ML16341E375

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Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-275/87-20 & 50-323/87-20
ML16341E375
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  Pacific Gas & Electric icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1987
From: Kirsch D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To: Shiffer J
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 8708110486
Download: ML16341E375 (16)


See also: IR 05000275/1987020

Text

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDB)

ACCESSION

NHR

FAC IL: 50-275

50-323

AUTH. NAMF

KIRBCHI D. F.

REC IP. NAME

SHIFFER

> J. D.

87081 10482)

DOC. DATE: 87/07/31

NOTARIZED:

NO

DOCKET

Diablo Canyon Nuclear

Power Plant,

Unit

11 Pacific

Qa

05000275

Diablo Canyon Nuclear

Poeer Planti

Unit 2i Pacific

Ga

05000323

AUTHOR AFFILIATION

Region

51 Office of Director

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Pacific

Gas

8. Electric

Co.

SUBJECT:

Ack receipt

of 870722 ltr informing

NRC of steps

taken to

correct violations noted

in Insp Repts

50-275/87-20

8c

50-323/87-20.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

IEOID

COPIES

RECEIVED: LTR

/ENCL + SIZE:

TITLE: General

(50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation Response

NOTES:

REC IP IENT

ID CODE/NAME

PD5

PD

INTERNAL:

ACRB

DEDRO

NRR/DOEA

D IR

NRR/DREP/RPB

NRR/PMAS/ILRH

OGC/HDS2

REB

DEPY GI

i"ERNAL;

LPDR

NBIC

COPIES

LTTR ENCL

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

RECIPIENT

ID CODE/NAME

TRAMMELLIC

AEOD

NRR

MOR IBBEAUI D

NRR/DREP/EPB

NRR/DRIB DIR

OE LI BERMAN1 J

R~

RQN5

FILE

01

NRC

PDR

COPIES

LTTR ENCL

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES

REQUIRED:

LTTR

23

ENCL

23

JUL ~ i f987

Docket Nos.

50-275

and 50-323

Pacific Gas

and Electric Company

77 Beale Street,

Room 1451

San Francisco,

California

94106

Attention:

J.

D. Shiffer, Vice President

Nuclear

Power Generation

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated July 22,

1987, informing us of the steps

you

have taken to correct the items which we brought to your attention in our

letter dated

June

23,

1987.

Your corrective actions will be verified during

a

future inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

~PI f~

VsiFSCh

Denni s

F. Kirsch, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

and

Projects

cc w/cy of ltr dtd 7/22/87:

State of California

bcc w/cy ltr dtd 7/22/87:

RSB/Document Control

Desk (RIDS) (IE01)

Project Inspector

Resident

Inspector

B. Faulkenberry

J. Hartin

J. Zollicoffer

bcc w/o cy of ltr dtd 7/22/87:

M. Smith

Region

V

ic (~

JBurdoin/norma

HHHendonca

7/gq/87

7/~q/87

8708ii0486 870732

PDR

ADOCN 05000275

PDR

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7+987

AJoh son

7P/87

[

RE

VEST COPY ] REQUEST

COPY ]

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UEST

COPY

ES /

NO

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NO

YES /

NO

E

/

NO

REQUEST

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NO

[ SEND

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PDR

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ES /

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DFKi4ch

7/y( /87

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DES ji<IttP~4~~.Fy OyIIIt/,7

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77 BEALE STREET

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SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA94',06

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(415) 781 4Z:I

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lVi/X9;0 372 65.7

JAMES O. SHlt'FKR

VICt ttttlttttt

NVCLtAAtOWtk Gtt4tATICtt

July 22,

1987

PGandE Letter No.:

DCL-87-176

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ATTN:

Document Control

Desk

Washington,

D.C.

20555

Re:

Docket No. 50-275,

OL-DPR-80

Docket No. 50-323,

OL-DPR-82

Diablo Canyon Units

1

and

2

Reply to a Notice of Violation in

IEIR 50-275/87-20

and 50-323/87-20

Gentlemen:

NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/87-20

and 50-323/87-20 (Inspection Report),

dyted

June

23,

1987,

contained

a Notice of Violation citing three Severity Level IV

violations.

