ML16340D955

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,Units 1 and 2.Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323.(Pacific Gas and Electric Company)

ML16340D955
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/31/1983
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0675, NUREG-0675-S19, NUREG-675, NUREG-675-S19, NUDOCS 8311010489
Download: ML16340D955 (56)

Text

NUREG-0675 Supplement No. 19 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Supplement No. 19 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation October 1983

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ABSTRACT Supplement 19 to the Safety Evaluation Report for Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application for licenses to operate Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power

Plants, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos.

50-275 and 50-323),

has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This supplement reports on the verification effort for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 that was performed between November 1981 and the present in response to Com-mission Order CLI-81-30 and an NRC letter to the licensee.

Specifically, Supplement 19 addresses those issues and other matters identified in Supple-ment 18 that must be resolved prior to commencement of fuel loading operations.

Diab1 o Canyon SSER 19

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT..

ABBREVIATIONS 1

INTRODUCTION APPENDIX C

STAFF EVALUATION OF VERIFICATION EFFORT FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT 1 APPENDIX D

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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ABBREVIATIONS ACI AFW AFWS AISC AISI ANSI ASLAB ASLB ASME BNL CAP CCW CCWS CRVPS DCNPP DCP DDE EOI FSAR GDC HVAC IDVP ITP ITR LOCA NRC OIR PGRE RFR RLCA American Concrete Institute auxiliary feedwater auxiliary feedwater system American Institute of Steel Construction American Iron and Steel Institute American National Standards Institute Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety Licensing Board American Society of Mechanical Engineers Brookhaven National Laboratory Corrective Action Program component cooling water component cooling water system control room ventilation and pressurization system Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Diablo Canyon Project double design earthquake Error or Open Item Final Safety Analysis Report General Design Criteri(on) (a) heating, ventilation, and air conditioning Independent Design Verification Program Internal Technical Program Interim Technical Report loss-of-coolant accident U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Open Item Report Pacific Gas and Electric Company quality assurance R.

F.

Reedy, Inc.

Robert L. Cloud and Associates Diablo Canyon SSER 19 vii

SER SRSS SSE SSI SWEC Safety Evaluation Report square root of the sum of the squares safe shutdown earthquake soil-structure interaction Stone 8 Webster Engineering Corporation TES ZPA Teledyne Engineering Services zero period acceleration Diablo Canyon SSER 19 v111

1 INTRODUCTION 1

N The staff of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued on October 16, 1974,'its 'Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in matters of the application'f the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGRE) to opera'te Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The SER has since been supplemented by Supplement Nos

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1 through 16 and No.

18 (Supplement 17 has not yet been issued.

It is not related to the design verification effort).

SER supplement No.

18 (SSER 18) presented the staff's safety evaluation on matters related to a verification effort for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 that was the result of Commission Order CLI-81-30 and an NRC letter to PG8E of November 19, 1981.

This is SER Supplement No.

19 (SSER 19) and presents the staff's safety evaluation of those unresolved matters identified in SSER 18 which must be satisfa'ctorily resolved prior to commence-ment of fuel loading operations at Diablo Canyon Unit, 1.

The verification effort relates only to Unit 1 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant; there-fore, this supplement applies only to Unit 1 unless otherwise stated.

This supplement is based on information available to the staff as of October 13, 1983.

Verification efforts required for fuel load have been completed.

Con-firmatory documentation will be provided by the licensee on certain items.

The staff has not completed its safety evaluation of all the information that became available after the SSER 18 information cutoff date of June 30, 1983 and which relates to unresolved matters which need not be resolved prior to the commence-ment of fuel load operations.

The staff will prepare its safety evaluation on these matters after completing its evaluation.

The verification effort covers a wide range of subjects that cannot be presented effectively in the normal format of an SER and its supplements.

Therefore, the safety evaluation of the verification effort in SSER 18 was reported in Appendix C to that supplement.

Appendix A to an SER supplement is normally used for an update of the chronol-ogy for all Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant related matters.

The latest

.chronology was included in SER Supplement 16 dated August 1983.

As in SSER 18, Appendix A has been omitted from this supplement.

However, the continuation of the chronology for the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 verification effort has been in-cluded in Appendix C.

Appendix B to an SER supplement is normally for the bibliography to that supple-ment.

In this supplement the bibliography has been included in Appendix C.

Appendix D to this SER supplement includes the list of contributors and consultants.

The NRC Project Manager for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is Mr.

H.

Schierling.

Mr. Schierling may be contacted by calling (301) 492-7100 or by writing to the following address:

Diablo Canyon SSER 19

Mr.

H. Schierling Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Copies of this Supplement are available for public inspection at the Commis-sion's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

and at the California Polytechnic State University Library, Documents and Maps Depart-

ment, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407.

Availability of all material cited is described on the inside front cover of this report.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19

APPENDIX C

STAFF EVALUATION OF VERIFICATION EFFORT FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - UNIT 1 Diablo Canyon SSER 19

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 2

QUALITY ASSURANCE 3

SEISMIC DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT........

3.2 Structures.......

3.2. 1 Containment Annulus 'Structure 3.2.3 Containment Exterior Shell 3.2.4 Auxiliary Building 3.2.8 Turbine Building......

3.3 Piping and Piping Supports 3'. 1 Large-Bore Piping and Supports 3.3.2 Small-Bore Piping and Supports 3.4 Equipment and Supports 3.4.3 Electrical Equipment arid Instrumentation and Supports

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NONSEISMIC DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT...

4.2 Initial Sample 4.2.3 Instrumentation and Controls Design 4.3 Additional Verification

4. 3. 5 Jet Impingement Effects of Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment..

4.3.6 Rupture Restraints

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SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 6

REFERENCES 7

CHRONOLOGY PERTAINING TO DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 VERIFICATION EFFORTS

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C. 1-1 C. 3"1 C 3",1 C. 3"1 C. 3-2 C. 3-3 C. 3-3 C. 3"4 C. 3-4 C. 3"5 C. 3-6 C. 3-6 C. 4-1 C. 4-1 C. 4-1 C. 4-2 C. 4-2 C. 4-2 C. 5-1 C. 7-1 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C-iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Table C.8.2 Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 Incomplete Effort.....

8 LIST OF TABLES Table C.8.1 Open Items in Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18.........

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C. 8-1 C. 8-1 C. 8-4 Table C.8.3 Table C.8.4 Table C.8.5 Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 Followup Items........

Interim Technical Reports (ITRs) and Other Reports Issued by IDVP Meetings on Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Verification Effort..

C. 8-5 C. 8-7 C. 8-13 "Not addressed in SSER 19.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C-iv

1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION On August 5, 1983, the NRC staff issued SER Supplement No.

18 (SSER 18) which presented the staff evaluation of a design verification effort for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.

The basis for this effort and a description of the process of this effort are described in detail in SSER 18.

In summary, the Commission Memoran-dum and Order CLI-81-30 (November 19, 1981) suspended the authorization to load fuel and perform low power testing granted by the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Operating License No.

DPR-76 because serious weaknesses had been identified in the imple-mentation of the quality assurance programs of PGKE and its seismic, service related contractors.

The Commission Order required that. an. independent.

design verification program (IDVP) of seismic, service related contract activities (pre-1978) be completed to the satisfaction of the NRC prior to lifting the suspension.

In addition, the NRC staff issued a letter (November 19, 1981) which required an IDVP with respect to non-seismic, service related contract activities, PG8E internal design activities, and post-1978 seismic, service related contract activities, which must be satisfactorily completed prior to an NRC decision regarding a full power license.

The activities associated with

,the Commission Order and the NRC letter have become known as Phase I and Phase II of the design verification, respectively.

The Diablo Canyon Unit 1 design verification effort consists of'wo separate efforts.

One is the IDVP as discussed above.

It is conducted by organizations and individuals not associated with PG8E under the program management of Tele-dyne Engineering Services (TES)."

The other effort is the PG8E internal tech-nical program (ITP) which is performed by PG8E's Diablo Canyon Project (DCP) which is.a combined PG8E/Bechtel organization.

As stated in SSER 18, by the fall of 1982 it became evident that the earlier distinction between the pre-1978 and post-1978 effectiveness of design controls was no longer valid'nd thus the timing for completion of Phase I and Phase II activities was no longer necessary.

PG8E proposed and the Commission approved a three-step process for reinstatement of the suspended low power license and issuance of the full power license as follows:

Step 1:

.-fuel load author ization Step 2:

criticality and low power authorization Step 3:

full power license The specific activities that must be completed for each of the three steps were delineated in the PG8E submittal of December 3,

1982.

In SSER 18 the staff presented its safety evaluation of the design verification effort, both IDVP and ITP, without specifically focusing on the requirements for the three-step concept.

The staff safety evaluation of the design verification effort in SSER 18 was based on information that had been submitted by the IDVP and PG8E as of June 30, 1983.

At that time the effort had not been completed.

