ML16341C575

Forwards Affidavit of Jl Mcdermott,Per 840729 Submittal. Supporting Brief Will Be Sent to Commission on 840730 Along W/Oneill Rebuttal Affidavit

ML16341C575
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	07/30/1984
From:	Devine T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	Asselstine J, Palladino N, Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML16341C576	List: ML16341C575 ML20093N234
References
2.206, NUDOCS 8408010235
Download: ML16341C575 (100)

Text

,- 'jSQVERNMENT ACCOUNTAIIILITYPROJECT

~e.'nstitute for Policy Stucfies 0901 Que Street. H.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 (202) 234.9-"

. Nunzio J. Palladino, Chair man Thomas Roberts, Commissioner James Asselstine, Commissionet Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner Lando Zech, Commissioner U.S Nuclear Regulator y Commission Julv 30, 1984

'84 JijL -" t All:28 Attachment to GAP 314. 08. 08 Ref: 'AP.ltr. to HRC, Dated:

July 30, 1984 Page 1 of 12 McDermott Aff.

1717 H Street, N.M.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: Diablo Canyon Plant, Units 1 5 2

Dear Commissioners:

Docket Nos.

50-275 and 50-323

',ac<

Enclosed is Mr. McDermott's affidavit, as promised in my July 29, 1984 submission.

Tomorrow a supporting brief will be sent to the Commission, along with Mr. O'Neill's rebuttal affidavit.

Respectfull submitted, Counsel for Messrs.

O'eill and McDermott

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Attachment to GAP

/

314.(}8.08

Reference:

GAP ltr. to NRC, NcDermott Aff.

A F F I. D A V I T

"'ated:

July 30, 1984 Page 2 of 12 My name is James L. McDermott. I am submitting.this affidavit freely and voluntarily to Mr. Thomas Devine, who has identified himself to me as the legal director of the Government Accountability Project and who serves as my attorney for dis-closures to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I have instructed Mr. Devine to add my name to the 'petition submitted by

~ Mr. Timothy O'eill on July 27, 1984 with Mr. O'Neill's permission,.which he has etxpplied.

This affidavit is in support

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of the joint petition.

My own case provides a clear illustra-tion of the need both for reinspections and systematic retrain-ing df all personnel at Diablo Canyon.

On Saturday, July 28, I was laid off from my job as a

welder for Pullman Power Products at Diablo Canyon, two days after I refused to sign three statements certifying my participa-tion in retraining programs on various matters.

I refused because I would have been engaging in a false statement if I had signed.

In one case, I was asked along with others to sign a

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To show how badly things have deteriorated, 15 other employees signed the form.

Since January 1984 I have been a witness in the ongoing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) investigation at Diablo I

Canyon.

During that time I have submitted five a""idavits and

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Attachment to GAP 314.08.08 iP" '-

Reference:

GAP Ltr. to NRC,rMcDermott Aff.

sr Dated:

July 30, 1984 Page 3 of 12 met with the NRC on three occasions, including twice with the Pffice of Investigations (OI).

Earlier'his month I settled a

Department of Labor lawsuit which had charged retaliation in an earlier layoff. I was a confidential witness, until the NRC technical staff blew my cover by turning over a copy of my affidavit to Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E).

Although my name was whited-out, the issues in my statement were traceable back to me since I had challenged the same violations on-site.

PG&E promptly published my name in a licensing brief. With my cover already blown, there was no reason to hold back and my wife began serving as a public spokesperson for the Consumers in Defense of Ener'gy Safety (CODES).

PG&E claimed that my continued employment at Diablo Canyon helped rebut charges of

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arassment for NRC whistleblowers.

PG&E's licensing brief is e..closed as Exhibit l.

The events surrounding my layoff began last Thursday, July. 25, when four handouts were distributed to personnel in the shop.

Each handout was for'etraining through the "Steps to Prevent Recurrence" (STPR) corrective action program..

We were all supposed to sign that we had been retrained on each problem, after studying each handout.

I signed one of the forms but Z had to refuse to sign three others.

The other three STPR forms involved problems with -- 1) flowmeters to control the release of gas in Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW);

(i fbi.lity records for certain plates; and 3) umpers.

2) falsified trace-cutting of crushable

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Attachment to GAP 314.08.08

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Reference:

GAP ltr. to NRC, McDermo

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Dated:

July 30, 1984 Page 4 of 12 The STPR on flowmeters contained the crudest falsification.

It is enclosed as Exhibit 2.

In essence we were asked to sign a form certifying our attendance in a retraining program that was never conducted.

The form was blang for all the spaces describing the retraining, including "Nature of Instruction",

"Date", "Time", and "Instructor".

Further, our signatures certified that we had participated in discussions and reviewed additional information.

The discussions never occurred and the referenced information was not included in the handout.

Fifteen people signed anyway. I talked with several people about why they signed a blank check.

As one explained, he didn't want to have trouble.

This phoney retraining program concerned a generic deficiency highly significant to plant safety.

The flow of gas keeps out undesirai'a atmosphere during the welding process.

Too much or too little gas can lead to unacceptable quality such as oxidation,

,u cracking, embrittlement and excessive cost.

The fraudulent retraining program means that the shoddy welding probably wi.ll continue for the thirteenth year in a row.

The STPR on traceability of plates, concerned falsified purchase order identification records.

It is enclosed as Exhibit 3. I could not sign the form, because the referenced procedures and quality assurance (QA) records were not included.

I had raised this same i.ssue near the end of June with th.

production foreman.

He said that maybe I should remove the

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phoney Purchase Order(

Before that happened'howev,er, a

QC

0 fists in his face.

Based on his experience, I believe that my initiative in raising the same issue to a foreman helped lead to my layoff.

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Attachment to GAP 314.08.08

Reference:

GAP letter to NRC, NcDermott Dated:

JUlg 30 1984 p

f inspector identified the problem and wrote a Deficient Condi-tion Notice (DCN).

The inspector suffered severe harassment for writing the report, including a public dressing down from the

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craft superintendent and construction vorkers who shook their The third STPR'concerned the improper cutting of crush-able bumpers, which are thin-gauged tubing welded to resemble square honeycombs.

They are used to absorb the impact in the event of a ruptured pipe.

The STPR is enclosed as Exhibit 4.

I could not sign this form, because the referenced procedure was not attached..

The training continues to be inadequate on a generic basis.

For example, the rece'nt "training" on harassment basically was to pass out a memo saying that we could be disciplined up to term-ination if we harassed QC.

The memo itself was a signal that management was pulling its punches:

harassment would not neces-sarily cost a vorker his gob if he vere caught.

There vere not any classes, or even discussions about a problem that has been getting out of control.

In other cases the handouts were inadequate as retraining documents, because the craft workers had never been trained sufficiently the first time to understand the terms in the QA reports.

I know, because various welders asked me what the documents meant.

Thev came, because I was a former QC inspector.

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Attachment to GAP 314.08.08

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Reference:

GAP ltr tel ggC, HcDermott Aff.

