ML16340B199
| ML16340B199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1980 |
| From: | Bagaglio M, Sternberg D, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340B200 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-80-16, NUDOCS 8010270138 | |
| Download: ML16340B199 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1980016
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>~Q1ISSIOV
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEIKNT
REGION V
50-275/80-16
Report
No.
50/275
License
No.
Priority
CPPR-39
Category
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
California 94106
Diablo C:nyon Unit 1
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
August 1-31,
1980
Incpcccion
condo ccd;
Inspectors:Tolbert Young Jr.,
e
d'or
Hario
B ga
x.o
.,
es
en
i eac or
nspec or
D'e Signed
Da
e Signed
Aoproved
Summary:
D. N. Ster
Reactor
Op
erg,
xe7, Iteac
o
r5 ec
s
rations
and Nuclear Support Branch
Date Signed
qJ(~
o
Date Signed
Ins ection of August 1-31
1980
l,'Re ort No. 50-275/80-16
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspection of preoperational
testing, plant tour,
IE circulars,
operator training and tuitnessing of testing in progress.
This inspection involved 200 inspector-hours
onsite by tvo
NRC resident
inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance
or deviations r'ere identified.
IE:V Form 919(l)
S0102ndo
Jgg
0
(
(
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
-R. D. Ramsay,
Plant Manager
R.
D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
+R. Patterson,
Plant Superintendent
N. iforem, Resident
Startup Engineer
+J.
S.
Diamonon,
QC Supervisor
+J. H. Gisclon,
Po~'er Plant Engineer
+D. A. Backens,
Supervisor of Maintenance
- W. B. Kaefer, Technical Assistant
to Plant Superintendent
- J. A. Sexton,
Supervisor of Operations
+R. T.
T~ iddy,
QA Supervisor
The inspectors
also talked vith and intervieved
a number of other licensee
employees
including members of general construction,
the operations staff
and
QA personnel.
- Denotes those attending
the exit interviev.
2.
Administration
Effective April 1,
1980,
the plant staff +as reorganixed
as part of the
Company's
commitment to address
lessons
learned
from the Three Mile Island
accident.
Mr. Ramsay,
Plant Superintendent,
~"as promoted to Plant Manager,
a ne~ ly
created position that ha . responsibility for direct supervision of all
administrative functions at the plant level, including personnel
manage-
'ent,
personnel
training, revier. and audit, security
and quality control.
He retains overall responsibility for the safe operation of, the plant.
Reporting to him are the Plant Superintendent,
the Technical Assistant
to the Plant Manager,
the Quality Control Supervisor,
the Security Super-
visor and the Personnel
Representative.
Hr. Patterson,
Supervisor of Operations,
is promoted to the Plant Super-
intendent
and
he
~ ill be in charge of the routine day-to-day operational
maintenance
and technical activities in the plant.
Reporting to Hr.
Patterson're
the Supervisor of Maintenance,
the Supervisor of Operations,
the Pover
Plant Engi<<err the, Supervisor of 'Chemistry
and Radiation Protection
and
the. Office Supervisor.
,i
Hr. Kaefer, Senior Poi.er Production Engineer,
takes over the position vacated
by Hr. J.
D. Shiffer and is no~. the Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager.
Hr. Boots, Senior Chemical
and Radiation Protection Engineer, no~'eads
a
group ~.hich had branched
out from the Technical Department
to become
a
separate
department.
lie is
nov, Supervisor of Chemi. try and Radiation
Protection.
Messrs.
Kaefer and Boots vill become
members of the
PSRC
once the
ne~ Charter is approved.
"~
-2-
3.
IE Bulletin/Circular Pollo~~n
Circular No. 79-17
A licensee field inspection
revealed
that
CE type SB-12 switches
are used
only in the Unit 2 switchgear
and
no auxiliary switch spares
have
been
ordered
to date.
All future SB-12 auxiliary s'tch
spares
are to be reviewed by Quality
Contxol for date of manufacture prior to acceptance
during receipt
inspection.
As a matter of standard
procedure,
operators
and electrical maintenance
personnel
also periodically monitor breakers'ed
light for continuity check
of the trip coil and the auxiliary switch which is another assurance
that the .
contact wipe problem of the auxiliary switch will be detected
should it
occur at the plant.
Circular No.
