ML16341B484
| ML16341B484 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1981 |
| From: | Bowers E Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, LBP-81-5, NUDOCS 8102190689 | |
| Download: ML16341B484 (38) | |
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LBP-81-5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
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'lizabeth S.
- Bowers, Chairman Glenn 0. Bright Dr. Jerry R. Kline O~hce sf the.ectePuf Dccketing 4 Savice Branch r
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PACIFIC GAS 5 ELECTRIC COMPANY Docket Nos.
50= 75-0 50-3 3-OL February 13, 1981 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1
tI 2)
PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDER At the time of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the record in this proceeding was complete.
The occurrence of that accident prompted a motion (from the Joint Intervenors) on May 29, 1979, to reopen the record.
The Staff urged that the Board defer ruling on that motion until the Staff could investigate the accident and report its conclusions as to the implications for the Diablo facility to the Board and the parties.
In an Order of June 5, 1979, the Board granted the Staff request.
On June 20, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 'issued a
1 "Statement of Policy for Further Commission Guidance for Power Reactor.
Operating Licenses,"
45 Fed.
Reg.
41738.
That statement adopted as both necessary and sufficient for responding to the TMI accident insofar as 5
new operating licenses are concerned the requirements contained in NUREG-0694, "TNI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses."
sxo2zoo>tri
The existence of this guidance from the Commission prompted the filing.
by Applicant of a motion seeking authority to load fuel and conduct. low power testing (a so-called
~ 50.57(c) motion).
The motion seeks an-operating license authorizing (i) loading of fuel; (ii) proceeding to initial criticality; (iii) performing startup testing at zero power; and (iv) testing at power levels not in excess of 5X of rated power with respect to each unit.
The Applicant's motion prompted further proceedings which are the subject of this prehearing conference order.
To some extent, the Joint Intervenors'otion to reopen is also necessarily involved in these proceedings and will be dealt with herein as appropriate.
Applicant's motion was filed on July 14, 1980.
On August 4, 1980, Joint Intervenors responded, asserting that prior to the grant of any such license outstanding issues pertaining to seismic design, security planning, quality assurance, and emergency planning had to be resolved.
Further, Joint Intervenors asserted the need for a hearing at which they would contest Applicant's conclusions with respect to fuel loading and low power testing.
Also on August 4, Governor Brown filed in opposition to Applicant's motion, asserting that the motion did not comply with the Rules of Practice.
On August 6, the Staff responded to the motion asserting, inter alia, that the motion application for 50.57(c) license appeared to be adequate and suggested that the Board should proceed.
Attached to the Staff's response was Supplement 10 to the SER which served as its evaluation of the impact of TMI on the sought-for license.
After calling for further response from the parties, the Board issued an Order accepting the Applicant's motion as sufficiently complete to commence the proceeding and setting October 27, 1980,.as the date for the filing of contentions.
This date was subsequently adjusted to December 3,
1980 because of the 'parties involvement with Appeal Board matters.
The Hoard also approved the Staff's identification of the issues remaining in the proceeding on which Board findings were still required and concurred in the Staff's judgment that a decision on Joint Intervenors'otion to reopen the record on so-called "Class 9" accidents should await the conclusion of proceedings on the seismic issue currently underway before an Appeal Hoard.
In compliance with the Board's Order, Joint Intervenors filed contentions and the Governor filed a list of "subjects" on which he wishes to participate.
The Applicant and Staff have filed responses, and a two-day prehearing con-ference was held on January 28 and 29, 1981, in Bethesda, Maryland; in which the contentions and "subjects" were discussed.
Before dealing in detail with the positions of the parties with regard to the contentions and "subjects", at the prehearing conference a related matter was considered.
On December 8, 1980, the Governor filed a motion to stay the proceeding pending preparati,on of an environmental impact statement (or alternatively an appraisal) dealing with fuel loading, testing, and low power operation.
This motion was supported by Joint Intervenors on December 18 and opposed by Applicant and Staff on December 23, since the motion did not even address the criteria for a stay.
The motion was argued at the prehearing conference and orally denied by the Board on
the basis that the Governor did not address the criteria in 10 CFR 2.788(e) which must be met in order for the motion to be granted.
The Board also stated the motion would not prevail on the merits since an EIS was issued and a PID on environmental matters was issued.
(Tr. 33-35) Subsequently, the Governor orally moved for reconsideration and requested the Board to direct the Staff to prepare an environmental impact appraisal in order to determine whether an environmental impact statement is necessary under 10 CFR 51.5(b)(3), 51.5(c)(l), 51.7 and 51.5(c)(l) prior to issuance of any fuel loading and low power testing license.
The motion was denied and the Board stated the rationale would be detailed in its Order,.
While these motions seek somewhat different results, the Governor's rationale in support of them and the Applicant's and Staff's rationale in opposition are essentially identical.
So are the Board's rulings.
Therefore, both motions will be discussed together.
The Governor relies for support on the provisions of 10 CFR 55 51.5(b) and (c).
Subsection (b) of this section lists certain licensing actions which may or may not require an environmental impact statement.
One of these is "[i]ssuance of a license to operate a power reactor...at less than full power...". -($51.5(b)(3).)
Subsection (c) states that in the event that an environmental impact statement is not prepared, a negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal will be prepared, unless the Commission determines otherwise, with respect to the licensing action listed in subsection (b).
The Governor seeks an order directing the Staff to prepare an environmental impact appraisal as a first step in determining whether an impact statement must be undertaken.
The motion
to stay sought a halt in. these proceedings pending the preparation of the statement or, alternatively, of the appraisal.
The Governor cites several cases for the proposition that NEPA requires agencies to take a hard look at environmental matters.
Both Applicant and Staff raised procedural objections to the motion to stay the proceedings, the principal of which was the lack of any showing having been made under 52.788.
- Further, both have pointed to the fact that an environmental impact statement and a supplement thereto have been prepared in regard to the full-term full-power operation.
Hearings have been held on the environmental issues and a Partial Initial Decision issued.
(LBP-78-19, 7
NRC 989 [1978].)