Further analyses and verification effort by the IDVP and the DCP (including modifications by the DCP) were still in progress.

The purpose of this supplement, SSER 19, is to Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 1-1

update the staff safety evaluation of those matters that were identified as unresolved in SSER 18 and which must be satisfactorily resolved prior to fuel load authorization, i.e.,

Step

1. It is based on information that had been provided to the staff as of October 13, 1983.

The submittals also include in-formation with respect to Step 2 and Step 3, and SSER 19 addresses some of these matters.

However, the staff has not completed its evaluation and resolution in this regard and intends to issue further SER.supplements with respect to Step 2

apd Step 3, as necessary.

A chronlogy of events and information exchanges is provided in Section 7 of this report.

Throughout SSER 18 the staff identified a number of items that require further action by the

IDVP, PG8E, or the staff.

They consist of (1) open items, (2) incomplete PG8E and IDVP effortand staff review, and (3) need for future documentation or verification.

With respect to open items, the staff identified 30 specific open items in its memorandum of September 6,

1983 to the Commission (SECY-83-366).

These items are listed in Table C.8. 1 of this supplement.

One additional item (Item 31) has since been added to the list.

As, shown in the

table, 14 items require'esolution for Step 1, 14 for Step 2,"and 3 for Step 3.

These open items are issues that were identified by the staff during its evalua-tion of the design verification effort that had been completed at that time by the IDVP.or PGSE.

They require further information, confirmation of data, addi-tional justification or bases for an analysis, or additional analyses or modifi-

cations, as appropriate.

The safety evaluation presented in SSER 18 was incomplete in a number of areas because at that time the IDVP had not completed its verification effort and the necessary ITRs, had not been issued.

Table C.8. 2 is a list of these areas in SSER 18.

Finally, there were identified in SSER 18 certain requirements for further documentation or verification.

This includes commitments by the licensee to update the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and the need for verification by the staff of certain PGRE actions:

These items are listed in Table C.8.3.

Resolution of these items is not required prior to fuel load authorization.

Since the issuance of SSER 18, PGRE, the IDVP, and,the staff, have pursued the completion of the design verification effort and the.resolution of issues iden-tified in that'upplement, in particular with respect to matters that require resolution prior to fuel load authorization.

This included an NRC meeting with PG8E and the IDVP on September 1,

1983 and a plant tour by the staff on September 6, 1983.

All meetings since June 30, 1983 are listed in'able C. 8. 5 The IDVP has since submitted all ITRs and their revisions.

They are listed in Table C.8.4.

All substantive information is provided in the ITRs.

The IDVP has updated its Final Report to incorporate that information.

The licensee has addressed the issues in SSER 18 in a number of submittals to the staff.

Certain items that require resolution prior to fuel load were discussed in an NRC meeting on September 28, 1983, with the licensee.

Much of the information has been provided to the staff after September 1983.

This supplement presents the staff review and evaluation of IDVP and PG8E infor-mation on those matters in SSER 18 that need to be resolved prior to fuel load authorization.

The staff evaluation is presented in the same section format of SSER 18 where the issues were identified.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 1-2

3 SEISMIC DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT 3.2 Structures 3.2. 1 Containment Annulus Structure S ectrum Avera in (Table C.8. 1 Item 1 - Ste

1)

In Section

3. 2. l. 6 of SSER 18 the staff evaluated the containment annulus

response, and specifically the free-hand averaging technique of spectra.

In Section 3.2. 1.6 it is stated:

"Based on the insights gained through the BNL analysis of the struc-ture as well as the review of the mathematical models, calculations, and drawings in addition to the staff field observations, the staff finds that the IDVP for the containment annulus structure was effec-tive in ensuring that, the dynamic response of the structure and attached and supported equipment will be adequately defined.

It is

noted, however, that whi"le the use of free-hand averaging of peaks and valleys in the spectra previously has been accepted by the staff, the smoothed curve should be a reasonable average but not a lower bound.

Also, its use should be limited to frequencies away from structural frequencies (peaks of the curve).

The staff review is not yet complete.

However, the staff will review the future ITRs before reaching a conclusion."

PG8E responded to the staff concern above in letters, including a letter of October 6, 1983, and in a meeting on September 28,

1983, as discussed in Sec-tion 1 of this Supplement regarding the implementation of the smoothing cri-teria of the floor response spectra in accordance with the FSAR commitment.

PG8E furnished 3 sets of floor response spectra for the annulus steel frame number 1 at nodal point ill.

One set shows the raw response spectra for 2, 3

and 7 percent equipment damping; the second set shows the smoothed response spectra for the same damping; and the third set shows the broadened response spectra for the same damping.

A comparison of curves in these three sets shows the FSAR requirements regarding spectrum smoothing have been met.

PG8E further indicated that free-hand averaging of response spectra was only applied to the frequency range below 5 Hz and that there were no equipment or piping systems with frequencies in that range.

For frequencies greater than 5 Hz, the response spectra were enveloped and broadened.

In addition, the IDVP has stated in ITR-51 Rev.

1 that the spectra smoothing and enveloping techniques used by the DCP satisfy the appropiate licensing criteria.

On the basis of its review and evaluation of the information provided, the staff considers this concern resolved.

PG8E has committed to provide additional spectra and other appro-priate information to confirm the spectra provided to date.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-1

Cutoff Fre uenc for Floor Res onse S ectra (Table C.8. 1 Item 2 - Ste 1

In Sections 3.2. 1.6 and 3.2. 1.7 of SSER 18 the staff evaluation of the DCP verification expressed a concern about the use of 20 Hz as the frequency where structural members were considered rigid in the Hosgri event.

The SSER stated:

"It is noted, however, that a frequency of 20 Hz should not be con-sidered as a frequency in the rigid range without verification.

The

, Newmark Hosgri spectra approach ZPA at 33 Hz. It is the staff's position that the use of the 20-Hz cutoff frequency for generation of floor response spectra should be verified and/or justified."

The Diablo Canyon Project responded to the staff concern above in letters, including a letter of October 12,

1983, and in the meeting with the staff on September 28, 1983.

Based on the staff review and evaluation of the informa-tion provided the staff considers this concern resolved.

PG8E has committed to provide additional analyses to confirm the results provided to date.

3.2.3 Containment Exterior Shell A

licabilit of AISC Code vs ASME Code Table C. 8. 1 Item 3 - Ste 1

1 In Section 3.2.3.4 of SSER 18 the staff questioned the use of the AISC Code instead of Section III of the ASME Code.

SSER 18 stated:

h "It.is noted, however, that instead of the AISC Code used by the DCP, the design code for containment penetrations accepted in the original licensing documents wasSection III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as indicated in Table 3.2-4 of the FSAR."

PG8E responded and addressed this concern by letters and in a meeting as discussed in Section 1.

PG8E stated that the containment penetrations were initially qualified to the AISC Code.

The evaluation of 'the penetrations based on the ASME Code were in prepar ation at the time of the SSER 18 information cutoff date, of June 30, 1983.

The PG8E response states the penetrations have now been shown to meet the requirements of both the AISC and ASME Codes.

Therefore, since the licensing commitments. have been satisfied, the staff considers this item resolved.

Yieldin of Steel Plates at 0 enin s in Containment Table C.8. 1 Item 4 - Ste 1

In Section 3.2.3.4 of SSER 18 the staff evaluation of the DCP reverification expressed a concern about the stress levels in the reinforcing plate around the equipment hatch.

SSER 18 stated:

"In addition, the IDVP should evaluate the justification for the local yielding of the steel plates around the opening."

The equipment hatch opening is surrounded by a hexagonal plate that is used to terminate the reinforcing steel in the containment shell where it is 'discon-tinuous due to the equipment hatch opening.

The plate is near the outside of Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-2

the wall and is not connected to the steel liner sleeve of the hatch. nor to the closure plate anchorage steel.

PG8E responded to this concern by letters and in a meeting as discussed in Section 1.

This response indicated that the yielding was local in nature and permitted by the provisions of the ASME Code.

In the meeting PG8E stated that the yield stress exceedance existed in only one element of the plate finite element model.

This stress level was in the range of 10 percent exceedance of the actual material yield strength.

ITR-54 Rev.

1 indicates the computed stress was 3 percent over the ASME allowable.

The staff considers the plate acceptable based on the code provisions which allow for exceeding yield, the limited extent of the area where yield stress is exceeded and only one load combination equation is involved.

This concern is resolved.

3.2.4 Auxiliary Building Soil S rin Influence on Seismic Res onse Table C.8.1 Item 7 - Ste j.

In Section

3. 2.4. 4 of SSER 18 the staff evaluation of the DCP reverification expressed a concern over the difference between the IDVP calculated values for the soil springs for the auxiliary building at elevation 100 feet and-the values calculated by, the DCP.

SSER 18 stated:

"The discrepancy between, the IDVP and the DCP sensitivity study of the soil spring influence on the seismic response should be reconciled.

