ML16341E433

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Insp Repts 50-275/87-37 & 50-323/87-37 on 871005-09.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Various Vital Areas & Equipment in Plant & Followup of Enforcement & Open Items
ML16341E433
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1987
From: Burdoin J, Mendonca M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML16341E434 List:
References
50-275-87-37, 50-323-87-37, NUDOCS 8711240131
Download: ML16341E433 (16)


See also: IR 05000275/1987037

Text

U.

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report Nos.

50-275/87-37,

50-323/87-37

Docket Nos.

50-275,

50-323

License

Nos.

DPR-80,

DPR-82

Licensee:

Pacific Gas

and Electric Company

77 Beale Street

Room 1451

San Francisco,

Cali fornia

94106

Facility Name:

Diablo Canyon Units 1 and

2

Inspection at:

Diablo Canyon Site,

San Luis Obispo County, California

Inspection

Conducted:

October 5-9,

1987

Inspector:

J.

F.

Bur doin,

Reactor

Inspect

Approved by:

M.

M. Mendonca,

Chief

Reactor

Project Section

1

~Summar:

Date Signed

~~/o Id"7

Date Signed

Ins ection Durin

Period of October 5-9

1987

(Re ort Nos.

50-275/87-37

and

50-323/87-37

vital areas

and equipment in the plant,

and followup of enforcement

and open

items.

Inspection

Procedures

Nos.

30703,

36100,

71707

and 92700 were

used

as

gui dance for the inspecti on.

Results:

No violations or deviations

were identified.

8711240131

871109

PDR 'DOCK 05000275

Q

.

PDR

DETAILS

Individuals Contacted

A

Pacific

Gas

and Electric

Com an

PGSE

2.

  • J. M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager-,

Support Services

  • D. B. Mislush, Maintenance

Manager

  • N. J. Angus,

Work Planning Manager

T. L. Grebel,

Regulatory

Compliance Supervisor

  • W. J. Kelly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
  • M. N. Stephens,

General

Foreman,

Instrumentation

S.

R. Fridley, Senior Operating Supervisor

R. N. Nanninga,

Senior

Power Production

Engineer

N. L. Smith,

Power Producetion

Engineer

J.

E. Strahl, Mechanical

Maintenance

Foreman

J. J. Griffin, Maintenance

Senior Instructor

Various other engineering

and

gC Personnel.

  • Denotes attendees

at exit meeting 'on October 9,

1987.

In addition,

NRC Resident

Inspectors

attended

the exit meeting.

A~I<<i

An independent

inspection

was conducted

in Units I and

2 Turbine and

Auxiliary Buildings.

The inspection

examined

areas

and equipment for

debris, potential

hazards,

oi I and water leakage,

and equipment

condition, e.g., oil level, valve position,

and electrical

connection

configuration

and cleanliness.

The equipment

and areas

inspected

included:

A.

Five Emergency

Diesel

Generator

Rooms.

B.

Six 4160 Volt Switchgear

Rooms.

C.

Combined Two-unit Control

Room.

D.

Four Containment

Spray

Pumps.

E.

Four Charging

Pumps, Unit I (three)

and Unit 2 (one, 2-3).

F.

Four Safety Injection Pumps.

G.

Four

RHR Pumps.

H.

Six Component

Cooling Water Pumps.

I.

Six Auxiliary Feedwater

Pumps.

J.

Six Emergency Battery Rooms.

K.

Six 480 Volt Vital Bus

Rooms.

L.

Two Cable Spreading

Rooms.

N.

Two Hot Shutdown

Panel

Areas.

H.

Two 480 Volt Load Center Areas.

0.

Turbine Building at Elevations 85'nd 140'.

Housekeeping

and equipment status

appeared

to be acceptable.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

C

3.

Followu

of Enforcement

Items

A.

Closed

50-275/323/87-25-01

Radiation Monitor

Environmental

ualification

E/ ) for Am henol

HN Connectors

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

letter (DCL-87-239 of

September

24, 1987) in response

to the Notice of Violation related

to Inspection

Report 50-275/323/87-28.

This letter described

the

measures

taken and/or planned to be taken to correct the findings of

this violation.

'The violation was that the amphenol

connector's

qualification was not acceptably

documented

in the E/g files.

The licensee

has obtained

a qualification report for the amphenol

connector.

The report was reviewed

and

has

been incorporated into

the

GE penetration

E/g file.

The file and test report demonstrate

the qualification of the amphenol

connector for accident conditions.

The licensee will review E/g files to verify that other design

electrical

connector configurations

are qualified by the applicable

test report by December

15,

1987.

The inspector

reviewed the documentation,

Westinghouse

Test Report,

PEN-TR-83-01 dated January

11,

1983 which was

added to complete the

E/g file for the amphenol

HN connector.

The above test report along

with Conax Test Report,

IPS-1054 dated

June

15,

1983 (included in

the E/g file) were examined.

The test conditions were compared to

the profiles of containment pressure

and steam/air

temperature

for

the

maximum safeguards

case

(LOCA).