The Applicant and Staff rely on Maine Yankee Atomic
~PC (6
1 1
1 At 1
P 6 tl 6 ALA6-161, 6 Att 11166
[1973]; aff'd sub nom., Citizens for Safe Power Inc. v.
- NRC, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975) for the proposition that, in this situation, there is no need to consider the environmental impact of something less than full-power, full-term operation.
The Staff also cites Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant)
LBP-78-40, 8
NRC 717, at 744 (1978);
aff'd: ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287 (1979) for the same proposition.
Additionally, the Staff points out that, absent some showing that the 550.57(c) license would entail some impacts which were not considered in. the earlier environmental impact statement, supplement thereto, and hearings and decision thereon, there is no need to undertake a fresh environmental study.
The latter, obviously, would only rehash earlier considerations.
For this proposition, the Staff cites Geor ia Power Com an (Vogtle Units 1
8 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404 (1975); Detroit Edison Com an (Enrico Fermi Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7
NRC 381 at 393 (1978);
and Northern States Power Com an (Prairie Island Units 1
& 2), ALAB-455, 7
NRC 41 at 46 n.
4 (1978).
The Governor has assumed and the Applicant and Staff have not challenged the proposition that 551.5(b)(3) includes the license here sought.
Section 51.5(b)(3) includes licenses to
~o crate at less than full power, while Applicant seeks a license to, inter alia, test at less than 5X of rated power.
The Board believes that a meaningful distinction may exist between testing and operation which would raise the question whether 551.5(b)(3) applies to this proceeding.
Be that as it may, following the assumption that 551.5(b)(3) is applicable, the Board notes that the Staff has correctly stated the law.
The Governor's attempt to postulate a situation not covered in the earlier environmental proceedings (issuance of a 550.57(c) license, followed by denial of a full-term, full-power license) simply does not hold water.
As pointed out in Maine Yankee,
~su ra, any licensee faces the possibi-lity of restriction or cancellation of his license as a result of regulatory developments.
Clearly the environmental impacts of full-term, full-power operation are greater than the impacts of the limited testing here sought.
To consider these limited impacts after the comprehensive review already undertaken would serve no useful purpose.
Consequently, it follows that both the Governor's motions must be denied; the motion to stay because the Governor cannot make the required showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits, etc.;
and the oral motion to require preparation of an environmental impact appraisal because the Governor has not prevailed on the merits.
Next, it is necessary to address the positions taken by the parties with respect to the standards to be employed in determining which "con-tentions" and "subjects" are admissible.
It would be an understatement to say that the discussion of this subject at the prehearing conference was characterized by some confusion.
Nonetheless, the Board has care-fully reviewed the transcript and has set down the positions of the parties as it understands them.
Joint Intervenors'osition is most 'easily understood.
The Joint Intervenors maintain that all'contentions which we'e timely filed (by December
- 3) and which have a nexus to the application for the testing license are admissible.
Contentions, of course, must meet the specificity requirements of 10 CFR 52.714 (Tr. 68, 82-84).
Joint Intervenors base their position on their reading of the Commission's "Further, Commission Guidance for Power Reactor Operating Licenses:
Revised Statement of Policy" of December 18, 1980 (45 Fed.
Reg.
- 85236, Dec.
24, 1980).
Joint Intervenors believe that the fact that the revised policy statement removed the limitation in the policy statement as to litigation of the sufficiency of additional regulatory
requirements (those which constitute new requirements as opposed to those which constitute refinement of existing regulations) means that contentions may propose additional requirements beyond those addressed in NUREG-0737 (Tr. 340).
Joint Intervenors take the position that their proposed contentions fall into two categories;
.they propose issues over and above those issues contained in NUREG-0737 and challenge the sufficiency of issues addressed in NUREG-0737.
Applicant's position, as stated in its response to contentions and sub-jects of 'December 18, is clear.
Applicant believes that the revised policy statement, reiterating as it does the traditional standards for reopening records and admitting late contentions, does not provide any authority to deviate from those standards.
Thus, absent a
showing of good cause under the applicable standard, a showing which intervenors have not attempted to make, no contentions are admissible.
At the prehearing conference Applicant took the position that the paragraph't the bottom of page 8 of the policy statement prohibits new contentions.~1/
Staff's position as set forth in the transcript of the prehearing conference adopts a position not far from Applicant's.
Staff agrees that good cause must be shown in order to reopen the record or admit a
new "The Commission believes that where the time for filing contentions has expired in a given case, no new TMI-related contentions should be accepted absent a showing of good cause and balancing of the factors in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(l).
The Commission expects adherence to its regulations in this regard. "
contention at this stage.
Staff correctly points out that the policy statement is not a rule and that therefore preexisting rules must be followed.
(Tr. 89)
Staff parts company with Applicant, however, in that it views the policy statement and NUREG-0737 as constituting by NUREG-0737 as meeting the "nexus" requirement.
(Tr. 89)
Staff does not similarly view NUREG-0737 as constituting good cause for filing new contentions based on its requirements.
Staff's reasons for this dichotomy are not entirely clear.
(Tr. 91, 93-94)
Governor Brown's position is complicated by the fact that he is participating under 10 CFR 52.715(c) as opposed to 52.714, and by the timing of his entrance into the proceeding after the record was complete.
The Governor's position is basically the same as the intervenors:
he may participate on any subject which he-timely filed (by December 3) and which relates to the testing license application.
The Governor stipulates that his "subjects" must meet the specificity and bases requirements of 10 CFR 52.714.
(Tr. 117-8)
Applicant maintains that, pursuant to 52.715(c),
the Governor may only participate on issues raised by the parties or by the Board and may not raise issues on his own.
(Applicants response of December 18)
The Governor, needless to
- say, takes sharp issue with this position.
(Tr. 111-4)
Staff's position with respect to the Governor appears to be the same as its position with respect to the Intervenors.
That position,
- however, has a much more dramatic effect on the Governor because he did not
10 participate when the original record was compiled and hence cannot reopen the record on matters which concern him.
(Tr. 118-9)
Thus the Governor would be limited to participating on any intervenor contentions and Hoard questions
- admitted, unless, in the Staff's view, he can make a showing of good cause to admit a
new contention at this time.
While these are interesting arguments, we have found it unnecessary to confront them.
