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Directors Decision Under 10CFR2.206 Denying Ds Fleischaker 801017 Petition for Preparation of Supplemental EIS Re Impact of Class 9 Accidents at Facility
	ML16340B579
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	03/26/1981
From:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML16340B578	List: ML16340B577; ML16340B579; ML17083A842;
References
	DD-81-03, DD-81-3, NUDOCS 8104080072
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UNITED STATES OF AHERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R.

DENTON, DIRECTOR 00-81-3 In the Hatter of PACIFIC GAS 8c ELECTRIC COHPANY (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 6 2)

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Docket Nos.:

50-275 50-323 DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 By petition dated October 17,

1980, David S. Fleischaker on behalf of the Joint Intervenors to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant operating license proceeding requested that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation take action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to require preparation of supplemental environmental impact statements on Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant.

The petition was supported by the affidavit of Hr. Richard B. Hubbard.

No'ice of receipt of the petition wes poh1ished in the Federel

~Re ister, 45 Fed.

Reg.'

?8317 (November 25, 1980).

Counsel for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG8E),

the applicant for the Diablo Canyon plant, submitted on January 8,

1981, a response opposing the petition.

The petition is similar to a peti Lion filed by the Friends of the Earth in 1979, which was denied in June 1980.

DD-80-22, ll NRC'19 (1980).

The petition requests relief with respect to the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, which are being constructed at the PGRE site in California and for which PG8E has applied for operating licenses.

The petition, supported by Hr. Hubbard's affidavit, asks that the Commission prepare supple-mental environmental impact statements to consider the environmental consequence'z o~ 080 ~WQ.

C i

of Class 9 accidents, evaluate a number of safety features to prevent severe accidents or mitigate their consequences, and prepare a simplified sy.;tern reliability analysis of several systems in the Diablo Canyon plant.

The petition requests that these actions be taken before the Commission issues either the low power or the full term operating licenses for the Diablo Canyon plant.

The petition provides the following bases for taking these actions:

The environmental impact statements summarily discuss consideration of Class 9 accidents, based on early estimates of reactor accident-probabilities and on the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, which has since been repudiated by the Commission; 2.

The accident at Three Hile Island, which the NRC concedes constituted a Class 9 accident, emphasized the need to evaluate the possible impact of a serious (Class

9) accident and to prepare to meet the possible consequences; 3.

4.

Seismic conditions at the Diablo Canyon site constitute "special circumstances" which would require consideration of environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents under the Commission's policy; and Analyses of Class 9 accidents, additional safety features and system reliability should be performed prior to the granting of any operating license for Diablo Canyon, either low or full power, because radioac-tive contamination of the reactor will either foreclose or increase the economic costs and health risks associated with additional

. engineering safety features that may be required as a result of such analyses.

For the reasons stated in this decision, the petition is denied.

I.

PROCEEDINGS RELATED TO THE PETITION In the June"1980 denial of the Friends of the Earth's petition, the NRC staff has effectively deait with those portions of the peti tion which request a supplemental environmental analysis of Class 9 accidents for Diablo Canyon.

See DQ-80-22, ll NRC 919 (1980).

In its petition the Friends of the Earth, like the petitioners

here, raised the occurrence of the accident at Three Mile Island and the Commission's "repudiation""of the MASH-1400 study.

The Oirectoi'

3 decision denying the Friends of the Earth's petition applied the Commission's interim policy to the three sites, including Diablo Canyon, for which

~

gq>ple-mental environmental statement was sought and found that a supplemental environ-mental statement for any of the three sites was not mandated under the policy.

1/

The Commission did not overturn the Director's decision.

In the October 1980 petition', the petitioners have not presented any new information which would s

lead the staff to reconsider the conclusions reached in the decision on the Friends of the Earth's petition.

Part II ofrthis decision repeats the analysis provided in DD-80-22 and responds to the petitioners'ontention that the site's seismic characteristics comprise "special circumstances" within the meaning of the Commission's new interim policy on severe accident considerations.

Apart from the recent denial of a substantially similar petition under 10 CFR 2.206, it should be noted that the petitioners here are parties to the operating license proceeding for Diablo Canyon and have a motion to reopen the proceeding to consider Class 9 accidents pending before the Licensing Board.

1/

The Commission's statement of interim policy indicates that the Three Mile Island accident was one of the reasons for withdrawing the proposed Annex.

to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 and substituting a

new interim policy on accident considerations in the Annex's place.

See Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Polic Act of 1969, 45 Fed.

Reg.

40101 et

~se (June 133 1980).

The Director rejected the so-called repudiation of NASH-1400 as a basis for preparing supplemental environ-mental impact statements.

See DD-00-22, 11 NRC at 931-32,-~citin 45 Fed.

Reg.

40102 and

~Penns Ivania Power 0 Li ht Co.

