ML16161A946
| ML16161A946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1988 |
| From: | Bryant J, Peebles T, Skinner P, Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A945 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-51, 50-270-87-51, 50-287-87-51, NUDOCS 8802030341 | |
| Download: ML16161A946 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1987051
Text
3 REGO
UNITED STATES
co
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-269/87-51, 50-270/87-51, and 50-287/87-51
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC
28242
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270,
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and
and 50-287
Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3
Inspection Conducted:
December 22, 1987 - January 15, 1988
J. C Bry~n
Senio'Resident Inspector
P.-i
Skinn
Sen~id Resident Inspector
'aVSge
)
L. 0. wert, Residen
Inspector
a-e S g d
Approved by:
_
_
_',
____
T.A. Peebles, Section Chief
Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced inspection involved resident inspection
on-site in the areas of operations,
surveillance,
maintenance,
physical
security, review of Safety System Functional Inspection items,
engineered
safeguards features lineups,
B&W Owners Group Plant Reassessment Program,
review of the public document room, and 10 CFR Part 21 reviews.
Results: Of the nine areas inspected, one violation was identified (Failure to
follow procedure for maintaining freeze seal, paragraph 6.b).
8802030341 880129
ADOCK 05000269
a
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
M. Tuckman, Station Manager
J. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
- W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
T. Glenn, Instrument and Electrical Support Engineer
C. Harlin, Compliance Engineer
- R. Lynn, Materials Manager, CMD
- J. McIntosh, Administrative Services Superintendent
- F. Owens, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- R. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
- C. Thompkins, Maintenance Manager, CMD
- L. Wilkie, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians,
operators,
mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.
NRC Resident Inspectors:
J. C. Bryant
- P. H. Skinner
L. D. Wert
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 15,
1988,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the
inspection findings listed below.
Dissenting comments were not received
from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this
report.
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
269/87-51-01
Open
(Violation)
Failure
to
follow
procedures associated with freeze seal
on LP piping to BWST
270, 287/87-51-02
Open
(Inspector Followup Item Completion of
NSM
22662
and 32662 for cavitating
venturis on emergency feedwater pumps
2
Item Number
Status
Description/Reference Paragraph
269, 270, 287/87-51-03
Closed
(Licensee Identified Violation) Failure
to provide timely reports to NRC as
required by TS 4.17.6.a and 4.17.6.b
269, 270, 287/86-16-15
Closed
- (Unresolved)
Associated
with
inspection.
Design analysis on
steam supply relief valves
269, 270, 287/86-16-17
Closed
(Unresolved)
Associated
with
inspection. Failure to conduct design
analysis
269, 270, 287/86-16-18
Closed
(Unresolved)
Associated
with
inspection. Failure to conduct design
analysis (5 examples)
P 2186-03
Closed
10 CFR Part 21 on diaphragm valves by
Dresser Industries
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This area was not inspected.
4.
Plant Operations (71707)
a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, technical
specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
shift turnover records, and equipment removal and restoration records
were
reviewed routinely.
Discussions were conducted with plant
operations,
maintenance,
chemistry,
health physics,
Instrument &
Electrical (I&E), and performance personnel.
Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily
basis. Inspections were conducted on day and on night shifts, during
week days and on weekends.
Some inspections were made during shift
change in order to evaluate shift turnover performance.
Actions
observed were conducted as required by the licensees administrative
procedures.
The complement of licensed personnel
on
each shift
inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS.
Operators were
responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant
conditions.
- Unresolved
items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
3
Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine
basis. The areas toured included the following:
Turbine Building
Auxiliary Building
Units 1, 2, and 3 Electrical Equipment Rooms
Units 1, 2, and 3 Cable Spreading Rooms
Station Yard Zone within the Protected Area
Standby Shutdown Facility
Units 1, 2, and 3 Penetration Rooms
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
Unit 1 operated at 100% power during this period.
Unit 2 began operation at 87% and reduced power to 80% due to an A2
feedwater heater leak on December 24.
The leak was isolated and
power gradually returned to 85% on December 31.
