ML16341A181
| ML16341A181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1984 |
| From: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341A180 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8408070532 | |
| Download: ML16341A181 (36) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISEION QPCL+S<IEE (I)
ItEOION V ll50MARIALABE,SUITE 210
%AL'IIIUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA04596 JUN 19 199<
NENORANDUN FOR:
RtON:
John S. Nartin, Regional Administrator T.
W. Bishop, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects SUBJECT mESULTS OF DlhSLO CANYON UNIT 1 FULL POWER LICENSEE REVIEW PANEL CONSIDERATIONS h review panel met on June 4, 1984 to consider the status of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and the basis for full power license issuance recoanendations.
The attendance was as follows:
D. F. Kirsch, Chairman, RV H. L. Canter, RV P. H. Johnson, RV F. A. Wenslawski, RU N. D. Schuster, RV G. H. Hernandez, RV P. J. Norrill, RU N. N. Nendonca, RV (Resident),
by telephone N. L. Padovan, RV (Resident),
by telephone T. Ross, RU (Resident),
by telephone T. Polich, RV (Resident),
by telephone G.
W. Knighton, NRR, by telephone C. I. Grimes, NRR, by telephone B. C. Buckley, NRR, by telephone Information considered by the panel included:
1.
Status of the xnspection program, testing program, enforcement actions, and costruction.
2.
Status of allegations 3.
Status of compliance with low power operating license conditions.
4.
Issues related to the 1977 NSC audit.
Nr. J. L
. L. Crews, Senior Reactor Engineer, was subsequently contacted to determine if he was in concert with the panel because he led the inspection team onsite in examining the performance of the operating crews.
Nr. Crews concurs in the conclusions and recommendations of the panel.
The panel and the Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) concluded that the state of readiness for full power licensing of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is adequate and recoamends issuance of the full power license.
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C Oygy4 urrrrrtD sTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSlO" hEOION V fi50MARIALANE,sUITE 210 srrALNl/TCREEK, CAlIFORNIA$4596 JUN i9 Pt!<
Enclosure (I)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John B. Nartin,'egional Administrator FROM:
T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
SUBJECT:
RESULTS OI'KVLO ChÃfON UNIT 1 FOLI POWER LICENSEE REVIEW PANEL CONSIDERATIONS h review panel sret on June 4, 1984 to consider the t t f D bl C
e s a us o
xa o
anyon nest an t e asis for full power license issuance recommendations.
The attendance was as follows:
D. F. Kirsch, Chairman, RV H. L. Canter, RV P. H. Johnson, RV F; A. Wenslawski, RV N. D. Schuster, RV G. H. Hernandez, RV P. J. Norrill, RV N. N. Mendonca, RV (Resident),
by telephone M. L. Padovan, RV (Resident),
by telephone T. Ross, RV (Resident),
by telephone T. Polich, RV (Resident),
by telephone G.
W. Knighton, NRR, by telephone C. I. Grimes, NRR, by telephone B.
C. Buckley, NRR, by telephone Information considered by the panel included:
1.
Status of the ins e t inspection program, testing program, enforcement actions, and costruction.
2.
Status of allegations 3.
Status of compliance with low power operating license conditions.
4.
Issues related to the 1977 NSC audit.
Nr. J. L. Crews
. L. Cre s, Senior Reactor Engineer, was subsequently contacted to etermine if he was in concert with the panel because he led the inspection team onsite in examining the performance of the operating crews.
Mr. Crews concurs in the conclusions and recommendations of the panel.
The panel and the Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) concluded that the state of readiness for full power licensing of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is adequate and recommends issuance of the full power license.
Gr
>Us 19>""< attachment 1 provides a listing of the panel's considerations and conclusions.
C T. V. Bishop, Director Division of Reactor Safety and Projects cc:
G. Knighton, NRR C. Grimes, NRR H. Schierling, NRR B. Buckley, NRR M. Mendonca, RU (4 copies)
D. Kirsch, RV F. Venslavski, RV G. Yuhas, RV M. Scbuster, RV L. Norderhaug, RV P. Johnson, RV P. Morrill, RV
t II II k
1.