Dated:

.July 30, 1984;:1 Page 6 of 12 e

On Thursday, July 26th,after reviewing the STPR handouts, I sought out the QC inspector.

'I told him this was bull, e

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e because we would be signing for documents and events that w'er'e not there..

He agreed and said he would notify the Resident Inspector.

At. the end of the shift, the foreman asked me.to sign the STPR forms. I refused on three out of four.

He asked me to point out to him what was the matter, which I did.

He said he saw my point and agreed with me that a good training program should have begun 13 years ago.

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Despite his agreement with my criticisms, the foreman said that the superintendent would still want me to sign.

He also said that maybe we should fillin the blanks on the training form for flowmeters.

I said maybe we shouldn'.

I believe that raising this problem of false statements internally, refusing to participate, and refusing to cooperate with a coverup contributed to my layoff.

On Friday the QC inspector told the NRC's Resident Inspector, Mavin Mendonca, of the STPR problems.

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On Friday T press conference.

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im O'eill also filed his petition and held a

Tim is a friend of mine, which was well-known I

4 a Attachment to GAP 314.08.08

Reference:

GAP letter to NRC, tlcDegkRt Att.

Dated:

July 30, 1984 Page 7 of 12 on-site.

We ate lunch together regularly, where in plain view I often reviewed or helped him to prepare reports of QA viola-tions.

We ate lunch together on Tuesday, July 24, the day Tim resigned.

I believe that my layoff the day after-his press conference in part was further retaliation due to guilt by association.

On Saturday, July 28 I was laid off, along with one other welder out of around 15 in our shop.

The other employee was a

traveler -- a member from another local outside of this union's

)urisdiction, with a travel card.

Although it is not a formal rule, travelers usually are laid-off first.

In fact, another brother said to me that he should of been laid off because he was a'ravelcard holder and. that I was a local member.

I believe that my layoff was retaliatory for three reasons:

1)

The time lag was two days after I refused to sign three false statements and one day after my friend Tim went h

public on a series of QA violations.including some which I had openly helped him to prepare. at the job site.')

Over half the rest of the crew were travelers.

3)

Two of the travelers were welders hired about two weeks earlier.

They had only passed the basic gate, or entry, test.

By contrast, I had been certified to unlimited thickness after passing the heavy wall test.

In fact, I had )ust trained these two welc'.ers, to replace me as it turned out.

When I was laid off the foreman said that it was not just his decision; that management also was involved.

He denied that

Attachment to GAP 314.08.08 Ref:

GAP ttr. to NRQ>pcDermott Dated:

Ju1y 30, 198g Page 8 of 12 there vere any "politics." involved, however.

A Sechtel supervisor told me that he vas sorry to see me go, because I newer missed anytime, vas always working and,was better qualified as a welder than those vho kept their )obs.

He said that didn't sLake sense from sn economic standpoint.

He added that he had made the same point to Pullman and Sechtel management, vithout any success.

I em familiar vith the conclusions in the 1977 Nuclear Services Corporation (NSC) audit about a quality assurance breakdown.

I can state vithout question that it is continuing vithout letup. If there has been corrective action, the effects have been invisible.

The QA breakdown continues, because those of us vho try to uphold the NRC laws are either ignored; harassed until they resign as with Tim; or laid-off like myself.

I am Joining Tim's petition, because the NRC must crack down to restore respect for its rules at Diablo Canyon. If the Commission licenses the pLane instead, it villbe a clear message that the Atomic Energy Act no longer is vorth the paper it is vritten on.

I have read the. above 7 page affidavit, and it is true, accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

James L. McDermott b sal hr aid Ststc. yesaaly appeared l4ICHAELs KACUT

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INTIROPflCI C HONDINCK DATe July 21, 1984 Tb PPP Superintendents FaoM paul Mokry SUBJECT Craft STPR '

on DR 5946 Attachment to GAP 314.08.08

Reference:

STPR on OR 5946 Dated:

July 21, 1984 Page 9 of 12 Fest mFoava>ioN

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This is a regulator with the Iow pressure gauge graduated in CFH, This device is not a.rue fEow""etc~.

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GENERAL NOTE FOR ALLEGATION j/314.10 The allegations contained in this affidavit are very similar to numerous previous allegations raised by a different alleger.

The thrust of all of these allegations is exactly the same:

i.e., that A307 Grade B is not weldable simply because it has not been designated a Pl material by the ASME Section IX committee.

The allegers consistently refuse to accept the irrefutable, objective evidence that the A307 Grade B material is weldable, has been successfully welded at Diablo Canyon, and that the installations are acceptable for service.

The welded attachments to the liner plate were subject to liquid penetrant examination and accepted, thus demonstrating weldability ahd acceptability.

The studs welded to the liner plate were also torque tested, which further demonstrates weldability and acceptability for use.

In contrast to this objective evidence, the allegers continue to quibble about ASh)E protocol in assigning P numbers to material.

Bolting materials are not addressed in ASME Section IX.

Section III, which does address bolting materials, assigns A307 Grade B a P-number 1 designation.

P-number 1

procedures were used to weld the bolts.

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f ~ $t gW Qb 71 GAP Allegation 8314.10.01 It is alleged that: On January 13, 1984, I identified widespread use of ASTN A-307 material in welded applications without a qualified welding procedure. This is a significant breakdown in both design and construction quality assurance, and was reported to both the licensee and the HRC RV staff by a discrepancy (nonconformance) report. Ny report was censored by the Pullman gA department to omit all reference to ASTN A-307 material. (2/22/85 O'Heill Aff. at 2.) The alleged "censoring" of the discrepancy report (DR) was answered in the attached response to Allegation f200, at paragraphs 27 through 31, PGandE letter DCL-84-166, dated June 30, 1984. The alleged censoring of the report did not occur since a nonconformance did not exist in relation to A307 material and there was no need to identify A307 material on a DR. The welding procedures used to weld A307 material were qualified, and no breakdown i" design o" construction quality assurance occurred. The acceptability of ASTN A307 bolting material has been addressed repeatedly, most recently in response to HRC Allegation 81541 which was submitted in PGandE letter DCL-'85.-077, dated February 22, 1985. A copy of the previous response is attached; 0362S/0034K -103- Attachment to GAP 314;10.01

Reference:

DCL-84-166 Dated:

June 30, 1984 Page 1 of 15 GAP f200, Petition at 12.

It is alleged that:

Hr. Karner conpletely reirrote a Discrepancy Report that a

QC inspector subnitted on studs nade fron unqualified naterials that vere fielded on the containnent liner and elsewhere.

Hr. Karner censored the DR to renove all references to bro of the three unqualified naterials Pullnan had used A-108 and A-307 naterial.

In effect, Wo-thirds of the proposed DR improperly was verbally dtsposlt3oned.

(~c1ttn 2/25/84 Anon. Aff. at 7.)

27.

