ML16340D143
| ML16340D143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1983 |
| From: | Carlson J, Kirsch D, Mendonca M, Morrill P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340D142 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-82-42, NUDOCS 8302070339 | |
| Download: ML16340D143 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1982042
Text
0
U. S.
NUCLLXR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
50-275/82-42
Docket No.
50-275
.. License
No.
'Safeguards
Group
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
'
P. 0.
Box 7442
San Francisco, California'4106
d
=
Facility Naae:
Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
co ducted:
December
2,
1982 through January
1,
1983
Inspectors:
ar son,
r.,
ss
en
nspec or
M. M. Mendonca,
R si
nt Inspector
Date Signed
l-l
Date Signed
Approved by:
P.
J
orri 11,
Rea tor Inspector
Date Signed
I. j
-83
. F.
K rsch, Chief,
actor Projec
s
ec ion
o.
3
Date Signed
Summary:
Inspection from December 2,
1982 throu
h Januar
1,
1983
Re ort No. 50-275/82-42
<<d:
1
1
1
1
1
p
11,
111
<<11,
physical security, follow-up of allegations
regarding the
RHR system,
maintenance,
the licensee's
audit program
and
emergency
preparedness
activities.
The inspection
involved 128 inspector-hours
by three
NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
RV Fo ra 219 (2)
ly
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
a.
Site
- R. C. Thornberry, Plant
Manager
- R. Patterson,
Plant
Superintendent'J.
M. Gisclon,
Power Plant Engineer
D. A. Backens,
Supervisor of Maintenance
- J. A. Sexton,
Supervisor of Operations
- J. V. Boots,
Supervisor of Chemistry
and Radiation Protection
W. B. Kaefer, Technical Assistant to the Plant
Manager
- R. G. Todaro, Security Supervisor
- R. T. Twiddy, Supervisor of guality Assurance
- R. M. Luckett, Interim Regulatory Compliance Engineer
b.
~Cor orate
- J. 0. Schuyler,
Vice President
Nuclear Power Generation
- W. A. Raymond,
Manager guality Assurance
~T.
G.
de Uriarte, Senior Engineer
(Audits)
F. J.
Dan, Supervisor. Electrical
Engineer
R. Otto, Electrical
Engineer
T. Crawford, Senior Mechanical
Engineer
J.
McCracken,
Senior Mechanical
Engineer
G.
C.
Wu, Licensing Engineer
The inspectors
also interviewed
a number of other licensee
employees
incl
shift supervisors,
reactor
and auxiliary operators,
maintenance
personnel
plant technicians
and engineers,
quality assurance
personnel
and members
of General
Construction.
uding
- Denotes those attending
the exit interview of January 7, 1983.
- Denotes those attending
the exit interview of December
14, 1982.
\\
2.
0 erational
Safet
Verification
During the inspection period,
the inspectors
observed
and
examined activities
to verify the operational
safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations
and examinations
of those activities were conducted
on
a daily, weekly or
.
monthly basis.
On
a daily basis,
the inspectors
observed control
room activities to verify
compliance with limiting conditions for operation
as prescribed
in the facility
Technical Specifications.
Logs, instrumentation,
recorder traces,
and other
operational
records
were examined to obtain information on plant conditions,
trends,
and compliance with regulations.
Shift turnovers
were observed
on
a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information on plant status
was relayed .
During each
week, the inspectors
toured the accessible
areas of the facility
to observe
the following:
1
a ~
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
General
plant
and equipment conditions.
Maintenance activities
and repairs
(See Section 3).
Fire hazards
and fire fighting equipment.
Ignition sources
and flammable material control.
Conduct of selective activities fov compliance with the licensee's
administrative controls
and approved 'procedures.
Interiors of, electrical
and control panels.
Implementation of selected
portions of the licensee's
physical security
plan.
Plant housekeeping
and cleanliness.
. The inspectors
talked with operators
in the control room,
and other plant
personnel.
The discussions
centered
on pertinent topics of general
plant
conditions,
procedures,
security, training,
and other aspects
of the involved
work .activities.
No items of noncompliance
or deviation were identified.
3.
Maintenance
Maintenance activities on 'a safety injection accumulator isolation valve
motor and
a rod drive power supply motor-generator
set were reviewed
by
the inspectors
during the month.
Observations
by the inspectors verified
that proper approvals
were obtained
and
system clearance
and tests of redundant
equipment
were performed,
as appropriate,
prior to conducting maintenance
on safety related
systems
or components.
The inspectors verified that qualified
personnel
performed the maintenance
and
used appropriate
maintenance
procedures.
Replacement
parts were examined to determine
the proper certification of
materials,
workmanship
and tests.
During the actual
performance of maintenance
activities,
the inspectors verified proper fire protection controls
and
housekeeping.