PGandE's

response

to this Notice of Violation is provided in the

enclosure.

In the Inspection

Report,

the

NRC indicated that

PGandE

should critically

assess

the manner in which the facility is being operated

and take the

necessary

management

actions required to ensure that plant personnel

perform

significant plant activities in accordance

with adequate

procedural

guidance

or instructions.

PGandE letter DCL-87-136, dated

June

15,

1987, describes

in

detail our management

action plan to ensure that personnel

perform plant

activities in accordance

with approved procedures.

We will continually review

the events occurring at Diablo Canyon to confirm the adequacy of actions

identified in PGandE's

June

15,

1987, letter and update

them as appropriate.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material

on the enclosed

copy of this

letter and return it in the enclosed

addressed

envelope.

Sincerely,

J.

.

hiffer

Enclosure

cc:

L. J. Chandler

J.

B. Hartin

H. H. Hendonca

P.

P. Narbut

B. Norton

CPUC

Diablo Distribution

1546S/0051K/RHH/1656

PGandE Letter No.:

DCL-87-176

ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE

TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION IN

NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 50-275/87-20

AND 50-323/87-20

On June

23,

1987,

NRC Region

V issued

a Notice of Violation (Notice) citi ng

three Severity Level IV violations,

as part of NRC Inspection

Report

50-275/87-20

and 50-323/87-20 (Inspection

Report) for Diablo Canyon

Power

Plant

(DCPP) Units

1

and 2.

A statement of each violation and

PGandE's

response

is as follows:

A.

TATEHENT

F VIOLATI N

Facility Technical Specification 6.8.1

states

that:

"Written procedures

shall

be established,

implemented

and

maintained

covering...

applicable

procedures

recommended

in Appendix

A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,

February 1978..."

Appendix

A of Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Revision 2, February

1978, Section lj; specified

procedures

for "Bypass of Safety Functions

and Jumper

Control."

In partial

implementation of this requirement,

Nuclear Plant Administrative Procedure

C-4S1

"Mechanical

Bypass,

Jumper

and Lifted Circuit Log Accountability"

provides that "momentary jumpers...shall

be listed

on the

attached

form ¹69-9102-4,

Momentary Jumper Status

Sheet."

Contrary to the above,

on Hay 14,

1987, while performing

a

loop test

on operable

emergency diesel

generator

2-1,

an

I&C technician installed

a "momentary" jumper across

terminals of emergency start relay ESRlA without logging

the jumper on the Homentary Jumper Status

Sheet.

With the

jumper installed, if jacket water pressure

switch

PS 229

failed with its contacts

closed, jacket water pressure

relays

JWPRl

and lA would energize,

immediately placing

the diesel

generator

in a possibly inoperable condition.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

R

A

N

F

TH

V

AT

N

F

M TT

PGandE

acknowledges

that the violation occurred

as described

in the

Inspection

Report.

As indicated in the Inspection

Report.and

in Licensee

Event Report 2-87-007-00,

dated

June

15,

1987, the root cause of this

event is personnel

error.

When the Instrumentation

and Controls

(I&C)

technician did not receive the expected

annunciator

response

during

performance of the loop test,

he did not follow I&C Department policy,

which requires

stopping the test

and contacting his foreman to determine

1546S/0051K

the applicable action.

A contributing factor to this event

was that the

associated

loop test procedure,

LT 21-19C,

"Diesel Generator

2-1 Jacket

Hater," contained

a data

sheet error that inappropriately required

annunciator verification.

RRE TIVE

TEP

THAT HAV

B

N TAK N AND H

8

TA

N T

AV

0

VI LATI N

AND THE

R

T

A HIEV

The following corrective actions

have

been

taken to preclude

recurrence

of this type of event:

1.

The technician responsible

was counseled

regarding proper

I&C

Department policies

on problems

encountered

during performance of

I&C tests.

2.

3.

The

I&C Haintenance

Hanager

conducted

a tai lboard with all

applicable

I&C personnel

to review this event.

The Plant Manager

and Plant Superintendent

also attended

the tai lboard to express

management

concern with events of this type where plant activities

are not performed in accordance

with procedural

guidance or

instructions.