Also the values of the soil properties should be resolved."

I PGLE responded by letters and addressed the concern in a meeting with the staff as discussed in Section 1.

The response indicated that sensitivity studies were done by the DCP and the effects on the structure of variations in the soil springs are not significant.

The DCP used soil properties based on soil infor-mation that was not available at that time to the IDVP for the soil spring calculation.

This information was made available to the IDVP for its use.

The IDVP addressed the staff concern in a letter dated September 27, 1983.

The IDVP has reviewed the DCP study and accepted the results.

ITR-55 Rev.

1 pro-vides more detailed information on the range of values the DCP considered and the effects on the response of the structure to these variations.

It has been shown that the effects of large variations in the soil springs resulted in very small changes in the response of the structure.

The staff finds acceptable the values used by the'CP as verified by the IDVP and considers the soil spring discrepancy resolved.

3.2.8 Turbine Building Load Combination Criteria (Table C.8. 1 Item 10 - Ste 1

In Section 3.2.8.4 of SSER 18 the staff evaluation of the DCP verification expressed.

a concern over the load combination equation used to determine the force and capacity shown in Table 2. 1.4-13 of the PG&E Phase I Final Report.

The staff concern was that the other loads required by the load combination equations were not considered in the evaluation of the members.

SSER 18 stated:

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C.3-3

"Although the design, criteria stipulate that the strength require-ment for the structural members is based on combined dead, live, and earthquake

forces, the summary tables showing the member forces do not indicate clearly such combination.

If the member forces are due to earthquake

alone, then a discrepancy exists."

PG8E responded to the staff concern in letters and addressed the concern in a meeting as discussed in Section 1.

The response stated that the design forces given in Table 2. 1.4-13 of the Phase I Final Report included the loading com-binations given in the design criteria, and the members were evaluated for a combination of dead, live, and earthquake forces.

The staff considers the con-cerns resolved.

3.3 Piping and Piping Supports 3.3. 1 Large-Bore Piping and Supports Lar e-Bore Pi in Su ort Anal sis Verification Table C.8. 1 Item 16 - Ste 1)

The staff stated in Section 3.3. 1.4 of SSER 18 that Table 2.2. 1-3 did not report the maximum stress or load ratios for the large bore piping supports and that this was considered a deficiency.

PGLE addressed this deficiency in letters and in a meeting as discussed in Section 1.

The response stated that due to the considerable number of supports per piping system and the large number of Design Class I piping systems it would be practical to provide the requested information for all supports.

The Diablo Canyon Project (DCP), however, pro-vided the support stress ratio summary for two small piping systems, which showed that all stress ratios for these supports and their components were less than 1.0, the highest being.99 in an anchor bolt.

In addition, the DCP also provided a computerized status of the DCP review to the IDVP for their review and verification.

The IDVP reported the completed verification of the DCP corrective actions on large bore pipe supports in ITR-60, Rev. 1, "Large and

- Small Bore Pipe Supports."

The IDVP stated that the methodology used by the'CP adequately addressed the scope of large bore supports hn the plant.

The IDVP verified on a sample basis that all licensing criteria were met and con-cluded that the large bore piping supports were designed in conformity with applicable licensing requirements.

The staff has reviewed the response by the DCP and the.IDVP verification effort.reported in ITR-60, Rev.

1, and finds these acceptable.

This issue is therefore considered resolved.

Bucklin Criteria for Linear Su orts Table C.8. 1 Item 17 - Ste 1

The staff recommended in Section 3.3. 1.4 of SSER 18 that the IDVP should eval-uate and justify the buckl'ing criterion specified for linear supports, specifi-cally the use of the Euler buckling equation for calculating the critical buck-ling load for all slenderness ratios.

The IDVP stated that it is outside its scope to evaluate these criteria.

However, the IDVP-also questioned the use of the Euler equation without regard to the slenderness ratio on the IDVP Final

Report, 10th submittal.

The DCP responded to the staff concern in letters, including a letter of October 6, 1983,'nd in the meeting on September 28, 1983.

The DCP has,stated, and the IDVP has verified, that the buckling criterion in the Diablo Canyon.Design Control Manual (DCM) M-9 was supplemented with an addi-tional buckling criterion.

This criterion was reviewed by the staff and found Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-4

unacceptable.

The staff has proposed an alternate supplementary buckling cri-terion.

The DCP has also submitted the results of a study of 24 typical cases of standard components with small slenderness ratios.

The results of this study indicate that the compressive loads in these members are considerably lower than the buckling values determined according to the staff criterion.

Based on the staff review and evaluation of the information provided the staff considers this concern resolved.

The licensee has committed to provide addi-tional analyses and information to confirm the results provided to date.

Anal sis of Pi in S stems with Revised Su orts and Curent Loadin s

(Table C.8.1 Item 18 Ste 1

The staff stated in Section 3.3. 1.4 of SSER 18 that selected piping systems analyzed previously by the IDVP and reported in ITR-12 Rev.

0, "Piping," and ITR-17 Rev. 0, "Piping - Additional Samples,"

be reanalyzed independently with revised support configuration and current loadings to verify that piping and supports satisfy corresponding design criteria.

This reanalysis should include a case where the thermal loads govern the acceptance of the analysis.

" The DCP responded to the staff concern in letters, including a letter dated October 6,

1983, and in the meeting on September 28, 1983.

The DCP has stated that the IDVP has reviewed and verified the DCP Corrective Action Program for large bore piping.

The IDVP review was reported in ITR-59, Rev.

1, "Large Bore Piping,"

which provided assurance, through comprehensive reviews of DCP procedures and sample'nalyses, that all previous concerns as identified in ITR-12 and ITR-17 were incorporated into the DCP Corrective Action Program, and that the large bore piping analyses met the licensing criteria.

The IDVP review sample included the piping systems previously reviewed in ITR-12 and ITR-17.

The staff reviewed ITR-59, Rev.

1, and found it acceptable.

However, since the IDVP included the same problems which had previously been"analyzed, the staff selected different piping problems, which have not been reviewed by the IDVP.

Two piping problems were selected, which the staff considers adequate to pro-vide final confirmation of the piping design process.

Based on the results provided to date and the fact that no significant plant modifications are likely to be required, the staff finds the DCP commitment acceptable and considers this issue resolved for fuel loading.

I 1

3.3.2 Small-Bore Piping and Supports Sco e of Small-Bore Pi in (Table C.8. 1 Item 19 - Ste 1

The staff indicated in Section 3.3.2.4 of SSER 18 that additional clarifica-tion was needed to determine the actual extent of the DCP review of small bore piping.

In letters and in the meeting on September 28, 1983 as discussed in Section 1 the DCP has provided this clarification and stated that all small bore piping was reviewed and requalified for conformance with the original design criteria, on a sample basis.

However, all small bore piping was also reviewed and reanalyzed as necessary for certain design considerations as described in the DCP Phase I Final Report.

This review program resulted in review and reanalysis of approximately 63.percent of the piping and 75 percent of the supports.

The staff'finds the DCP response accepable and considers this issue resolved.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-5

3.4 Equipment and Support 3.4.3 Electrical Equipment and Instrumentation and Supports ualification of Cable Tra s (Table C.8. 1 Item 23 - Ste 1)

In Section

3. 4. 3. 4 of SSER 18 the staff evaluation of the DCP verification expressed a concern over the qualification of the cable tray system.

The staff's concern was that the trays and supports were analyzed separately and not as a system and the trays themselves did not appear to be qualified.

SSER 18 stated:

"The report, as filed, does not address the qualifications of the cable trays themselves or how the flexibilityof the cable trays interact with the supports.

This subject should be addressed."

PG8E responded to the staff concern by letter and addressed the concern in a meeting, as discussed in Section 1.

The response stated the cable trays them-selves were qualified for the DDE and Hosgri events generically.

Where the trays could not be qualified generally, then the as-built condition was analyzed.

A field walkdown was carried out to determine the as-built conditions.

The supports were evaluated using two separate, analyses.

The first analysis was based on the support itself and using the tributary weights of the cable trays.

The approved criteria damping value of 7 percent was used to determine the acceleration values used in the analysis.

The second analysis used a

coupled system and response was -determined using 15 percent damping.

The 15 percent damping was based on a series of tests conducted by Bechtel several years ago.

The staff does not accept the 15 percent damping and the results of this test for the Diablo Canyon Plant.

The test results have been accepted for other plants but with very stringent restrictions.

The original licensing basis for the cable trays,was,the first analysis.

PGKE considers the second analysis to be confirmatory and not a basis for the license.

In ITR-63 Rev.

1, "HVAC Ducts, Electrical

Raceways, Instrument Tubing and Associated Supports,"

the IDVP has evaluated the cable tray and support system qualification and found it to be acceptable.

The staff considers the concern resolved based on the DCP qualification of the trays and supports to the original licensing criteria.