Upon completion of the maintenance activity; the component
was tested prior to return to service.
No items of noncompliance
or deviation were identified.
4.
Surveillance
Surveillance testing
on 4
KV r clays
and contacts,
and atmospheric
steam
dump instrument loops were reviewed by the inspectors.
Observations
by
the inspectors
including verification that proper procedures
were used,
test instrumentation
was calibrated,
and that the tested
system or component
was properly removed from service
as required
by the test procedure.
Upon
completion of the surveillance tests,
the inspectors verified that the test
results
met the acceptance criteria of the Technical Specifications
and
were reviewed
by the cognizant licensee personnel'he
inspectors
also
verified that corrective action
was initiated, if required,
to determine
the cause for any unacceptable
test results
and to restore
the system or
component to an operable status consistent with the technical specification
requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
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5.
Emer enc
Pre aredness
The inspectors
reviewed -and observed
an'mergency drill by a plant fire
brigade
and industrial safety
and fire protection training.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
6.
Audit Pro ram and
Im lementation
The inspector 'reviewed the licensee's
audit program
and implementation thereof
to determine if the program conformed to ANSI N-18-7-1976
and
ANSI
N 45.2.12-
1977.
In addition,
the inspectors verified that auditor qualifications
were consistent with ANSI
N 45.2.23-1978.
--The following procedure
manuals that describe
the licensee's
Audit Program
were reviewed:
a ~
equality Assurance
Manual for Nuclear
Power Plants
(1)
Section SVIII - Audits
(2)'ection
SVI - Corrective Action
3)
Procedure
10.1 - Nonconformance
and Corrective Actions
4
Procedure
11.1 - Audits Performed
by Company Departments
(5)
Procedure
11.1,
Supp.
1 - Open Items Report
b.
Nuclear
Power Generation
Manual
ualit
Assurance
(1)
Procedure
1.1 - gA Department
Program
and Organization
2)
Procedure
2.2 - Training and Indoctrination
3)
Procedure
15.1 - Nonconformance
Reports
(4)
Procedure
16. 1 - Open Item Reports
5
Procedure
17.1 - Auditor qualifications
(6)
Procedure
18.2 - gA Audits
(7)
Procedure
18.6 - Planning/Scheduling
of Audits
c.
gualit
Auditor Handbook
Based
upon the review of the above noted procedures,
the inspectors
determined
that the licensee's
gA Audit Program conforms to the criteria of ANSI
N
18.7-1976
and
ANSI
N 45.2.12-1977.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's
auditor qualification program, tests,
and records to ensure audits
were being conducted
by properly qualified
auditors.
The inspectors
determined
the licensee's
auditor qualifications
were consistent with ANSI
N 45.2.23-1978.
Next, the inspectors
reviewed the following audit reports to determine if
audit plans, checklists,
findings and corrective action followups were being
performed properly:
fP
C.
d.
e.f.
g.
Audit 820416 '-
Audit r20500-
Audit <<21011
Audit $ 20919
Audit g21111-
a.
Audit $12300-
b,
Audit Pr20400
"Criterion XVIII - Audits"
"Criterion XV - Nonconformances
and Criterion XVI-
Corrective'Action"
"Criterion XV and XVI"
"Fire Protection"
"Status of Open OIR's'!
"Technical Specifications"
"Containment Annulus Steel"
The inspectors
determined that the audits
were being conducted
properly
using the prescribed
audit plans
and checklists;
however,
tracking of "Open
Items" was
weak in that audited organizations
were not responding
to adverse
audit findings in accordance
with the criteria of Section 4.5 of ANSI
N
45.2. 12-1977.
Specifically, estimated
completion dates
(ECD) were being
. exceeded
with no new (ECD's) being established.
Additionally, the audit
findings were being tracked using the licensee's
"Commitment Control System"
that assigns
a noncontrolling priority to all adverse
audit findings.
The
inspectors
identified to management
that
some of the findings would have
resulted 'in technical specification violations if fuel loading
had
commenced
without correction of the identified problems from audit findings.
During
the exit interview, the licensee
committed to having revised
ECD's for all
outstanding
Open Item Reports
by February 1, 1983,
.and prioritizing all
outstanding
Open Item Reports
by February 28,
1983 (82-42.01).
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
7.
Review of Stone
and Webster Construction Audit
As part of the Independent
Design Verification Program
(IDVP).
Stone
and
Webster Engineering Corporation
(SWEC) was tasked with the evaluation of
the construction quality assurance
program at Diablo Canyon under the auspicies
of Teledyne Engineering Service
(TES).
The inspectors
reviewed the following
documents
and discussed
the audit with PGKE representatives
to determine
how open item reports
were being generated
and dispositioned
.
a.
b.
C.
d.
