ML16341A621
| ML16341A621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1985 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Dodds R, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341A622 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-323-85-14, IEB-79-01, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-1, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-79-23, NUDOCS 8505290120 | |
| Download: ML16341A621 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000323/1985014
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Report No.
Docket No.
License No:
REGION V
50-323/85-14
50-323
Construction Permit CPPR-69
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1435
San Francisco, California 94106
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Unit 2
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection conducted:
March 25-29,
1985
Inspector:
F.
Bu doin, Reactor Inspector
D te Signed
Approved By:
T. Young, Jr
, Chief, Engine ring Section
D
e
igned
R. T. Dod s, Chief
Reactor ProjectsSection I
D
Signed
Summary:
Ins ection durin
eriod of March 25-29,
1985
(Re ort No. 50-323/85-14
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced
inspection by one regional inspector of
construction
and modification activities including: an area inspection,
licensee actions
on previously identified items,
enforcement
items, IE
Bulletins,
and 50.55e Items.
The inspection involved 39 inspection hours by
one inspector.
Results:
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8505290120
85050b
ADOCK 05000323
6
DETAILS
Individuals Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
(PGK)/Pro ect Team General
Construction
PTGC
"-R. R.
-B. R.
'"R. A.
M. N.
J.
B.
R, P.
G. D.
J
~ D.
R. K.
G. R.
G. T.
W. K.
W. E.
V. R.
W. J.
D. S.
S. J.
Lieber, Field Construction
Manager
Tinkle, Technical Assistant to the Project Superintendent
Hobgood,
QC Supervisor
Norm, Lead Startup Engineer
Maysey,
QC Inspection
(Mechanical)
Gilbreath, Instrumentation
and Control Assistant Supervisor
Morrison, Electrical Field Engineer
Lawton, Startup Technician
Rhodes,
Instrumentation
and Control Supervisor
Vincent,
QC Inspector
Glasscock,
Resident Electrical Engineer
Glenn, Startup Engineer
Coley, Assistant
Lead Startup Engineer
Foster,
Senior Power Production Engineer
Kelly, Licensing Representative
Wright, Electrical Performance
Test Supervisor
Foat,
Power Production Engineer
Various other engineering
and
QC personnel.
"-Denotes attendees
at exit management
meeting
on March 29,
1985.
An independent
inspection
was
made in Unit 2 containment at
elevations
91 ft., 117 ft and
140 ft.
The equipment
spaces
inspected
included two reactor coolant
pump (2-1 and 2-2) areas,
the seal table
area,
reactor pit area (elevation
63 ft.), and recirculation
sump area.
Construction
(completion) work was still in process in some areas in the
containment.
No violations of NRC requirements
were identified.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement
Items
(Closed)
Noncom liance (50-323/85-06-04) Electrical Racewa
Su
orts
Modification Not Performed In Accordance With Procedures
Three electrical raceway supports:
and
2A-119-6-20 were identified in this citation.
The installation drawing for support 2H-100-4-63 required that
a washer
be installed under the bolt which attached
a S-6 brace to the unistrut
support.
No washer
was installed.
Drawing MC-28 for support 2F-117-3-90 called for the installation of a
P-1001/C-41 unistrut with two clamps.
However,
a P-1001 with one
clamp
had been installed.
A six inch weld on a six inch long angle iron added to stiffen support
2A-119-6-20 was undersized for 25 percent (lq") of the length (6") of the
weld.
Ex lanation and Corrective Ste
s Taken
Su
ort 2H-100-4-63
This support
was incorrectly identified in the Notice as support
1178-H-100-4-63.
The correct support
number is 2H-100-4-63 'esign
Change Notice DC2-EC-18480 required
a washer to be installed
on the S-6
brace of this support
and
a torque value of 85 ft/lb applied at that
location.
The brace
was torqued to 85 ft/lb, and no washer
was
installed.
A QC inspector overlooked this condition during inspection.
The licensee's
Discrepancy Report No. E-3148 was written to document the
condition when it was identified by the NRC, and the support
was reworked
to conform to the design drawing.
Corrective action was completed
on
January
28,
1985,
when the discrepancy report was closed.
Su
ort 2F-117-3-90
Design
Change Notice 'OC2-EC-16532 required the removal of three existing
supports
and the installation of three
new ones'wo of the three
new
supports
called for P-1001 unistruts at all three locations.
A QC
inspector overlooked this condition during inspection.
The licensee's
Discrepancy Report No. E-3145
was initiated to document the condition
when it was identified by the
NRC.
The support
was reworked in
accordance
with Design Drawing DC2-EC-16532 requirements.
Corrective
action was completed
on January
28,
1985,
when the discrepancy report was
closed.
Su
ort 2A-119-6-20
Design required
a 1/8-inch fillet weld 6-inches
long to be made
on an
angle used to stiffen the support.
The weld was undersized for
25 percent
(1-1/2 inches) of the length of the weld, which exceeded
the
accepted
tolerance of 10 percent.
A QC inspector
overlooked this
condition during inspection.