(Susquehanna Steam Elertric Station, Units 1

8 2), LBP-79-29, 10 NRC 586, 589 (179).

See also Public Service Co. of Okla.

(Black Fox Station, Units 1 8 2), CLI-80-8, ll HRC 433 (1980).

-6" environmental impact statements for on-going and future NEPA reviews will <jive consideration to a broader spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents that may have been designated "Class 9" under the Annex.

Mith respect to plants for which Final Environmental Statements have been

issued, the Commission stated in its new interim policy that:

"It is expected that these revised treatments will lead to conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents similar to those that would

'e reached by a continuation of current practices, particularly for cases involving special circumstances where Class' risks have been considered by the staff...

~

Thus, this change in policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in any previously-issued Statements, nor, absent a

showing of similar special circumstances, as a basis Qr opening, reopen-

~ ing or expanding any previous or on-going proceeding.

Commissioners Gi linsky and Bradford disagree with the inclusion of the preceding two sentences.

They feel that they are absolutely inconsistent with an even-handed reappraisal of the former, erroneous position on Class 9 accidents."

45 Fed.

Reg. at 40203.

As the Commission noted in its new statement of interim policy, the staff has identified special circumstances in the past which would warrant more extensive consideration of Class 9 accidents.

The special circum-stances fell within three categories:,

(1) high population density around the

,proposed site; (2) a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other

'han a light water reactor);

or (3) a combination of a unique design and a

unique siting mode.

In Public Service Com an of Oklahoma, which was d~cided 3/

before the Commission stated its new interim policy, the Commission noted in addition to these three criteria that proximity of a plant to a "man-made or See 45 Fed.

Reg.

40102 (June 13, 1980); Public Service Elec.

8 Gas Co.

(Salem 3/

Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), DD-80-17, 11 NRC 596, 615 n.

21 (April 1980).

In the first category fell the Perryman site, for which the staff performed an informal assessment in the early site review of the relative differences in,Class 9 accident consequences among the alternative sites.

The Clinch River Breeder

Reactor, a liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor which is different from the more conventional light water reactor, fell within the second category, novel reactor design, and the staff inciuded a discussion in the final environmental statement (NUREG-0139, Feb.

l977) of its consideration of Class 9 accidents.

The Floating Nuclear Power Plants represented the third category of special circumstances, a combination of unique design and a unique siting mode.

Because the plants would be mounted on a floating barge, there would be no soil structure to retard the release and dispersal of activity beneath the plant following a core melt accident as would be the case for land-based plants.

The staff concluded that the most likely exposure to the population from the liquid pathway for a floating nuclear plant is significantly gr ater than for a land-based plant.

0

Mithin radii of 20 and 30 miles, the densities were 55 and 40 residents p~r

'quare mile, respedtively.

The population densities were projected to'pproxi-mately double by the year 2000, thus remaining well within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Part 100.

Therefore, population distribution near the Diablo Canyon plant is not a "special circumstance" within the meaning of the Commission's policy statement.

The Diablo Canyon plant also does not represent a "combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode."

The Diablo Canyon site is located adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, which is the only surface water body which could be affected by liquid releases from a Class 9 accident.

Ground water near the site is limited to the streambed of Diablo Canyon Creek, an intermittent stream which empties into the ocean.

The sandstone bedrock underlying station foundations is, at most, partially saturated (i.e.,

no water table) for a con-siderable vertical distance.

Its low permeability, combined with the lack of a near surface water table, would preclude:lateral movement of contaminated water from the station toward the ocean at more than an extremely slow rate.

At a minimum, many years would be available to interdict any such flow.

Therofoie, there are. no unusual hydrogeologic features of the site which would warrant special consideration of the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon site.

~ The staff analyzed the site characteristics and other nearby features to assure the potential for impairment of safety-rel'ated portions of station facili-ties due to natural or man-made hazards occurring nearby.

The Safety Evaluation

I

"9-Within radii of 20 and 30 miles, the densities were 95 and 40 residents p~r square mile, respectively.

The population densities were projected to approxi-mately double by the year

2000, thus remaining well within the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 4.7 and 10 CFR Part 100.

Therefore, population distribution near the Diablo Canyon plant is not a "special circumstance" within the meaning of the,Commission's policy statement.

. The Diablo Canyon plant also does not represent a "combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode."

The Diablo Canyon site is located adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, which is the only surface water body which could be affected by liquid releases from a Class 9 accident.

Ground water near the site is limited to the streambed of Diablo Canyon Creek, an intermittent stream which empties into the ocean.

The sandstone bedrock underlying st"tion foundations is, at most, partially saturated (i.e.,

no water table) for a con-siderable vertical distance.

Its low permeability, combined with the lack of a near surface water table, would preclude lateral movement of contaminated water from the station toward the ocean at more than an extremely slow rate.