Adjunct Program for Evaluation of Construction
equality Assurance-
Rev.
1 dated 10/1/82
(TES document)
~
Construction
equality
Assurance
Evaluation
(SWEC Project Procedure
4-2-1
dated 10/22/82).
Diablo Canyon Verification Program
(DCVP) Procedure
$ 1 - Interface with
Consultants.
DCVP Procedure
82 - Program Resolution Reports.
The inspectors
determined
the
scope of the audit was to evaluate
the as-
built quality of two contractors:
1)
Guy F. Atkinson Co.
Containment
, Building Contractor,
and 2) Wismer and Becker Co. - installation of NSSS
piping.
The above noted procedures
described
the auditing process
to be
used
and handling of audit findings.
The inspectors
have reviewed the program
for familiar ization.
At the present
time, the
SWEC onsite audit team
has
P;
completed
the as-built audit and
has generated
twenty-nine
Open Item Reports
(OIR).
So far, the licensee
has dispositioned
eighteen of the OIR's.
The
inspector s will complete the review in this area
when the remainder of the
OIR's are dispositioned
(82-42-02).
Ho items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
8.
0 en Items Fol lowu
Plant Administrative procedures
C451 and
D756 have been
prepared
to assure
reinstatement
of Environmental gualification conditions after maintenance
or surveillance testing.
This closes
open, items 80-'16-01
and TI-15-41.
9.
Alle ations
Re ardin
the Diablo Can
on Residual
Heat
Removal
S stem
On December
2,
1982 the inspector
met with licensee representatives
to discuss
allegations
regarding the Diablo Canyon residual=heat
removal
(RHR) system.
These allegations
had also previously been
examined at the jobsite and documented
in Region
V inspection
reports
-50-275/82-26
and 50-323/82-13.
The following
paragraphs
paraphrase
the allegations,
summarize
the inspection,
and state
the findings of the inspector.
(a)
Allegedly there were
no control
and interlock circuit drawings for
motor operated
valves
8701
and 8702
(RHR hot leg suction isolation
valves).
The inspector
examined
PGEE drawings
437592
"Residual
Heat
Removal
Flow Control Valves",
and
103058 "Circuit Schedule
480 Volt
for Busses
F,
G, H" circuits
H19POO through
H19P12
and
G25POO through
G25P13.
The inspector
observed
that these
drawings describe
the power,
control,
and interlock circuits for the subject valves.
The allegation
was not substantiated.
(b)
Allegedly no one
knew how these circuits. were routed in the plant.
Licensee project engineering
personnel
stated
that in addition to the
drawings described
above,
the raceway schedule depicts circuits in
a particular conduit, the conduit drawings
show conduit locations in
the plant,
and the circuit schedule
itemizes the pull data for each
wire in the plant.
They also stated that the drawings
and schedules
were available to the plant staff through the site document control
center if this material
was not available in the control room.
The
inspector
had previously verified that this type of documentation
was
properly controlled
and readily available to the plant staff.
This
allegation
was not substantiated.
(c) It was alleged that the design
was
no good in that the control/interlock
circuits are routed from the "hagen" racks via the solid state protection
system to the relays which shut the valves.
Licensee
engineers
explained
that this was
a standard
design
and that the "hagen" racks
took low level analogue
signals
and (in this case)
used bistables
to
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generate
signals
in the milliamp range.
The solid state protection
system completes
the logic:function and generates
a larger output signal
(amps.)
which in turn actuates
relays in the auxiliary logic cabinet.
They explained'that
they were not in a position to change this arrangement
(since it is
desigq). and that they were unaware of any
problems with this arrangement.
The inspector
examined
the location
of the components
of the
RHR isolation valve control
and interlock
'circuits to verify the licensee's
statements.
The allegation
was substantiated
to the extent that the circuits were
as alleged,
however there
was
no apparent
dev'iation from regulatory requirements
or safety criteria.
(d) It was alleged that
a design
change request
(DCR) submitted
about February
1981 to get "rid of that system" (i.e.
RHR hot leg suction isolation
interlocks)
has never
been
acted
upon
by PGEE.
The inspector verified
. that there were
no outstanding
on
PGhE drawing 437592
(which depicts
the system in question)
and that none were originated from or arrived
at the Diablo Canyon project.
The site Resident
Inspectors verified
that
no
DCRs were outstanding for this drawing at the jobsite.
This
allegation could not be substantiated.
(e) It was alleged that the
FSAR, Chapter
5, paragraph
5.7,
pages
37b and
38 as well as Chapter
7, paragraph
6.2,
pages
3 and
4 describe
the
automatic high pressure/high
temperature
isolation of the
RHR system
from the reactor coolant
system,
and that this is inconsistent with .
the technical specifications section 3.4.9.3 which requires
AC to be
removed from the associated
valves
(8701
and 8702) thereby disabling
the automatic isolation features.