The attendance

of the Plant Hanager

and the Plant

Superintendent

at the tai lboard 'was to emphasize

the importance of

procedural

compliance.

This type of attendance

was one of PGandE's

identified efforts in this area

as discussed

in the June

15 letter,

DCL-87-136,

on PGandE's

management

actions to maintain the high

level of performance at

DCPP.

A review of associated

diesel

generator jacket water loop tests for

the same'data

sheet error was completed

on Hay 22,

1987, with no

additional

errors found.

4.

I&C Department

loop tests

on safety-related

equipment

are being

reviewed

and revised

as necessary

to meet the guidance

provided

by

ANSI Standard

N18.7-1976.

5.

DCPP is revising the jumper program to improve the control

and

handling of jumpers.

Upon completion,

-I&C will conduct

a tai lboard

session

with all applicable

I&C personnel

on the requirements

of the

new program.

DATENHNF LL

HP

ANEW

L

AHIEVD

PGandE is in full compliance.

To preclude recurrence,

the review of

safety-related

loop tests will be completed

by August 3,

1987,

and the-

jumper program revision

and

I&C training will be completed

by

September

30,

1987.

1546S/0051K

B.

TATEHENT

F VI LATI N

Facility Technical Specifications [sic] 6.8.1 states

that

"Hritten procedures

shall

be established,

implemented

and

maintained covering...appl i cabl e procedures

recommended

in

Appendix

A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 Revision 2,

February 1978...."

Appendix

A of Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Revision 2, Section

9d specified

procedures

for "Draining

and Refil ling the Reactor Vessel."

In partial

implementation of this requirement,

an On-The-Spot-Change

to Operating

Procedure

(OP) Bl:V[I] [sic]

"RHR - Draining

the Refueling Cavity" was issued

and approved to control

cavity and vessel

pumpdown.

OP 8-2:VI, step

13, specified

"when the water level in the refueling cavity has

been

lowered to approximately

1 foot below the reactor vessel

flange,

stop

RHR pump 2-2 (Approx. 113'n

RVRLIS or tygon

tube indication)."

Contrary to the above,

on May 12,

1987, during pumpdown of

the Unit 2 refueling cavity with the reactor vessel

defueled,

operators

failed to stop the residual

heat

removal

pump 2-2 when reactor vessel

water level reached

113's

indicated

on RVRLIS, and proceeded

to conduct

plant evolutions outside the

scope of the procedure

without appropriate

documented

procedures

or

instructions.

This resulted in vortexing the

RHR pump on

two occasions.

This is

a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

REA

N

F

R THE VI LATI N IF ADMITTED

PGandE

acknowledges

that the violation occurred

as described

in

the Inspection

Report.

Plant operators

incorrectly relied upon

direct observation of the reactor cavity water level

and

doubted

the accuracy of the reactor vessel

refueling level

indicating system

(RVRLIS).

RR

TIV

TEP

THA

AV

B

N TAKEN AND HI

AV IDVI

ATI N

AN

TH

R

T

AH

VE

A

N T

Following this event,

PGandE performed

a thorough review of the

causal

factors that contributed to this event.

As described

in

the Inspection

Report, corrective steps

included the following:

1.

Three

memoranda

were issued to the Operations staff.

The first

memorandum,

dated

Hay 15,

1987,

was

an Operations Shift Order issued

by the Senior Operations

Supervisor stressing

the

need to perform

operations

in accordance

with procedures.

A second

memorandum,

1546S/0051K

regarding

use of procedures,

dated

May 18,

1987,

was issued

by the

Operations

Manager to all Operations

personnel.

Both memoranda

stressed

that if a procedure

is not adequate,

or if unforeseen

circumstances

develop,

the operation in process

must stop,

and

further guidance

must

be obtained prior to resumption of work.

This

policy is to be followed regardless

of impact on outage

schedules,

plant startup,

or required

load changes.

The third memorandum,

dated

May 18,

1987,

from the Operations

Manager to Shift

Supervisors,

Shift Foreman,

and Shift Technical Advisors, addressed

guidelines for handling investigations of significant occurrences

and providing information to upper management.