The licensee's
Discrepancy Report
No. E-3209
was written to document this condition when it was identified
by the
NRC and was forwarded to Project Engineering in San Francisco for
resolution.
Project Engineering
reviewed the existing condition,
determined it was adequate'or
the structural integrity of the support,
and
recommended
a use-as-is
disposition.
Corrective action was completed
on January
30,
1985,
when the discrepancy
report was closed.
Retraining of QC inspectors
in, order to enhance
job performance is
standard practice at Diablo Canyon.
However,
due to a reduction in
personnel,
one of the
QC inspectors
involved with the items cited in the
Notice is no longer employed at Diablo Canyon
and retraining is not
necessary.
The other individual is employed by a different contractor
L'
E
~
'4
and has been retrained in accordance
with that contractors'rocedures.
In addition,
the Field Observation
Memorandum program,
implemented at
Diablo Canyon subsequent
to the original work on the cited items,
provides
an additional means
through which onsite contractor personnel
can identify possibly deficient conditions to the licensee's
equality
Control for investigation.
This program
h'as increased
the licensee's
ability to identify and correct any deficient conditions at Diablo
Canyon.
Based
on the actions described
above, Project Engineering's
review of the type and severity of each condition found, the adequacy of
existing procedures,
and the licensee's
ongoing surveillance
program; it
is felt that adequate
corrective actions
have been taken to prevent
recurrence.
The inspector verified the completion of the repairs to raceway supports
and 2F-117-3-90 by inspection of these
two supports in the
field and examination of the
gC records for the repair work.
The
documentation
supports
the corrective measures
taken.
The inspector also
examined the licensee's
resolution of the discrepancy for support
The modifications
and resolution of the identified
discrepancies
for the three identified raceway supports
appear to be
adequate
and complete.
Based
on a review of the corrective measures
taken and inspection of the
modified supports, it is concluded that this item is closed.
1
4.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins
a.
(Closed)
Environmental
uglification of ASCO
The bulletin required the replacement of certain acetal plastic
material parts
and buna "N" elastome material gaskets in those
ASCO
exposed
to an accident environment.
The inspector
examined
DCO-EM-378 and other documentation onsite for
replacement
of gaskets
and acetal plastic parts, verification of
solenoid coil materials
and retesting of 37 solenoid valves for
Unit 2 ~
This Bulletin is closed for Unit 2.
b.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-02
Pi e Su
ort Base Plate Desi n Usin
Concrete
Ex ansion Anchor Bolts
IE Bulletin 79-02 summarized
the requirements for pipe support base
plate designs
using concrete
anchors.
The licensee's
internal review program
(IRP) established
in mid-1982
for Unit 2, required that all Class
1 system
be re-analyzed.
This
resulted in the redesign
and modifications to
a large number of
Class
1 pipe supports.
The licensee's final response
to IE Bulletin 79-02 was submitted by
letter dated February 4,
1985.
This letter states
that during the
ly ~
1
Ht
weeks of October
22 and November 26,
1984 and January
14,
1985, the
NRC staff
(NRR) conducted audits of Unit 2 piping design analysis
work; and that these audits verified compliance with the concerns of
Supplement
No.
30 to the Diablo Canyon plant
safety evaluation .report supports
the licensee's
conclusions.
This Bulletin is closed.
(Closed) Bulletin 79-1.4
Seismic Anal ses of Safet -Related
Pi in
S stems
summarized
the requirements
for the seismic
analysis of as-built safety-related
piping systems.
The licensee's
final response
to IE Bulletin 79-14 was submitted by
letter dated Fe'bruary 4,, 1985.
The internal review program
(IRP) for Diablo Canyon Unit 2,
as
described in the licensee's
letters
dated October 5, October
19,
and
November 2,
1984,
was initiated by the licensee in mid-1982.
The
program included:
(1)
a walkdown of all seismic, Category
1 piping
systems
which ensured that as-built drawings reflect plant
conditions,
and (2) seismic
reanalyses
which used the verified
piping geometry
and support configurations.
The final phase of the
reanalysis
includes
an as-built reconciliation scheduled for
completion by February 28,,l985.
The licensee's letter dated October
17,
1979, included
Attachments
A-E which provided the response
to Item
1 of the
Bulletin for Units
1 and 2.
The walkdowns
and seismic reanalyses
satisfy the requirements
of Items
2 and 3.
Item 4 of the Bulletin
is not applicable to Unit 2 because
reanalyses
of all seismic
Category
1 piping systems
were based
on as-built piping and
supports.
The licensee's
final response
states
that during the weeks of
October
22 and November 26,
1984 and January
14,
1985,
the
NRC staff
(NRR) conducted audits of Unit 2 piping design analysis work; and
that these
audits verified compliance with the concerns of IE
Supplement
No.
30 to the Diablo Canyon plant safety
evaluation report supports
the licensee's
conclusions.
This Bulletin is closed.
(Closed)
Potential Failure of Emer enc
Diesel
Generator Field Exciter Transformer
The bulletin required certain actions,
described
below, to be taken
by the licensee
to determine
the reliability of operation of the
(EDG).