The test results

demonstrated

the connector

was environmentally qualified and the E/g file for the

connector

was complete.

This item is closed.

Closed

50-275/87-08-02

Oil Slin er Rin

Material

Chan

e from

Brass to Bronze

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

letter

(DCL-87-110 of May 14,

1987) in response

to the Notice of Violation related to Inspection

Report 50-275/87-08.

DCL-87-110 described

the measures

taken to

correct the findings of this violation.

The violation was that the

change

in material

from brass to bronze

had not been processed

as

a

design

change

as required

by procedure,

but rather,

had been

accomplished

pursuant to maintenance

shop follower, MM-1-85-670.

At the time of the violation,

no specific

DCPP administrative

controls existed for the review of replacement

material suitability

for fabricated parts.

Diablo Canyon Administrative Procedure

(AP)

C-40S3,

"Use of PIMS Corrective

Maintenance

Work Order Module" has

been revised with specific guidelines for evaluating

replacement

material suitability for fabricated quality related parts.

Licensee

maintenance

engineers

are

now required to review work orders

(replaced

shopwork followers) to ensure that parts manufactured

in

the. machine

shop are in accordance

with the applicable

design

specifications.

Also,

a Design

Change is required

when parts

are to

be manufactured different than the specified design.

The

AFW pump manufacturer,

Byron Jackson,

was contacted

by the

licensee

on February

25, 1987,

and verified that the material

substitution of bearing

bronze

ASTM B144 (discontinued

and replaced

by ASTM B-584) for cartridge brass

ASTM B135 was acceptable

and

would not affect

AFW pump operability.

Shopwork Followers

(SWF) documenting work performed prior to the

issuance

of AP C-40S3

have

been

reviewed by the licensee's

equality

Control Department.

This review verified proper materials

have

been

used

on work where parts

were manufactured

in the Plant Machine

Shop.

To verify the licensee's

corrective actions

and audit the original

work in December

1985, the inspector

reviewed

and examined the

following documents:

AP C-40S3,

"Use of PIMS Corrective Maintenance

Work Order

Module"

Borg Warner Industrial Products

Letter of May 1,

1987

Authorizing Bronze

ASTM B-505 or B-584 AL 932 as Substitute for

Brass

ASTM B-135 Alloy 2.

DCO-OM-37589, (date

June

9, 1987) Design

Change,

allowed the

substitution of Bronze

ASTM B-505 or B-584 for Brass

B-135

Alloy 2.

Action Request

A0029756, Discolored Oil in Outboard Bearing

AFW

PP 2-2.

equality Evaluation f0003309,

Contaminated

Oil in AFW PP 2-2

SWF, MM-1-85-669,

AFW Pump 1-3, Repair

and Reassemble

Outboard

Bearing.

SWF, NM-1-85-670,

AFW Pump 1-2, Repair

and Reassemble

Outboard

Bearing

SWF, NM-2-85-803,

AFW Pump 2-2, Repair

and Reassemble

Material Request/

Requisition

Form 0019258, for 660 Bronze

(Stock Code 15-9318) Stock for AFW Bearings

Inventory Parts Catalog,

Stock Codes

15-9318

and 72-9658

The above documentation verified the

pump manufacturer's

endorsement

of substituting bronze for brass

in the material for AFW pump

bearing oil slinger rings.

The bronze material

used in shopwork

follower MM-1-85-670 was traced

back to the warehouse

material

request

(19258)

and identified as the substitute material

(bronze

ASTN B505 or B584) for brass

ASTM 135 alloy 2.

The above

documentation

also verified the procedure

changes

the licensee

identified in his corrective steps for the subject violation. It is

concluded the licensee's

corrective actions

taken in response

to the

violation are acceptable.

This item is closed.

C.

(Closed

50-275/323/87-01-01

Use of Unlabeled Lubricant Containers

and

Lack of Lo

Books

0

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

letter of response

(DCL-87-083

of April 27, 1987) to the Notice of Violation related to Inspection

Report

Numbers 50-275/323/87-01.

The licensee

in DCL-87-083

'described

the measures

taken to correct the findings of this

violation.

The violation was that contrary to prescribed

procedures

(APD-753 Revision 10) unlabeled containers

containing oil and three

unlabeled

grease

guns were found.

In addition log books were not

being maintained in bulk storage

or dispensing

areas

as required

by

procedure.

The inspector performed the following reviews in order to verify the

licensee's

corrective actions:

Inspected lubricant bulk storage

areas

in the turbine building,

the electric

shop

and at the intake structure.

Determined that

all lubricant containers

were properly identified and labeled

in accordance

with procedures.

The log books at each of the above storage

areas

were examined

for lubricant and quantity used,

equipment/person/department

receiving lubricant,

date taken,

and that

a periodic audit of

the log was performed

by the shop foreman.

Examined Revision ll to administrative procedure

D-753 "Control

of Plant Lubricants" for completeness.

Examined the quarterly seminar training plans for electrical

and mechanical

maintenance

personnel

for inclusion of training

on changes

to lubricant control procedure.

Also, examined

attendance

records

for these

seminars.

