M. Taylor, Supervisor, guality Assurance
(gA)
C.
C. Miller, C&RP Engineer
"T.
L. Grebel, Supervisor,
Regulatory
Compliance
J.
A. Hays,
General
Foreman,
~L. T. Moretti, Foreman,
b.
NRC Personnel
"J.
L. Crews, Senior Reactor Engineer,
Region
V
"A. D. Johnson,
Enforcement Officer, Region
V
- M. L. Padovan,
Acting Senior Resident
Inspector
- K. E. Johnston,
Resident
Inspector
Denotes
those present at the exit interview on January
22,
1988.
In addition to the individuals identified above,
the inspector
met and
held discussions
with other members of the licensee's
and contractor's
staffs.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
92701
Closed
Followu
50-323/87-21-04
Inspection
Report
Nos.
50-323/87-21,
50-323/87-30
and 50-323/87-40 describe
previous inspection
efforts regarding the licensee
s guality Hotline (gH) investigation,
No.
gCSR-87-005,
involving radiation protection concerns of an individual
working in the radiological controlled area
(RCA) of Unit 2 during the
refueling outage.
Inspection
Report
No. 50-323/87-40
documented
the
review of the
C&RP Department's
investigation
and response
to gH
regarding this matter.
During this inspection,
the on-site
gH representative
informed the
inspector that the concerned
individual had reviewed
C&RP's reply and
had
no further concerns
or questions
regarding radiological controls that
were at issue.
The inspector
had
no further questions
regarding this
matter.
C 1 osed
Fo1 1 owu
50-323/87-40-01):
Inspection
Report No. 50-323/87-40
documented
the inspector's
review of a draft extremity exposure
evaluation of an individual who had
a radioactive fuel particle on his
sock that was not identified on an initial survey.
During this
inspection the inspector
reviewed the licensee's
final investigation
and
dose evaluation report,
Evaluation
No.
0151.
Based
on this review the
inspector
noted that the licensee's
extremity dose estimation of 1.642
rem appeared
conservative
and appropriate.
The results of the evaluation
emphasizing
the lessons
learned
were forwarded to the Training Department
for incorporation into the licensee's
radioactive particle training
program.
The inspector also observed this matter being discussed
during
a
RP radioactive particle requalification training class
on January
21,
1988.
The inspector
had
no further questions
regarding this matter.
3.
Radioactive Solid Wastes
84722 - Minimum
a.
gA Audits
gA Audit Report
No.
87248T,
dated
December
1, 1987,
was examined.
The audit was conducted
November 2-10,
1987, to verify that Diablo
Canyon
Power Plant
(DCPP)
had adequately
implemented the applicable
requirements
of the
Code of Federal
Regulations,
gA Policy,
Technical Specifications
(TS), and procedures
for the receipt,
control
and accountability,
disposal
and transportation of licensed
radioactive material.
The audit,
among other items,
included:
interviews with cognizant
management
personnel,
reviews of numerous
procedures
and documents
related to the areas
audited.
The audit identified one discrepancy that resulted in the issuance
of one Audit Finding Report (AFR), No.87-269, that required
corrective action.
The
AFR was issued to the Materials Department
for failure to notify the
C8RP Department
upon receipt of an area
monitoring, instrument that contained
a limited quantity of
radioactive material.
The
C8RP Department
had identified this item
on October
26, 1987, during a routine inventory of material stored
at the warehouse.
The package
was located in the appropriate
storage
area
and was not considered
a safety
and health problem.
Based
on a discussion with the Materials Superintendent,
the
inspector confirmed that corrective actions
appeared
appropriate.
With the exception of the one
AFR issued,
the gA auditors
concluded
that
had been
implementing the requirements
for receipt,
control
and accountability,
disposal
and transportation of
radioactive material.
The inspector,
being familiar with the
named
gA audit team members,
determined that the audit was conducted
by qual Hied personnel.
b.
~Chan
es
The inspector
was. informed by the responsible
C8RP Engineer that
DCPP was in the process
of changing vendors for radioactive waste
solidification encapsulation
and dewatering operations.
The final
gA acceptance
and approval of the
new contract vendor was nearly
complete.
Since the last inspection of this area,
the licensee
had moved their
clean trash sorting and surveying operation
from the 115 ft. level
of the Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building to Bay No.
6 of the Waste
.
Storage Facility.
During a tour of the clean waste sorting area
on
January
20,
1988, the inspector
made the following observations.
While waste sorting was in progress, it was noted that the air
flow into the small sorting
hood appeared
nonexistent
as
indicated
by using
a very thin strip of masslin cloth.
Although the
room was equipped with an existing ventilation
exhaust
system,
the licensee
was using
a small portable exhaust
blower equipped with a shop type bag filter (non
HEPA) that
exhausted
into the
room area.
Bags of supposedly
clean waste to be sorted
and surveyed
were
overflowing (three to four feet) into the designated
zone where
marked
bags of surveyed trash were being stored.
Prior to sorting,
bags of chemical
and reagent bottles,
and
bags containing oily rags and/or rags with absorbed
paint
solvents
(noted
by odor) were not typically marked
as hazardous
waste.