Unit 3 began operation at 100% and reduced power on January 4, 1988,
to 80% due to a SG tube leak.
The leak stabilized at approximately
.016 gpm and power was increased to 100% on January 11.
b.
During a review of outstanding items by licensing engineering
personnel at the general office, a condition was identified regarding
reports
required
by Technical
Specification (TS) 4.17.6.a and
4.17.6.b. This TS requires that the number of tubes plugged or
repaired in each steam generator (SG)
be
reported to the
NRC,
Region II,
within 30 days following completion of the plugging or
repair procedure and a report within 3 months providing the results
of SG tube inservice inspection. The licensee identified that 10 of
the last 17 reports were submitted late and that the current report
per TS 4.17.6.a is overdue for the most recent Unit 1 outage.
This
finding is documented in the licensee's Problem Investigation Report
(PIR) Serial No. 4-088-0009. Although this problem is a violation of
TS,
it will not be cited since it meets the conditions as stated in
10 CFR 2, Appendix C, in that:
(1) The problem was identified by the licensee
(2) The problem fits into a Severity Level V
(3) It was reported as required
(4) The problem is being corrected and measures being taken to
prevent recurrence
(5) It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have
been
prevented by
corrective action taken
on a previous
violation.
4
For documentation purposes this item is identified as Licensee
Identified Violation (LIV) 269,
270,
287/87-51-03:
Failure to
provide timely reports to NRC as required by TS 4.17.6.a and b.
5. Surveillance Testing (61726)
Surveillance tests were reviewed by the inspectors to verify procedural
and performance adequacy. The completed tests reviewed were examined for
necessary test prerequisites, instructions, acceptance criteria, technical
content, authorization to begin
work,
data collection, independent
verification where required, handling of deficiencies noted, and review of
completed work. The tests witnessed, in whole or in part, were inspected
to determine that approved procedures were available, test equipment was
calibrated, prerequisites were met,
tests were conducted according to
procedure, test results were acceptable and
systems restoration was
completed.
Surveillances witnessed in whole or in part:
PT/O/A/600/21
Post Maintenance Operation of SSF Diesel Generator
PT/0/A/600/23
Inventory Checks of SSF D/G Fuel Tank
PT/O/A/160/04 Containment Hydrogen Control System Piping Flow Test
PT/1/A/115/04 Emergency Feedwater System Valve Verification
IP/1/A/503/3B Reactor Protection System Channel B Online Testing
(Unit 1)
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Maintenance Activities (62703)
a. Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the
reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified
personnel and that approved procedures in use adequately described
work that was not within the skill of the trade.
Activities,
procedures
and work requests
were
examined
to verify proper
authorization to begin work, provisions for fire, cleanliness, and
exposure control,
proper return of equipment to service, and that
limiting conditions for operation were met.
Maintenance witnessed in whole or in part:
WR 10690C
Low Pressure Nitrogen Heater Repair
WR 92035C PR-9 Repairs
b.
On October 7,
1987,
a spill of approximately 30,000 gallons of
slightly radioactively contaminated water occurred when a freeze plug
failed while making a repair on a three inch pipe in the fluid path
to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST).
A portion of this spill
was not adequately contained and resulted in an uncontrolled release
to the chemical treatment
pond and subsequently off-site.
The
5
licensee has investigated this event
and the details of this
investigation are given in the licensee's investigation report number
OS-87-08-1.
The inspector has also reviewed in detail
the
circumstances attributing to this event and considers that a failure
to follow procedures compounded by a failure to provide an adequate
procedure to be the root cause of this event. The procedure used for
this evaluation was TM/1/A/1800/06, Freeze Plugging -
Stainless Steel
Pipe -
Using Liquid Nitrogen -
Repair of Line Between 1LP-41 and
1LP-42 dated September 30, 1987. Areas where the procedure were not
followed are step 11.5.1 which required the nitrogen to be poured
slowly into a funnel to establish the ice plug and step 11.5.2 which
required adding nitrogen occasionally to keep the jacket flooded.