The allegation appears to arise out of the alleger's lack of understanding of Nr. Karner's procedural responsibilities as QA/QC

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28.

Under Pullnan's ESD-240, 'Field Procedure For Non-Confornance Reporting,'he QA/QC Manager is responsible for the revieM and approval of all",Discrepancy Reports (DRs) prior to subnittal to PGandc.'his revi~ ensures that the alleged discrepant itens

'do actually represent departures fron procedures, specifications, or applicable codes and that the recommended disposition of the discrepant itens corylies vith the requirenents of Pullnan's Quality Assurance Progran.

The DR is considered "proposed" until Mr. Karner has conpleted his review.

Attachment to GAP 0'314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-84-166 Dated:

June 30, 1984 Page 2 of 15 29.

The proposed DR referenced fn the allegation declared, inter alia, that Lhe use of ASTH A-)08 and A-'307 Grade B naterfals as welding studs was a

nonconfornance because they allegedly ~ere not P-1 materfals as defined In ASHE Sectfon LX.

30.

During hfs revfe~ of the proposed DR, Mr. Karner deternfned that A-108 and A-307 Grade B bolts, though not specifically listed fn Section 1X, do qualify as P-1 naterials and that no deviation fron approved procedures had occurred fn welding then.

ASTM A-108 fs defined as a P-1 naterial fn ASHE code case N71-10.

A-307 Grade B, as used at Diablo

Canyon, also qualifies as a P-1 aa'terfal.

(See PGandE

response, dated March 19, 1984, to Joint lntervenors'otion to Reopen on

CQA, Brefsnefster, et al., Aff. at 12-13.)

The fnspector'who had prepared the proposed DR was fnformed of Mr. Karner's findings, and a corrected version of the DR was subnftted to PGandE as DR 5739.

31.

The fnplfcation of this allegation fs that Mr. Karner has no right to edft DRs prepared by hfs subordinates.

The facts are that Mr. Karner, under approved QA procedures, has the rfght, responsfbflfty, and oblfgatfon to ensure the accuracy of such reports.

Mr. Karner discharged this responsfb fifty approprfately.

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Attachment to GAP ¹314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 3 of 15 NRC Allegation f1541 Allegation

Description:

An individual is concerned that PGandE and NRC did not prepare their response regarding the use of ASTM A-307 and ASME SA-307 grade B, bolts.

quote from Lockert Affidavit Paragraphs 1.1 - 1.8:

1.1 On January 13, 1984 a Pullman t)C Inspector documented the use of ASTM A-307 and ASME SA-307 Grade B bolts for welded installations on hangers and supports for Class 1

safety related systems:

07 (Reactor Coolant),

08 (Chemical and Volume Control ), 09 (Safety In)ection ), 10 (Residual Heat Removal),

12 (Containment Spray),

and 14 (Component Cooling Water).

The bolts were not specifically ordered to be made from a P-1 classified base material.

The purchase orders for the bolts did not specify that the supplementary requirements for welded applications would be in effect.

As stated in ASTM A-307-82a (Exhibit 1) the supplementary requirements shall apply only when specified in the purchase order or contract.

Exhibit 1

was first presented by myself in a 3/21/84 affidavit to which PGSE has yetto sh'ow purchase orders showing supplementary requirements applicable.

1.2 PGEE has stated in DCL-84-195 at para.

226,241, DCL-84-239 at JIR-28 (pages 1-6) that the bolts installed without supplementary requirements in the purchase order for the bolts are acceptable because ASME Sec. III tells them so.

Note that PGSE has conveniently left out where in Sec. III this is stated.

What has PGAE got to lose from a full and open disclosure of the facts?

Regardless, it is well known and universally practiced that the master P-Number list for materials and their weldability is found in Sec.

IX of the ASME code.

1.3 For example Article IV, para.

t)W 421 of ASME-83, Sec.

IX states "... base metals have been assigned

'-Numbers and for ferrous base metals which have specified impact test requirements, Group Numbers within P-Numbers.

These assignments are based essentially on comparable base metal characteristics such as composition, w'eldability, and mechanical properties, where this can be logically done.

These assignments do not imply that base metals may be indiscriminately substituted for a base metal which was used in a qualification test without consideration of compatability from the standpoint of metallurgical properties.,

postweld heat treatment,

design, mechanical properties, and service requirements."

0354A

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'P L ~

~II l

Attachment to GAP ¹314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 4 of 15 1.4 Grou fn of Base Metals for Oualfffcatfon fs the title for e

mas er st o

- u ers or proce ure qualification purposes.

OH-422 does not list A-307, grade B bolts as a P-1 base metal.

Any claim to the contrary would be patently false.

gH 422 fs the place fn the code where P-Numbers shall be determined and gW 422 fs contained fn Sec.

IX; as ft should be, behind the.

definition fn gH 421 for a quick and final reference.

1.5 DCL-84-195 at 226 and 241, DCL-84-239 at JIR-28 (pages 2, 5, and 6) allude to the Code Case N71-7 as qualifying A-307, grade B bolts installed at Diablo Canyon Project.

Brefsmefster at 12 and 13 also presents this case stating that this proof qualifies A-307, grade B bolts as P-1 base metal.

The USNRC Region Y staff has also accepted the above citations as a final, "straw grabbing" qual)ffcatfon basis.

Have any of the above individuals even read the text of the Case before citing fts number?

Conspicuously, the text was deleted from all references and no detafls were used to support the position.

1.6 ASME Section III Code Case N71-7 was approved ll/12/76 and annulled 11/21/80.

The Case fs no longer fn effect because of a three year time restraint.

Thfs fs an oversight PG&E forgot to mention.

Additional oversights noted are:

o Clearly citing the full Code reference N-71-7 (1644-7),

o Stating the-time period of PG&E's contract specification versus the time N-71-7 was fn effect, o

Clearly stating where fn PG&E's contract-specfffcatfons the Code Case had been implemented into design and quality assurance specifications for the project.

1.7 The title of Code Case N-71-1 Additional Yaterfals for Com onent Su orts Sec. III Division u sec ion ass an om onent u

orts c ear y e ines fts oun aries.

e case was avai a

e on y to nuclear power plants whose desfgn and qualfty assurance programs were dedicated to ASIDE Sec. III.

By PG&E's own admission fn DCL-84-195, paragraph

250, "ASIDE Sections III and VIII only apply fn a very limited degree to Pullman's scope of work at this site and are, therefore, not a part of the training program."

1.8 Had PG&E and the NRC Region Y staff even read the Code Case text there'ere 7 conditions to be met.

Three conditions are worthy of note:

0354A 2

II

o Adherence to Sec. III Attachment to GAP ¹314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 5 of 15 o

0.35% limit on carbon for base metals to be welded o

All supports built under the provisions of the Case be identified with the Cas'e number Pullman had welded A-307 bolts with no limit on the percent of carbon, did not adhere to Sec. III, and did not identify the supports where the special conditions of the code case applied.