As set forth below, we have viewed the Governor' "subjects" in the same light as contentions put forward by Joint Intervenors in those instances where an admitted cont'ention did not exist.
With this background, it is appropriate to set forth the Board's rulings with respect to the above matters, followed by rulings on specific contentions.
Because of the nature of the application here in question, this discussion must begin with 10 CFR 550.57(c).
Section 50.57(c) provides that, in any contested proceeding on an operating license application, the Applicant may request a "...license authorizing low power testing (operation of not more than 1 percent of full power for the purpose of testing the facility) and further operations short of full power operation."
The presiding officer is to act on the motion "...with due regard for the rights of the parties...,
including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized."
To the extent that the motion is contested, the presiding officer is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings and conclusions on matters not in contest are to be made by the Oirector of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Historically, 550.57(c) motions have usually been made prior to the closing of the record in operating license proceedings, but after the completion of the record on any contentions which are relevant to the sought-for testing license.
This timing permitted the presiding officers to make the necessary findings and conclusions with respect to the testing license prior to the completion of the record on all contentions For purposes of the 550.57(c) motion, the contentions were those previously allowed in the proceeding.
Contentions were considered "relevant" to the motion to the extent that they needed to be resolved prior to criticality.
Thus, for example, a contention which asserted that the control rod drives were defective would have to be heard and decided prior to the grant of a testing license.
To the extent that matters not raised by contentions were "relevant" to the motion, 550.57(c) contemplates that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation would make the necessary findings.
The filing of the motion was not deemed to provide an opportunity to file new contentions.
Acceptance of new contentions remained governed by the provisions of 52.714.
Some recent developments must be taken into consideration against this backgroun'd.
An Appeal Board has laid down rules under which unresolved safety issues are to be considered (in the absence of controversy) in construction permit cases Gulf States Utilities Co.
[River Bend Station, Units 1
8 2] ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 at 775 I'1977]) and another Appeal Board has applied these rules, to a limited extent,
12 to operating license cases (Vir inia Electric
& Power Co.
[North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1
8 2]
ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 248 [1978] ).
More importantly, the Commission has adopted measures it considers both necessary and sufficient to adequately protect the public health and safety for new operating licenses (NUREG-0737) along with a revised.
policy statement to govern consideration of these measures in licensing proceedings.
Further, the Commission has recently adopted new rules governing emergency planning.
These developments must be considered in passing on the relevance of contentions to the motion for a testing license.
NUREG-0737 and the rule on emergency planning constitute new regulatory requirements.
New regulatory requirements have always been viewed as establishing good cause for reopening a record or admitting new contentions.
The Board does not agree with the Staff that there is a basis for treating NUREG-0737 as establishing good cause to reopen the record on old contentions while reaching an opposite conclusion with respect to the filing of new contentions.
On the contrary, the whole purpose of the revised policy statement is to open the door to litigation of all NUREG-0737 requirements.
If NUREG-0737 is not to constitute good cause for both reopening the record and filing new contentions, the revised policy statement becomes largely meaningless.
The Board interprets the "nexus" requirement as nexus to Diablo Canyon facility not "nexus" to a contention previously admitted in this proceeding.
- Further, the appeal board's North Anna ruling means that
13 we cannot totally leave to the Staff for resolution those items which are not clearly contemplated by a relevant contention.
Applying the above to the instant proceeding, the Board will:
1.
Make findings on all relevant preexisting contentions if no findings have been made previously.
2.
Reopen the record on all relevant preexisting contentions to the extent necessary to properly take into account NUREG-0737 and the new rule on emergency planning.
3.
Admit new relevant contentions with respect to the new rule on emergency planning and NUREG-0737.
With respect to NUREG-0737, the Board will:
a.
deny any contention which is not directly related to NUREG-0737 requirements.
Contrary to Joint Intervenors
- view, we believe the Commission's intent as set forth in the policy statement was not changed by the subsequent revision.
Both the policy statement (p. 6) and the revised policy statement (p. 7) contain similar paragraphs which set forth three reasons why NUREG-0694 as clarified by NUREG-0737 should be the principal basis for consideration of the new requirements in adjudicatory hearings.
These are:
first, the effort expended by the Staff and Commission to deal with a large number of issues (the statement notes that this process cannot be duplicated in adjudicatory hearings);
- second, the lack of NRC resources to litigate
14 the Action Plan in individual proceedings; and third, the fact that many decisions involve policy issues better dealt with through less formal means than adjudication.
- Further, under the heading "Commission Decision" on page 6 of the revised policy statement, the following appears:
Based upon its extensive review and consideration of the issues arising as a result of the Three Mile Island accident -- a review that is still continuing--
the Commission has concluded that the list of TMI-related requirements for new operating licenses found in NUREG-0737 can provide a basis for responding to the TMI-2 accident.
The Commission has decided that current operating license applications should be measured by the NRC Staff against the regulations, as augmented by these requirements.gi In general, the remaining items of the Action Plan should be addressed through the normal process for development and adoption of new requirements rather than through immediate imposition on pending applications.
Consideration of applications for an operating license should include the entire list of require-ments unless an Applicant specifically requests an operating license with limited authorization (e.g.,
fuel loading and low-power testing).
A similar statement appears at page 5 of the policy statement.
In view of the above, the Board does not believe it reasonable to interpret the provision permitting the challenge of the sufficiency of new regulatory require-ments as permitting the addition of requirements not contained in NUREG-0737.
15 b.
admit contentions which are based on category one requirements (those which refine existing regulations).
These contentions may challenge both the necessity and sufficiency of the refinement within the limits imposed by the regulation; and c.
admit contentions which are based on category two requirements (those which supplement existing regulations).
Similarly, these contentions may challenge both the necessity and sufficiency of a requirement.
In considering these contentions, the Board will pay parti-cular attention to the nexus of the contention to the TMI accident, the significance of the issue raised by the contention, and the differences in the rationale underlying the contention and the NUREG-0737 requirement; and 4.
Require the Staff to place on the record its conclusions regarding any issues which the Board, sua
~s onte, considers relevant and significant to the instant motion.
