ML16340C172
| ML16340C172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1981 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Andrea Johnson, Shackleton O NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340C173 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-81-28, 50-323-81-17, NUDOCS 8112290498 | |
| Download: ML16340C172 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1981028
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
eport No,
50-275/81-28
and 50-323/81-17
Docket No.
License
No
CPPR-39/CPPR-69
Safeguards
Group
Paci fic Gas
and
Electri c Company
P. 0.
Box 7442
San Francisco,
California 94106
Facil ity Name
Diabl o Canyon
Unit 1,
2
Inspection at
Diabl o Canyon Si te,
San Luis Obi sPo County,
Cal ifornia
Inspection conducted:
May 27; June
2, 3,
1981
Inspectors:
ames
.
c
ar t,
eactor
nspec or
Da e
Soigne
Owen C.
hack eton
or Investigator
g/ jw
6l
ate Signe
Date Signed
Date Signed
ate
Soigne
Approved by:
Allen D. Johns
Director, Investigations
and
Enforcement
a
e Soigne
S ecial
Ins ection durin
eriod of Ma
27; June
2
3,
1981.
Re ort Nos.
50-275/81-28
and 50-323 81-17
.
Areas
Ins ected:
Allegations
made
by RICHARD G.
PETERSON
by letter
to Chairman
Joseph
M. Hendrie,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,
dated April 3,
1981, concerning
Diablo Canyon were investigated at
the site.
Results:
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were idenli.fjed. 2l9
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By letter dated April 3, 1981, Richard
G. Peterson
wrote
a letter to
Joseph
M. Hendrie,
Chairman,
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission setting
out allegations
concerning
Diablo Canyon
and his concerns for the
U.
S.
to develop alternative
forms of energy.
Mr. Peterson
was employed
by the Pullman
Power
Products Division of M.
W. Kellogg Co.
as
a draftsman at Diablo Canyon from February
13,
1974
until August 1,
1974 when
he was released
because
of a reduction in
force.
He was rehired
on November
19,
1974 as
a Pipe Support Designer
and worked until September
18,
1975 when
he was again released
because
of a reduction in force.
Mr. Peterson
has stated
the Kellogg Co. installed
much of the plant's
piping, pipe hangers
and pipe restraints.
Mr. Peterson
advised
he attended
four years of college at California
Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo, majoring in Aeronatical
Engineering
and mathematics.
He did not graduate.
Mr. Peterson
presently resides
in a city in San Luis Obispo County,
California and works for one of the cities in that county as
a survey
helper.
'ETAILS
Princi al Licensee'Em lo ees
Pacific Gas
and Electric
(PG&E
Richard
D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
Michael
Norem,
Lead Start
Up Engineer
John
A.; Ammon, Resident
Mechanical- Engineer
Thomas
A. Bowles,,Civi-l Inspector
Larry G. Lunsfor'd, Site Security Manager
1'ontractor
Personnel
-'ullman'ower
Pro ects
KELLOGG)
John
W. iRyan, Resident- Construction
Manager,
Arthur J-. flacCauley, Field Engineer,
'.
Alle ations
and Findi'n s
J
A copy of Mr,. Peterson's,
letter to'hairman
Hendrie is enclosed
to
this report. as Exhibit.No. l., A signed statement
by Mr. Peterson
dated
June
3,
1981 is enclosed
to this report
as Exhibit No. 2.
Mr. Peterson
was interviewed
on June 2, 1981 by the inspection
team
to determine if he
had any additional
concerns
to those
expressed
in his letter.
As stated
in )is signed statement
Mr. Peterson
observed or heard
some of .the" things
he
has written about first
hand
and the others
he learned
from someone else.
He had
no addi-
tional allegations
to provide to those
he sent to the Chairman.
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Mr. Peterson
was recontacted
on June
3,
1981
by the inspection
team
and the findings to his allegations
were presented
to him.
Set out below are Mr. Peterson's
allegations
and the findings by
the
NRC inspection
team.
Alle ation:
"Pipe supports
ranged
from simple cantilever
beams to complex
structural
steel
supports.
The vast majority of them are
attached
to concrete walls or floors by steel
plates
anchored
by Hilti or Phillips concrete
anchor bolts (redheads).
(1)
During start-up testing of individual systems
throughout the
plant,
~man
plates
were ripped right off the walls because
workers would hit rebar in the wall, and rather
than reposi-
tion the plants slightly to avoid the rebar,
they cut off the
head of the redheads
and tack welded
them to the steel
plates
to make it appear
as if they were actually there in the wall
securing
the plates.
In many instances,
hangers
were connected
to the wall with only one or two redheads!
Some bolt heads
were acctually held on by gum.
I have witnesses
to all this."
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viously received
and investigated
and documented
in NRC
ins-'ection
report number 50-275/77-17
(conducted July 11-14,
25,
29 and August 2-3,
1977.
Excepts
from that report are
as
follows:
Alle ation:
"During the installation of pipe hangers
and
rac s, anchor bolts were cut short or omitted to avoid drill-
ing rebar or resetting
the hangers
or racks.
The licensee's
program for inspection, testing
and repair of pipe hangers,
pipe racks
and seismic limiters will neither detect or correct
this problem."
~RC
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licensee
determined that
some concrete
expansion
anchors
were
improperly installed
and initiated a major reinspection of
completed
pipe hangers
and concrete
expansion
anchors.
The
NRC has
been cognizant of the licensee's
program of reinspec-
tion, .'testing
and repair of concrete
expansion
anchors
since
the program inception.