Manual Cha tcr 9 B
eratin License Issuance Xas ection Pro ram The status of the inspection program prescribed by MC 2512, 2513, and 2514 vas reviewed.
The panel concluded that the inspections prescribed by MC 2512 and 2513 vere complete and that the inspections prescribed by MC 2514 were current, consistent with present plant and testing status.
Inspections related to the Independent Verification Program (IDVP)
~ad the licensee's Xnternal Technical Program (ITP) were reviewed.
The paacI concluded that. tbe inspections of the IDVP and ITP were complete for Unit: 1 and that some inspection of the transfer of findings and engineering to Uait 2 should bc completed for Unit 2 licensing.
The panel discussed recent findings related to the Seismic Interaction Program (SIP) with the conclusion that the licensee's coneitment to complete all follow-up items identified during the staff's Msy 1984 inspection by the end of July 1984 wss acceptable.
(i.e.,
modifications and wslkdowns, verify documentation is comp ete and accurate, complete review of "as-is" packages and verify proper engineering approval, and provide NRC with a schedule for transfer of SIP to thc Nuclear Power Operations Group).
Regarding the TMI Action Plan (TAP) items, the panel concluded that these items appeared to be completed for full power operation with the exception of the PASS system which would be verified complete by R
before the plant wss in Mode 1.
The Region V staff hss conducted an audit'to verify that all TAP items are complete or on schedule.
NRR is curreatly reviewing the I.icensec's Core Damage Estimate procedure.
Regarding emergency preparedness, the inspection program hss consisted of emergency exercise observations, and preoperstional snd routine inspections.
No items of noncompliance or open items exist in this area.
Recent updated FEMA findings continue to reflect adequate emergency preparedness.
However, the ASLB condition requiring FEMA findings oa the adequacy of the State plan is still unsatisfied.
Ssfegusrds and security inspections have consisted of verifications of ssfegusrds requirements and compliance.
No items are required for resolution prior to full power operation.
Radiation protection inspections centered on verif'c t f TMI full ow 1 ica 1oa 0
u power requirements and the licensees programmatic compliance.
Onc item of noncompliance in this functional area vas issued during the period from January 1, 1983, to Msy 31, 1984.
This inspection effort has not to date identified any opea items or concerns that should be restrictive to full power operation.
No items are required for resolution prior to full power operation.
l
B.
Testin Pro The licensee has successfully completed the core loading and low pover (< Q) testing program, including natural circulation testing on Nay 23, 1984.
hs re'quired by the staff, the operators from each shift have satisfactorily participated in the natural circulation tests.
Procedures for the required pover ascension tests have been ecxnpleted aud approved.
Mo significant deficiencies vere identified during the reviews of these procedures.
The NSSS supplier (westinghouse) has completed review and acceptance of the low power testing program prior to starting the pover ascension test program.
C.
Enforcement hctions The folloving list tabulates the enforcement actions taken since January 1984.
The lov pover license vas reinstated o
A
'1 18 1984.
e on pri Inspection Report and Dates Severity Level Functional Area and Description of Non-Co liance 83-37 11/14"18/83 11/28 -12/83 One Level 4 Construction - Pullman inspectors vere performing inspections prior to completing required training.
83-38 11/14-18/83 One Level 4 Radiation Protection - Personnel in the containment did not evacuate shen the evacuation alarm sounded and three individuals vho left the contain-ment failed to log out.
83-39 12/5-22/83 Tvo Level 4 and One Level 5 Fire, Protection - Fire vatch personnel were not aware of velding permit requirements, permits vere not properly posted, and in one case a permit vas not completed.
83-40 12/13-20/83 Two Level 4 Engineering - Enviornmental Qualification files vere not subject to quality assurance program controls and in one case vere not checked by a checking engineer.