I ualification of Su erstrut Welds Table C.8.1 Item 24 - Ste 1)

In Section 3.4.3.4 of the SSER 18, the staff evaluation of the DCP verification expressed a concern over the incorporation of the allowable shear values for spot welds in the tray support members determined from testing of field samples:

SSER

-18 stated:,

"In addition, the DCP in a separate effort established through test-ing of field samples the allowable limits for welds used in super-strut construction.

These limits should be used in the qualification of the cable, trays, supported by superstrut material."

PG8E responded by letters and addressed this concern in a meeting as discussed in Section l.

The response stated that the DCP determined the 35 support Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-6

types out of 420 support types that had the lowest margin of safety (less than 1.1) in flexure.

The DCP selected an additional 13 types that were judged to be susceptible to direct shear in the spot welds.'ased on these analyses using the allowable weld values determined from the tests the lowest margin of safety of shear in the spot welds was 1.27.

Based on the information provided, the staff finds the results of the analysis acceptable and considers the concern resolved.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 3-7

4 NONSEISMIC DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT

4. 2 Initial Sample 4.2.3 Instrumentation and Control Design Classification of Valves FCV-37 and FCV-38 (Table C.8. 1 Item 27 - Ste 1

In Section 4.2.3. 1 of SSER 18, the staff evaluated the IDVP review of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system as addressed in the IDVP Final Report and in Interim Technical, Report 27, Rev.

1.

As noted in SSER 18, the staff requires that the valve operators and control circuits for the isolation valves (FCV-37 8

FCV-38), which provide the steam supply to the turbine-driven'FM pump, to 'be classified by PG8E as safety-related.

This is consistent with the Diablo Canyon FSAR commitment to General Design Criterion GDC 57 for these valves.

The classification of these valves were the subject of the IDVP EOI File 8018.

By letter dated August 10, 1983, the, licensee noted that the subject valves were procured and installed as Class lE components and the valve operators have been reclassified as Instrument Class 1A (safety-related).

This change in the instrument classification for the, valve operators involves revising appropriate documentation and qualification files to reflect this change and confirming that the related reviews are not affected.

Further, by letter dated October 6,

1983, the licensee noted that the control circuits for the valves are

'now classified as safety-related.

Based on this action, the staff considers this matter closed.

Sin le Rela Used to Terminate Steam Generator Blowdown Table C.8. 1 Item 28 - Ste 3

In Section 4.2.3. 1 of SSER 18, the staff evaluated the IDVP review of the use of a single, nonsafety-related relay used to terminate steam generator blow-down on starting of an AFW pump."

The IDVP had identified this aspect of the design as a potential concern with regard to the capability of the AFW system to satisfy the minimum design flow requirements for events which may not result in a safety injection signal.

This concern was identified in EOI File 8047 and was addressed in ITR 27.

The staff concurred with the conclusions of the IDVP that the AFW system satisfied the minimum design flow requirement without-reliance on termination of steam generator blowdown.

However, the use of a single nonsafety grade relay was not consistent with the design described on FSAR Figure 7. 1-2, Sheet 15.

The staff noted that this,was a matter it would pursue with the licensee.

By letters dated September 9,

and October 6, 1983, the licensee committed to install a redundant relay consistent with the logic as shown on Sheet 15 of FSAR Figure 7.2-1 and to classify the circuits used to terminate steam gener-ator blow'down on start of, an AFW pump as safety-related.

These actions are to be completed prior to full power operation.

In addition, in the review of this matter the staff had identified other areas of the FSAR in -which incon-sistencies existed.

By letter dated October 6, 1983, the licensee provided a

commitment to correct the identified inconsistencies in the FSAR in the next Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 4-1

FSAR update.

The staff finds that the licensee's commitments to modify and

. reclassify as safety-related the steam generator blowdown circuits, as noted

above, resolve the conflict between the existing design and the logic shown on FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 15.

Further, the licensee's commitment to complete these modifications prior to full power operation is acceptable since they do not involve protection which is essential to plant safety nor would they have any safety significance during low power testing.

Finally, the licensee's commitment to correct the discrepancies in the FSAR which were identified during this review, is acceptable since in no instance were any problems found that were contrary to any licensing criteria or requirements.

Therefore, based on these actions, the staff considers this matter closed.

4.3 Additional Verfication 4.3.5 Jet Impingement Effects on Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment e

Jet Im in ement Loads on Pi in Inside Containment Table C.8. 1 Item 29-

~Ste 2

The staff stated in Section 4.3.5.3 of SSER 18 that the DCP had not as yet demonstrated nor had the IDVP verified, that possible jet impingement loads were considered in the design and qualification of all safety-related piping and equipment inside containment.

The IDVP reported the results of its verifi-cation in ITR-48, Rev.

0, "Additional Verification of Jet Impingement Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture Inside Containment."

The report provides a descrip-tion of the work done, summary and evaluation of the results, and conclusions of the IDVP with respect to the concern of the jet impingement effects inside containment.

The DCP responded to the staff concern by letters, including a letter of October 12,

1983, and in the meeting on September 28, 1983 'ased on the review and evaluation of the information provided the staff concludes that the licensing commitment in the FSAR regarding the consideration of jet impinge-ment loads have been met and therefore this concern is resolved with respect to fuel load considerations.

The staff will continue its evaluation to assure that the licensee has given appropriate considerations to the more stringent current requirements.

The staff will complete this effort prior to full power authorization.

The staff does not consider it likely that significant modifi-cations are likely to be required.

4.3.6 Rupture Restraints Ru ture Restraints Inside and Outside Containment Table C.8. 1 Item 30 - Ste 1

The staff reported in Section

4. 3. 6. 2 of SSER 18 that the DCP had not as yet satisfactorily reviewed, nor the IDVP verified, that the rupture restraints outside and inside containment were properly designed and installed to provide protection against postulated ruptures in high pressure piping.

The DCP re-sponded to this concern by letters',

including a letter of October ll, 1983, and in the meeting on September 28, 1983.

The DCP response stated that rupture restraints, both inside and outside containment, were evaluated and their acceptability verified by utilizing a common review program.

This applies to all restraints except those which use crushable energy absorbing materials, and which are located inside containment only.

Except for these crushable

, bumpers, restraint configurations and design principles used outside contain-ment include all those inside containment.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 4-2

The IDVP verification of rupture restraints was reported in ITR-65, Rev.

1, "Rupture Restraints."

However, this report addresses restraints outside containment only.

The IDVP review did not include any restraints inside containment because of a potential conflict of interest by the IDVP, in that a

member of the IOVP had previously reviewed some of these restraints in his capacity as a consultant to PG&E.

The IDVP review consisted of examining the DCP qualification of rupture restraint designs outside containment for pipe rupture loading.

It also included field inspection on a sample basis to ensure conformance of design drawings to as-built conditions, and a verification that the OCP methodology and criteria satisfy the licensing requirements.

Based on the verification of the OCP corrective action program, the IDVP concluded that there is reasonable assurance that rupture restraints outside containment were designed in conformity with PG8E licensing criteria and are, therefore, accept-able.

This IDVP conclusion is based on the assumption that the final phase of OCP rupture restraint review will be completed correctly.

This final phase consists of determining and setting the final cold and hot gaps between the rupture restraints and the pipes during startup.

Although the IDVP did not verify the design and installation of rupture restraints inside containment, the staff considers these designs acceptable, except for crushable

bumpers, since these restraints were evaluated under a

common review program by the DCP and the same methodology and design criteria were applied to the restraints inside and outside containment.

The staff has received additional information regarding the DCP design of the crushable bumpers.

The DCP stated that these restraints were designed based on criteria documented in DCP Design Criteria Memorandum DCM-64, "Design of Rupture Restraints Inside Containment."

These criteria are based on results of tests which were performed in 1977.

These tests results and calculation were stated to be available in the DCP files.

The final design of these bumpers have been verified against new piping loads, but some modifications may be necessary to accommodate piping hot movements during startup.

The design of these crushable bumpers will be audited by the staff prior to criticality/low power (Step 2).

Based on the staff review and evaluation of the information provided the staff considers this concern resolved.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 4-3

l

5

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS The purpose of SSER 19 is to present the staff safety evaluation of those con-cerns in SSER 18 that must be satisfactorily resolved prior to the commencement of fuel load operations at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 (i.e.,

Step 1 of the three-step process)

~

In Section 1 of this supplement, the staff concerns in SSER 18 have been categorized, in three groups:

(1)

Open Items (Table C.8.1)

(2)

Incomplete Efforts (Tab 1 e C. 8. 2)

(3)

Followup Items (Table C.8.3)

The IDVP and the Diablo Canyon Project of PGLE have provided extensive addi-tional information after the June 30, 1983 information cutoff date regarding their continuing efforts and have responded to the staff's concerns, in partic-ular with respect to fuel load items.

The IDVP has submitted all Interim Technical Reports (ITRs) and their revisions.