16 The Joint Intervenors requested the Board to certify the following question to the Commission:
"What requirements, other than relevancy to low-power operation, sufficient specificity and an adequate statement of the basis for the contention must be met for a contention to be admitted for,litigation in this period."
(Tr. 331)
The Board has interpreted the Commission's Revised Policy Statement and applicable regulations more in support of Joint Intervenors position that the position of either Applicant or Staff.
We have accepted NUREG-0737 as good cause for admitting new contentions if there is nexus to Diablo and if they are significant.
While we do not accept Joint Intervenors position that the sufficiency of 0737 can be challenged on matters not included, our interpretation opens this proceeding to a wide range of Joint Intervenors contentions.
In light of the provisions of the Revised Policy Statement discussed
- above, we have determined that a sufficient reason does not exist to certify this question to the Commission and we decline to certify.
The Board notes that neither the Governor nor the Joint Intervenors sought to establish good cause for admitting new contentions or reopening the record on old contentions aside from their reliance on NUREG-0737.
Therefore, the contention and subjects are viewed only in the context of NUREG-0737.
17 A.
Joint Intervenor s Contentions Contention 1.
No final decision has been rendered by the Commission as to the Applicant's compliance at Diablo Canyon with 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A regarding seismic safety.
Because of the exceptional nature of the seismic danger associated with the Diablo Canyon facility such a definitive determination by the Commission must be issued prior to fuel loading.
Contention 2.
No final decision has been rendered by the Commission as to the Applicant's Compliance at Diablo Canyon with 10 CFR Part 73, regarding physical. protection of nuclear plants and materials.
Such a definitive determination by the Commission must be issued prior to fuel loading.
These Contentions are legal arguments advanced by Joint Intervenors to the effect that there must be a final Commission decision with respect to seismic and security matters prior to fuel loading.
Both of these matters are currently the subject of further proceedi ngs before the Appeal Board.
At the prehearing conference, the parties agreed to discuss the possibility of a stipulation relating to these contentions and report their progress to the Board.
(Tr. 168-170)
No report was forthcoming.
Because these contentions do not present any factual
- issues, the Board will defer any further action on them until the Initial Decision.
Therefor e, the parties are requested to advise the Hoard of their respective positions on these contentions (or of any agreement they have been able to reach) in their proposed findings submitted following closing of the record, taking into account any Appeal Board decisions which may have been rendered in the interim.
Contention 3.
The Applicant has failed to demonstrate compliance at Diablo Canyon with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, regarding quality assurance.
18 Joint Intervenors did not take advantage of an opportunity to be heard on quality assurance matters in hearings raised by the Board oh October 18-19, 1977.
They have not demonstrated in their filings or oral argument a specific relationship between this contention and the additional requirements for fuel loading and low power testing arising from the accident at TMI as specified by the Commission in NUREG-0737.
(Tr. 178) for these reasons and in accordance with the Commission Revised Statement of Policy of December 18, 1980 (at page
- 8) contention 3 is e
denied.
Contention 4.
Numerous studies arising out of the accident of TNI recognized the necessity of upgrading emergency response planning.
Based upon these studies, the Commission has promulgated revised emergency planning regulations effective November 3, 1980.
The Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the combined Applican
- state, and local emergency response plans for Diablo Canyon comply with those revised regulations
("Final Regulations on Emergency Planning,"
45 Fed.
Reg.
55402 (August 19, 1980)).
Contention 5.
The Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the combined Applicant, state and local emergency response plans for Diablo Canyon comply with the requirements of Sections III.A.l.l and III.A.1.2 of NUREG-0694.
The Board has stated that it will admit new relevant contentions with respect to the new rule on emergency planning and NUREG-0737.
Contention 4 specifically identifies requirements of the new rule on emergency planning which must be complied with (new Appendix E to Part 50).
Contention 5 identifies requirements of NUREG-0694 (which was later issued and approved by the Commission as NUREG-0737 with changes and clarification) which must be complied with prior to the issuance of a license for fuel loading and low power testing.
(NUREG-0737 Enclosure
- 2) The requirements are stated in NUREG-0737 Enclosure 2,
~
~
19
- however, the text gives no additional clarification for Items.)
These contentions are relevant'nd specific to matters which must be resolved prior to issuance of the requested license.
Contentions 4 and 5 are, therefore, admitted insofar as they pertain to issues related to fuel loading and low power testing.
Contention 6.
The Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the containment at Diablo Canyon can withstand pressures resulting from the combustion of hydrogen likely to be generated by the reaction of zirconium cladding with water during a loss of coolant accident at the facility.
Joint Intervenors in oral argument pointed to requirement II.E.4.1 of NUREG-0737 which deals with dedicated hydrogen penetrations when called upon to show how contention 6 is related to new TMI requirements.
They conceded, however, that this requirement does not specifically contain a requirement which "meets" contention 6.
(Tr. 212)
They argue instead that the NUREG-0737 requirement is insufficient.
(Tr. 212)
The Board interprets this as a demand for a new item not now contained in NUREG-0737.
The Board has stated that we would reject such contentions as being inconsistent with the Commission's Revised Statement of Policy.
Contention 6 is therefore denied.
Contention 7.
The Applicant has failed to address adequately safety considerations designated as high priority and/or high risk in Table B.2 of NUREG-0660 TMI Action Plan.
The Commission in its Revised Statement of Policy has decided that current operating license applications should be measured by the NRC Staff against the regulations as augmented by these requirements contained
20 in.NUREG-0737, not NUREG-0660 'he Revised Statement of Policy states:
"In general the remaining items of the Action Plan should be addressed through the normal process for development and adoption of new requirements rather than through immediate imposition on pending applications:"
Items appearing in NUREG-0660 but not in NUREG-0737 are, therefore, not to be imposed on pending applications'oint Intervenors assert, however, that under their right to challenge sufficiency of NUREG-0737 requirements 12 additional items taken from NUREG-0660 should be made a part of NUREG-0737.
(Tr. 224)
Little rationale for the adoption of the newly enumerated items was given in oral argument however.
Contention 7 is denied.
Contention 8.
The accident at TMI Unit 2 demonstrated that reliance on natural circulation to remove decay heat is inadequate.