The above inspections

and examinations verified that the licensee

instituted the corrective actions

described

in response

(DCL-87-083)

to the notice of violation. It is concluded that the licensee's

corrective actions in response

to the violation are acceptable;

This item is closed.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

4.

Followu

of 0 en Items

A.

0 en

50-275/323/87-01-04

Slo

e of Air Su

1

Line at Air

0 crated Valves

AOVs)

During a walkdown of a portion of the compressed air system at the

85-foot elevation of Unit 1 turbine building,

an inspector

observed

that the control air supply lines on several

air operated

valves

tended to slope toward the air operators.

The concern

was that if

moisture accumulated

in the air lines it would flow to the air

operator

and could prevent

normal operation of the valves.

The licensee

does not require that air lines attached to valve

actuators

be installed with the air lines sloped

away from the

actuators

because

at

DCPP, the plant air system incorporates

an air

drying system that maintains plant air at a dew point of

approximately

minus 40 degrees

Fahrenheit

which precludes

the

presence

of any significant moisture.

Licensee

engineering

groups

have also re-reviewed

PGandE's

standard practice

and design

specifications,

and concluded that there is no design specification

nor standard field installation practice that requires

negative

sloping of air lines attached

to valve actuators

away from the

actuators.

DCPP has not experienced

any significant buildup of

moisture in the air lines to valve actuators.

Com ressed Air S stem

The inspector

reviewed the compressed air system in section

nine of

the

FSAR and examined the schematic

diagram of the system.

The compressed air system

was designed for process

control systems

and for station service throughout Units 1 and

2 under startup

and

normal operating conditions.

The compressed air system

was not

designed for safe

shutdown,

reactor protection,

containment

isolation, or engineered

safety features

(ESFs).

Four air compressors,

rated

320 scfm each,

located in the turbine

area of Unit 1, were designed to supply compressed air to Units 1

and 2.

Normally, one compressor

is in operation with the remaining

compressors

on a selective

automatic standby-start

scheme.

A master

compressor controller loads the operating

compressor

at 98 psig and

unloads at 105 psig,

measured

at the supply header.

The standby

compressors

automatically start

and load if the header

pressure

drops to 93 psig.

The compressors

have nonlubricated cylinders to provide

an oil-free

air system.

(Local oiling units are provided on the service air

system where equipment requires lubricated air).

Each compressor

has

a water-cooled aftercooler separator

at the discharge

flange.

Filter-separators

and

an air dryer in the discharge

line reduce the

air dewpoint to approximately

minus 40~F at system pressure.

The

air dryer has

redundant dryer towers.

The desiccant

in the dryer

tower, which is not on line, is regenerated

with 'air,

and preheated

by an electric heater.

Dry air leaving the air receivers

is again

filtered through

a

3 micron filter before passing to the instrument

and service air distribution systems.

If electrical

power is lost to all the compressors,

or if system

pressure

drops to 90 psig, the service air distribution system is

isolated to reserve

the air in the air receivers for use in the

instrument air system.

There are

7 to 10 minutes of reserve

in

these

receivers

at the expected

rate of usage for plant process

control.

This time is available to restore

the air

system.

Alarms in the control

room indicate:

Plant air system pressure

less

than

87 psig

High cooling water temperature

through each air compressor

Status of the standby air compressors

and air dryer

High moistut e content

downstream of air dryers

In order to ensure that oil, water, or other impurities will not

result in the failure of instrumentation

or other equipment,. the

compressed air system is provided with oil-free compressor

cylinders, filter separators,

an air dryer,

and

3 micron filters.

The inspector determined that the air receiver high moisture alarm

is tested

under loop test 25-9E.

It is in the recurring task

scheduler

and was last calibrated

May 9,

1987 under work order

C13161.

The inspector

concluded that the direction of slope of the air

supply lines at the

AOVs does not pose

a problem with respect to

moisture in a dried air system

as long as the system is operated

and

maintained

as designed.

There should

be essentially

no moisture in

a dried system

and increasing moisture content in the system is

alarmed in the control

room.

Intrusion of moisture into a positive

pressure

system is highly unlikely.

However, this item remains

open pending

an inspection

by the

resident

inspectors

in the areas of operation

and maintenance.

resident

inspectors

findings will be reported in a subsequent

inspection report.

The

0 en

50-275/323/87-01-06

Resolution of Backlo

of Action Re uests

~ARs).

The review of the licensee's

corrective actions to remedy this

deficiency were

commenced

during this inspection

by examining the

readiness

for restart

program (Unit 2); task force meeting

on

improving PIN's system

dated April 4, 1987;

AR type codes

and other

documents

related to the

AR backlog problem.

However, inspection in

this area is incomplete at this time and shall

be continued during a

future inspection.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

The inspector

conducted

an e'xit meeting

on October 9, 1987, with the

members of the plant staff as indicated in paragraph

1.

- During this

meeting,

the inspector

summarized

the scope of the inspection activities

and reviewed the inspection findings as described

in this report.

The

licensee

acknowledged

the concerns identified in the report.

~

'