Surveys of waste being sorted
appeared
to be adequate
for the
detection of any radioactive material that could be present.
The inspector
was also informed by waste sorters that only
infrequently is radioactive material
found (typically <500 net
cpm with a thin window hand held frisker) in the clean waste.
The inspector
noted that detailed records for each
b'ag sorted
were maintained at the work location.
In review of recent
sorted clean trash records
and survey data,
the inspector
observed
no problems that would indicate any lack of control of
the licensee's
inplant segregation
of radioactive
contaminated
and clean waste.
Recent daily air sample data from the waste sorting operations
indicated nothing other than natural occurring activity.
The observations
of poor air flow, exhaust
system setup,
unmarked
bags that appeared
to contain hazardous
waste,
and general
housekeeping
practices
in this area
were discussed
with the
supervisory staff.
The
RP Supervisor
and other members of his staff
visited the area
and acknowledged
the inspector's
observations.
The
RP Supervisor halted the clean waste sorting operation,
and informed
the inspector that clean waste sorting would not restart until the
operation
was brought
up to normal standards.
This matter was also
discussed
at the exit meeting
on January
22, 1988.
The Plant
Manager acknowledged
the inspector's
observations
and
made assurance
that the matter
would be handled expeditiously.
~
~
~
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Licensee
Event
Re orts
LERs
and Licensee Identified Problems
92700
~and 83726
The following LERS and problems
were reviewed on-site:
a.
LERS
LER No. 1-87-027-00,
Radiation 'Monitor Alarm and Hot Particle
Caused
Fuel Handlin
Buildin Ventilation
S stem
Chan
e
Actuation
of En ineered Safet
Feature
due to Failure to Perform Surve
,
dated January
19, 1988.
This event occurred
on December
20, 1987,
in the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building during reracking
when
a hot
particle (Co-60) was apparently
removed from the Spent
Fuel Pool,
while a diver tender
was taking slack out of an air grinder's
hose
that
had tangled with the divers air hose.
The hot particle
exhibited dose rates sufficient to cause
the
FHB radiation. monitor
(RE-58) to alarm and cause
automatic initiation of the ventilation
system into the iodine removal
mode.
Based
on the potential
radiological safety significance,
the licensee
immediately initiated
an investigation of this event in accordance
with Nuclear Plant
/
The licensee's
Event Investigation Report
No. 87-02,
Hot Particle
Event of December
20, 1987,
was also examined during this
inspection.
Based
on review of the licensee
s investigation,
discussions
with
the contract divers
and cognizant licensee
representatives,
and
observations
during several
tours of the Unit 1
FHB during diving
operations,
the inspector
observed that:
The licensee
had appropriately identified the hot particle to
be 45.5
mi llicuries of Co-60.
The licensee
had also
conservatively calculated that
had the diver tender
come in
contact (0.5 seconds)
with the hot particle with his hands,
he
could have received
an extremity dose of 895 mrem and
5 mrem to
other portions of the body.
The licensee's
approach
and
methodology for dose calculations
and estimates
appeared
reasonable.
10 CFR 20. 101 limits the extremity dose to 18.75 rem/quarter.
Root causes
of this event,
as determined
by the licensee,
was
a
lack of:
1) adequate
procedure policy; 2) communication
between
the
CHIRP technician staff and management
concerning the
accelerated
weekend work activities and reduced staff; and 3)
recognition of work activities in the pool which could provide
a mechanism for production and transport of hot particles to
the surface of the pool.
Corrective actions
appeared
appropriate
and
had been effectively implemented to preclude
recurrence.
~
'
LER No. 1-87-026-00,
Mode 1
Power
0 eration
Entr
While in Action
Statement
TS 3.6.2.2. a In Violation of TS 3.0.4
due to Lack of
Procedural
Guidance,
dated January
19,
1988.
This event occurred
on
December
17, 1987, at 0430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br />
and involved the failure to
maintain the
NaOH concentration
in the Spray Additive Tank at the
TS
required concentration
of 30-32K prior to entering
Mode 1.
The
concentration
had been adjusted to 29.5X and the responsible shift
chemistry
foreman
had incorrectly rounded the analysis
data to 30K,
which was reported to the shift foreman.
The licensee's
analysis
for determining the
NaOH concentration
has
an accuracy of +0.2X.
On
December
17, 1987, at 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />,
the Senior
C8RP Engineer
(Chemistry Supervisor)
observed
the error when reviewing the
previous shift work activities.
The Shift Foreman
was immediately
notified.
Draft LER No. 01-88-01,
Failure to Per form Technical
S ecification
3. 3. 3. 10. b
Re uired Plant Vent Air Sam ler Flow Estimate
Due to
Personnel
Error.
This event occurred
on January
1, 1988, with Unit
1 in Mode 1,
and involved the failure of a shift chemistry
technician to review the shift turnover log sheet per Administrative
Procedure
A-10151, Relievin
the Watch.
The applicable
T.S. Action
Statement
(51) requiring
a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
sample flow rate estimate for the
plant vent monitor (RE-24)
had been
noted in the shift turnover
log
on the previous shift.