Inspection Report and Dates Severity Level Functional brea aad Description of Noa-Co lianc>>
83-41 Two Level 4 11/27 - 12/31/83 and One Level 5 Operations Melding was being done with no fire-watch or extinguisher, the Solid State Protection System vas removed from service vithout written procedures, the containment equipment hatch vas ajar vhen required to be closed and the jumper log for the pressurizer pressure transmitters incorrectly indicated that the transmitters sere not bypassed.
84-01 1/3-6/84 One Level 5 Construction - Connection 794 in the turbine building had been accepted by H. P. Foley QC despite lack of veld fusion aad omissions of portions of stitch velds.
84"02 1/1 - 2/4/84 One Level 4 One Level 4 (Uait 2)
Operations - Redundant fans for the control room ventilation vere improperly aligned to the same power supply.
Construction - Excessive undercut on a structural steel veld in the containment annulus and missing vashers at a bolted structural connection.
84-03 One Level 4 2/5 " 3/24/84 Quality Assurance/Construction-hccess of personnel to control material storage was not controlled.
84-04 4/2-9/84 One Level 4 Construction - An electrical raceway supports a non-confor-mance report
@as lost and two velds vere not inspected.
84-06 4/7-17/84 One Level 3 (050,000 c.p.)
Operations - Licensee disabled a
portion of the ECCS system (high pressure core injection via the Boron injection tank) for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />.
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The constru n items of non-compliance do n appear to be major pervasive pro lems but do indicate a need to continue examinations of Unit 2 with NRC and contract personnel resources.
The operations items of non-compliance culminated in an enforcement conference held on May 1, 1984, during which the staff discussed problems related to the failure of the licensee's staff to exhibit an acceptable degree of awareness of the facility Technical Specifications.
The staff intends to closely aonitor the licensee's management, both in the response to, and follow-up of, items related to this issue.
The panel did not find that this item of non-compliance should impede the issuance of the full power license.
In addition to the above, there are several enforcement actions pending as a result of allegation investigations.
D.
Construction The construction of all safety-related systems has been completed.
The licensee's operating organization has accepted cognizance of all safety-related systems.
h design modification to the reactor tri breakers shunt trip was required prior to exceeding 5g power and has been completed.
The panel found that this would not impede the issuance, of the full power license.
2.
Status of Alle ations Allegations regarding design, construction, operation and management have been submitted to the NRC since early 1983, the majority being submitted since late 1983.
h specific evaluation effort for allegations was initiated in late 1983, under the Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (DCAMP).
As of early March 1984, approximately 200 allegations had been submitted by various, sources.
The staff's evaluation of these allegations is presented in SSER 21 (December 1983) and SSER 22 (March 1984).
The Government Accountability project (GAp) submitted approximately 300 allegations in February and March 1984 in support of a petition, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206, to defer any licensing action.
Another approximately 250 allegations have since been sub 'tt d letters b
e ers y GAP and Joint Intervenors.
Most of all the allegations are identical or very similar.
Some of the allegations are being investigated by the Office of Investigations.
hs discussed in SSER 22, the staff applied certain criteria for determining which allegations aust be resolved on a priority basis.
rior to reinstatement of the low power license, the staff had evaluated each allegation in sufficient detail and concluded that none are of such safety significance to preclude low-power operation.
The staff has identified allegations in the following areas that require resolution before a full-power decision:
Piping and piping supports; Containment paint;
I',
II
o System teractioas; RHR system low flow alarm; hs-built drawiags; Solts on contaiament liner.
The staff is continuing its evaluation of all allegatiqns and will present the result.s in a future report.
The staff has act a aumber of times with individuals making allegations or raising concerns.
In some cases, the iadividua)s have requested confidentiality and are represented by GAP.
An official transcript has been taken of the meetings whenever possible.
The staff is currently reviewing the meeting transcripts to determine if they include any specific allegations or concerns aot already included in those submitted.
3.
Status of Com liance with Low Power eratin License Conditions The liceasee has successfully completed the low power test program consistent with Section 14 of the Diablo Canyon Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and NRC approved changes.
The on-site phase of the Region V Special Team Inspection of the operating crews (directed.by the Commission as a condition of low power authorization) was concluded on Nay 23, 1984, with the observation of the natural circulation tests and associated training of the operating crews.