During the accident it was necessary to operate at least one reactor coolant pump to provide forced cooling of the fuel.
However, the Applicant's testing program does not demonstrate a
reliable method for forced cooling of the reactor in the event of a small loss-of-coolant accident
("LOCA") particularly with regard to two-phase flow and with voids such as occurred at TMI-2.
This is a threat to health and safety and a.violation of both General Design Criterion ("GDC") 34 and GDC 35 of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A.
In the prehearing conference Joint Intervenors asserted only a remote relationship between this contention and the augmented requirements for licensing contained in NUREG-0737.
They asserted instead a right to go beyond the requirements of NUREG-0737 (Tr. 234)
(i.e., to challenge their sufficiency under the Commission Revised Statement of Policy).
Therefore, this contention is denied.
21 Contention 9.
Using existing equipment at Diablo Canyon, there are three principal ways of providing forced cooling of the reactor:
(1) the reactor coolant pumps; (2) the residual heat removal system; and (3) the emergency core cooling system in a "bleed and feed" mode.
None of these methods meets the NRC's regulations applicable to systems important to safety and is sufficiently reliable to protect public health and safety.
a.
The reactor coolant pumps do not have an adequate on-site power supply (GDC 17), their controls do not meet IEEE 279 (10 CFR 50.55a(h))
and they are not adequately qualified (GDC 2 and 4).
b.
The residual heat removal system is incapable of being utilized at the design pressure of the primary system.
c.
The emergency core cooling system cannot be operated in the "bleed and feed" mode for the necessary period of time because of inadequate capacity and radiation shielding for the storage of the radioactive water bled from the primary coolant system.
In the prehearing conference Joint Intervenors asserted only a remote relationship between this contention and the augmented requirements for licensing contained in NUREG-0737.
They assert instead a right to go beyond the requirements of NUREG-0737.
(Tr. 234)
(i.e., to challenge their sufficiency under the Commission,'s Revised Statement of Policy)
For these reasons this contention is denied.
Contention 10.
The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are necessary to maintain natural circulation at hot stand-by conditions.
Therefore, this equipment should be classified as "components important to safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22), seismic and environmental qualifi-cation (GDC 2 and 4), automatic initiation (GDC 20), separation and independence (GDC 3 and 22), quality assurance (GOC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies (GDC 17) and the single failure criterion.
The Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four of the heater groups to the present on-site emergency power supplies does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
22 Joint Intervenors point to item II.E.3.1 in enclosure 2 of NUREG-0737 which addresses emergency power for pressurizer heaters as a
new TMI-related requirement justifying admission of this contention (Tr. 242)
Item II.E.3.1 does, however, not require that pressurizer heaters be classified as "components important to safety" a fact conceded by intervenors (Tr. 242)
Intervenors challenge the sufficiency of this requirement (Tr. 242)
(i.e., that they ought to be so classified).
We do not believe that they have sufficiently tied this contention to the requirements of NUREG-0737 for it to be
- admitted, nor has it been demonstrated what a bearing this has on fuel loading and low power testing at Diablo Canyon.
The contention is denied.
Contention ll.
The Appl-icant has proposed simply to add the pressurizer heaters to the on-site emergency power supplies.
It has not been demonstrated that this will not degrade the capacity, capability and reliability of these power supplies in violation of GOC 17.
Such a demonstration is required to assure protection of public health and safety.
Joint Intervenors cited item II.E.3.1 of NUREG-0737 as a
new Commission requirement for licensing arising from the accident at TMI.
(Tr. 242)
Item II.E.3.1 deals specifically with requirements of emergency power supplies to pressurizer heaters.
Its requirements must be met 4 months prior to issuance of the SER according to enclosure 2 of NUREG-0737 (p. 2-6).
This contention is, therefore, relevant to this proceeding and specifically related to a new require-ment for licensing.
It is, therefore, admitted.
23 Contention
- 12. Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
In addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a
LOCA.
There-fore, these valves must be classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria.
This contention does not specifically identify an item in NUREG-0737 which has not been complied with nor has a showing been made that any item is insufficient.
The contention is therefore denied.
Contention 13.
NRC regulations require instrumentation to monitor variables as appropriate to ensure adequate safety (GDC 13) and that the instrumentation shall directly measure the desired variable.
IEEE 279, 54.8, as incorporated in 10 CFR 50.55a(h)),
states that:
"To the extent feasible and practical protection system inputs shall be derived from signals which are direct measures of the desired variables."
Diablo Canyon has no capability to directly measure the water level in the fuel assemblies.
The absence of such instrumentation delayed recognition of a low-water,level oondition in the reactor for a long period of time.
Nothing proposed by the Staff would require a direct measure of water level or provide an equivalent level of protection.
The absence of such instrumentation poses a
threat to public health and safety.
This contention raises an issue which is clearly TMI-related, and is included in NUREG-0737 (II.F.2) as an action item.
As presented, the contention lacks specificity, as there is no argument among the parties that a water level indication will be required.
During discussion of the contention (Tr. 258-252) it was revealed that the Intervenor's concern was that installation of the indicator would not be required until 1/1/82, rather than before fuel loading and low power testing.
With that understanding the Board ~acce ts contention
¹13 as a litigab1e issue.
24 Contention 14.
10 CFR 50.46 requires analysis of ECCS performance "for a number of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents of different
- sizes, locations, and other properties sufficient to provide assurance that the entire spectrum of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents i's covered."
For the spectrum of LOCAs, specific parameters are not to be exceeded.
At TMI, certain of these were exceeded.
For
- example, the peak cladding temperature exceeded 2200'ahrenheit (50.45(b)(1)),
and more than 1! of the cladding reacted with water or steam to produce hydrogen (50.46(b)(3)).
The measures proposed by the Staff address primarily the very specific case of a struck-open power operated relief valve.
Additional analyses to show that there is adequate protection for the entire spectrum of small break locations for the Diablo Canyon design have not been performed.
Therefore, there is no basis for finding compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 and GDC 35.
None of the corrective actions to date have fully addressed the demonstrated inadequacy of protection against small LOCAs.
The contention appears to have a very tenuous relationship with NUREG-0737; specifically to I.C.1.