At a minimum, many years would be available to interdict any such flow.

Therefore, there are no unusual hydrogeologic features of the site which would wai rant special consideration of the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents at the Diablo Canyon site.

The staff analyzed the site characteristics and other nearby features to

'ssure the potential for impairment of safety-related portions of station facili-ties due to natural or man-made hazards occurring nearby.

The Safety Evaluation

-10" Report states the staff's conclusion that there are no industrial, transpor ta-tion, or military facilities in, the area of the site which have pote>'-iat to adversely affect plant safety systems.

The staff's review specifically ensures that station design is adequate to accommodate other natural character-istics of the site environs.

The staff's review has not identified any unusual circumstances with respect to external hazards that would warrant reopening or expanding proceedings on Diablo Canyon.

The petitioners point to the seismic characteristics of the Diablo Canyon site as a "special circumstance" that.would warrant consideration of Class 9

accidents.

The petitioners base this characterization on a quotation from ALAB-519 in which The Appeal Board described the circumstances surrounding the need to make additional findings regarding the plants'eismic design capability as exceptional in every sense of that word."-

The Appeal Board was not. consider-II 7/

ing, of course, in that decision whether the seismic characteristics of the site constituted "special circumstances" war ranting consideration of Class 9

accidents under the Commission s policy.

The Appeal Board only addressed 8/

whether a sufficient showing had been made to warrant issuance of a subpeona to two ACRS consultants.

7/

Paci fic Gas 8 El ec.

Co.

(Oi abl o Canyon Nucl ear Power Pl ants, Units 1 8 2j, ALAB-619, 9 HBC S2, SB (1979),

Bunted in Fleischaker letter at 3 and Hubbard's affidavit at 10.

8/

The policy in effect, at the time was the proposed Annex.

9/

This showing is necessary because under 10 CFR 2.720 NRC personnel are not amenable to subpoena except "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances."

As set forth in its testimony in the operating license proceeding, staff believes that the Diablo Canyon plant meets the Commission's criter'!a for seismic design of nuclear facilities.

The staff does,not believe, therefore, that the seismic characteristics of the Diablo Canyon site constitute "sp~c'ia1 circumstances" which would warrant special consideration of Class 9 accident.

The staff recognizes, however, that site seismicity and the related design capability of the plants have been 'subject of additional hearings, most recently in October 1980 before the Appeal Board, in the operating license proceeding.

The Appeal Board has not yet rendered a decision on the reopened seismic record.

Should the Appeal Board decide that the plants do not meet the Commission's criteria, the staff would reconsider its view that the seismic conditions do not constitute "special circumstances."

Any such inquiry will be conducted, however, in the operating license proceeding, not in the context of 10 CFH 2.206.

As noted earlier in this decision, the Licensing Board has deferred consideration of the petitioners'otion to consider Class 9 accidents until after the Appeal Board makes its decision.

III. ADDITIONAL SAFETY ANALYSES RE(VESTED BY PETITIONERS In support of the petition, Mr. Fleischaker submitted the affidavit o."

Richard B. Hubbard.

l1r. Hubbard points to a number of safety features and reviews which are discussed in NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plans Develo ed as a

Result of the TMI-2 Accident, and then asks that these features be analyzed and the reviews performed prior to the licensing of Diablo Canyon for low power

P

"12" e

testing'r full power operation.

In a revised statement of policy on reactor xo/

licensing, the Commission has discussed the purpose of the NRC's Action Pion:

"The Action Plan was developed to provide a comprehensive and integrated plan for the actions judged appropriate by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to correct or improve the regula-tion and operation of nuclear facilities based on the experience from the accident at TNI-2 and the official studies and investi-gations of the accident.

In developing the Action Plan, the various recommendations and possible actions of all the principal investigations were assessed and either rejected, adopted or modified.

A detailed summary of the development and review

. process for the Action Plan was initially provided in NUREG-0694,

'TMI-Related Requirements For New Operating Licenses,'nd can now be found, as changed, in NUREG-0737, 'Clarification of TNI Action Plan Requirements.'"

Further Commission Guidance for Power Reactor 0 eratin Licenses-Revised Statement of Polic 45 Fed.

Reg.

85236 (Dec. 8, 1980) (footnotes omitted).

In this revised statement of policy, the Commission discussed the require-ments for new operating licenses and the schedule for implementing the actions proposed in the Action Plan:

"In approving the schedules for developing and implementing changes in requirements, the Commission's primary considerations were the safety significance of the issues and the immediacy of the need for corrective actions.

As discussed

above, many actions were taken to improve safety immediately or soon after the accident.

These actions were generally considered to be interim improvements.

In scheduling the remaining improvements, the availability of both NRC and industry resources was considered, as well as the safety significance of the actions.