Preliminary findings and conclusions by the Special Inspection Team include:
1 ~
Overall operating crew performance was judged to be good, with Shift Advisors effectively integrated into shift operations.
Zero power physics and low power tests demonstrated acceptable reactor and systems performance, without significant deviation from licensee/NSSS design expectations.
iii. Licensee management, including senior corporate, involvement in the day-to-day operation of the facility was found to be substantial and effective.
Observations during the course of the Special Inspection revealed thc need for improvements in the areas of (a) maintenance work planning (particularly in the use and installation of special test equipment in aon-safety-related systems of the plant which offer the potential for interaction with or unnecessary challenge to reactor protection/safeguards systems);
{b) procedural guidance for and the implementation of measures to provide independent verification of equipmeat/system allignment and status; and (c) the reliability of post trip/sequence-of-cvents informational systems (plant
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41
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e~~ci r printer end sequence of evenconputer) foyfovin signific t transjeats such as loss of hC power and safety injection (ECCS) initiation.
Each of these areas are receiving priority attentioa by licensee management for resolution prior to exceeding Sg power.
24-25 1 84 In addition, on-site special inspection was conducted h r'1 9-11 d
9
, to evaluate the qualification traiaiag and examination o
Shift hdviaor Candidates.
Concomitantly, a special evaluation of the Shift Advisors was conducted by the NRC Division of Human Factors Safety during the period April 10-11, 1984.
These nspectioas/evaluations concluded that the training program for the a visors was adequate and that all Shift Advisors and Candidates more than mct the minimum quslificatioa recceeendcd by the industry.
The licensee hss completed all other low power license conditions with the exception of proof testing, the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) and obtaining NRC approval of the Core Damage Estimate procedure which is currently under review by NRR.
4.
NSC Audit and Related Matters a
~
On September 9, 1983, the Joint Intervenors filed a document with the ASLAB to supplment their motion to reopen the record on Construction Quality hssurrsnce.
This document contained s report of a Nuclear Services Corporation (NSC) audit conducted August 22-September 20, 1977 of Pullman Power Products (Pullman) from 1971 through 1977 aad alleged major breakdowns in Pullman's as well as the licensee's QA programs.
b.
The Region U staff has conducted three inspections/invetigstions of this audit aad the corrective actions taken by Pullman aad the licensee (Reports 50-275/83-34, October 11-14, 1983; 50-275/83-37, November 14-18 and November 28 - December 9, 1984; and 50-275/84-16, April 2-4, 1984).
Onc item of noncomplisace (Level 4) was i enti ied in that Pullman welding inspectors were conducting inspections prior to completing their required training.
The licensee reviewed the qualifications and training of these personnel and examined a sample of welds accepted by personnel whose training mig t e questionable to verify the adequacy of the accepted welds.
No unacceptable welds werc found.
The Region U staff and subsequently Chairman Psllsdino have invited Qusdrex Corporation (the corporate descendent of NSC) to attend s
commission briefing to explain the NSC findings in more depth,
- however, Qusdrex hss declined all requests to meet with the Commission on this issue.
C The NSC audit has also been the subject of Congressional Staff inquiries (Dr. H. Myers, Sub-Committee on Energy aad the Environment) dated March 22, March 26, and April 10, 1984.
The Region U staff hss provided a draft response to the March 22 and 26 questioas in a draft letter forwarded to the EDOs office on Junc 4,
.I
l984.
The April l0 questions had not been responded to at the time of the panel's aeeting.
The panel concluded that these issues vere adequately addressed in the afforementioned Region V inspection reports and that there vere no issues associated with the NSC audit othich should preclude the granting of the full poser license.
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i Enclosure (2)
SUMMARY
OF INSTALLATION UALITY VERIFICATIONS In its April 9, 1984 report to the Commission, the ACRS stated that the Staff should examine a sampling of actual construction details to help assure that appropriate quality has been accomplished in the construction and modification of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
The Staff feels that considerable efforts and resources have been expended by the NRC Staff anh others in the examination of actual construction details involved in the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant as follows.