The method used was a continuous flow of nitrogen into the freeze
jacket which was not described in the procedure as an acceptable way
of establishing and maintaining the ice plug. In addition, step 11.6
which described the method to be used to thaw the ice plug was not
used which deviated from a special safety consideration given in the
procedure in step 4.3.5.B which stated that thawing should be done as
rapidly as possible. Inadequacies in the procedure were generalities
such as step 6.7 which stated "Verify adequate source of liquid
nitrogen is available at job site" instead of identifying the
quantity of liquid nitrogen to be maintained, and step 4.3.8 which
stated "Normal operating pressure AND temperature of system should be
reduced as much as possible" instead of specifying the limits to be
met for this requirement.
Another inadequacy was the chart provided
in Enclosure 13.2 which was for temperatures (water, pipe and work
area) below 70 degrees F and stated that a "longer time" will be
required when any of the temperatures are above 70 degrees F but
provided no additional
guidance.
Although this spill was
not
significant due to the low levels of contamination associated with
the BWST contents, the lack of management controls that allowed this
to occur is significant.
This item is identified as a violation
(269/87-51-01); Failure to Follow Procedures Associated With Freeze
Sealing Safety-Related Piping.
No additional violations or deviations were identified.
7. Resident Inspector Safeguards Inspection (71881)
In the course of the monthly activities, the Resident Inspectors included
review of portions of the licensee's physical security activities.
The
performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the
conduct of daily activities which included; protected and vital areas
access controls, searching of personnel,
packages and vehicles,
badge
issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory
posts. In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting and
protected and vital areas barrier integrity, and verified interfaces
between the security organization and operations or maintenance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6
8.
Inspection of Open Items (92701)
The following open item is being closed based on review of licensee
reports, inspection, record review, and discussions with
licensee
personnel, as appropriate:
(Closed) P2186-03: 3050 Diaphragm Valves by Dresser Industrial Valve
and Instrument Division. The licensee indicated that two of the type
valves identified in this Part 21 concern were shipped to the Oconee
Nuclear Station in 1976. There is no record of these valves being
installed in any safety related system.
The actual disposition of
these two valves was not identified, however,
the licensee stated
that the valves were not used in safety-related applications and are
no longer on-site. There is speculation that the valves may have
been moved to a non-nuclear facility.
Based on this information,
this item is closed.
9. Safety System Functional Inspection Report (92701)
Items left open
on the referenced inspection report (50-269,
270,
287/86-16) were reviewed to determine current status, as follows:
a.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-269,
270,
287/86-16-17);
Examples of
Failures to Perform Design Analysis Discussed in Paragraph 3.4.7.
Example
1 identified a potential for runout of the Emergency
Feedwater Pumps (EFW) if flow control valves FDW 315 or 316 remained
open. The licensee addressed this issue and corrective action for
this condition in LER 269/86-10 and in a supplemental letter for this
LER dated May 28, 1987. The proposed corrective action for this item
is to install a cavitating venturi in each EFW line downstream of the
control valves. This action is scheduled to be completed during the
end-of-cycle refueling outages 11,
10 and 10 for Units 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Since this item is being tracked by the closure of
action associated with LER 86-10,
example 1 corrective actions are
considered complete for tracking purposes.
Example 2 was associated with modification NSM ON-1012 in which a
total discharge head (TDH)
was not performed to confirm that the
Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
auxiliary service water (ASW)
pump
could deliver required flow.
A TDH calculation was completed and
approv~d by DPC on December 8, 1986 (Calculation
number OSC-2072)
which confirmed that the SSF ASW pump would deliver required flow to
steam generators as required.
Example 3 identified that orifice sizing calculations were either not
done or not documented during a modification associated with the
high-pressure injection system.
A QA condition 1 calculation
(OSC-2341
dated December 22,1986) has been completed and shows that
the existing orifice plates were properly sized.