Over heating of the exciter
power transformer
due to circulating current had caused,
an EDG at
the Turkey Point facility to trip during
a 24-hour full load test.
-3
t
II
t
C
ll.
'1
~
N(,
The licensee's
response
to the subject bulletin submitted by letter
dated November 8,
1979 included the following responses
to two
requirements:
1.
Determine whether or not connections
have been
made between
low
KVA rated transformers
and high KVA rated
EDGs without adequate
limitations on the flow of circulating currents.
If
applicable,
provide
a description of the corrective action
being taken to address
this
problem.'.
Provide
a schedule for the completion of a full-load operation
test of EDGs, or provide the results of a sustained full-load
operation tests for the
EDGs at your facility.
The test should
demonstrate full-load carrying capability for an interval of
not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, of which 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> should be at
a load
equivalent to the continuous rating of the diesel generator
and
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> at
a load equivalent. to the
2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rating'f the diesel
generator.
The test should also verify that voltage
and
frequency requirements
are maintained
and that the cooling
system functions within design limits.
R~es
ense
1.
Connections
do not exist between low KVA rated transformers
and
high KVA rated
EDG.
The Diablo Canyon low KVA rated
CPTs are
wired in an open delta configuration while the high KVA rated
EDGs are wired in an ungrounded
"Y" configuration.
2.
Pull-load tests of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> duration were performed
on
Diesel Generators ll and
12 and
13 on March 9,
1979,
February 28,
1979
and October 2,
1979 respectively.
This test
consisted
of a
2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> overload condition at
> 2750KW followed
by a 22 hour2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> full load condition at
> 2484I5l.
Voltage,
frequency,
and jacket cooling water temperature
were recorded
and logged for the duration of the tests
and were all
maintained within design limits.
The full load operation
(24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) tests
have. not yet been performed
on Unit 2 EDGs
21 and 22.
The,24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> tests
are scheduled
to be
performed
on EDGs
21 and 22 prior to Unit 2 reactor going to Mode 4
operation.
These
two diesel generators
21 and
22 are identical
machines
to EDGs ll, 12 and 13.
The inspector
examined test results of recent
(October 83/January
84) full load operation
(24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) tests
run on
EDGs 11,
12 and 13.
The inspector 'also examined reliability tests
performed
on EDGs
21 and
24 by the startup
group.
These tests
included four separate
starts
followed by a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run at
app'roximately
2MW load, which is slightly less than full load.
All
test results
examined
appeared
to be in order and demonstrates
the
operability of the EDGs.
The licensee
has satisfied
the
requirements
of the bulletin.
This item is closed for Unit 2.
v
k.
i
h
V
'I
(Closed)
(50-323/85-02-03)
Pollowu
Item:
Concern
Re ardin
Limitor ue
A contract inspector
expressed
a concern
as to the environmental
qualification of limitorque operators
on valves
LCVs 108,
109;
MPHs 06,
ll; and
MPGs
21 and 48.
The concern for the LCVs 108 and
109 (limitorque
model
SMC) was an impression
from an earlier experience in this area by
the contract inspector,
that the manufacturer
had been unable to
environmentally qualify this model
SMC valve operator.
It was also the
contract inspectors'pinion
that the other four valves
(MPHs 06/ll and
MPGs 21/48) which were equipped with brake
shoes
were not qualified since
the operators
were qualified without brake shoes.
The limitorque valve operators identified in the concern are located
outside the containment.
However, they are subject to a hi-energy line
break environment because
main steam lines and feedwater lines pass
through the area of the location of the above identified valves.
The
NRC inspector
examined the qualification type test report No. B0003,
and documentation for qualification of the above identified limitorque
valve actuators for Class
lE service outside primary containment,
and
found it to be in order.
The inspector also examined the completed
design
change notice
(DCN),
DC2-EM-935 which required the removal of brake
shoes
from valve operators
MPH-6 and MPG-48.
The inspector inspected in the field these
two valve
operators
to be assured
that the brake
shoes
had been
removed.
The
DCN
completed in March 1983 was found to be in order.
The inspector
examined
the licensee's
corrective action review of valve
operators
equipped with brakes with regard to operators
MPH-11 and
MPG-21.
These valve operators
actuate
containment
spray
pumps 2-1 and
2-2 discharge isolation valves.
The justification for exemption of the
removal of brake
shoe from these
two valve operators
concludes:
these
valves are required to open at the initiation of containment
spray
and
close prior to the initiation of spray recirculation from the
RHR system.
Since post-accident
radiation exposure of these valves occurs after
recirculation initiation, loss of functionality does not occur until
after the valves safety function is completed.
Therefore,
the failure
mode of these valves
does not prevent or impair their post-accident
safety function.
It is concluded the initial concern identified has
been properly
considered
and adequately
evaluated
by the licensee.
This item is
closed.
On March 29,
1985, the inspector; met with the licensee's
representatives
identified in paragraph
1.
During this meeting,
the inspector
summarized
the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection
findings as described in the report.
The licensee
acknowledged
the
concerns identified in the report.