According to cognizant licensee
representatives,
the
LER would be issued within the
30 day time
limit requirement.
The above
LERS were reviewed for event description,
root cause,
corrective actions,
generic applicability and report timeliness.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Action Re uest
No.
A0097157
During the inspection,
on January
20, 1988, at about
1816 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.90988e-4 months <br />,
while initiating a radioactive liquid discharge,
from the
No.
2
Laundry Holdup Storage
Tank, the liquid radwaste
monitor RE-18
alarmed
and automatically terminated the discharge.
This was the
first liquid radwaste
discharge
following a spent resin transfer
earlier in the day.
The Auxiliary Control Operator notified a a
Chemistry Technician that RE-18 had tripped, flushed the system
lines
and re-initiated the discharge.
This was in violation of
procedures
OP G-1: 11, Li uid Radwaste
S stem - Processin
and
Dischar
e of Li uid Radwaste,
and
CAP A-5, Li uid Radwaste
Dischar
e
Mana ement,
which require termination of the discharge
permit so
that an evaluation
can
be made
and resampling of the source of
discharge.
After about
one hour into the discharge,
a
CHIRP Foreman
observed
a note related to the RE-18 trip, immediately investigated
the matter,
had the discharge
terminated,
and calculated
the
potential
release
rate which was about 0. 11K of TS limit.
The
licensee
informed the inspector of this event
on January
21, 1988,
at about
0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />.-
The radioactive resin transfer
system
and the liquid radwaste
system
share
some
common lines.
The licensee
has
had previous problems
as
'
result of this system sharing
and
RE-18 alarms.
Inspection
Report
No. 50-275/87-30 describes
these
problems
and the need for
procedural
changes
to reduce
RE-18 alarms,
which was also noted
as
a
followup item (50-275/87-30-04).
The inspector discussed
the licensee's
recurring problems associated
with the shared
systems
and
RE-18 alarms at the exit meeting
on
January
22, 1988.
The inspector. also encouraged
the licensee to put
extra effort on resolving the problems
due to the shared
systems.
The inspector's
observations
were acknowledged
by the Plant Manager.
The licensee's
final investigation of this event will be examined in
a subsequent
inspection
(50-275/88-01-01,
Open).
5.
Surve
s and Monitorin
. 83726
The inspector
reviewed two licensee
personnel
exposure
evaluation reports
due to particle contaminations
to determine
the licensee's
compliance
with 10 CFR Part 20 and licensee
procedures.
Radiolo ical Occurrence
Re or t No. 87-15848,
dated
December
20,
1987.
This report and associated
exposure
evaluation involved an individual who
had
a Co-60 particle of about 0.073
uCi on his chin.
This individual had
been performing decontamination activities
on a spent fuel rack removed
from the Unit 1 SFP.
The licensee
evaluated
the event
and assigned
a
dose of 635
mrem to the skin of the whole body using the total time this
individual had been in the radiologically controlled area.
10 CFR 20. 101
limits the whole body skin dose to 7.5 rem/quarter.
Extremit
Ex osure Calculation,
dated January
7, 1988.
This event
involved a. suspected
radioactive particle when
a diver performed
an
underwater
survey of himself during Unit 1 rerack operations.
While the
diver was vacuuming the floor area,
previously occupied
by a fuel rack,
the under water dose rate meter
showed fluctuations
from a 5 mrem/hr
background to 20 mrem/hr.
An underwater
survey,
by the diver, indicated
a reading of 54 mrem/hr on his left forearm.
The dive was terminated
and
the diver surfaced.
The surface
survey did not detect
any readings
above
the normal
background (0.2-0.5 mrem/hr) readings.
Based
on the plants
good fuel history and analysis of contaminates
that had been
encountered
during rerack operations,
the licensee
assumed that a Co-60 particle was
the cause for the reading
on the divers forearm.
The licensee
evaluated
and assigned
an extremity dose of 404 mrem to the individual.
In review of the above events
and through discussions
with licensee
representatives,
the inspector
observed that the licensee's
evaluations
appeared
to be conservative,
methodology for calculations
and doses
assigned
appeared
reasonable.
No violations or deviations identified.
~
'
'
6.
Fat il it
Tours
83726
The inspector
toured various areas of the auxiliary, fuel handling,
waste
storage
and turbine buildings of Units 1 and
2 on several
occasions.
The
inspector
made independent
radiation measurements
using an
NRC RO-2
portable
ion chamber,
S/N 2694,
due for calibration February 5, 1988.
In addition to observations
noted in the above paragraphs,
the inspector
noted that radiation areas
were posted
as
required
by 10 CFR Part 20.
Licensee
access
and posting controls for
were observed to be consistent with TS, Section
6. 12,
and licensee's
procedures.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with the licensee
representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on January
22,
1988.
The scope
and findings of the'inspection
were summarized.
The inspector
informed the licensee
representatives
that
no violations or
deviations
were identified.
The inspector's
observations
concerning
areas
of improvement discussed
in
this report were acknowledged
by the licensee.