Pullman's quality assurance program was still struggling to meet its B31.1 and B31.7 comnitments after 10 to 12 years of Diablo construction.

To even imply that ASME Sec. III is applicable at Diablo in defense of welding A-307 grade B bolting material as structural members holding base plates on Class 1 systems is simply false and unsupported by the facts.

ASME Sec. III Subsection NF, para.

4311.1 restricts stud welding to non-structural applications such as insulation, name plates, and locating lugs.

Melded A-307 grade B bolts as reported per the

-January 13, 1984 Discrepancy Report remain a Code non-conformance.

PGAE's position has been one false statement after another in an inept coverup that gust shows sloppy Code distortions to untenable positions.

Note that PGIE and the NRC-have not offered to consult the ASIDE Code writing body for conformation t:sic3 of their position; an act they of Lsic] done instead of wasting effort on useless Code citations that remain unsupported.

ASIDE Code Case N-71-7 is openly presented as Exhibit 2.

The issue of the use of AS1N A307 bolting material has been addressed and resolved in the NRC Report Nos. 50-275/84-42 and 50-323/84-31 dated February 5, 1985.

The information below is provided as additional supporting material.

Overview of Res nse to Lockert Affidavit Nr. Lockert's latest affidavit appears to be an attempt to create chaos out of the Codes and to somehow change the original allegations and the responses to those allegations.

0354A 3

1

Attachment to GAP ¹314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 6 of 15 Regar din'g the shielded metal arc welding of A307, Grade B studs, ft fs appropriate to start at the beginning and briefly recount the history so as not to lose perspective.

The welding fs technically correct, and the decision to weld these studs was properly derived.

It was originally intended to attach studs to the containment liner plate by the automatic stud welding process (SM).

This was abandoned fn favor of attaching the studs by the manual Shielded Petal Arc Weldfng (SMAW), or manual Gas Tungsten Arc Xeldfng (GTN) processes.

At that time, early 1980s, an evaluation was made to determfne the weldabilfty and code acceptability of various material.

A prominent and obvious choice was A307, Grade B.

This choice was based on the fact that A36 fs a weldable plain carbon steel designated as a Pl material and is listed in the relevant installation codes:

ASHE Section VIII, modified for the liner plate and attachments thereto; ANSI B31.7 for nuclear systems piping; and ANSI B31.1 for balance of plant pfping.

A36 references A307 and A325 for the bolt product form.

Of these materials, the engineers selected A307, Grade B because it has appropriate limits on composition, strength, and hardness fn the 1978 version of that material specfffcatfon.

A307, Grade B was also listed in ASIDE Section III Code Case N-71-7, fn 1977, as a weldable material, and fn Section III, Appendix Table I-13.3, as a Pl material fn the winter 1978 addenda.

Mhfle these ASIDE references were not and are not directly applicable, they support the engineering rationale that A307, Grade B is weldable and suitable for component support services.

0354A

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Attachment to GAP 8314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February Z2, 1985 Page 7 of 15 Thus, A307, Grade B weld studs were ordered.

The orders specifically stated that weld studs and certificates of conformance were to be provided.

In general, the purchased studs were used where necessary.

However, occasionally a headed A307, Grade B bolt was used with the head cut off.

In response to a DR on this subject, two chemical analyses were performed and these confirmed that the A307, Grade B unheaded bolts were in fact A307, Grade B, met the chemical composition requirements of A307, and were weldable.

The welds attaching these studs to the Unit 1 liner plate were subject to liquid penetrant examination.

Also, all studs have the nuts tightened which applies a meaningful load, and torque testing is performed -on those studs, welded to the containment liner plate, which is another meaningful test.

It is against this background of a carefully reasoned and thorough engineering approach to component support welding that Hr. Lockert's initial allegation that welding was being done on comnon hardware bolts was made (See Attachment A, which is the original allegation by Hr. Lockert and the response I

as given in the CgA response to JI allegations 814 and 15, Breismeister et al., Aff at 12 and 13.)

The original allegations have now been altered and distorted.

It is, therefore, appropriate to address each of Hr. Lockert's paragraphs.

0354A

Attachment to GAP ¹314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 8 of 15 The bolts were ordered to A307, Grade B which fs a Pl material by virtue of the A36 reference.

Thfs determination fs sustained by the ASME Section III confirmation.

There was no need to speci ffcally order the material as a Pl classfffed material.

The selection of A307, Grade B was made before the 1982 edition of the A307 speci ffcatfon was available.

Note that these standards are generally not available until the last half of the year of issue.

The 1974 and 1978 versions of the A307 specification dfd not have an optional supplementary requirement for welding appl fcatfons.

It fs obviously a misconception on Mr. Lockert's part to suggest that the A307-82 option requirements could have been imposed prior to mfd-1982.

(There fs no requirement to update specfffcatfons to comply with the latest code revisions.)

The intent of the 1982 edftfon optional supplement fs met since the purchase orders speci ffcally state that weld studs are to be provided.

Mhether the optional requirements are truly necessary fs debatable fn lfght of the other chemical, hardness, and strength lfmftatfons imposed on A307, Grade B. It fs noted that ASME Section III does not r equfre the optional supplementary requirement to be imposed on A307, Grade B.

Thus, ft fs erroneous to allege that optional conditions which were not avaflable prior to the last half of 1982 should have been mandatory prior to that time.

The purchase 'order requirements, as stated therein, caused a

satisfactory product to be delivered, as was demonstrated repeatedly by the 0354A

Attachment to GAP 8314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 9 of 15 many liquid penetrant examinations and torque tests and by the two chemical.

analyses performed fn 1984.

1.2 Res nse A307, Grade B (SA307, Grade B) has been listed fn ASME Section III, Appendices, Table I-13.3 since the winter 1978 addenda to the 1977 edition (see Attachment B).

Section III determined that this material was weldable and a Pl material when used for component supports.

ASHE Sectfon III has continued to list the A307 material fn the 1980 and 1983 editions.

1.3 and 1.4 Res onse It fs incorrect to assume that only members of Section IX are knowledgeable regarding welding and can consider material classfffcatfon, although Section IX personnel do perform these activities and do assign P numbers.

It fs obvious that Section III personnel considered the subject and assfaned a Pl classff'fcatfon to the A307, Grade B, first fn a Code Case and then fn the Code.

There fs no technical support for Yr. Lockert's refusal to accept the most relevant Section III reference and, fn turn, to rely solely on a lack of clarfffcatfon from Section IX.

0354A 7

Attachment to GAP 0'314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 10 of 15 1.5 and 1.6 Res onse

~

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The Code Case N71-7 was referenced because ft supports the theseus that A307, Grade B bolts are weldable.

(Hr. Lockert's reference to Brefsmefster at 12 and 13

$ s fn error, but that

$ s )amater)al.)

Hr. Lockert's aff)davit evidences a lack of understanding of Code Cases and the Code.

All Code Cases have built-fn termfnat$ ons unless they are reaffirmed or superseded by newer revisions.