The IDVP also submitted the last installment to its Final Report, including an Executive Summary.

PG&E has responded in a number of letter s to most of the staff concerns in SSER 18, in particular those that relate to fuel load requirements.

In addition, PG8E has provided information that updates the Phase I and, Phase II Final Reports.

Much of the information from PG8E and the IDVP was submitted to the staff during the two weeks prior to the issuance of this supplement.

The staff has concentrated its efforts on those matters that relate to fuel load.

The staff is continuing its review and evaluation of all other matters and will provide the results in a future supplement.

As stated in Section 1, the staff requires that 14 of the Open Items in Table C.8. 1 be satisfactorily resolved prior to fuel load (Step 1).

During the course of the review the staff determined that Item 29 - Jet Impingement Loads, also be resolved at Step l.

In its review the staff relied on infor-mation provided by PG8E, and on selected information provided in the IDVP Interim Technical Reports.

The staff has not completed its evaluation of all matters covered in these ITRs and will present its conclusions in a future supplement with respect to all incomplete efforts listed in Table C.8.2.

As stated in Section 1, the followup activities listed in Table C.8.3 need not be accomplished prior to fuel load.

Based on the review and evaluation of the information provided the staff con-siders that the'concerns expressed in all 15 Open Items that are required to be resolved prior to the commencement of fuel load operations have satisfactorily been resolved.

PG8E has committed to provide additional analyses and informa-tion to confirm the results provided to date for three Open Items (1, 2 and 17);

the requirement for complete resolution has been changed for two Open Items (18 and 29) and one Open Item (30) requires a staff audit.

A complete listing of all fuel load Open Items is presented below.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 5-1

Ste 1 0 en Items Table C.8. 1) 1.

Spectrum averaging for containment annulus Status resolved; confirma-tion required 2.

20 Hz cutoff frequency for floor response spectra resolved; confirma-tion required 3.

Code for containment penetrations 4.

Yielding of steel plates at opening in containment 7.

Soil spring influence on seismic response 10.

Load combinations for turbine building 16.

Large-bore piping support analysis 17.

Buckling criteria for linear supports resolved resolved resolved resolved resolved t

resolved; confirma-

.,tion required 18.

Analysis of piping systems as modififed 19.

C Scope oCP small-bore piping review 23.

qualification of cable trays 24.

Allowable limits for welds in superstrut 27.

Control circuits safety classification

• 29.

Jet impingement loads resolved; completion at Step 3

resolved resolved resolved resolved resolved; completion at Step 3

30.

Rupture restraint design and installation resolved; audit required "Item not listed in Table C.8. 1.

The staff believes that all matters required for, fuel loading have been acceptably resolved.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 5-2

7 CHRONOLOGY PERTAINING TO DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 VERIFICATION EFFORTS I

SSER 18 provided a choronology for the Diablo Canyon Unit verification efforts from September 22, 1981 through June 30, 1983.

The following is the contin-uation of the chronology:

July 1, 1983 July 1, 1983 July 1, 1983 July 1, 1983 July 5, 1983-July 5, 1983 July 6, 1983 July 7, 1983 July 8, 1983 July 8, 1983 July 8, 1983 July 8, 1983 July 8, 1983 July 14, 1983 Letter from licens'ee transmitting "Final Report on Evaluation of Spot-Welded Materials Used in Support Systems for Electrical Conduit 8 Cable Trays at Diablo Canyon Power Plant."

Board Notification 83-91 transmitting Teledyne June 24th letter and Stone

& Webster June 24th letter.

Letter from licensee advising that 'fuel building modifications are complete.

Letter from licensee regarding, anonymous allegations discussed in letter from D. Fleischaker dated March 28, 1983.

Memo to Commission, Status of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Design Verification Program.

Letter to Teledyne requesting assessment of circumstances reported-in June 23rd letter from J.

Reynolds.

Meeting with licensee to discusse seismic analysis of buried tanks.

Board Notification 83-92 transmitting Teledyne June 28th and June 30th letters.

j Letter from Stone 8 Webster advising of no open item reports for July semimonthly report.

Letter from Teledyne regarding J.

Reynolds June 23rd letter and NRC July 5th letter.

Letter from licensee transmitting 41st semimonthly status report.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting Open Item reports.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting semimonthly report.

Board Notification 83-98 transmitting trip report for May 12th meeting and transcript of July 6th meeting.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-1

July 14, 1983 July 15, 1983 July 15, 1983 July 22, 1983 July 22, 1983 July,.22, 1983 July 22, 1983 July 26, 1983 July 26, 1983 July 26, 1983 July 27, 1983 July 27, 1983 July 28, 1983 July 28, 1983 July 29, 1983 July 29, 1983 August 1, 1983 August 2, 1983 Letter from licensee advising that Joint'ntervenors'tatements regarding IDVP independence are incorrect.

Letter from Commission Office of the Secretary providing schedule for remainder 'of Commission r'eview.

1 Letter from Teledyne transmitting'Errata Package No.

3 and schedule for IDVP Final Report.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting semimonthly status report.

Letter fom licensee'transmitting 42nd semimonthly status report.

Letter from Teledyne forwarding list of effective pages and "Table of Contents" for Final Report.

Letter from Teledyne trarismitting ITR 50, Rev 0.

Board Notification 83-103 transmitting R.

L. Cloud July 8th letter, Teledyne July 8th letter, and -Stone 8

Webster July 8th letter.

Letter from Teledyne regarding review of IDVP resolution to EOI File 8018 and 8047 (flow control valves and non-safety relay device).

Letter from licensee providing additional information on containment spray timing.

Letter from'tone

& Webster transmitting ITR 20, Rev 2; ITR 22, Rev 2; and ITR 27, Rev 2.

Letter from licensee transmitting information on classification of instrumentation and control for containment isolation valves.

Letter from Stone 8 Webster transmitting ITR 14, Rev 2, and ITR 28, Rev 2.

Board Notification 83-77A - Allegation Concerning Release of an NRC Draft Report.

Letter from Stone 8 Webster transmitting ITR 48, Rev 0.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting Errata Package No.

4 of IDVP Final Report.

Letter from licensee regarding pending submittal on buried diesel fuel oil tanks.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 57, Rev.

0.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C.7-2

August 5, 1983 Board Notification 83-113 transmitting Teledyne July 25 letter.

August 5, 1983 August 5, 1983 August 9, 1983 August 10, 1983 August 10, 1983 August 10, 1983 August 10, 1983 August 12, 1983 August 12, 1983 August 12, 1983 August 15, 1983 August 16, 1983 August 18, 1983 August 19, 1983 August 19, 1983 August 19, 1983 Issuance of Supplement 18 to SER.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 31, Rev. l.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 58, Rev 0.

Letter from licensee transmitting "Operational Readiness,"

concerning actions taken or to be taken to be ready for fuel loading and, low power testing.

Letter from licensee in response to concerns discussed in SER Supplement 18 concerning classification of instrumentation for auxiliary feedwater turbine shutoff valves.

Letter from Joel Reynolds regarding independence of IDVP.

t Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting Open Item Reports

1138, 1139,

1140, 1141 and 1142.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting 2nd Friday semimonthly repor t.

Letter from 1 icensee transmi tting 43rd semimonthly status report.

1 Letter from Stone 8 Webster, reporting for August semi-monthly report no Open Item reports.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 66, Rev 0.

Board Noti,fication 83-120 transmitting Teledyne letters of July 22nd (3 letters),

Stone

& Webster letters of July 27th (2 letters) and July 28th, Teledyne letter of July 29th and Stone 8 Webster letter of July 29th.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 60, Rev 0.

Letter from licensee transmitting Harding 8

Lawson Associates

report, "Geotechni,cal

Studies, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks."

Letter from R.

L. Cloud,transmitting report ITR 59, Rev 0.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting 8th Text Submittal of IDYP Final Report.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-3

August 19, 1983 Letter fr'om licensee transmitting proposed changes to post-fuel loading initial test program.

August 22, 1983 August 23, 1983 August 23, 1983 August 23, 1983 August 25, 1983 August 26, 1983 August 26, 1983 August 26, 1983 August 29, 1983 August 30, 1983 August 30, 1983 August 31, 1983 September 1,

1983 September 2,

1983 September 2,

1983 Letter from Teledyne transmitting Errata Package No.

5 for IDVP.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting repor t ITR 63, Rev.

0.

Board Notification 83-124 -

NRC Region V Inspection Report 50-275/83-26 relating to apparent less than minimum piping wall thickness.

Letter from licensee requesting exemption from require-ments of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(3)(i) until after completion of design verification program.

Letter to licensee transmitting SER Supplement No.

16.

Board Notification 83-130 - transmitting R.

L. Cloud letters of August 10th, August 19th, August 18th, August 15th, Stone 8 Webster letter of August 12th, Teledyne letters of August 12th, August 19th, and August 22th.

