ML16341B697
| ML16341B697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Humboldt Bay, Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1981 |
| From: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340B910 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107140634 | |
| Download: ML16341B697 (8) | |
Text
July 10, 1981 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 Arizona Pub11c Service Company P. 0.
Box 21666 Phoen)x,. Ar)zona 85036 Attentfon:
Mr. E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
V)ce Pres)dent, Nuclear Projects Gentlemen:
The enclosed c)rcular
$ s forwarded for your Information.
Your review of-thfs matter and correct)on of any
$ dent$ f$ed problems
$ s expected before licensing of your plant. If you have any questions related to th$ s matter please contact th$ s office.
Sincerely, 5fgimf 'sign@ 5y
- 9. L Engelken R.
H. Engelken Director
Enclosure:
IE C)rcular No. 81-09 cc w/enclosure:
F.
M. Hartley, APS Bi07140634 8i07i0 PDR'DOCK 05000i33 G
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RV FAULK(NBERR 7/10/81 7/10/8 Y/dot ENGELKE
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. IISGF0 1980
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SS IN, No.:
6830 Access No.:
810330373 IEC 81-09 UNITED STATES'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 10, 1981 IE Circular No. 81-09:
CONTAINMENT EFFLUENT WATER 'IHAT BYPASSES RADIOACTIVITY MONITOR Descri tion of Circumstances:
At Indian Point Units 2 and 3 and at H. B. Robinson Unit 2,.licensee reviews of service water systems, have identified unmoni tored effluent paths from contain-ment.
Although containment cooler water effluent is monitored, containment cooler fan motor cool.ing water bypasses the monitors. by joining the containment cooler water effluent. downstream of the radiation monitoring equipment.
This represents a'otential unmonitored release path if the containment is at design pressure due to a design basis accident (DBA) and if, leaks are present in the fan motor cooler system.
Similar designs may exist at other plants.
Appropriate monitoring of direct discharges (from. containment to the environment following a
DBA) having the potential to exceed the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 is required.
Recommended Actions:
l.
All water system effluents that are not automatically isolated by a high-containment-pressure containment isolation signal and that flow directly to the environment from containment should be reviewed to determine whether or not a pathway exists for "significant" unmonitored discharge.
A "signif-icant" discharge, for purposes of this circular, is a discharge where projected concentrations in unrestricted'areas are likely to exceed the concentrations listed in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, column 2, with the containment at design pressure due to a design basis accident and with maximum credible leakage, such as a single completely severed cooler tube, assumed to be present in the water system inside containment.
You may take credit for design pressure in the water system being higher than containment design pressure only for cases where neither single failures, nor operation in degraded modes as permitted by Technical Specifications under a limiting condition of operation (LCO), are likely to result in operation of the water system at water pressures lower than the containment design pressure.
2.
All water system effluents that are not automatically isolated by a high-containment-pressure containment isolation signal and that flow directly to the environment from containment should be reviewed to determine whether or not any "significant" radioactive discharge can be isolated once it is detected.
The review should include evaluatioh of the capability of the system to be isolated without interruption of any safety-related functions.
Isolation of the system's inlet as. well as its discharge may be required
IEC 81-09 July 10, 1981 Page 2 of 2 to prevent radioactive discharge through the inlet piping to the inlet piping of a parallel system and/or. to. the environment.
3.
Corrective actions
.to install detection and isolation methods that provide performance consistent with Technical Specification requirements should be initiated for any "significant" unmonitored and/or unisolable discharge pathways.
Although no written response to this circular is requested, a report and, cor-rective actions may be required by applicable Technical Specifications in the event an unmonitored and/or unisolable effluent pathway is identified.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact the appro-priate IE Regional Office.
Attachment:
Recently Issued IE Circulars
0
RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Attachment IEC 81-09 July 10, 1981 Circular No.
Sub 'ect Date of Issue Issued to 81-10 Steam Voiding in the Reactor 7/2/81 Coolant System During Decay Heat Removal Cooldown All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 81-08 81-07 Foundation Materials Control of Radiactiviely Contaminated Material 5/29/81 5/14/81 All power reactor faci1 ities with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 81-06 81-05 Potential Deficiency Affecting 4/14/81 Certain Foxboro 20 to 50 Milliampere Transmitters Self-Aligning Rod End Bushings 3/31/81 for Pipe Supports All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 81-04 The Rol e of Shift Technical Advisors and Importance of Reporting Operational Events 4/30/81 All power reactor facilities with an OL or near-term OL 81-03 Inoperable Seismic Monitoring 3/2/81 Instrumentation All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 81-02 81-01 Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated 2/9/81 1/23/81 All power reactor facilities (research
& test) with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP 80-25 Case Histories of Radiography Events 12/5/80 All radiography licensees OL = Operating Licenses CP
= Construction Permit
I '