An alternative to reaff$ rmat$ on

$ s kncorporatfon of the Code Case

$ n the Code.

It $ s th$ s latter course that was followed

$ n this instance.

Code Case N71-12

$ s current, and viable today.

A307, Grade B fs presently lfsted

$ n ASME Section.III and

$s, thus, no longer a Code Case.

The Code Case was referenced as supporting data, to demonstrate that A307, Grade B.materfal

$ s weldable and supports the pro)ect selection.

It was neither stated nor Implied that the Code Case was a prospect requirement.

The Code Case need not be referenced fn prospect speck f$ cat$ ons.

1.7 Res nse The reference to the Code Case was to support the pro)ect selection and to demonstrate consistency, although compl)ance was not required.

The A307, Grade B materfal was used

$ n a nuclear power plant for component supports, as

$ s the Intent of the Code Case, and ASHE Section III.

The application has been consistent with these references, although compliance has not been requfred.

Thus, the A307, Grade B

$ s su(table for the purpose and was used 0354A

Attachment to GAP 8314.10.01

Reference:

DCL=85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page ll of 15 appropriately.

Mr. Lockert apparently cannot accept this and has cited previous responses out of context.

1.8 Res nse

. Once again, the reference by PGandE to the Code Case and to Section III were to sustain the prospect selection.

These were not, and are not, requirements.

The certified mill test reports (CMTRs

) have shown that these materials meet the carbon content limitation of 0.35 percent.

There are numerous practical manufacturing concerns which dictate that this limit would be consistently met.

The A307, Grade B specification has a hardness limit of Brinnel 212 or Rockwell B95, which is relatively soft.

This limit would be difficultto obtain with higher carbon content material.

Carbon content is also limited by manufacturers to minimize material costs, fabrication problems and the need for softening heat treatments.

Because of the relatively low minimum tensile strength requirement, 60,000 psi, there is no need for other than plain carbon steel which is easily weldable.

Because the Code Case was not required but merely cited for reference or precedent, there is no need to reference the Code Case.

Mr. Lockert has confused the Subsection NF restriction on stud welding, an automatic welding process in structural applications, with the manual Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) or manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW) processes for studs.

Mr. Lockert is comparing entirely different processes as if they 0354A 9

Attachment to GAP 0'314.10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 12 of 15 were the same.

The Subsection NF reference is not a requirement for Diablo

~

~

Canyon.

In suttnery, the welding of 307, Grade B material for component support structures is technically valid (and is sustained by references to Code Case and Section III as precedent) sustaining the prospect decision and selection.

Numerous liquid penetrant examinations and torque tests have verified that the A307, Grade B material is weldable and suitable for service.

In contrast, there is no contrary evidence regarding suitability presented by Mr. Lockert but rather a jumble of time inversions, misstatements, and attempts to change the required code.

0354A

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NRC Allegation 1541 Attachment A

1 of 2 Attachment to GAP ¹314a10.01

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Dated:

February 22, 1985 Page 13 of 15 b~ck gouging serve tne same purpose by providing backing for the weld puddle and assur1ng full weld fusion to the weld root.

The back gouging and back weld1ng operations vere con.rolled by the process sheets.

Therefor.,

even though back gouging is not specifically identif1ed in MPS 7/8, it 1s equivalent to the use.of a back1ng bar.

In addition, the welding of studs using MPS 7/8 1s qual1fied 1n accordance v1th ASME IX.

31.

Contrary to Nr. Lockert's reference to MPS 7/8, the MPS being used when Nr. Lockert expressed his concern to Pullman supervision vas MPS-203, which utilizes the 6TAM process.

MPS-203 specified the 6TAM process, an ASIDE IX qual1f1ed weld1ng procedure, that is qualified for all the essential var1ables necessary to install the studs.

32.

Finally, Nr. Lockert was not 'yanked'rom this assignment.

As stated 1n his own aff1davit (Locker't at p. AS), Nr. Lockert was not requ1red to 1nspect the referenced welds to the approved procedures due to h1s reservations, and another 1nspector was asked to perform the inspect1on.

JI gl4 and 15, lotion at 12.

It is alleged that:

Pullman also overextended Code 7/8 by weld1ng consign hardware bolts, instead of the threaded studs that theoretically were'elded to the contaiment liner.

Construct1on crews turned the bolts 1nto rough threaded studs by cutting the heads off and ch1seling the end ontfl 1t nas no(ntad

(~<t.fn 1/16/84, Anon. Aff. at 3H.)

51nce

+Bey came from comnon hard~are bolts of A 307 Iaterial, the homemade studs ne1ther have controlled chemica'ontents such as carbon limitations, nor material traceability.

As a result, 1t 1s uncertain whether the welds will hold for such suspect material.

(~eftkn 1/16/84, Anan. Aff. at 3-4 and 1/12/84, Annlln.

Aff. at AS.)

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Attachment to GAP ¹314n10.01 NRC Allegation 1541 Dated:

February 22,

Reference:

DCL-85-077 Attachment,A 1985 2of2 Page 14 of 15 he studs referred to. in this allegation are not "comnon hardware bolts'ith uncontrolled chemistry as alleged.

In fact, these studs comply with all the requirements for A307 Gr.

8 steel.

A307 6m 8 bolts are included as a referenced Product form in A36.

Thus, A307 Gr n 8 bolts are A36 aaterfal.

A36 material fs a p-1 material and fs weldable using NPS 7/8.

The use of A307 6r.

8 bolts as a p-l material 1s further verified by ASliE Section III (thc code which superseded ANSI 831.7 for nuclear construction).

Add1tionally, as discussed in response to JI Ill, 12 and 13, these studs were properly welded using AS 7/8.

34.

The bolts were altered to obtain a chisel end to provide double bevel groove which would afford the full penetrat1on weld specfficd.

This

'chisel'onfigurat1on 1s obtained from a threaded stud or a bolt. with the head removed.

The result fs-the same as 1f a threaded stud had.been 35.

used and has no affect on the weld groove'and qualityn Contrary to the allegation, both the threaded stud and bolt material

~ects all spec1f1cation and code requ1rcments for wcldability, chemical compos1tfon,

strength, and traceability.

Furthermore, all welded studs were torque tested, wh1ch demonstrated the adequacy of the installation.

JI P6, Notion at 12-13.

It fs alleged that:

Code 7/8 has been used to weld at least eight pipe support )oint configurations, including flare bevel groove welds, and double groove welds, not covered by 7/8.

Each conf1gurat1on represents a unique essential

~elding var1ablc and legally -'est have 1ts own approved weld procedure spec1f ication deta111ng the Joint configuratfon.

(~cstsn 1/16/64.

Anon. Aff at 6&.[sfc, actually ~1tsn Hudson Aff. at 5] and Lockart Aff at.

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P GAP Allegation ¹314.10.02 It is alleged that:

Use of ASTM A-307 material in welded applications cannot be considered conservative engineering practice, as the quality assurance requirements normally associated with the manufacturing of bolts for flanged joints are wholly inadequate to ensure weldability for critical installations.