Thus, the Action Plan approved by the Commission presents a sequence of actions that will result in a gradually increasing improvement in safety as individual actions are completed and the initial immediate actions are replaced'or supplemented by longer term improvements....

"Based upon its extensive review and consideration of the issues arising as a result of the Three Mile Island accident - a review that is still continuing - the Commission has concluded that the list of THI-related requirements for new operating licenses found in NUREG-0737 can provide a

basis for responding to the TNI-2 accident.

The Commission has decided that current operating license applications should be mea ured by the NRC staff against the regulations, as augmented by these requirements.

In

general, the remaining. items of the Action Plan should be addressed through the normal process for development and adoption of new require-ments rather than through immediate imposition on pending applications."

45 Fed.

Reg.

at 85238 '

See Hubbard affidavit at 11-15.

10/

Litigation of TNI-related requirements should be conducted in accor!~nce with this policy and the Commission's procedural requirements before the Licensing Board, not within the context of 10 CFR 2.206.

Several remarks should be made regarding the specific actions which the petitioners culled from NUREG-0660 and urged should be fed into the Diablo Canyon licensing process at this time.

The petitioners point to the safety reanalysis of the Indian Point and Zion facilities and ask that such an analysis be instituted for Diablo Canyon.

The reanalysis includes considera-tion of mitigation features for severe accidents.

The Indian Point - Lion study, as well as a study of the Limerick site, were initiated specifically because these plants are located in areas of high population density.

The Diablo 'Canyon site does not share this population characteristic with these other sites such that a special study is warranted.

Moreover, the features which Hr.

Hubbar d identifies as part of the Indian Point-2ion study are also under consideration for all plants as part of a proposed rulemaking on consideration of degraded or melted cores -in safety regulation.

See Advanced Notice of Pro osed Rulomakinu, 45 Fed.

Reg.

65474 (Oct. 2, 1980).

The Commission has also proposed interim requirements related to hydrogen control and certain degraded core considerations.

)

See 45 Fed.

Reg.

65465 (Oct. 2, 1980).

l'1r. Hubbard's affidavit also urges consideration of groundwater interdiction methods to control radioactive contamination of water. 's discussed

above, the ground water characteristics of the site do not compromise "special cia cum-stances" requiring consideration of Class 9 accidents.

Special action for Diablo Canyon is not required at this time.

The NRC staff proposed a further detailed study of the hydrologic features of all reactor sites in the Action

0

- 14=-

Plan.

The liquid pathway interdiction study is designated Task Action III.D.2 Based on currently available data, there is a small likelihood of any hyd,>>logic problems at the Diablo Canyon site.

In the event that significant possible impacts are identified in the study, methods of interdiction and mitigation will be specified.

A number of mitigation methods are available, including pump-ing and construction of slurry walls.

Mr. Hubbard also notes the Integrated Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) and urges that a similar simplified system reliability analysis be performed for a number of systems.

See Hubbard affidavit at 15.,

The IREP is described in NUREG-0660 (Task II.C, at pp. I?.C-2 to II.C-5).

The IREP is a pilot program at present and does not consider seismic or other natural phenomena sequence initiators.

NUREG-0660 describes a gradual implementation of IREP and studies for operating reactors.

No special reason exists for changing this schedule to apply IREP directly to Diablo Canyon at thi s time. It should be noted that a study of systems interaction for seismically induced events has been conducted for Oiablo Canyon.

See NUREG-0660, Task II.C.3.

This study has been completed and any necessary plant modifications for each unit will be made before any license is issued that authorizes full-power operation.

Finally, Mr. Hubbard points to possible radioactive contamination of the plant as a basis for instituting the analyses listed in his affidavit.

Again, the question of whether PG8E is entitled to either a low power or full power license is before the Licensing Board for resolution in light of the Commission':.

policy on issuance of operating licenses and the schedule for completing requii u!i actions before full power licenses may be issued.

It should be.noted in this regard that the health or economic costs of installing additional engineered safety features are not significantly affected by low power tests, because who

fission product inventory for such operation would be less than 0.10 of o>>o percent of the inventory generated by the plant during one year of opurat.i.>ll at full power.

IV.

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in this decision, the staff does not believe that "special circumstances" exist for the Diablo Canyon plant that would warrant t

consideration of Class 9 accidents.

To the extent that the petitioners raise matters that should be considered as conditions for issuance of the Diablo Canyon operating

licenses, those matters should be addressed in the operating license proceeding and not resolved under 10 CFR 2.206.

The petition is, therefore, denied.

A copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.

As prov.ided in 10 CFR 2. 206(c), this decision will constitute the final action of the Commission twenty-five (25) days after the date of

issuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.

Dated at Bethesda, tlaryland'his26 day of

Harch, 1981 Harold R.

Oenton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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