.7
In example 4 associated with NSM-1275,
was a case where the design
analysis to confirm that the motor driven EFW pumps from other units
could supply both SG's at full secondary pressure was performed by a
design engineer but was not controlled by a process suitable for
review and verification without recourse to the individual who
performed the analysis. This analysis was subsequently verified and
documented by calculation OSC-2516 dated July 28, 1987.
Example 5 was associated with modification NSM ON-2245 in which an
existing steam relief valve was to be replaced with a new valve of
the same size. Engineering personnel concluded that the same design
parameters
as the existing valve would
be used.
As a result,
engineering did not
identify that the
installed relief
had
insufficient capacity to prevent overpressurization of the piping
upstream of the relief valve.
In response dated October 1, 1986,
item 2.1.2 (1), DPC stated no potential impact on system function or
personnel safety due to the overpressurization condition. Subsequent
changes have been made to install steam traps on these steam lines
and also raise the design pressure rating of the piping upstream of
MS-92. These modifications are complete on Unit 1 and scheduled for
the next refueling outages on Units 2 and 3.
The examples cited above have each been addressed by the licensee.
The licensee's design control activities have been updated, reviewed
and re-indexed as described in DPC correspondence dated October 1,
1986, item 2.3.2 (1).
This system is located in the corporate design
offices in Charlotte. Based on the review of the corrective actions
of the specific examples cited above, this item is closed.
b. (Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-269,
270,
287/86-16-18);
Apparent
Failure to Conduct Adequate Design Analyses in Accordance With ANSI
N45.2.11.
Several
examples
were
found where
analyses
for
safety-related equipment were not performed in a controlled manner.
Correction of the examples given is discussed below:
Example 1 discussed orifice sizing associated with flow transmitters
FT-153 and FT-154. Analyses performed were not checked or verified,
the analyses did not have file identifiers and were not identified as
QA Condition 1. These calculations have been performed as documented
in DPC
calculation OSC-2340 dated December 22,
1986.
This
calculation shows that the orifice plates were properly sized.
Example 2 was associated with EFW pump flowrate calculation errors.
The licensee performed additional analyses at the time the inspection
was made as discussed in the details of the inspection report section
3.4.8 (2).
8
Example 3 was associated with the analysis of the motor starting
capability of the standby power supply fed through the underground
feeder from Keowee hydroelectric plant.
This dynamic analysis was
redone in a QA Condition 1 calculation format.
This calculation
shows that the voltage conditions at the
motor terminals is
sufficient to start and run the safety-related motors.
The licensee has corrected the specific examples identified in this
item. In addition, in DPC correspondence dated October 1, 1986,
in
item 2.3.2 (4),
the licensee recognized a weakness in the auditing
process by third party reviews and as a result formed a task force to
review their programs. The task force recommended revisions to the
documentation of the design process and integrated review of the
total design.
Implementation of these program
changes has been
completed as of March 1, 1987.
Based on this review, this item is
closed.
c.
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item (50-269,
270,
287/86-16-15);
Apparent
Failure to Conduct Adequate Design Analyses for EFW
Steam Supply
Relief Valve. This item is concerned with an overpressurization of
the steam supply line to the EFW pump turbine if
the steam supply
valve should fail open and the inadequate capacity of the steam
relief (MS-92). The steam line piping design pressure was 385 psig.
As addressed in the licensee's response dated October 1, 1986, item
2.1.2 (1),
DPC stated that there was no potential impact on system
function or personnel safety due to pressure exceeding the original
design rating. In addition, Duke has increased the pressure rating
of the piping and also issued modifications 12662,
22662 and 32662
which will install steam traps rated for higher pressures on the
steam lines. This modification has been completed on Unit 1 and is
scheduled for the next refueling outage on Units 2 and 3.
The
completion of NSM 22662 and 32662 on Units 2 and 3 respectively is
identified as
an inspection followup item 50-270,
287/87-51-02;
Completion of NSM 22662 and 32662.
10.
Public Document Room Review
The inspectors visited the Public Document Room, (PDR) for Oconee Nuclear
Station which is located in the Oconee County Library in Walhalla, South
Carolina. The Public Document Room librarian explained the facilities and
resources available and discussed with the inspectors how the document
room is utilized.