79>>19
'I
The Diablo Canyon Residual
Heat Removal
Pumps are Ingersoll-Rand
type
8X20h~ (2 each unit).
Loosening of the
pump impeller locking device was
first noted
on
RHR Pump
1>>1 during preventive maintenance
check on 7/8/77.
The impeller locknut and capnut were found loose although toraued to procedure.
The locknut and capnut were found to be smaller in diameter
than the bore
of the impeller and this caused deflection of the washer that when the
pump
is heated
up, it c.ould relieve tension on the locknut causing it to come loose.
I
In consultation
~ ith Ingersoll-Rand,
a design
change
was initiated to correct
the problem.
A larger size capnut
~.as fabricated which assures
a metal to
metal fit between
the shaft
and impeller", the i asher
was modified riith a
positive locking device.
After performance
test
on the
pump proved that flow
characteristics
~.ere not altered, modifications on the other three
pumps
followed.
Circular No. 79-20
Quality Control reported that this type of relay is not used in the Diablo
Canyon Engineered
Safeguards
Syst: em or in any safety-related
applications.
The
AC auxiliary relays in us'e are either the flapper or the rotary-type
relays where,
becau.,e of their construction,
the problem observed is nonexistent.
Circular 79-22
Surveillance Test Procedure
V-3J1, "Exercising Pressurizer
Power Operated
Relief and Isolation Valves," recuires
exercising
and verifying stroke time
of. thc Diablo PORVs at least ruarterly to assure
that they will perform
as intended.
The concern of this Circular has
been addressed
by the plant staff.
Circular No. 79-23
The
DCPP Units
1 and
2 250VDC motor control centers
were supplied
by ITE<<Gould.
As the problem is only confined to
NEHA si
e
3 motor starters
and contactors,
the motor starters
that would apply are the ones for the generator air side
backup seal oil pumps
(one for each Unit). However,
the date
codes for these
starters
are i'ay before the period of concern,
therefore,
the circular does
not apply.
A check by Quality Control on warehouse
stock revealed
that although the
plant staff ordered
and received size
3 starter
replacement
parts during
the period of concern
(Purcha. e Order 595606 dated 7/6/78), there were no
complete units ordered but only additional pole add>>on kits.
Consultation
with the manufacturer
concludes
the add-on kits are not part of the problem
described
in the circular.
Circular No. 79-25
As several mechanical
shock arrestors
'(seismic limiters) manufactured
by
Pacific Scientific are installed in both units, Quality Control investigated
the possibi.lity that the Circular would apply to the plant.
Consultation
with Pacific Scientific, General Construction Hanger Group, andthe hanger
installation contractor
(Pullman Power Products)
confirmed that the
PSA sizes
in question are not installed in any of the plant piping systems
and that no
Bergen-Paterson
hardwares
have been used in either unit.
The Circular,
therefore,
does not apply to the plant.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
4.
Follow
on Previousl
Identified Items
Volume Control'Tank
(79-06-01,
closed)
Because of the problems
revealed during
of the unit 2's VCT.
Unit 1's
VCT was re-inspected
and the
were noted.
Both VCT.'s were repaired
and hydrostatic tests
The test results
were examined with the
same procedures
and
reported in Inspection Report
No. 50-323/79-06.
the inspection
same indications
were performed.
results
as
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
5.
PG-PL
L oodvard Governors
The Terry Corporation procedures
to assure
turbine restart within 30 minutes
without experiencing
an erroneous
overspeed trip have
been incorporated
into the surveillance test procedures.
The Supervisor of Operations
committed
to making the necessary
changes
in the operating procedure.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
~ ere identified.
6.
Containment Purging
The inspector
reviewed
P & ID's and held discussions
with plant technical
personnel
to ascertain
that there are no manua'1 over-vide features for
containment isolation valves at Diablo Canyon.
Supplement
No.
9 to the
SER,
dated
June
1980,
@tates in part that the applicants
analysis
has
been
reviewed
and a conclusion
made that the 48 inch containment
purge valves
will operate
when reeuired during
a loss-of-coolant accident.
'o
items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
-4-
7 ~
tPlant Tour
The inspectors
walked through various areas of the plant on a weekly basis
to observe activities in progres;
to inspect
the genexal state of clean-
liness,
housekeeping
and adherence
to fire protection rules; to check the
proper approval of "man on the line, caution
and clearance"
tags
on e~uip-
ment,
and to review ~-"ith operation personnel
the status of various
systems
in the plant.