Therefore the
FSAR should
be
amended.
Licensee representatives
showed the inspector Table 6.3-10 of the
which shows that the valves are to be shut
and racked out at power
and
open
and r acked out du< ing shutdown cooling mode.
This is in accordance
with NRC direction.
The licensee
representatives
also stated that
the entire
FSAR would be updated
(with inconsistencies
removed)
in
September
1983 in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.
The allegation
was partially
substantiated,
but no safety problem or noncompliance with regulatory
requirements
>>as identified.
The alleger stated that the
FSAR section 3.1.3 states
that spurious
closure of normally open/fail
open valves is not considered
as either
a passive or active failure and is not analyzed for at all which is
a problem.
Licensee
engineers
explained that there were
no reasonable
failure modes
which would cause
normally open/fail
open or normally
closed/fail
closed valves to change state.
The only possibility they
could imagine was
a "copper octopus" which caused
selective shorting.
This issue
had
been dealt with in the Fire Protection
Review and
was
one reason that certain valve circuit breakers
were racked out after
the valve was placed
in the desired position.
As far as control circuits
are concerned,
any short with 120 volts or higher would cause the logic
circuits to go to a fail safe condition due to the overwhelming signal
stl ength
(normal signals
are
4 to 20 milliamps).
The allegation could
not be substantiated.
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It was alleged that there
was
no low flow alarm for the
RHR system
and that there should
be one.
The inspector verified that
an
pump trip is annunciated,
that shut
RHR suction valves
are indicated,
and that the subcooling meter was available to ensure
adequate
core
cooling.
Licensee
representative.;
pointed out that the
RHR pumps
have
a miniflow recirculation .to maintatn
some flow, and that the monitor light
box indicates
valves-: or circuits in the incorrect state.
The inspector
concluded that the allegation
was correct in that there
was
no "low
flow" alarm,
but also concluded that there
appeared
to be
no requirement
or necessity to have one.
It was alleged that
an
RHR pump ran without flow for 5 minutes in September
1981,
and that this event
was not reported
as required
by administrative
procedure
C-12 'and 10 CFR 50.72.
The site resident inspector verified
that
a Nuclear Plant Problem Report
(DCI-81-OP P1057)
and the associated
corrective action
was completed.
The allegation
was not substantiated.
(i) It was alleged that the
RHR hot leg suction
does
not meet the single
failure'criteria for function (suction from reactor coolant
system
hot leg), that newer plants
had this feature,
and that this portion
of the system should
be redundant to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendi'x A Design
Criteria.
The inspector verified tfiat this functi'on was not safety
related
in the Diablo Canyon plant design
by examining the
FSAR.
The
inspector
observed that the suction from the containment
and from
the refueling water storage
tank were both safety related
and arranged
to meet regulatory requirements for redundancy..
The inspector
also
observed that
some other plants did have two
RHR suction lines but
that these plants
used
a different nuclear
steam supply system vendor.
The inspector
concluded that the allegation
was correct in that the
RHR suction line was redundant
only for the purpose of reactor coolant
system isolation, but that there
was
no apparent
safety problem or
.
deviation from regulatory requirements
associated
with this design.
(j) It was alleged that nuclear plant problem reports
(NPPR)
were not getting
management
review which is
a violation of administrative
procedure
C-12 and that
NPPR
DC 1-81-OP
P1057
had
been
signed off, after this
shortcoming
was identified to management.
Other
NPPRs
should
be examined.
The Resident
Inspectors
observed that other
NPPRs were being given
appropriate
management
review and resolution.
The allegation
was not
substantiated.
(k) It was alleged that
NPPRs
DCO 79 TI P0006
and
79 TI P0117
are still
open after three years
and should
be closed.
The Resident
Inspectors
observed that response
to
NPPR P0006
was complete
and that response
to P0117
was underway.
The allegation
was substantiated,
but no particular
safety or regulatory significance could
be attached
to this situation.
( 1) It was alleged that
a change to the Plant
Manual
Volume 16, reactor
coolant
pump "lo oil level" alarm should
have
been
changed
to "lo-hi
oil level" but had not been corrected eight months after the correction
had
been submitted.
The Resident
Inspectors identified this allegation
to the licensee.
The licensee initiated
a
NPPR (DCI-83-TN-P0001)
and
the problem is to be resolved.
The licensee
personnel
that were interviewed,
were not previously aware of this problem.
The allegation
was substantiated.
The inspector
concluded that the allegations
were partially correct but
that these
had
no apparent safety significance or deviations
from regulatory
requirements.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspectors
met with licensee'representatives
(denoted
in paragraph
1)
and discussed
the
scope
and findings of the inspection.
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