I.C.1, however, appears to lead toward off-normal occurrence analysis with the view of developing procedures to be used in operator training, rather than ECCS performance, per se.
In any event, 10 CFR 50.46 sets limits on clad temperature and oxidation, and does not lay down input parameters to be used in analysis.
As phrased in the contention and further laid out in discussi'on (Tr. 262-268), the contention lacks the necessary basis and specificity to be accepted.
The contention is therefore denied.
Contention 15.
The accident at TMI-2 was substantially aggravated by the =fact that the plant was operated with a safety system inoperable, to wit:
two auxiliary feedwater system valves were closed which should have been open.
The principal reason why this condition existed was that TMI does not have an adequate system to inform the operator that a safety system has been deliberately disabled.
To adequately protect the health and safety of the public, a system meeting the Regulatory Position of Reg.
Guide 1.47 or providing equivalent protection is required.
25 Review of the contention as presented and the pertinent discussion (Tr. 268-270) indicates that there exists a very fragile connection with the requirement of NUREG-0737 at best.
In any event, a broad allegation that the requirements of NUREG-0737 are insufficient does not supply the requisite specificity to define an issue to be placed in litigation in this proceeding.
The contention is denied.
Contention 16.
The design of the safety systems at TMI was such e<<h p
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y function which was initiated automatically; to wit:
the operator could (and did) shut off the emergency core cooling system prematurely.
This violated 54.16 of IEEE 279 as incorporated in 10 CFR 50.55(a)(h) which states:
"The protection system shall be so designed that, once initiated, a protection system action shall go to completion."
The Diablo Canyon design is similar to that at TMI and must be modified so that no operator action can prevent the completion of a safety function once initiated.
The Board could find no connection between this contention and the requirements of NUREG-0737.
The contention is denied.
Contention 17.
The design of the hydrogen control system at TMI was based upon the assumption that the amount of fuel cladding that could react chemically to produce hydrogen would, under all circum-
- stances, be limited to less than 5%.
The accident demonstrated both that this assumption is not justified and that it is not conservative to assume anything less than the worst case.
Therefore, the Diablo Canyon hydrogen control systems should be designed on the assumption that 100% of the cladding reacts to produce hydrogen.
This contention was considered in conjunction with contention 6.
(Tr. 209-222).
For the same reason set forth above the contention is denied.
26 Contention 18.
The TMI-2 accident demonstrated that the severity of the environment in which equipment important to safety must operate was underestimated and that equipment previously deemed to be environmentally qualified failed.
One example was the pressurizer level instruments.
The environmental qualification of safety-related equipment at TMI is deficient in three respects:
(1) the parameters of the relevant accident environment have not been identified; (2) the length of time the equipment must operate in the environment has been underestimated; and (3) the methods used to qualify the equipment are not adequate to give reasonable assurances that the equipment will remain operable.
Diablo Canyon should not be permitted to load fuel until all safety-related equipment has been demonstrated to be qualified,to operate as required by GOC 4.
The criteria for determining qualification should be those set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.89 or equivalent.
NUREG-0737, at II.B.2, considers added requirements for shielding against and qualification tests for the radiation to be expected in a TMI-2 situation.
To this extent the contention appears to be related to a NUREG-0737 requirement.
However, the stated contention, as well as the discussion which took place at the Prehearing Confererice (Tr. 272-74) is totally lacking in any specific issues which might be litigated in this proceeding.
Even the three defects in environmental qualifications I
at TMI were not shown to connect in any recognizable way with Diablo
- Canyon, and even if so alleged, are too diffuse to constitute a litigable issue.
The contention is denied.
Contention 19.
Neither the Applicant nor the NRC Staff has presented an accurate assessment of the risks posed by operation of Diablo Canyon, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 51.20(a) and 51.20(d).
The design of Diablo Canyon does not provide protection against so-called "Class 9" accidents.
There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not credible.
- Indeed, the Staff has conceded that the accident at TMI-2 falls within that classification.
There-fore, there is not reasonable assurance that Diablo Canyon can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.
27 Without going to the merits of the contention, as presented, the Board will defer consideration of this issue until the Appeal Board has ruled on the Diablo Canyon seismic issue which is now before it.
Contention 20.
The TMI-2 accident demonstrated that there are systems and components presently classified as non-safety-related which can have an adverse effect on the integrity of the core because they can directly or indirectly affect temperature,
- pressure, flow and/or reactivity.
This issue is discussed at length in Section 3.2, "System Design Requirements,"
of NUREG-0578, the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Report (Short Term).
The following quote from page 18 of the report describes the problem:
There is another perspective on this question provided by the TMI-2 accident.
At TMI-2, operational problems with the condensate purification system led to a loss of feedwater and initiated the sequence of events that eventually resulted in damage to the core.
Several nonsafety systems were used at various times in the mitigation of the accident in ways not considered in the safety analysis; for example, long-term maintenance of core flow and cooling.with the steam generators and the reactor coolant pumps.
The present classification system does not adequately recognize either of these kinds of effects that nonsafety systems can have on the safety of the plant.
Thus, requirements for nonsafety systems may be needed to reduce the frequency of occurrence of events that initiate or adversely affect transients and accidents, and'other require-ments may be needed to improve the current capability for use of nonsafety systems during transient or accident situations.
In its work in this area, the Task Force will include a more realistic assessment of the interaction between operators and systems.
The Staff proposes to study the problem further.
This is not a sufficient answer.
All systems and components which can either cause or aggravate an accident or can be called upon to mitigate an accident must be identified and classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-'.grade design criteri a.
There is not cognizable, relationship between this contention and the requirements in NUREG-0737, as confirmed by Intervenor. (Tr. 280).
The contention is denied.
28 Contention 21.
The accident at TMI-2 was caused or aggravated by factors which are the subject of Regulatory Guides not used in the design of TMI.
For example, the absence of an automatic indication system as required by Regulatory Guide 1.47 contributed to operation of the plant with the auxiliary feedwater system completely disabled.
The public health and safety require that this record demonstrate conformance with or document deviations from the Commission's regulations and each Regulatory Guide presently applicable to the plant.
The Intervenor has agreed that there is no NUREG-0737 requirement which is related to this contention (Tr. 284).