Letter from licensee transmitting 44th semimonthly status report.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting semimonthly status report for August.

Board Notification 83-127 transmitting R.

L. Cloud letters of August 5th, August 2th, August 9th, and August 10th and J.

P.

Knight memo of August 8th regarding Brookhaven report on buried diesel fuel oil tank seismic analysis.

Letter from Teledyne discussing soil springs for auxiliary building model.

Letter from-licensee transmittin'g response to unresolved items in SER Supplement 18.

L'etter from licensee regarding status of compliance with certain license conditions.

Letter from J.

Reynolds commenting on IDVP Final Report and SER Supplement No.

18.

Letter to licensee requesting review of draft working paper regarding gA case studies.

Letter from Teledyne transmjtting ITR 51, Rev.

0.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-4

September 2,

1983 September 2, 1983" September 6,

1983 September 6,

1983 September 6, 1983 September 6,

1983 September 8,

1983 September 8,

1983 September 9, 1983 September 9,

1983 September 9,

1983 September 9,

1983 September 9,

1983 September 9,

1983 September 9,

1983 September 10, 1983 Letter to NRC Office of the Secretary from State of California Attorney General regarding verification program.

,4 Board Notification 83-135 - Diablo Canyon Quality Assurance Case Study.

Letter from licensee regarding unresolved item in SER Supplement 18.

Board Notification 83-134 advising of issuance of Supplement No.

16 to SER.

Board Notification 83-136 transmitting R.

L. Cloud August 23rd letter and Teledyne August 26th letter.

Plant tour to view modifications made as a result of the verification program.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 55, Rev.

0.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 57, Rev.

1.

Letter to licensee transmitting'ederal Re ister reprint for Sholly notices reported in August monthly report.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting Open Item reports 1143 and 1144, Rev.

0.

Letter from licensee transmitting 45th semimonthly status report.

%I Letter from licensee providing requested information concerning seismic design of diesel generator intake/

exhaust piping, silencers and filters.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting second Friday semi-monthly report.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting 9th text submittal of IDVP Final Report.

Letter from licensee regarding unresolved items identified in SER Supplement 18.

Letter from licensee regarding"'post-fuel loading modifi-cations.

September 12, 1983 September 13, 1983 Letter from NRC Office of Secretary regarding changes in

-meeting scheduled. for September 13, 1983.

'etter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 67, Rev.

1.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-5

September 14, 1983 September 14, 1983 September 15, 1983 September 15, 1983 September 15, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 54, Rev., 0.

Letter from Eattel le transmitting "Independent Calculation for the Diablo Canyon Project of the Temperature and Pressure Distribution Resulting from a Split Break Located in Area GE/GW of the Auxiliary Building."

Letter from D.

ST Fleischaker to Commission requesting that meeting be held in California to hear views of parties on reinstatement of low power test license.

Letter from D.

S. Fleischaker regarding role of Joint Intervenor's role as intermediary between NRC staff and author of eight allegations.

Board Notification 83-143 transmitting October 1 meet-ing transcript, Cloud letters of October 2nd, October 8th (two letters),

and October 9th, and Teledyne letter of October 9th.

September 19, 1983 Letter to J.

R.

Reynolds in response to August 10th letter regarding independence of IDVP.

September 19, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 65, Rev.

0.

September 20, 1983 September 21, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 56, Rev.

0.

Board Notification 83-145 transmitting Teledyne letter of October 9th and R.

L. Cloud letters of October 13th and October 14th.

September 21, 1983 September 22, 1983 September 23, 1983 September 23, 1983 Letter from licensee transmitting comments on draft working paper on gA.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 68, Rev.

0.

Letter from.Teledyne transmitting September semimonthly status report.

Letter from Teledyne transmitting. errata page for ITR 51, Rev.

1.

September 23, 1983 September 26, 1983 September 26, 1983 September 27, 1983 Letter from licensee, transmitting 46th semimonthly status report.

Board Notification 83-148 Diablo Canyon gA Case Study.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting ITR 59, Rev. l.

Letter from licensee requesting license restoration at earliest possible time.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-6

September 27, 1983 Letter from Teledyne providing first IDVP response to SER Supplement 18 open times; September 28, 1983 l

September 30, 1983 Letter from State of California" Attorney General trans-mitting information received by R.

B. Hubbard from anonymous source regarding electrical construction work.

Letter from NRC Office of the Secretary advising of October 28th meeting to receive comments from utility, Joint Intervenors and Governor of California regarding IDVP completion and NRC analysis and recommendation to reinstate license.

September 30, 1983 October 1, 1983 Board Notification transmitting Teledyne letters of September

21st, 23rd, and 25th and R.

L. Cloud letters of September 14th, 19th,'20th, and 22nd, 1983.

Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 58, Rev.

1.

October 1, 1983 October 2, 1983 Letter for R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 55.

Letter from -R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 61 Rev. 1.

October'2, 1983 Letter fr'om R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 63, Rev. l.

October 4, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 54, Rev. l.

October 4, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 60, Rev. l.

October 4, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud forwarding diagram of for'ces 8

stresses at OWST foundation.

October 5, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR 68, Rev.

1.

October 6, 1983 October 6, 1983 October 6, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding unresolved Item 28 in SER Supplement 18.

Letter from licensee regarding Diablo Canyon Unit 2 design review.

Letter from licensee regarding unresolved items in SER Supplement 18.

October 7, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding unresolved item on flow control valves in SER Supplement 18.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C.7-7

October 7, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding superstrut raceway supports.

October 7, 1983 October 10, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding Generic Letter 83-28 (reactor trip breakers).

Letter from Teledyne transmitting IDVP Final Report 10th Submittal.

October 10, 1983 Letter from Teledyne transmitting IDVP Executive Summary.

October ll, 1983 Letter from R.

L. Cloud transmitting report ITR-65, Rev.

1.

October ll, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding unresolved Item 30 in SER Supplement 18.

October ll, 1983 Letter from licensee transmitting update information on PG8E Phase I and Phase II Final Reports.

October ll, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding additional information on turbine building tornado loads.

October 12, 1983 October 12, 1983 October 12, 1983 Letter from licensee regarding operational readiness with respect to containment integrity.

Letter from licensee regarding Item 29 in SER Supplement 18.

Letter from licensee regarding Item 2 in SER Supplement 18.

Diablco Canyon SSER 19 C. 7-8

8 TABLES Table C.8.1 Open Items in Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 The following open items had been identified in SSER 18.

Page refer-ence and resolution requirement are listed in parentheses.

1.

2.

3.

4 5.

6.

10.

11.

Free"hand averaging of spectra for containment annulus structure should be in accordance with staff ap'proved technique.

(C.3-9; Step 1)

Cutoff frequency of 20 Hz for generation of floor response spectra in containment annulus structure should be justified.

(C.3-9; Step 1)

Use of AISC Code for design of containment penetrations should be justified.

(C.3-17; Step 1)

Local yielding of steel plates around opening in containment should be justified.

(C.3-17; Step 1)

Assumptions in model for auxiliary building floor slab quali-fication regarding rigidity/flexibilityshould be clarified and justified, including documentation of parametric studies.

(C.3-22; Step 2)

Use of different versions of ACI code in FSAR and in design verification effort of auxiliary building should be justified.

(C.3-22; Step 2)

Discrepancy between IDVP and DCP sensitivity of soil spring influence on seismic response of auxiliary building should be reconciled, including resolution of soil properties and docu-mentation of parametric studies.

(CD 3-22; Step 1)

I Use of translational and torsional response of auxiliary build-ing as input to base of fuel handling building should be docu-

mented, including parametric studies.

(C.3-26; Step 2)

Selection of set of degrees of freedom in dynamic model for fuel handling building should be justified.

'(C.3-26; Step 2)

Load combinations in analysis of turbine building should be clarified.

(C.3-36; Step 1)

Modeling of roof trusses in turbine building should be clarified and justified.

(C.3-36; Step 3)

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-1

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20 Effect of one continuous exterior wall in analysis of turbine building should be evaluated.

(C. 3-37; Step 2)

Differences in turbine building modeling of steel frame and roof truss for two vertical models should be clarified.

(C.3-37; Step 3)

The use of alternative procedures for model combinations by SRSS method should be explained and clarified.

(C.3-37; Step 2)

Use of increased allowable stresses in accordance with AISC Code 8th Edition should be justified,with respect to criteria delineated in FSAR.

(C.3-37; Step 2)

Results of analysis of large bore piping supports should be verified.

(C.3-48; Step 1).

Buckling criteria for linear supports, specifically the Euler buckling equation for calculating critical buckling loads for all slenderness

ratios, should be evaluated and justified.

(C.3-48; Step 1)

Calculations for selected piping systems analyzed previously in ITR 12 and ITR 17 should be repeated with revised support con-figurations and current loadings to verify that piping and supports satisfy corresponding desing criteria.