Welding of this material must be in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BSPY)

Code,Section IX.

Section IX requires chemistry controls not found in the A-307 specification to ensure weldability.

There was no procedure qualified to weld this

material, and as recent new information indicates, serious doubts as to the adequacy of the quality assurance program of a vendor identified in my report.

The quality of these installations is not assured, it is indeterminate.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 3.)

The acceptability of ASTM A307 bolting material has been addressed in response to NRC Allegation ¹1541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077, dated February 22, 1985, attached to the response to ¹314.10. 01.

Contrary to the allegation, welding procedure specifications and welders were qualified in accordance with ASME,Section IX.

Section IX does not specifically require chemistry controls.

The Section IX committee considers chemistry along with other criteria when assigning P numbers.

Section IX does 1

not address bolting materials.

Section III considered A307 Grade B bolting materials and assigned a Pl designation.

(}ualified Pl welding procedure specifications were used to install this material.

The allegations as to the adequacy of the quality assurance program of a vendor (Cardinal Industrial Products) were answered in PGandE letter DCL-85-152, dated April 17, 1985.

0362S/0034K

- 104-

The suitability of the A307 Grade B material provided by Cardinal and others has been repeatedly proven and reproven by the liquid penetrant examinations-and torquing of the installed welded studs.

These examinations and tests have shown that there is no concern for the A307 Grade B material provided by Cardinal and others, as welded at Diablo Canyon.

0362S/0034K

- 105-

GAP Allegation 8314.10.03 It is alleged that:

In a meeting with gA manager Harold Karner on January 18,

1984, I was told by Karner that "all A-307 material was produced from A-36 steel",

although Karner had no objective evidence to prove this statement.

I explained the technical requirements for weldability of carbon steel, specifically carbon content control and material traceability, to refute the assertion that weldable grade material is universally used to produce bolts.

There is no assurance that weldable grade bolts were supplied at Diablo

Canyon, and used extensively in safety-related pipe supports.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 4.)

The acceptability of ASTN A307 bolting material was addressed in response to NRC Allegation 81541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077 dated February 22, 1985; a

copy of that response is attached to the response to Allegation 8314.10. 01.

The proof that weldable material was used lies in the numerous liquid penetrant examinations and torque tests which have been performed and have.

demonstrated the material to be weldable and acceptable for use.

0362S/0034K

-106-

GAP Allegation ¹314.10.04 It is alleged that:

In the above referenced

meeting, Karner produced a chart from ASME B8PV,Section III which listed ASTM A-307 as a

P-1 material.

I replied that the section was not applicable, as it concerned bolting stress allowances for design.

For weldability,Section IX is the controlling document and does not recognize A-307 as a weldable (P-1) material.

Karner refused to in'elude A-307 in the official report, which is in reality falsification of a document by omission.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 4.)

Contrary to the allegation,Section IX is not the exclusive definer of weldability.

Other sections also consider material weldability.

The Section III committee has determined that A307 Grade B is weldable and has assigned it a Pl designation.

The issue of the use of ASTM A307 bolting material has been addressed in response to NRC Allegation ¹1541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077 dated February 22, 1985; a'opy is attached to the response to Allegation ¹314.10. 01.

The alleged falsification, previously called "censoring" by the alleger, was completely answered in PGandE letter DCL-84-166 dated June 30, 1984, Allegation ¹200, at paragraphs 27-31 (see copy attached to the response to Allegation ¹314.10. 01).

0362S/0034K

- 107-

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GAP Allegation $314.10.05 It is alleged that:

The use of ASTM A-307, A-325, A-194-B7, and other materials as well 'in welded applications clearly indicate I:sicj a pervasive breakdown of quality assurance in regard to welded studs.

Also, there was no design review by PGSE for weldability of the materials, as the ASME Code clearly.

prohibits welding of these specifications with the procedures qualified and in use at Diablo Canyon.

For PG8E to admit that a breakdown in quality assurance of this magnitude existed, it would have to be corrected prior to licensing the plant.

At this time, PG8E was requesting an operating license for Unit.l.

New information o'nly recently made available indicates a serious breakdown in the quality assurance program of a supplier of ASTM A-307 bolts referenced in my original report.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 5.)

As this allegation involves the use of three different materials, separate responses have been prepared discussing each material.

The issue of the use of ASTM A307 bolting material has been addressed rtI in response to NRC Allegation 5'1541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077 dated February 22, 1985; a copy is attached to the response to Allegation 8314.10.01.

It can clearly be seen that no "pervasive breakdown" of l}A occurred.

Section III of the ASME Code clearly allows welding of A307 Grade B

material with the use of qualified procedures such as those in use at Diablo Canyon.

AsSection III allows welding of A307 Grade B, and has designated it a Pl material, no specific or formal design review by PGandE for weldability was required.

That designation is consistent with the weldability considerations of Pullman and PGandE.

0362S/0034K

- 108-

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The use of ASTM A325 material in welded applications was identified, properly documented in Discrepancy Report DR-5739, researched to determine the scope of applications, and properly dispositioned by PGandE.

Contrary to the allegation, this demonstrates a properly functioning gA program.

3.

The A194 material specification is for nuts, not bolting.

Therefore, it is presumed that the alleger meant A193 Grade B7, which is the specification for bolting material.

It is true that A193 Grade B7 material had been used in welded applications at Diablo Canyon.

.This usage was properly:

(1) identified through a functioning gA program; (2) documented fn Pullman's DR-5891 for Unit 1 and DR-8521 for Unit 2, and in PGandE's NCRs DC1-84-RM-N010 for Unit 1 and DC2-84-RM-N011 for Unit 2; (3) researched to determine the extent of the application; and (4) properly dispositioned and resolved by PGandE.

0362S/0034K

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GAP Allegation ¹314.10.15 It is alleged that:

A recently-released Region V Inspection report, dated February 5, 1985, contains some glaring false statements regarding the issue of welded ASTM A-307 material.

In Report Nos.

84-42 and 84-31, Inspector Dennis Kirsch

states, "The staff satisfied itself that A-307 was a

material which was properly approved for ASME or AWS usage and the use of welding procedure 7/8."

This statement is

false, as neither AWS or ASME recognize the use of this material without first qualifying 'a welding procedure

~usia

'this material.

A further aspect of this is that conservative engineering groups would require more quality assurance of materials than is required for A-307 in welded applications.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 10.)

Contrary to the allegation, the ASME Section III committee has considered the A307 Grade 8 material, determined that the material was acceptable for component supports, and assigned a Pl designation.

With the Pl designation, qualification of a procedure with the specific material is not necessary.

Pullman used ASME Section IX-qualified Pl welding procedures to install the A307 Grade 8 material.

The acceptability of ASTM A307 bolting material has been addressed in detail in the response to NRC Allegation ¹1541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077, e

dated February 22, 1985; a copy is attached to the response to Allegation ¹314.10. 01.