Denied.
Contention 22.
Withdrawn (Tr. 286)
Contention 23.
The accident at TMI-2 was a multiple failure accident involving independent and dependent failures.
The multiple fai lure sequences exceeded the single failure criterion utilized in the Diablo Canyon design basis accident assessment.
Therefore, comprehensive studies of the interaction of nonsafety grade components, equipment,
- systems, and structures with safety systems and the effect of these interactions during normal operation, transients, and accidents need to be made by the Diablo Canyon Applicant in order to assure that the plant can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public.2/
This contention was considered to be on the same subject as contention 20.
For the same reasons the contention is denied.
Contention 24..
Reactor coolant system relief and safety valves form part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
Appropriate qualification testing has not been done to verify the capabilities of these valves to function during normal, transient,and accident conditions.
In the absence of such testing and verification, compliance with GDC 1, 14, 15 and 30 cannot be found and public health and safety are endangered-.-
2/
On February 11, 1981, the Joint Intervenors submitted two (2) documents referenced in the prehearing conference.
The Board had prior knowledge of these documents.
29 NUREG-0737, at II.D.1, sets out test schedules for relief valve, safety valve and block valve tests.
Th'e RV and SV tests must be completed before fuel load.
- However, the block valve tests completion schedule is for before fuel loading or 7/1/82, whichever is later.
Intervenors believe that all these tests should be completed prior to fuel loading, and that the NUREG-0737 requirements are not sufficient in this manner.
(Tr. 250-258)
With this understanding by the Board, the contention is
~acce ted.
Contention 25.
Withdrawn (Tr. 286)
Contention 26.
Withdrawn (Tr. 286)
Contention 27.
Withdrawn (Tr. 286)
In the prehearing conference, at such times when the Applicant or Staff criticized a contention of the Joint Intervenors as inadequate, the Joint Intervenors would volunteer that they could improve the specificity of a contention after meeting with their technical consultants (e.g., Tr.
185 or 193).
The Joint Intervenors had several months to develop their contentions.
They are represented by knowledgeable, experienced counsel.
The Board has ruled on the contentions as submitted and as clarified at the prehearing conference.
The Joint Intervenors will not be granted additional time to revise and resubmit those contentions not admitted by the Board.
30 The Joint Intervenors in their filing of January 8,
1981 and in the prehearing conference (Tr. 116) want to adopt Governor Brown's subjects as their contentions.
The only subjects admitted were bootstrapped to the Joint Intervenors contentions.
There are no separately admitted subjects from Governor Brown.
The question is academic.
B.
Governor Brown's Subjects Governor Brown's timely-filed petition to participate as the representative of an interested state under 10 CFR 2.715(c) set forth "subjects on which Governor Edmund G. Brown; Jr., intends to participate" in this proceeding.
No contentions, ger se, were presented.
As a
representative of an interested state participating under 10 CFR 2.715(c)
Governor Brown is not required to submit contentions of his own, but is free to fully participate in the litigation of any contentions which are otherwise accepted by the Board.
However, if the Governor wishes to raise specific issues not otherwise accepted by the Board he must comply with the requirements of'0 CFR 2.714(b) for acceptable contentions, just as any other party must.
[See Gul.f Stata Utilities Co. (River Bend
- Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977).]
The Governor agrees to this proposition (Tr. 117-18).
To determine the admissability o'
Governor Brown's subjects as issues in this proceeding (as limited by the Board's Order of October 2, 1980) they will be considered individually as contentions and subjected to the same tests as have been applied to the contentions submitted by Joint Intervenors.
31 Sub'ects 1
and 2.
Withdrawn (Tr. 169-71)
Sub ect 3.
Whether the emergency plans of PGKE, the State, and the ocal gurisdiction are satisfactory for issuance of the requested licenses.
A.
Whether further steps, including those set forth in the NRC's Final Rule on Emergency
- Planning, 45 Fed.
Reg.
55402 (August 19, 1980),
must be accomplished before the licenses may be issued.
This subject is closely related to Joint Intervenor's contentions 4
and 5, which the Board has accepted.
Governor Brown may thus participate in litigation of this issue.
~Sub ect 4.
Whether PG&E, as alleged in its Motion, has complied with or will comply with the requirements of NUREG-0694 prior to loading fuel (Motion, p. 2), including'the following matters specified in the Safety Evaluation Report
("SER"), Supplement 10, which the NRC Staff has examined but which, as of publication of Supplement 10, were not complete:
(a)
Adequacy of the training, experience and procedures for shift technical advisors.
(SER, Suppl.
10,
- p. I.A.-2)
(b)
Results of cold license examinations for the 21 candidates who were to take examinations in August
- 1980, and results of examinations for other licensed personnel.
(Id. I.A.-6)
(c)
Adequacy of procedures for accident mitigation and recovery.
(Id. I.B-3)
(d)
Adequacy of the reorganization of PGSE's operating organization for both routine and emergency operations and adequacy of PG8E's agreements with other organi-zations and utilities to pool resources in the event of an emergency.
(Id.)
(e)
Adequacy of PGKE's guidelines and procedures for emergency core cooling and small break LOCAs.
(f)
Adequacy of PG&E's startup test procedures.
(Id. I.C.-7)
32 (g)
Adequacy of PG8E's measures to deal with human factors-related deficiencies.
(Id. IV. 1-2 and 3).
There is no issue presented here.
All parties and the Board agree that these matters must be resolved before a license can issue.
(Tr. 288-295)
The Board and the parties should be kept informed on the status of Applicant's compliance.
Denied.
~Sb 5.
Ilb 5
5 5
5 5 by EIIE 5
are a complete list of necessary tests.
A.
Whether, in addition to the seven stated tests, there must be tests designed to demonstrate 2-phase natural circulation cooling capability that are representative of actual accident conditions.
This subject is not contained in the NUREG-0737 requirements, nor does it have the basis and specificity to qualify as a contention on its own.
(Tr. 236-39).
Denied.
~Sub ect 6.
Whether the activities sought by PGGE to be authorized under the licenses are "vital to demonstrate the effectiveness of the augmented reactor operation training program, improved management organization and operating procedures and controls, and certain changes in design and equipment implemented by PGEE to meet the NTOL Require-ments."