The
NRC findings in this regard are
documented. in IE Inspection
Report Nos. 50-275/76-14,
77-03,
77-11 and Nos.;;50-323/76-05,
77-01, 77-03,
and 77-06.
The investigator, re-examined
the licensee's
"Procedure for
Establishing
Acc'eptance Criteria for Concrete
Anchor Installa-
tions". and the Pullman
Power Products
gA Instruction
No.
98
("Pr'ocedure for Inspection, of Existing, Concrete
Expansion
Anchors, in Hanger', Installation" )
,The utilization of the
'above test and,;inspec'tion
methods
adequately
provide for
detection
and 'correction of conc'rete,expansion
anchors
which
are omitted or shortened
by cutting either the plug or threaded
end of,the expansion
anchor.
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phldgd
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concrete
due to the pipe rack weight.
~gh<>class "A'elds (very important welds that have to
be'-',rayed)
were falsified.
That is, either the x-rays were
never'taken
and they were okayed
anyway or they were taken,
found to be defective,
but still okayed!"
NRC Findin
During a 1977
NRC inspection
(inspection report
num er
-2 5/77-06,
March 21-23,
1977) the
NRC identified an
item of noncompliance
(infraction) regarding radiographic film
reading of field weld 'number
FW 197 (steam generator
number
1)
which is a feed water. pipe to steam generator
weld.
This item
was identified during
a
NRC review of radiographic film and
consisted of the
NRC inspector identifying "drop through with
crack markings" in the above mentioned weld.
The indications
were not recorded
on the radiograph
reader
sheets.
This item
of noncompliance
resulted
in a j00 percent re-reading of
radiographs
for both Unit
1 and
2 safety related piping welds
produced
by M.
W. Kellogg (Pullman
Power Products) resulting
in repairs to 70 Unit
1 welds
and
104 Unit 2 welds.
The
details of the licensee's
corrective action are given in
written responses
dated
June
3, August 4, and October 26, .1977
and in
NRC inspection report 50-275/77-16
performed July 11,
1977.
The
NRC considered this corrective action satisfactory
and the item closed.
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Due to the magnitude'f the',licensee's
corrective action
regarding this, item of noncompliance, it is assumed
that the
problem was "publicly known" among.-the site employees
as
alleged.
Als'o, tI1e problem identified, could have
been inter-
preted
as "falsified~' radiographs,
however, there
was
no
evidence indicating radiograph falsification.
Alle ation:
The attitude of the workers in general
was the worst the
alleger
had ever seen.
fle said the work reflected this attitude.
~NCFidi:
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h
h
titd
f
h
contractor
employees
was not an issue that
came under the
direct juridiction of the
NRC.
However, the quality of work
performed
on safety related
hardware
by the contractors
was
addressed
in the
NRC inspection
program.
This inspection
program included not only direct spot inspections
by
NRC
inspectors,
but also inspections
by gC/gA inspectors of the
contractor's
and the licensee.
Alle ation:
Plant security
when the alleger worked there
was described
by
him as
a "joke."
He said to get past the front gate, all one
needed
to do was ride in with someone with a pass,
or to have
a pass visible in your front window.
He said several
times
he
forgot his pass
and stuck
a kleenex
box on the front dash
approximately the
same color as the pass
and was waived on
through.
Then, all one
needed
to get past the parking lot was
a hardhat.
The alleger
s'tated it was easy to get
a hardhat.
He said
he still has his as
he kept it when
he got laid off
and
many people
do the same.
He further stated,
"So anybody
could get to that plant as easy
as pie.
The possibility of
terrorists infiltrating that plant
seems
imminent to me."
NRC Findin
A review of the alleger's
employment record at
t e sste
s owed
he was employed
as
a draftsman
from February
13,
1974 until released
because
of a reduction in force on
August 1,
1974.
He was rehired
as
a Pipe Support Designer
on
November
19,
1974 and worked until September
18,
1975 when
he
was let go for another reduction in force.
The alleger
was advised
by the
NRC investigators
that during
the period covering his employment in 1974-75 Diablo Canyon
was
a construction site with no nuclear fuels on site.
Presently
Part 73, Section
73.55 of Title 10,
Code of Federal
Regulations,
sets
out the requirements
of licensed activities in nuclear
power plants.
The licensee
would not have
been required to institute
a physical security
program subject to
NRC requirements
and inspection until they
were licensed to have nuclear fuel
on site.
Their license
(SNM 1503)
was issued
on December
31,
1975.
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, Under the present security
program for contractor
personnel
working at Unit No.
1 the following procedure is enforced
by a
large force of armed guards:
1.
To get
a vehicle through the main gate onto
PG8E
property, approximately
7 miles from the nuclear
'ower plant, the vehicle must display
a vehicle pass
in the windshield.
The guard will wave such
a
vehicle, during certain time zones,
on through the
gate onto
PG8E property.
2.
At the parking lot outside the protected
area the
employee
goes
through what is
known as
"badge alley."
At this point,a guard matches
the employee's
face
with a contractor's
photo
badge
and gives
him the
badge to proceed to the security building.
3.
The employee next goes into the security building
where
he goes
through
an explosi-ve detector, all his
hand carried items are put through
an x-ray machine,
he then
goes
through
a metal detector,
and then
he
turns in his contractor 's photo
badge for a protected
area
photo badge
and
a coded rkey card.
He is then
allowed inside the protected
area
through electrically
controlled doors operated
by the guard force inside
a bullet resistant
enclosure.
4.
On his exit from the plant, the process of badge
trading is reversed.
The plant is not,
as the alleger stated,
an open target for
someone
to easily infilltrate.
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