0362S/0034K

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GAP Allegation 8314.10.16 It is alleged that:

Dennis Kirsch uses the same flimsy excuse that Harold Karner attempted to use more than a year ago by referring to ASt1E Section III, Table I-13.3.

The P numbers listed in this table are for information onl

, and one must reference ASh1E Section IX for we a

e mater)als.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 10.)

The allegations raised by this alleger are merely a repeat of similar 4

allegations previously raised by another affiant.

These earlier allegations have been addressed in response to NRC Allegation f1541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077 dated February 22, 1985.

The specific responses are numbered 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, and are located on page 7 of the copy attached to the response to Allegation 8314.10.01.

0362S/0034K

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GAP Allegation f314.10.17 It is alleged that:

The fact of this matter is that ASME Code Interpretation NI-84-041, which is to be published in the next addenda to the Code, specifically citesSection IX as the controlling document as an answer to the very question posed in this case.

The P-numbers listed in Table I-13.3 cannot be used to determine weldability.

This is exactly what I told Harold Karner more than a year ago, to refute his contention that because Table I-13.3 listed A-307 as a P-1 material, it in fact was.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 10; )

Again, the response to this allegation is included in the response to NRC Allegation 81541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077 dated February 22, 1985.

Specifically, see responses 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 on page 7 included with the response to Allegation 8314.10. 01.

The interpretation regarding the fine points of ASME protocol for P number assignment is immaterial to this issue.

The facts are that the weldability of

'I A307 Grade B material was successfully proven by examinations and tests of the installed material, and that the decision to weld the A307 Grade B was derived by analysis and the precedent of the ASME Code Cases N71-7 and N71-8.

Further, A307 Grade B continues to be listed in ASME Section III, Minter 1984

\\

Addenda, as a Pl material.

0362S/0034K

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• GAP Allegation f314.10.18 It is alleged that:

Kirsch further states in his February 5, 1985 report that he "examined certified material test reports (CMTR) for the welded A-307 at Diablo Canyon.

As this was the first time a

CMTR had been mentioned,'

called Kirsch on February 15, 1985 to gain more information.

In this conversation, Kirsch stated he had not seen the CMTR's until late 1984.

In light of the fact that the manufacturer would not normally be required to have CMTR's for this material, and that the manufacturer was Cardinal Bolt, and that almost a year elapsed since the issue was

raised, serious questions arise as to the validity of these reports.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 11.)

At Diablo Canyon, Pullman Power Products purchased and used A307 Grade B

material for pipe supports.

For pipe support material, only a Certificate of Compliance (CofC) is required, not a CMTR.

A CofC. is a simple statement by the manufacturer that the material provided conforms to the material specification requirements,

whereas, a

CMTR is a certified report of actual results of tests performed on the actual material provided.

Some of the welded A307 material was supplied with a CMTR, a higher level of certification than was required.

The manufacturer of those particular bolts was Texas Bolt

Company, not Cardinal Bolt as alleged.

0362S/0034K

GAP Allegation 8314.10.19 It is alleged that:

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When asked to cite purchase orders reviewed, Kirsch stated he "had not written anything down", and that he "could't

[sicj remember which ones he looked at".

He did state that

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"several Purchase orders could not be matched to a CNTR".

Although this would seem to substantiate my concerns, this vias ignored by 'the staff.

Due to the findings of the NRC VPB, there is little objective evidence to believe that Cardinal would have above-board gA for their non-certified items, yet would be in so much trouble over their supposedly certified materials.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff.

at 11.)

As stated in the response to Allegation f314.10.18, CMTRs are not required for pipe support material.

All A307 Grade B material supplied by Cardinal was supported by a Certificate of Compliance, in accordance with Code and contract requirements.

As discussed in PGandE letter DCL-85-153, dated April 17, 1985, the hardware delivered by Cardinal has repeatedly been found to meet requirements.

There.

is no data to suggest that Cardinal provided deficient A307 Grade B material.

0362S/0034K

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GAP Allegation f314.10. 20 It is alleged that:

Kirsch could not confirm that the CMTR's he reviewed indicated that the material used to manufacture A-307 bolts was purchased as a,P-l material in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Code.

This is the only acceptable conclusion to the acceptability of this material.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 11.)

n As stated in previous responses, and in response to Allegation 81541 submitted in PGandE letter DCL-85-077, dated February 22, 1985, no special requirements need to be placed on A307 Grade B material in order for this material to be weldable and acceptable for use.

ASME Section IX does not address bolting materials.

Thus, it is inappr'opriate to allege that inaction by Section IX implies that A307 Grade B bolting material is not weldable or acceptable.

It is also incorrect to expect CMTRs for bolting to reference Section IX, which addresses qualification tests for welding procedure specifications and personnel.

0362S/0034K

- 115-

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GAP Allegation 8314.10. 21 It is alleged that:

In a February, 1984, interview with RV inspector Gonzalo Hernandez, I was told by Hernandez that, "NRC metallurgists had determined that A-307 material was acceptable, but that A-325 was not."

As Region V would not examine a

CMTR until it was "resurrected".almost ten months later, I wonder what Hernandez was citing as evidence that no problem existed.

The metallurgists refer red to in this conversation were most probably PG8E's.

Further attempts throughout

March, April, and May to obtain any objective evidence for this conclusion proved futile.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 12.)

PGandE.has no knowledge of the alleged remarks by Mr. Hernandez and the assumed activities of the NRC, but the indicated conclusions are consistent with PGandE's earlier responses..

A CMTR is not a required document in determining the acceptability or weldability of these materials.

The NRC Staff members involved in this investigation may have considered the numerous examinations and tests which have been successfully performed on the installed products as the best evidence of weldability.

0362S/0034K

- 116-

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GAP Allegation 8314.10.22 It is alleged that:

NRC Region V staff stated falsely in testimony before the Commission that the use of ASTM A-307 material in welded applications was authorized by a Code Case to the ASME B&PV Code.

In facto current Code Case is applicable to this material in welded applications.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff.

at 13.)

The response to this allegation is contained within the response to NRC Allegation f1 541 in PGandE letter DCL-85-077, dated February 22, 1985.

Specifically, see responses numbered

1. 5 and 1. 6 in the copy provided with the response to Allegation 8314.10. Ol.

The assertion that the A307 Grade B material is not listed in a current Code Case is correct.

However, the material is listed as a Pl material in ASME Section III in the current 1983 Edition, Winter 1984 Addenda.

The.,A307 Grade B ma+erial was au+horized

'.n Code Case N71-7 and N71-8 until +his material was incorporated into the Code,Section III, where it remains to this day, thus continuing its authorization.

0362S/0034K

- 117-

GAP Allegation 5314.10.23 It is alleged that:

The fact that the HRC Region V staff's position on this matter parroted the original excuse that Pullman and PGSE offered proves the staff's willingness to accept licensee responses to allegations at face value, with no critical review of the information presented.