The Re ular NRC Ins ection Pro ram The NRC's regular inspection program for power reactors under construction, as defined by IE Manual Chapter 2512, provides for considerable direct inspector observations and examinations in all aspects of plant construction.
While careful attention is given to the applicant's management controls, quality assurance
- records, training procedures, and other non-hardware aspects of a construction program, a substantial portion of the inspectors'ime is also given to direct inspection of actual construction details.
The IE Inspection Procedures address work observation and direct inspection of completed work over a wide range of activities, including plant foundations, structural steel and concrete, safety-related pressure boundary piping and supports, mechanical systems and components, electric cables, cable trays and supports, electrical components, containment penetrations, welding and nondestructive examination practices, and plant instrumentation.
Such direct inspection coverage was provided to Diablo Canyon during plant construction and subsequent modification.
These inspections are documented in approximately 104 staff inspection reports for Unit 1 since 1972.
The staff has issued an additional 175 inspection reports for Unit 1 in other areas (system testing, maintenance, operations, etc).
Comparable inspection attention was also given to Unit 2.
In addition, the subject of construction quality has been the subject of ASLB reviews and appeals.
2.
NRC Follow-u on Alle ations and IDVP Modifications In excess of 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of NRC staff effort have been devoted to the follow-up and resolution of allegations in recent months.
The regular inspection program has also continued during this period, including attention to IDVP modifications.
A substantial portion of this inspection effort has involved direct inspection of actual hardware or construction details.
- Combined, these direct inspections have specifically included examination of the following:
Safety-related structures (modifications to containment annulus structural steel; modifications to turbine building; fuel handling building structural steel modifications; catwalk supports; and structural steel components supplied by
k
Bostrom-Bergen):
These examinations have included 122 structural connections involving over 1000 welds.
Safety-related pressure boundaries and mechanical systems (Reexamination of 102 radiographs; 25 delta-ferrite measurements on selected stainless steel pipe welds; 549 pipe suuports; containment equipment hatch integrity; valve operaMlity and piping expansion tests; Systems Interaction Program hardware modifications; hydraulic snubbers; anchor bolts; reactor vessel assembly; component cooling water liquid penetrant tests and system tests; stainless steel pipe weld shrinkage; heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems; arrangement of accumulator discharge piping; and u-bolts attached to small bore Class I piping).
Safety-related electrical systems (4 KV breaker maintenance; emergency lighting; diesel generator tests; 50 cable tray installations; 322 cable tray, conduit and raceway supports and related anchor bolts; 53 electrical cable installation, labeling and terminations; in excess of 100 conduit clamps; electrical panels and devices inside containment; and inspection of various safety-related areas to determine potential consequences of falling light fixtures).
Safety-related components (support weld quality on over 100 components; reactor coolant pump seal and motor replacement; diesel generator maintenance; control rod testing; charging pumps; RHR pumps and pump rooms; containment building polar crane; dead load supports for 50 safety-related valve bodies or operators; 41 HVAC supports; and replacement of bolts in containment fan cooler structural supports).
Quality of special processes (independent nondestructive examinations including radiography, ultrasonic, and delta-ferrite; visual examination of numerous field welds in piping systems and structural assemblies; and examination of weld repairs).
0 Instrumentation,
- controls, and protective features (reactor trip breaker tests; RHR flow indication and low flow alarm, modifications to air e)ector and gas decay tank discharge monitors; in-core thermocouple circuits; and pressurizer instrumentation).
Other quality-related inspections (fire barriers, fire protection systems and fire-fighting equipment; examination of over 500 modifications to verify correctness of as-built drawings).
The staff inspection of 1283 modifications identified 33 items which did not conform to requirements.
Most of these (21) involved structural connections in the Fuel Handling Building.
In response, the licensee conducted a
100X reinspection of the welds in that building, and additional inspections elsewhere.