Results of piping system reevaluation with high thermal load should be verified.

(C.3-48; Step 1)

The scope of the DCP small bore piping review should be clarified.

(C.3-57; Step 1)

All equipment listed in Table 2.3.1-1 of DCP Phase I Final Report should be seismically qualified for nozzle loads and component configurations should be verified.

(C. 3-59 and C.3-70; Step 2) 21.

Stresses in extreme fibers at inter face between valve nozzle and pipe should be evaluated and results be documented.

(C. 3-66; Step 2)

It 22.

23.

Stresses in pump flanges should be verified to be within allowable limits.

(C.3-69; Step 2) qualification of cable trays and interaction of trays with supports should be addressed.

(C.3-80; Step 1) 24.

Allowable limits for welds based on field samples should be used in qualification of trays supported by superstrut.

(C. 3-80; Step 1)

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-2

25.

Total lateral forces, total resistance to sliding and factor of safety against sliding of intake structure should be fully evaluated.

(C.3-86; Step 2) 26.

Additional analyses of buried diesel fuel oil tanks should be performed (analyses with refined mesh and withou't deconvolution, partially filled tank, examination of properties).

(C.3-99; Step 2)

'27.

Control circuits for isolation valves in steaq supply line for turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump should be classified as safety-related.

(C.4-11; Step 1) 28.

Auxiliary relay for automatic closure of redundant steam generator blowdown isolation valves should meet Mestinghouse requirements.

(C.4-12; Step 3) 29.

30 Consideration of jet impingment loads in design 'and qualifica-tion of all safety-related piping and equipment should be clearly demonstrated.

(C.4-29; Step 2)

It should be clearly indicated that rupture restraints inside and outside containment have-been properly designed and installed.'C.4-31; Step 1) 31.

The combination of codirectional responses to three components of earthquake for the turbine building should be explained.

(C.3-37; Step 2)

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-3

Table C.8.2 Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 Incomplete Effort 1.

Containment Annulus Structure 2.

Containment Interior Structure 3.

Containment Exterior Shell 4.

Auxiliary Building 5.

Fuel Handling Building 6.

Intake Structure 7.

Turbine Building 8.

Large Bore Piping 9.

Large Bore Piping Supports 10.

Small Bore Piping ll.

Small Bore Piping Supports 12.

Mechanical Equipment and Supports 13.

HVAC Equipment 14.

Raceways, Tubing & Supports 15.

'Soils Intake Structure 16.

Soils Intake Structure Boring Capacity 17.

Shake Table Testing 18.

Main Control Board C. 3-9 C. 3-13 C. 3-17 C. 3-22 C. 3-26 C-3-28 C-3-37 C-3.48 C-3-48 C. 3-58 C. 3-58 C-3-70 C. 3-73 C.3-76/77, C.3-80 C. 3-83 C. 3-85 C. 3-89 C. 3-91 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-4

Table C.8.3 Diablo Canyon SER Supplement 18 Followup Items PG8E will perform a startup test of AFWS runout control system to confirm dynamic stability.

(C.4-3) 2.

PG8E will delete from design drawing steam trap in steam supply line for turbine driven pump of AFWS.

(C.4-5)

PG8E will revise FSAR to reflect acceptability of as-built conditions regarding separation and color coding of electrical circuits for AFWS.

(C.4-8) 4.

PG8E will correct table in environmental qualification report with respect to flow transmitters and flow control valves in AFWS.

(C. 4-12) 5.

6.

PG8E will conduct analyses to determine qualified life of motor capacitor for steam generator control valves.

(C.4-12)

PG8E will amend FSAR to indicate that pipe breaks are not postulated in steam supply line to turbine driven pump of AFWS.

(C.4-16) 7.

8.

9.

10.

12.

13.

PG8E will amend FSAR to include all changes for equipment qualification (CRVPS and AFWS) that resulted from reanalysis of pipe break environments outside containment.

(C.4-16)

PG8E will revise FSAR licensing commitment regarding need for protective shields for AFWS components (valves) against effects of moderate energy line breaks.

(C.4-17)

Staff will confirm that any modifications required in safety-related systems with respect to pressure/temperature rating and power-operated valve operability are implemented.

(CD 4-26)

PG8E will verify assumptions regarding closing/opening of doors and operation of ventilation systems in their continuing pressure-temperature environmental reanalysis.

(C.4-27)

PG8E will make modifications and provide revised documentation as necessary based on results of pressure-temperature environ-mental reanalysis (C.4-27).

Staff will evaluate PG&E results of reanalysis with respect to assuring environmental qualification of equipment.

(C.4-27)

PG8E will revise FSAR to incorporate use of ANS 58.2 jet impingement temperature calculational method where applicable.

(C.4-14

& 16)

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-5

14.

PG8E will revise equipment qualification documentation to include qualified AFWS cable/wire other than that previously identified.

(C.4-16)

IL 15.

PG8E will revise FSAR to incorporate results of moderate energy line break analyses on the CRVPS.

(C.4-17)

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8"6

Table C.8. 4 Interim Technical Reports (ITRs) and Other Reports Issued by IDVP Number ITR-1:

ITR-2:

ITR-4:

ITR-5:

ITR-6:

ITR-7:

ITR-8:

ITR-9:

ITR-10:

ITR-11:

ITR-12:

ITR-13:

ITR-14:

ITR-15:

Title, IDVP organization,

revision, and date Additional Verification and Additional Sampling (Phase I) (RLCA).

Revision 0, June 10, 1982 Revision 1, October 22, 1982 Comments on R.

F.

Reedy, Inc., equality Assurance Audit Report on Safety Related Activities Performed by Pacific Gas and Electric Prior to June 1978 (TES).

Revision 0, June 23, 1982 Tanks (RLCA).

Revision 0, July 16, 1982 Shake Table Testing (RLCA).

Revision 0, July 23, 1982 Design Chain (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 19, 1982 Auxiliary Building (RLCA).

Revision 0, September 10, 1982 Electrical Raceway Supports (RLCA).

Revision 0, September 17, 1982 Independent Design Verification Program for Verification of Pacific Gas and Electric Company Corrective Action (Phase I) (RLCA).

Revision 0, October 7, 1982 Development of the Service-Related Contractor List for Non-Seismic Design Work Performed for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant - Unit 1 Prior to June 1,

1978 (RFR).

Revision 0, October 18, 1982 Verification of Design Analysis Hosgri Spectra (RLCA).

Revision 0, October 18, 1982 Pacific Gas and Electric Westinghouse Interface Review (TES).

Revision 0, June 23, 1982 Piping (RLCA).

Revision 0, November 5, 1982 Soils-Intake Structure (RLCA).

Revision 0, November 5, 1982 Verification of the Pressure, Temperature, Humidity, and Submergence Environments Used for Safety-Related Equipment Specifications Out-side Containment for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 6,

1982 Revision 1, May 9, 1983 Revision 2, July 25, 1983 HVAC Duct and Supports Report (RLCA).

Revision 0, December 10, 1982 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C.8-7

Table C.8. 4 (Continued)

Number ITR-16:

ITR-17:

ITR-18:

ITR-19:

ITR-20:

ITR-21:

ITR-22:

ITR-23:

ITR-24:

ITR-25:

ITR-26:

Title, IDVP organization,

revision, and date Soils Outdoor Water Storage Tanks (RLCA).

Revision 0, December 8, 1982 Piping - Additional Samples (RLCA):

Revision 0, December 14, 1982 Verification of the Fire Protection Provided for Auxiliary Feedwater

System, Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System Safety-Related Portion of the 4160 V Electric Syste~

(SWEC).

Revision 0, December 13, 1982 Revision 1, May 24, 1983 Verification of the Post-LOCA Portion of the Radiation Environments Used for Safety-Related Equipment Specification Outside Containment for Auxi1'iary--Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 16, 1982 Verification of the Mechanical/Nuclear Design of the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 16, 1982 Revision~ 1, April 26, 1983 Revision, 2, July 25, 1983 Verification of the Effects of High Energy Line Cracks and Moderate Energy Line Breaks for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 15, 1982 Revision 1, May 3, 1983 Verification of the Mechanical/Nuclear Portion of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 17, 1982 Revision 1, April 26, 1983 Revision 2, July 25, 1983 Verification of High Energy Line Break and Internally Generated Missile Review Outside Containment for Auxiliary Feedwater System and Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).,

Revision 0, December 20, 1982 Revision 1, May 27, 1983 Verification of the 4160 V Safety-Related Electrical Distribution System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 21, 1982 Revision 1, May 4, 1983 Verification of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Electrical Design (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 21, 1982 Revision 1, April 29, 1983 Verification of the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System Electrical Design (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 21, 1982 Revision 1, May 2, 1983 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-8

Tabl e.C.8. 4 (Continued)

Number ITR-27:

ITR-28:

ITR-29:

ITR-30:

ITR-31:

ITR"32:

ITR-33:

ITR-34:

ITR-35:

ITR-36:

ITR-37:

ITR-38:

ITR-39:

Title, IDVP organization,

revision, and date Verification of the Instrument and Control Design of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 23, 1982 Revision 1, May 13,'983 Revision 2, July 25, 1983 Verification of the Instrument and Control Design of the Control Room Ventilation and Pressurization System (SWEC).