The inspectors
noted that the status of the systems
and the housekeeping
appeared
consistent
.;ith ccnstruction activities.
The reactor cavity is
still being maintained
as a clean area
and extra personnel
are still
assigned
to cleanup
crews.
Cleanliness
and housekeeping
of the plant is
still improving.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
8.
0 orator Trainin>>
The operations division is continuing their intensive retraining program
for the operators
and technical advisors to include two weeks at the
Mestinghouse
simulator.
The inspector's
have monitored
some of these
classes
and will monitor more classes
throughout the training program.
No items of'oncompliance
or deviati'ons
were identified.
0 eratin>>,
Administrative
and Surveillance Test Procedures
An inspector reviet ed several
new and revised
licensee operating,
adminis-
trative,
and surveillance test procedures.
Procedures
reviewed included:
NPAP A101 Sup
1
NPAP C-3
NPAP C'-9 Sup
1
NPAP C-703
EP OP-ll
STP 1-1584
STP I-20
STP I-64
E:excessive
Load Increase
System Underfre<uency
Accidental Depressuri,".ation of Hain Steam
System
Hydrogen E::plosion Inside Containment
Emergency
Shutdown
Natural Circulation of Reactor Coolant
Loss of Containment Integrity
Relieving the Match
Conduct of Plant
and Enuipment Tests
Sealed Valves
Meldex'dentification Symbol
Irradiated Fuel Damage
Emergency )3oration
Loss of Component Cooling Mater
Nuclear Instrumentation Halfunctions
Charging of Letdown Line Failure
Anticipated Transient Mithout Trip
Respon.
e Time Testing of Containment
Pressure
Transmitters
Calibration of Charging
Plo~; Channel,917
Calibration of Containment Recirculation
Sump Level
Channels
940 6 941
0
-5-
STP P-8B
STP N-84A
EP N"6
STP I<<'30A
STP I-30B
STP I-32A ,
STP I"32B
STP I-61
STP I-63
STP I-12B11
Op Order 0-1
OP-L-4
STP I-12B8
OP-A-4A-V
Op Order 0-2
Op Order 0-3
Routine Surveillance Test of CCfl Pumps
Hotor Operated
Valve Thermal. Overload Bypass Functional Testing
Nonradiological Fire
Functional Test of Accumulator Level Channels
950-957
Calibration of Accumulator Level Channels
950-957
Functional Test of Accumulator Pressure
Channels
960>>967
Calibration of Accumulator Pressure
Channels
960-967
Calibration of Containment Structure
Sump Flow Channels
40 6 41
Calibration of Reactor Cavity Sump Flow Channel
42
Response
Time Testing of Steam Generator
Pressure
Operation of Limitor~ue Valve Actuators
Operation at Power
Response
Time Testing of Steam Generator
Flow Transmitters
Pressurizer
Heaters - Emergency Operations
Operation of Hagan Controllers
Notifying the Shift RHi of Technical Specification Re<'uirements
Based
upon review, the following comments
are pertinent:
A.
Some Surveillance Test Procedures
(STP)
do not have
a provision to ensure
the restoratdon of environmental aualifications for safety related transmitters
after completion of periodic testing.
The licensee
has
committed to incorporate
such
a provision in existing STP's for safety related transmitters
or
generate
an independent
procedure
that would delineate
steps
to be taken
to restore transmitter environmental c~ualifications.
Pending revision of
existing procedures or generation of an independent
procedure this comment
will remain an open item for followup (80-16-01).
B.
Four of the above procedures;
OP L<<4,
and
EP H-6;
appear
to conflict with reouirements
in the licensee's
proposed Technical
Specifications.
Thc licensee
has
been provided with x"ritten comments
addressing
the potential areas of conflict.
Pending resolution of the
comments
by the
licensee,
this concern
~ ill remain an open item for follo~~p (80-16-02) .
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspectors
met
x ith a senior licensee
representative
on a weekly
basis
and wi,th the representatives
denoted
in .Paragraph
1 on August 29,
1980.
The scope
and findings of the inspection were
summari: ed by the
inspectors.