Inspection of
0 V
,'7 8I
allegations and assoriated hardoare identified approxinately ~tvenc more construction related items of noncompliance (all of vhich related to procedural/administrative
- errors, none of vhich involved specific hardvare inadequacies) 3.
Other ualit Verifications Performed b
Third Parties Third party examinations of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant hardvare have been instituted at the request of the NRC, by NRC contract perscmnel, ur by other Federal agencies since 1977.
These include the follovhng; a.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an audit of the NRC inspection program at the Diablo Canyon facilities during the veeks of May 30 and June 6,
- 1977, and conducted intervievs with numerous craftsmen engaged in safety-related vork.
The GAO notified the Region V office of the audit items of concern, vhich identified allegations of improper vorkmanship by three individuals.
As a consequence the Region V office conducted a
special investigation during July and August, 1977 of (a) pipeway welding and structural steel, (b) seismic and pipe rupture restraints, (c) concrete anchor bolt testing, and (d) resin filter trap velding quality (Inspection Report 50-275/77-06).
One item of non-compliance was issued for failure to complete a weld inspection step.
b.
In September
- 1981, subsequent to the licensee's discovery that portions of the seismic analysis inputs for the containment annulus were reversed, the NRC suspended the lov power license.
The NRC staff required that an Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) be successfully completed by outside contractors prior to reinstatement of the license.
Two ma)or verifications of plant hardvare vere conducted concomitant with the IDVP.
First, in order to verify the accuracy of engineering, the IDVP contractors had to verify the "as-built" condition of the plant.
These verifications took place from December 1981 through January 1984 and involved approximately 1600 man-hours total effort.
The scope of these examinations is described as follovs:
R. L. Cloud and Associates piping systems, pipe
,supports, electrical raceway supports, heating and ventilation supports, equipment supports, structural
- steel, and concrete structures.
Stone and Webster Corporation Auxiliary Feedwater System, Control Room Heating and Ventilation System, 4160 volt electrical system, missile barriers, and pipe rupture restraints.
Teledyne Engineering Services Oversight of the examinations described above.
, t@
1
This effort found many instances of inaccuracies in the engineering calculations and/or."as-builting" process which required reanalysis.
After the licensee had completed appropriate corrective actions, the IDVP concluded that the plant's engineering and as-builting were satisfactory.
- Second, Stone and Webster Corporation conducted an examination of the quality af construction of the containment (erected by f.. Atkinson Coepany) and of the primary coolant system (constructed by Vismer and Seeker Company) during the fall of 1982.
This effort involved approximately ten experienced auditors and/or technical experts who invested approximately BQQ man-hours at the site.
This team found one item which required correction; that item related to documentation of an inspection of dye penetrant tests which could not be found.
No hardware problems were identified.
C ~
ASME Code Ins ections Pullman Power was examined on four different occasions by ASME survey teams of four or five members.
These surveys were conducted in October 1972, August 1977, July 1980, and August 1983.
Wismer and Becker was surveyed and granted an ASME authorization in 1973.
No findings resulted from the ASME
- surveys, although minor items were referred to the Authorized Inspector (AI) for followup.
d.
Authorized Code Ins ector (AI The California State Code Inspector served as AI for the Diablo Canyon site from the beginning of code-related construction effort through June 1975.
At least one and as many as four resident AIs were stationed at the site during this period, which covered much of Pullman's construction activity and essentially all of Wismer and Becker's.
After June
- 1975, Hartford Steam and Boiler Inspectors served as AI.
A resident AI was at the site until 1976; coverage since that time (to the present) has been provided on a part-time basis.
4.
Conclusion NRC and third-party inspec'tions at Diablo Canyon have examined a
wide diversity of plant structures,
- systems, and components.
For the greatest part, these direct observations and hardware inspection efforts have verified proper quality of construction activities.
In limited cases where problems were identified, licensee corrective actions and NRC enforcement actions, where appropriate, and NRC follow-up inspections have been provided to ensure proper quality.
Enclosure (3)
SUMMARY
OF LICENSEE UALITY ASSURANCE AUDITS AND STOP CWORK ORDERS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981 The PG&E Quality Assurance Program is described in detail the "Quality hssurance Manual for nuclear Power Plants."