Revision 0, December 23, 1982 Revision 1, May 13, 1983 Revision 2, July 25, 1983 Design Chain - Initial Sample (SWEC).

Revision 0, January 17, 1983 Small Bore Piping Report (RLCA).

Revision 0, January 12, 1983 HVAC Components (RLCA).

Revision 0, January 14, 1983 Revision 1, August 4, 1983 Pumps (RLCA).

Revision 0, February 17, 1983 Revision 1, April 1, 1983 Electrical Equipment Analysis (RLCA);

Revision 0, February 18, 1983 Revision 1, April 28, 1983 Verification of DCP Effort by Stone 8 Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC).

Revision 0, February 4, 1983 Revision 1, March 24, 1983 Independent Design Verification Program Verification Plan for Diablo Canyon Project Activities (RLCA).

Revision 0, April 1, 1983 Final Report on Construction guality Assurance Evaluation of G.

F. Atkinson (SWEC).

Revision 0, February 25, 1983 Revision 1, June 20, 1983 Valves (RLCA).

Revision 0, February 23, 1983 J

Final Report on Construction guality Assurance Evaluation of Wismer 8 Becker (SWEC).

Revision 0, March 1, 1983 Revision 1, March 16, 1983 Revision 2, June 20, 1983 Soils - Intake Structure Bearing Capacity and Latera1 Earth Pressure (RLCA).

Revision 0, February 25, 1983 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-9

Table C.8. 4 (Continued)

Number ITR-40:

ITR-41:

ITR-42:

ITR-43:

ITR-44:

ITR-45:

ITR-46:

ITR-47:

"ITR-48:

~ITR-49:

"ITR-50:

"ITR-51:

• ITR-52:

"ITR-53:

~ITR-54:

"ITR-55:

Title,- IDVP organization,

revision, and date

'oils Report - Intake Sliding Resistance (RLCA).

Revision 0, March 9, 1983 Corrective Action Program and Design Office Verification (RFR).

Revision 0, April 19, 1983 R.

F.

Reedy, Inc., Independent Design Verification Program Phase II Review and Audit of Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Design Consultants for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 (RFR).

Revision 0, April 15, 1983 Heat Exchangers (RLCA).

Revision 0, April 14, 1983 Shake Table Test Mounting Class lE Electrical Equipment (RLCA).

Revision 0, April 15, 1983 Additional Verification of Redundancy of Equipment and Power Supplies in Shared Safety-Related Systems (SMEC).

Revision 0, May 17, 1983 Additional Verification of Selection of System Design Pressure and Temperature and Differential Pressure Across Power-Operated Valves (SWEC).

Revision 0, June 27, 1983 Additional Verification of Environmental Consequences of Postulated Pipe Ruptures Outside of Containment (SMEC).

Revision 0, June 27, 1983 Additional Verification of Jet Impingement Effects on Postulated Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment Revision 0, July 27, 1983 Additional Verification of Circuit Separation and Single Failure Review of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment

{SMEC).

Revision 0, June 23, 1983 Containment Annulus Structure Vertical Seismic Evaluation (TES).

Revision 0, July 22, 1983 Containment Annulus Structure Seismic'valuation (TES).

Revision 0, September 2,

1983 Revision 1, September 21, 1983 Combined with ITR 68 Combined with ITR 68 Containment Building - Corrective Action (RLCA)

Revision 0, September ll, 1983 Revision 1, October 3, 1983 Auxiliary Building - Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, Septembr 8, 1983 Revision 1, October 1, 1983 Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C.8"10

Table C.8.4 (Continued)

Number "ITR-56:

• ITR-57:

• ITR-58:

~ITR-59:

"ITR-60:

"ITR-61:

"ITR-62:

~ITR-63:

"ITR-64:

~ITR-65:

"ITR-66:

"ITR-67:

"ITR-68:

Title, IDVP organization,

revision, and date Turbine Building Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, September 9, 1983 Revision '1, September 24, 1983 Fuel Handling Building - Review of DCP Activities (Rl CA).

Revision 0, August 1, 1983 Revision 1, September 8,

1983 Intake Structure - Verification of DCP Activities (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 8, 1983 Revision 1, October 1, 1983 Large Bore Piping - IDVP Verification of Correction Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 18, 1983 Revision 1, September 24, 1983 Large and Small Bore Pipe Supports - IDVP Review of Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 17, 1983 Revision 1, October 3, 1983 Small Bore Piping - IDVP Review of Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, September 10, 1983 Revision 1, October 2, 1983 Combined with ITR-60 HVAC Ducts, Electr ical Raceways, Instrument Tubing and Associated Supports - IDVP Verification of Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 22, 1983 Revision 1, October 2, 1983 Combined with ITR-63 Rupture Restraints - IDVP Verification of DCP. Activities (RLCA).

Revision 0, September 16, 1983 Revision 1, October ll, 1983 Combined with ITR 63 Equipment - IDYP Verification of Corrective Action (RLCA).

Revision 0, August 12, 1982 Revision 1, September 9,

1983 Verification of HLA Soils Mork Revision 0, September 20, 1983 Revision 1, October 4, 1983 NOTE:

The the 1:

2 3

following reports were issued by RFR before the establishment of ITR concept:

Review of ANCO Engineers, March 1, 1982.

Review of Cygna Energy Services, March 1, 1982.

Review of EDS Nuclear Inc., January 20, 1982.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C ~ 8-11

Table C.8. 4 (Contin'ued)

Number

Title, IDVP organization,

revision, and date 4:

Review of Harding Lawson Associates, January 26',

1982.

5:

Review of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, March 5, 1982.

6:

Review of URS/Blume and Associates, Engineers, March 5, 1982.

7:

Review of Wyle Laboratories, March 1, 1982.

~Indicates reports dated after SSER 18,information, cut off date of June 30, 1983.

k Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-12

Table C.8.5 Meetings on Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Verification Effort The following is a listing of NRC meetings that have been held since June 30, 1983.

It is a continuation of Table C.l ~ 2 in SSER 18.

Date (30)

July 6, 1983 (31)

September 1,

1983 Participants/attendants/location

NRC, BNL, PGRE (DCP)

Bethesda, Md.

NRC, PG8E (DCP),

IDVP, Gov. of California, Joint Intervenors

Bethesda, Md.

(32)

September 6,

1983 NRC Plant Tour-Diablo Canyon Site (33)

September 7,

1983 (34)

September 13, 1983 (35)

September 2?,

1983.

(36)

September 28, 1983

NRC, PG8E (DCP),

Gov. of California San Luis Obispo, Calif.

NRC Commission Meeting Washington D.C.

NRC Commission Meeting Washington, D. C.

NRC, PG8(E (DCP)

Bethesda, Md.

Diablo Canyon SSER 19 C. 8-13

T

NRC Staff T.

Dunning M. Hartzman P.

Kuo H. Polk H. Schierling APPENDIX 0 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Instrumentation and Control Systems Mechanical Engineering Structural Engineering Structural Engineering Licensing Diablo Canyon SSER 19 D"1

fi

NRC FOAM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BIBLIOGRAPHICDATA SHEET

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE (Add Volume No.,ifappropriateJ Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

7. AUTHOR(sI

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILINGADDRESS (Include Zip Codei Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission Washington, DaC 20555

12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAII.INGADDRESS (Includs Zip Codel

3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION No.

5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED MONTH October DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTH ober

6. (Leave blankl YEAR 1983 YEAR 1 8 B. (Leave blankJ

10. PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNITNo.

11. CONTRACT No.

1. REPORT NUMBER (Assiyned by DDCJ NURZG-0675 Supplement No. 19

2. (Leave blank J

13. TYPE OF REPORT PERIOD COVEAED (Inclusive daresJ

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50"323

16. ABSTRACT l200 vvords or less(

14, (Leave Olanl'J Supplement No. 19 to the Safety Evaluation Report for Pacific Gas and Electric Company's application for 1icenses to operate the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323), located in San tuis Obispo County, California, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission.

This supplement presents the staff's safety evaluation of those unresolved matters identified in Supplement No, 18 which must be satisfactori+ re-solved prior to commencement of fuel loading operations at Diablo Canyon Unit 1.

17, KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a. DESCRIPTORS 171). IDENTIFIERSIOPEN ENDED TERMS IB, AVAILABILITYSTATEMENT Unlimited MAC FOAM 335 l7.7/I

19. SECURITY CLASS (7'ha reporrl Un lassified 20AKCURITYCLASS (This payeJ

'unc1asszz 3.ed 21, No. OF PAGES 22, PRICE S

5i