The
inspectors reviewed
the types of material
maintained in the facility.
Using the POR indexing system,
several
samples of information were located and reviewed. The facility appears to
be maintained in a very organized and efficient manner in accordance with
PDR directives.
The PDR custodian appeared very knowledgeable of her
duties and highly capable of maintaining the PDR.
9
Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group Plant Reassessment Program
In January 1986, NRR requested the Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group (BWOG)
to assume a leadership role in accomplishing key aspects of the overall
effort required for the reassessment of all
B&W plants.
The
BWOG
committed to take the lead in a planned effort to define concerns relative
to reducing the frequency of reactor trips and the complexity of post-trip
response in B&W plants.
The BWOG issued BAW-1919,
"Trip Reduction and
Transient Response Improvement Program" including 5 revisions as of July
1987. The NRC has reviewed BAW-1919 and its revisions and has issued a
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-1231). Some of the areas contained
in BAW-1919 are still in the process of being reviewed and will be
addressed in a supplement(s) to NUREG-1231.
Table 12.1 of the NUREG list
the 207 recommendations that were developed by the BWOG for implementation
considerations at each of the
B&W utilities.
These
recommendations
comprise the BWOG Safety and Performance Improvement Program (SPIP) which
has goals by the end of 1990, to reduce the average trip frequency per
plant to less than two per year and also that the number of complex
transients will be reduced to 0.1 per plant per year based on a moving
3-year average.
Attachment 1 to this report shows the completion to date
of the SPIP recommendations at Oconee.
ATTACHMENT 1
SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
TR-007-ICS
Remove BTU limits from ICS
Complete
TR-011-ICS
Determine if the grid frequency
Complete
error circuit has been detuned
TR-012-ICS
Determine if operators have
Complete
necessary information from
procedures, indicators, etc.
to detect loss of NNI power
TR-013-ICS
Prevent loss of power to the ICS
- Not
Applicable
TR-014-MFW
Install Monitoring Systems on
Rejected
MFW pumps to document causes
of pump trips
TR-018-MFW
Provide training on MFW system
Complete
components
TR-019-MFW
Ensure there are sufficient
Rejected
annunciator and trip signals
for MFW supply system
TR-020-MFW
Establish procedures for
Complete
switching MFW pump oil supply
TR-022-EFW
- Not
level setpoints
Applicable
TR-023-MSS
Determine need to replace MSSV
Complete
release nut cotter pins
TR-024-MSS
Determine causes to correct
Complete
anomalous post-trip performance
of MSSVs
TR-025-MTS
Review EHC system for loss of
Complete
input power
2
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
(cont'd)
TR-026-OPS
Operability of SG Shell
Complete
thermocouples
TR-027-ADM
Calculation techniques for power
Complete
range imbalance
TR-028-ADM
Training on power/imbalance control
Complete
TR-029-ADM
Include human error information
Complete
in TAP reports
TR-034-ICS
Training on loss of ICS power
Complete
TR-035-ICS
Familiarize operators with Rancho
Complete
Seco event
TR-036-ICS
Evaluate turbine bypass valve
- Not
position on loss of ICS
Applicable
TR-037-ICS
Evaluate MFW pump speed control
- Not
on loss of ICS power
Applicable
TR-039-ICS
Wire the power supply monitor in
- Not
the ICS/NNI directly to the output
Applicable
bus after the auctioneering diodes
TR-041-MOV
Confirm by field inspection data
Complete
required to size operators and
valves for motor-operated valves
TR-042-MOV
Obtain analytic methods used by
Complete
valve and operator vendors
TR-050-MSS
Include in plant operating
Complete
procedures provisions for opening
steam trap bypass valves during
startup, and draining turbine
bypass header valves before
startup or cooldown
TR-051-OPS
Conduct postmaintenance and
Complete
surveillance PORV testing
TR-052-SFI
Filter steam generator level
- Not
signals in steam feedwater
Applicable
rupture control system
3