This manual describes the licensees QA prograa for control of aIZ activities affecting the quality of safety-related structures systems and components during the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants.
The staff requested that the licensee compile a list of audits and stop work orders which occured after September 1981 under this QA program.
This data is enclosed as Table 1 and Table 2 which follow.
EIII TABLE 1
SUMMARY
OF QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981 Yeere A.
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO.
l.
Audits 2.
Findings 3.
Observations 4.
Stop Work Orders B.
PULLMAN POWER PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1981 51 24 0
0 1982 1983 133 431 0
0 2
0 1984 38(9}
60 0
1 C.
l.
2.
3.
4 ~
Audits Findings Observations Stop Work Orders H. P.
FOLEY COMPANY 11 22 1
0 20 23 71 96 lo 16 0
0 9
30 1
0
- l. 'udits 2.
Findings 3.
Observations 4.
Stop Work Orders 6
17 119 65 0
9 0
3 ll 44 7
2 NOTES:
(1)
For period ending May 1, 1984.
(2)
For period ending May 31, 1984.
(3)
Audits from September 1981.
(4)
An audit of calibration considered each tool not in compliance as a
finding.
Approximately 42 findings resulted from audit.
(5)
Includes scheduled and unscheduled
- audits, corporate audits, agency inspections, and ASME surveys.
(6)
Includes scheduled and unscheduled
- audits, and corporate audits.
(7)
The customary practice of POTE is to write findings, not observations in order to assure mandatory corrective action takes place.
(8)
Includes approximately 100 mini audits.
(9) 38 audits completed, actually 127 audits have been assigned
- numbers, but the remainder are in some stage of preparation.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY
INFORMATION ON LICENSEE STOP CWORK ORDERS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1981 PGandE Date Issued Reason Date Work Allowed to Resume June 15, 1982 Energy, Inc.
Qh Program for furnishing Incore Thermocouple-Computer Class 1E Isolation System was found to be deficient during an audit Partial - 6/21/82 Partial - 6/28/82 Complete - 8/16/82 September 29, 1982 Installation of Class 1E Cable stopped at DCPP due to deficiencies identified in the manufacturer's QA Program.
Approx. 12/8/82 January 9,
1984 Reannealing of Rupture Restraints - Meddco Metals-work stopped due to procedural deficiencies identified during an audit.
1/19/84 - Findings resolved.
H. P.
FOLEY CO.
Date Issued March 7, 1984 Reason 84-02.
Fourteen of 200 Electrical work requests were issued without a QA approved Work Process Traveler.
Date York Allowed to Resume NCR 8802-1122 was generated, and closed March 24, 1984.
York was allowed to commence upon closure of the NCR.
February 23, 1984 84-01.
Inadequate work packages prevented proper QC inspection and documen-tation of in-process work for Barton Transmitters.
New work requests were prepared and approved by QA, and work was resumed March 22, 1984.
C
Date Issued december 20, 1983 Reason 83-03.
Procedures for Class I soldering required updating and approval, and persons assigned to solder-ing required certification under revised procedures.
Date Work Allowed to Resume Procedures were reviewed.by PG6E Quality Control on December 13, 1983 and approved by PG&E Quality Assurance on December 21, 1983.
All work resumed January 6, 1984.
December 20, 1983 89-02.
Improved control of core drilling, concrete
- chipping, and drilling activities was required to prevent damage to embedded items.
Controls were established and work resumed on December 21, 1983.
May 13, 1983 83-01.
Rev. 0, May 13, 1983.
Stop work order issued for suppliers whose qualifications were expected to expire March 17, 1983.
Supplier Approval Requests were received and approved on May 14,
- 1983, and purchasing was resumed on May 14, 1983 for all suppliers except the three no longer used.
See Revision 1 following.
May 14, 1983 83-01.
Rev.
1, May 14, 1983.
Three additional suppliers not on list for Rev. 0.
Vendors no longer used by H. P. Foley; qualifications were permitted to expire.