In this case, the use of ASTM A-307 material is clearly unacceptable without some objective evidence that this material, as supplied to Diablo Canyon, meets the requirements for weldable chemical composition.

Had this information, if it existed at the

time, been made available, this would not have become the issue it now appears to be.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 13.)

The clear, objective evidence of weldable material is the numerous liquid penetrant examinations and the torquing tests which have been successfully applied to the welded studs.

As has been consistently demonstrated, no special chemical control of A307 Grade B material is required by either the contract specification or the applicable construction code to allow A307 Grade B to be used in welded applications.

0362S/0034K

-118-

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GAP Allegation 8314.10.24 It is alleged that:

The staff freely divulged the content of our confidential conversations concerning harassment and intimidation to the very management individuals who, I believe, were orchestrating the process in an attempt to get me off the Diablo Canyon site.

By PG8E's own admission at the time, the delays caused by allegations were costing upwards of

$16 million per week.

The types of deficiencies I was finding as an inspector were serious enough as to have licensing impact.

As licensing drew near, and particularly after the June ASLAB hearings-,

the harassment I was getting became markedly more severe.

Exhibit 6 is a decision by the California Unemployment Apnea s Board, Case No.

VH 24357, concerning Pullman's appeal of re unemployment insurance claim.

This report states, inter alia, "The Department determined that the claimant had quit his job because of unsafe working conditions which were brought to the employer's attention but insufficient action was taken to correct this matter"."

and

"...the claimant had voluntarily quit because of hazardous working conditions after informing the employer that a need for corrective action need be taken.

The claimant met his reporting responsiblity to the employer by making the employer aware of his concern.

The Department

'determined that insufficent action was taken to correct the problem by the employer.

The Department determination and rul=ing and the presumption was not rebutted by the employer."

(2/22/85 O'Heill Aff. at 15-16. )

Pullman

(}A/(}C management has held a number of discussions with the NRC regarding harassment and intimidation, both in general terms and in regard to specific incidents.

The information and documentation of actions taken 0362S/0034K

- 119-

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pertaining to specific incidents was presented to the NRC for its review.

No harassment or intimidation of an individual, including this alleger, occurred as a result of any discussions between an individual and the NRC or with regard to investigations conducted by the NRC.

The incidents claimed as harassment or intimidation by this alleger were investigated by his Lead Man, QC Supervisor, Assistant QA/QC Manager, QA/QC

Manager, and Resident Construction

Manager, as applicable and appropriate.

When the incident could be verified and the responsible parties identified, appropriate action was taken.

In those cases where the incident could not be verified, craft supervisors were reminded that harassment of QC personnel.was a violation of federal law and could result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.

Any quality deficiencies documented by ihe alleger were evaluated and resolved in accordance with approved Procedures ESD 268 and ESD 240.

PGandE asserts it has never condoned any harassment or intimidation of personnel at the Diablo 'Canyon Plant.

A thorough investigation into all such claims was conducted, and if the facts warranted, appropriate action was taken.

0362S/0034K

-120-

GAP Allegation ¹314.10.25 It is alleged that:

NRC investigations did not make an effort to protect the confidentiality of the allegers.

The effect of the investigations was to alert the licensee and subcontractor who the "problem" individuals were who were providing information to the NRC.

These individuals, myself

included, were then targeted for harassment.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 16.)

Both Pullman and PGandE recognize that any alleged instances of inspector harassment could have an adverse affect not only on the overall efficiency and acceptability of the guality Assurance'rogram but also, ultimately, on the licensing of Diablo Canyon.

All such alleged incidents were, and are, thoroughly investigated by the appropriate supervisors.

When any incident of harassment was substantiated and the responsible party was identified, appropriate disciplinary actions were taken.

In addition, PPP made all its personnel aware of the consequences of harassing guality Control personnel, not only under the Company's internal policy, but also pursuant to the provisions of NRC regulations regarding "Employee Protection" and "Protection of Inspectors."

The assertion that PGandE or any of its contractors had a management policy of harassing or condoning the har rassmeht of known allegers is categorically untrue.

0362S/0034K

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GAP Allegation 831 4.10. 27 It is alleged that:

Once PG8E established the l}uality Hotline in March, 1984, the staff refused to accept new allegations.

I was wary of dealing with the Hotline, but did make several allegations that the NRC refused to listen to available to the Hotline.

These concerned concrete drilling practices, harassmen't over discrepancy reporting priority, and material storage problems that the subcontractor refused to deal with.

The Hotline, as I suspected, was a vehicle for PGSE management to stall issues past any licensing deadline, while management ultimately succeeded in making my life on site so miserable that I had no choice but resign.

(2/22/85 O'eill Aff. at 16-17.)

The PGandE guality Hotline was established in January 1984 to respond to quality complaints and concerns.

Its existence was broadly publicized to all personnel on site.

Under this program, investigation of Hotline concerns was made the responsibility of the General Construction 'guality Control Department.

The General Construction

(}C Department promptly and independently I

investigates all complaints and takes any appropriate action to resolve the concerns.

Since its inception, the guality Hotline has received over 140 concerns.

The majority of these concerns have been resolved within 30 days of receipt.

Their resolution is in no way governed by management or licensing pressure nor has it been used by PGandE as a" "vehicle" to stall issues past any licensing deadline.

Indeed, all Hotline records of concern are available for inspection and review by the NRC at any time.

l Records show that the alleger did contact the Hotline with several concerns 0362S/0034K

- 122-

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As documented in the alleger's Hotline concern file, the alleger was not satisfied with the

.Hotline's resolution of his concerns.

The four concerns submitted to the guality Hotline by the alleger involved the subjects of (1) uncontrolled storage

areas, (2) anchor bolts, (3) stop work

orders, and (4) gC inspector harassment.

Disposition of these concerns was as follows:-

Subject Uncontrolled Storage Area Anchor Bolt Concerns Stop Work Orders

()C Inspector Harassment Date Initiated 05/08/84 05/15/84 05/18/84 07/02/84 Date Closed 09/06/84 11/16/84, 08/06/84 08/03/84 l}CSR 8 041 045 048 059 The primary reason that three of the concerns remained open for 3, 4 and 6

months, respectively, was that specific information regarding the concerns was not originally provided by the alleger.

The investigations involved numerous follow-up meetings with the alleger to acquire sufficient facts to close the concerns.

In NRC Inspection Report Nos.

50-275/84-21 and 50-323/84-10, dated September 12, 1984, para.

5.J, at p 15 (attached),

the NRC stated that it had reviewed selected records from the ()uality Hotline Program and determined that 0362S/0034K

- 123-

it was an effective method for resolution of ".quality" concerns and that PGandE had expended a substantial effort to address the concerns.

As to the allegation that since the inception of the l}uality Hotline (January 1984) "the Staff I:hasj refused to accept new allegations,"

one has only to look at the literally hundreds of allegations

accepted, investigated, and resolved by the Staff since that time as par t of its Allegation Management Program (DCAMP).

0362S/0034K

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