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
(cont'd)
TR-053-SFI
Correct overheating problems
- Not
that can lead to electric power
Applicable
supply malfunctions
TR-054-SFI
Redesign MSIV pneumatic hardware
- Not
to ensure this equipment is
Applicable
exercised during surveillance
testing
TR-056-ADM
Move chain link fences to
Complete
provide better access to critical
components
TR-057-ADM
Consider ways to improve access
Complete
to critical components
TR-058-OPS
Use highest emergency classifi-
Complete
cation level when making initial
notification to NRC
TR-059-OPS
Training for personnel who make
Complete
emergency notifications
TR-061-OPS
For specific training identify
Complete
high priority operator tasks
during emergencies
TR-062-OPS
Maintain a high SPOS availability
Complete
by corrective and preventive
mai ntenance
TR-063-OPS
Ensure that PiT graphs are
Complete
provided in the control room
TR-064-OPS
Training for resetting turbine
Complete
driven EFW pumps
TR-065-OPS
Improve communications between
- Not
control room and certain plant
Applicable
areas at Rancho Seco
TR-069-MFW
Eliminate automatic control of
Complete
the MFW block valve except during
4
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
(cont'd)
TR-070-MFW
Provide capability to override a
Complete
"close" signal to the MFW block
valve
TR-074-MFW
Schedule I&C calibration and
Complete
inspection work to minimize the
number of times the MFW pump and
turbine instrumentation and
controls are disturbed
TR-077-MFW
Review and Upgrade preventive
- Not
maintenance on auxiliary boilers
Applicable
TR-079-MFW
Put MFW regulating valves, main
Complete
block valves and startup control
valves on a refueling frequency
for an operational check
TR-080-MFW
Instrumentation to determine
Rejected
performance of MFWPT shaft
driven oil pump
TR-086-MFW
Improper draining of first-stage
- Not
FW heaters
Applicable
TR-088-MFW
Eliminate automatic plant runback
- Not
on low MFW pump discharge pressure
Applicable
or establish setpoint to achieve
a successful runback
TR-093-MFW
Allow full power operation using
Rejected
only two hotwell pumps (for Oconee
Units only)
TR-096-MSS
Evaluate design of turbine
Complete
bypass and atmospheric dump
(Portions
systems
rejected)
TR-097-EFW
Evaluate design of EFW flow
Complete
control Valves
TR-098-MFW
Overfill protection for MRW system
Complete
TR-099-OPS
Include guidance on excessive MFW,
Complete
throttling AFW, and throttling
HPI in plant procedures
5
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
(cont'd)
TR-100-MTS
Review MSR drain tank level control
Complete
and drain line configuration
TR-101-MTS
Operator training on main
Complete
generation excitation, voltage
control and operation
TR-111-RPS
Review safety system surveillance
Complete
procedures for checking which
channel is available for testing
before initiation of test
TR-114-PES
Evaluate hardware to ensure diesel
- Not
generator cannot be synchronized
Applicable
to grid out of phase
TR-115-PES
Test diesel generators to assure
- Not
they will carry loads under
Applicable
expected sequential load conditions
TR-123-IAS
For instrument air systems, protect
- Not
against failures possible with
Applicable
dessicant-type driers
TR-126-IAS
Compare instrument air system
Complete
configuration with functional
target criteria
TR-128-IAS
Review training and loss of air
Complete
response procedures for
instrument air system
TR-139-IAS
Install on/off status and remote
Rejected
start of instrument air
compressors in the control room
(for Duke and FPC only)
TR-161-EFW
Evaluate the margin between the
- Not
Applicable
points to prevent unneeded EFW
actuations
TR-162-EFW
Modify EFW flow control to
- Not
provide smoother flow control
Applicable
rather than on-off control
6
Recommendation
Number
Subject
Remarks
(cont'd)
TR-163-EFW
Review EFW surveillance and test
Complete
procedures to ensure that
components used in the EOPs are
included in the test program
TR-169-MTS
Evaluate possibility for
- Not
defeating the high vibration
Applicable
trip during main turbine valve
testing (for GE turbines only)
- per DPC analysis