2.

PGandE's

Vice President;

Nuclear Power Generation,

between

May 15

and

May 20,

1987,

conducted

discussions

with each operating

crew

regarding

several

topics including the

need for procedural

compliance,

stopping work when things are not going according to

plans or when questions

develop,

and involving the proper people

(including management)

in the decision-making

process.

DATE WHEN

F

L

MP

AN

W

B

A

V 0

C.

PGandE is in full compliance.

TATEM NT

F V

LATI N

10 CFR 50.72 "Immediate notification requirements

for

operating nuclear

power reactors,"

Section (b)(2)

"Four-hour reports," specified

the licensee

"shall notify

the

NRC.

~ .within four hours of the occurrence of...any

event or condition that results in manual or automatic

actuation of any Engineered

Safety Feature

(ESF)..."

Contrary to the above,

on May 14,

1987,

emergency diesel

generator

2-1

was inadvertently actuated

at

1021 hours0.0118 days <br />0.284 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.884905e-4 months <br />,

and this

ESF actuation

was not reported to the

NRC until

1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br />.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement VIII).

R

A

N

F

R

TH

V

A I

N IF ADM TT

PGandE

acknowledges

that the violation occurred

as described

in the

Inspection

Report.

The root cause of this event

was the failure of the

shift foreman to recognize

the diesel

generator start with Unit 2

defueled

as

an

ESF actuation.

RRE TIV

T

P

THAT HAV

B

EN TAK N AN

W

B

TAK N T

AV ID

VI LATI N

AND THE

RE

AH

VD

As a result of previous late

10 CFR 50.72 reports (i.e., one-hour

and

four-hour reports),

PGandE previously developed

a

10 CFR 50.72 training

program

and presented it to all on-shift operating

crews.

In response

to

1546S/0051K

4

this additional

occurrence of late reporting,

PGandE

has

taken or will

take the following additional actions,

as discussed

in

LER 2-87-007-00

and letter

"PGandE

Management

Actions to Maintain the High Level of

Performance

at DCPP," dated

June

15,

1987.

2.

Operations

has issued

a Shift Foreman's

memorandum that further

clarifies the

10 CFR 50.72 reporting requirements.

Administrative Procedure

C-llS2, "Supplement

2 to Non-Routine

Notification and Reporting to the

NRC and Other Governmental

Agencies - Significant Event Reports," will be revised to provide

additional

examples of event reporting.

3.

A training session,

focusing

on selected

events

and proper

reportabi lity, will be conducted

during the regular training week

for each shift beginning July 27,

1987.

4.

During each training session

thereafter,

reportabi lity training will

be discussed,

using specific

examples of industry events.

5.

During at least

one of the simulator training sessions

for each

week, excluding examination

sessions,

reportabi lity of at least

one

event will be included in a scenario.

6.

When

a test is administered for a week of training, at least

one

reportabi lity test question will be asked.

The emphasis

discussed

in items 4, 5,

and

6 will continue until it is

determined

by PGandE

management

that the emphasis

should

be either

reduced or increased.

DATE

WH

N

F LL

MPLIAN E WI

A

H

V

PGandE is in full compliance.

To preclude recurrence,

revision of

AP C-llS2 will be completed

by August 1,

1987,

and the training session

of item

3 will be completed

by August 28,

1987.

~DI ~QN

The issues

contained

in the three violations are

summarized

as

noncompliance

with plant procedures,

conduct of operations

outside

the

scope of procedures,

and late event reporting.

These

issues

are

among

those presently

being addressed

as described

in PGandE letter DCL-87-136,

dated

June

15,

1987,

"PGandE

Management Actions to Maintain the High

Level of Performance

at DCPP."

As stated in the letter,

PGandE

management

is focusing increased

attention

on actions to ensure

compliance with procedures

and correct

and timely notification and

reporting of appropriate

DCPP events.

As events

occur at

DCPP,

PGandE

management will monitor the

implementation

and effectiveness

of actions

taken to address

concerns.

This was described

in the June

15,

1987,

PGandE letter.

1546S/0051K