(Motion, p. 2)
This subject has no colorable relationship with this proceeding, because PGSE reasons for desiring to undertake the testing program at this time are irrelevant to Section 50.57(c) requirements.
- Further, the subject lacks any connection to NUREG-0737 and lacks sufficient basis and specificity to qualify as a contention on its own.
(Tr. 295-307)
Denied.
33
~Sub ect 7.
Whether the requested licenses and the activities authorized thereby "will provide meaningful technical information beyond that obtained in the normal startup test program."
(Motion, p.
2)
This subject has no colorable relationship with this proceeding, because PGSE reasons for desiring to undertake the testing program at this time are irrelevant to Section 50.57(c) requirements.
- Further, the subject lacks any connection to NUREG-0737 and lacks sufficient basis and specificity to qualify as a contention on its own.
(Tr. 295-307)
Denied.
as
~Sub ect 8.
Whether the requested licenses and the activities authorized thereunder "will not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of,the public" (Motion, p. 2), particularly since PG8E has not submitted safety analyses related to these activities and the NRC's risk assessment is unsupported by plant-specific analyses.
(SER, Supp.
10, p. I.G.-5)
This subject lacks the requisite basis and specificity to qualify a contention.
(Tr. 295-307)
Denied.
~Sub ect 9
iihe.ther-the requested licenses will result in radiation levels within the plant that would preclude or impede implementation of any later changes ordered by the NRC. (Ref. Motion, p.
2)
A.
Whether these levels would expose workers to unacceptable exposures beyond ALARA levels.
as This subject lacks the necessary basis and specificity to be accepted a contention.
(Tr. 388-.89).
Denied.
Subject 10.
Whether the requested licenses and the activities authorized thereunder "will provide significant supplemental operator training."
(Motion, p. 2).
A.
Whether there are other means, including training on simulators and at other facilities, to obtain such supplemental operator training.
34 This subject has no colorable relationship with this proceeding, because PGEE reasons for desiring to undertake the testing program at this time are irrelevant to Section 50.57(c) requirements.
- Further, the subject lacks any connection to NUREG-0737 and lacks sufficient basis and specificity to qualify as a contention on its own.
(Tr. 295-307)
Denied.
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2 will contribute in any meaningful way toward the national objective of reducing dependence on imported oil and/or reduce in any meaningful way the ri s ks or consequences to the publ ic of inadequate generating resources and/or allow generation of power using less expensive fuels.
(Ref. Motion, p. 3).
This subject has no colorable relationship with this proceeding, because PG&E reasons for desiring to undertake the testing program at this time are irrelevant to Section 50.57(c) requirements.
- Further, the subject lacks any connection to NUREG-0737 and lacks sufficient basis and specificity to qualify as a contention on its own.
(Tr. 295-307)
Denied.
~Kb'2.
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1 fd analyses and tests, including computer code verification, required for Westinghouse PWRs are sufficiently complete and accurate to permit issuance of the requested licenses.
This subject lacks the necessary basis and specificity to qualify as a contention and does not relate to an admitted contention.
(Tr. 263-268)
Denied.
35 Subject 13.
Whether the licenses should issue prior to installation
.of PGSE of a reliable and unambiguous method of measuring reactor vessel water level.
A.
Whether PG&E's proposed system to measure water level in the reactor vessel is adequate for all conditions, including level swell, 2-phase flow, flow blockage and system dynamics.
(SER, Supp.
10, p. II.F-9)
Although lacking the basis and specificity required for an allowable contention, the subject is essentially the same as Joint Intervenors contention 13, which the Board has accepted.
Governor Brown may, therefore, participate in litigation of this issue in the form in which the Joint Intervenor.'s contention was accepted.
Subject 14.
Whether the licenses should issue prior to completion of qualification tests and analyses on relief and safety valves.
Although this subject lacks the specificity and basis necessary to being accepted as a contention, it is essentially the same as Joint Intervenor's Contention 24, and Governor Brown may participate in this litigation.
Subject 15.
Whether PG8E has established adequate procedures for dissemination of operating experience, obtained from operation of both Diablo Canyon and other nuclear plants, to PGSE personnel.
(SER, Supp.
10, p. I.C.-7)
The subject lacks the necessary basis and specificity to qualify as a contention (Tr..309-12) 0enied.
~b'6.
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T A
i P1 i<<
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completed before the licenses are issued, including:
(a)
NRC audit of emergency procedures (NUREG-0660, p. I.C.-7)
(b)
Withdrawn (Tr. 313)
36 (c)
Withdrawn (Tr. 313)
(d)
Withdrawn (Tr. 313)
(e)
Withdrawn (Tr. 313)
(f)
Completion of upgraded training and qualification requirements.
(Id. I.A.2-1)
(g)
Completion of reevaluation of AFW reliability.
(Id. II.E.l-l)
This subject, as stated, lacks the requisite basis and specificity to be accepted as a contention.
- Further, as discussed
- above, the Action Plan items are not appropriate for litigation unless contained in NUREG-0737.
(Tr. 312-17)
Denied.
Sub ect 17.
Whether the NRC and PGI)'E have complied with all ob sgations under the National Environmental Policy Act, the regulations of the Council on Environmental guality, and the NRC's regulations in Part 51.
A.
Whether an environmental impact statement, or at the very minimum, an environmental impact appraisal must be prepared.
This subject has no relationship to any allowable issue in this proceeding and also lacks the basis and specificity necessary for it to be accepted as a contention.
(Tr. 317-28.
See, also, Board rulings on Governor Brown's Motion to Stay and Governor Brown's oral motion for ruling in Tr. 321-23 made previously in this Order).
Denied.
At the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated to the following schedule (Tr. 367):
37 Assuming Board Order Issues Close of Discovery Motions for Summary Disposition Prepared Direct Testimony Filed Hearing Commences February 13, 1981 March 25, 1981 April 1, 1981 May 8, 1981 May 19, 1981 The Board accepted the schedule.
(Tr. 370)
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 13th day of February 1981.
X~ u,3 ADMINISTRATIVEJUDGE
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